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April 22, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Republican Congressional Leadership
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1553040
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April 22, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Republican Congressional Leadership
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Cambodia
Vietnam (Republic)
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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1975-04-22
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1975
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1975-04-22
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1975
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Ed
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Gerald Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Republican Congressional Leadership
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
April 22, 1975 - Tuesday
8:00 a.m.
PLACE:
Roosevelt Room
The White House
The President: I have three subjects I would like to discuss this morning:
Vietnam, energy and the budget.
Kissinger: Jim [Schlesinger] will update the military situation, but it is
clearly hopeless. The North Vietnamese have the capability to force a
military solution. Our objective is to achieve the most controlled situation
possible for evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese. This requires the
cooperation of many -- the Congress has to understand the shoals between
which we are trying to navigate. We have had a steady reduction in the
American presence. We have tried not to leave so many that we couldn't
get them out, and we have avoided pulling them out so fast that we create
a panic. We will be down to one lift by tonight: one batch will leave from
Ton Son Nhut by C-130 and one from Saigon by helicopter. We are
evacuating the high-risk Vietnamese by trickles.
The diplomatic situation is delicate and we can't say too much. Hanoi
has continued to say that Thieu is the only obstacle. I never believed it.
They will probably start trying to unravel the government, although they
may want to project an air of responsibility by negotiating for Saigon.
We are in touch with several countries. Unless there are controlled
conditions, it won't be possible to get out large numbers of Vietnamese.
The evacuation from Saigon will be much trickier than the one from Phnom
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
FORD LIBRARY & BRAR RALO
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A, KISSINGER
YTOP SECRET - XGDS (3)
By
NARA, Date 1/20/00
13
- 2 -
Penh. We are trying not to trigger a panic, but also not to jeopardize
Americans. We could have the refugees from Vung Tau but our prupose
is not to be indiscriminate but to rescue those who would suffer the most
if we left them. The trouble in the ports would be to sort out the high-
risk people from the mass of refugees. Any substantial evacuation of
South Vietnamese would therefore depend on negotiations.
There is no question North Vietnam could take over Saigon and unravel
the government by keeping to make demands for further change. The
only glue holding the country together is the military. They have the only
viable administrative structure. Huong will probably be replaced soon
and his replacement soon after.
Some of the terms of the debate on aid are no longer relevant. The thought
that aid is an open commitment is no longer relevant, as is the argument
that it would prolong the fighting. What it does now is give North Vietnam
some incentive to say in a negotiation they have stopped our aid, and to
give the government some confidence to keep things under control. We
think it is important to vote some part of the aid package to give us some
control over these tragic events.
The President's objective from the outset was to achieve a controlled
situation, and these events, while happening rapidly, were somewhat
predictable. It is important we get out with the maximum dignity and unity.
Rhodes: What sort of government will it be? Will the Viet Cong be
allowed to run it?
Kissinger: It is not clear yet. Sometime over the next two-three years
North Vietnam will absorb it, but whether they will go through an interim
PRG Government or move quickly to absorb it is not clear. The occupied
areas are being administered by cadres from the North because there
are no PRG cadre. My guess is they will move rapidly. The ones most
unhappy over these developments will be the Chinese.
Scott: Right.
Kissinger: I can't imagine the Chinese wanting a large military power on its
border, so the Chinese could be excpected to want to support some sort of
PRG government.
R.
FORD
GERALD
GE
LIBRARY
- 3 -
Rhodes: How about Cambodia?
Kissinger: The last months of the war were being fought against Sihanouk,
not the government. Sihanouk has known for a long time that we would
support his return. The obstacle to his return was the Khmer Rouge, not
us. The Khmer Rouge wanted to prevent Sihanouk from coming back as
anything but a tool. That is why they refused even a ceasefire and that is
why they are exterminating every vestige of leadership. It may be even
worse than what will happen in Vietnam. Cambodia will be a total Commun-
ist-controlled state. The question is who will be in control -- Hanoi or
Peking? Peking has long supported Sihanouk as a counterweight. They
are aided by the hatred between the Cambodians and the Vietnamese.
Over the years it is obvious that there will be a conflict between the large
Communist countries and the only hope for Laos and Cambodia will be to
balance between them. North Vietnam will take over as much control of
Laos as they wish; that is probably true of Cambodia also. The Hanoi
leaders have done nothing but fight all their lives.
Cederberg: We have a tactical problem over the next few days. Yesterday
I could see more military than economic aid would be a problem, so I
recommended equal amounts. But I still think we will have trouble on the
Floor, and I see no way to get it to the Floor before next week.
Case: We have a bill on the floor now. One hundred million dollars
could be used for anything at all. It would be a while to see what is needed.
We might get it raised to $200 million.
The President: I still believe we need some humanitarian aid and some
military aid.
Schlesinger: The situation is crumbling. The East is being pulled back.
Bien Hoa will be under attack within two-three days. The Hanoi propa-
ganda line has always been that the PRG is doing the battle, so that they
may not want to assault Saigon. We have five carrier groups in the area.
We can lift 1, 700 and have about 2, 000 now. Any evacuation from Saigon
will be risky and could be interrupted or terminated by brute force. It
will be a hairy exercise.
The President: The Ambassador is under orders to get down by the end of
the day. We are getting the Americans and dependents down to the barest
minimum.
LERRAT GERALD FORD
- 4 -
It is my judgment we should try to get something through the Congress to
help stabilize the military situation.
Tower: I have a bill in my pocket to add $200 million in military aid.
Griffin: I would vote for it but I think it would be defeated. About half
the Rapublicans would vote against it. I think the Democrats are on the
hook now. If we were to add military assistance and get it defeated one
would get the Democrats off the hook because a lot of Republicans would
vote against it.
[There was much discussion -- all negative. The President read a number
of reports about foreign leaders' doubts about American constancy. He
asked them not to use the quotes.]
Cederberg: What has happened to bipartisanship? The Democrats give
us nothing. It is not like when you were minority leader.
The President: There is no leadership there at all.
Griffin: Mr. President: You have to keep pushing for aid, but you should
know what the realities are on the hill.
[Secretary Lynn and Mr. Zarb each gave a short report on the economy
and energy situations respectively.]
Fiver #
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GERA
GE
LIBRARY
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GE LERART GERALD FL OHIO
1
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(much discussion - all mg ath)
P
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(Reads grote about amiun christmas) use quote)
Celumn
what has happened to partionship, The given
is withing. not like you of incienty hader
P
There is we leadership then at all.
Giffin
mr. you have 5 hey pushing for and, but yes
shall know what C subties one are one hill.
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LIBRARY GERAL FORM