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April 29, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Jordanian King Hussein
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April 29, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Jordanian King Hussein
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Scarriti
Roberts
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS
JORDAN
His Majesty, King Hussein I
Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifai
UNITED STATES
President Gerald R. Ford
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
Deputy Assistant to the President,
Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft
Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering (Notetaker)
TIME, PLACE - 10:30 - 11:30 A.M., April 29, 1975
The President's Office, the White House
SUBJECT: The Middle East, U.S.-Jordanian Bilateral Relations
After an exchange of greetings, the President opened
the conversation.
PRESIDENT FORD: I want to welcome you here again, Your
Majesty. I look forward to using this
meeting in order to get better acquainted.
I remember that you were the first Head of State I saw
as President. We had an opportunity during our last meeting
to expand the original contact which I had with you as
Vice President. On the Middle East I know that you share with
me my disappointment on what has happened. Leaving aside
the events of last night (Vietnam evacuation), I want you
to know that the Middle East still deeply concerns us. We
are conducting an in-depth reassessment of our policy in
the area. It will be the broadest possible look at the
alternatives. This is being conducted from my own office
and also from the State Department. But it is being carried
out on a government-wide basis. I cannot tell you any
precise conclusion because we have not gotten that far
FUND
along yet. But in the absence of such conclusions, we
LIBRARY
believe it would be very helpful to have your own views,
and I would be very grateful if you would give them to us.
GERALD
You have been in contact with President Asad, I know,
and have also recently met with the Saudi Arabians. We
look forward with interest to what you have to say, and I
urge you to give us your candid and frank assessments.
SECRET/NODIS
DECLASSIPIED
GDS
B.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines state
TOP SECRET 1 XGDS (3)
By
, NARA, Date 5/14/04
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECRET/NODIS
-2-
KING HUSSEIN: I am very proud and happy to be here again,
Mr. President. We have had a long history
of close relations. I am very proud of the
relationship we have been able to develop with the United
States over the years. That relationship requires that I
speak very frankly with you.
We are very concerned about events in the area.
Conditions are still deteriorating after the recent
developments surrounding the Secretary's trip. From the
Arab point of view it is a question of territory or
peace. The combination for the Israelis of territory
and peace is an impossibility.
Going back in time, after the October War, we saw
some very encouraging work and forward movement in the
area. Arab leadership before that time had been
dominated by extremists. Since that time they have
been able to revert to moderation. They have committed
themselves to work for the establishment of a just and
durable peace. But we were not very happy regarding the
deterioration which has taken place. The Arab leaders
and people are losing hope, and I find the situation very,
very alarming. We may now be facing our last chance to
make progress for the area and the world. There are many
of us moderate leaders in the Arab world who are not likely
to last very long if we fail this time in making progress.
Also if we fail it means that war becomes inevitable. We
believe we have done everything possible as far as Jordan
is concerned to meet Israel halfway on the path of peace.
For Jordan, unfortunately, this effort has been marked
by a string of lost opportunities. More recently Egypt has
had to face the same sad result.
President Sadat, we believe, faces great difficulties
with his people and with his army, and these are com-
pounded by economic problems. Because of the heavy mili-
tary burden he carries, there is a lack of ability to
divert Egypt's energies to reconstruction and rebuilding
from the war and to meet the needs of the people.
We are all very admiring of the results of the
work which Dr. Kissinger has accomplished, and all of the
Arab leaders share in admiration and respect for him.
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
-3-
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Don't say that to the Congress.
PRESIDENT FORD: I know the responsible members of the
Congress agree with me and support the
Secretary. However, the problem in
these questions is with the Congress and not with the
Secretary.
KING HUSSEIN: The last time we met in Amman we pleaded with
the Secretary to do all he possibly could
to bring about another step.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. President, I asked King Hussein at
that time how much effort we should
put forward in order to achieve another
step. He urged that we continue to do out utmost. He
made it clear that there would be drastic results for the
moderate Arabs all over the Middle East if we were not
to succeed.
PRESIDENT FORD: We all recognize the Secretary made a
maximum effort last time. You know I
have publicly expressed my disappoint-
ment about the Israeli inflexibility and the lack of
results in our last effort. I indicated that as a conse-
quence our general reassessment was taking place.
KING HUSSEIN: It seems now that Israel is more interested
in territory than in peace. We do not be-
lieve that the reason for Israeli inflexi-
bility was the often-talked about weakness in the Israeli
Government. The Israelis are masters at long-range
planning. We conclude from their actions that their plan
is to secure the area. They have been able to obtain
and build up great military strength superior to what
they have ever had before. But with all that military
strength, they cannot guaranty a peace in the area. Con-
tinuing the situation of no war and no peace does not
help either.
We cannot tolerate failure in the area. Jerusalem
will continue to be occupied and the Israelis will con-
tinue to create facts by further building. The occupied
territories will also be changed further with settlements
erupting all over the West Bank, Golan and Sinai. In
our view further failure must be equated with an eruption
of war. The weapons are there to create this sort of
SECRET/NODIS
GERRED
SECRET/NODIS
-4-
catastrophe. And more important will be the fact that
failure must be equated to a loss of hope.
Over the long term as we compare our numbers and
resources to theirs we can see no other reason for the
emphasis on building a military machine of such pro-
portions unless they want to use it. If war is the
only way, sooner or later it will inevitably involve us.
All the Arabs are still interested in moving toward peace,
but hope is fast disappearing. We wonder, frankly, Sir,
whether the failure on a small area in Egypt means that
nothing more can possibly be accomplished elsewhere in
the West Bank, with the Palestinians, or on the Golan.
Our answer, given the present situation, must be nega-
tive.
We must also consider where we go from here. As
for Jordan, I am really worried for the first time about
the possibility of a further loss of Jordanian territory.
Israel might want additional territory and we are a
possible target. For example, if the Israelis would
like to bargain Jerusalem against other holy places, we
are in a direct path to Medina and Mecca. We are also
on the road to the oil fields. I must be able to meet
my realistic defense requirements; I must have adequate
weapons, especially air defense. I will need them as soon
as possible. I am under real pressure from my own people.
I do not know what I can do.
I know you have had similar views from President
Sadat on events in the area. In Saudi Arabia it was
certainly the desire of King Khalid to continue the very
best relations with the United States. We are all appealing
to you to do all possible to keep talks going and to avoid
rapid deterioration in the situation.
In Saudi Arabia conditions are much better than I
had thought they would be. We all suffered a loss with
Faisal's death and the disappearance of the last of the
first generation of Arab Kings. Khalid recognizes his
limitations and has delegated much of the responsibility
to Prince Fahd and the others around him. They seem to
be closely cooperating with each other and determined to
meet the desires in their country for peace and progress.
I am more optimistic about Saudi Arabia.
2803
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
-5-
Prince Fahd asked me to convey one thought directly
to you. He is still deeply concerned about reactions
in his country to any statements about possible U. S.
intervention regarding the Saudi oil fields. There was
an extensive and severe public reaction to this, and he
asks if you can do everything possible to hold the
publicizing of these statements down.
PRESIDENT FORD: I don't think there have been any state-
ments recently since the one made some
time ago.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Prince Fahd is very sensitive on
this issue. In March there was
an article in Harper's magazine
by someone labeled as a defense analyst from a think
tank. The article was written under a pseudonym and
presented the arguments for taking over the oil fields.
It caused a severe reaction in Saudi Arabia.
KING HUSSEIN: As for Syria, I have seen Asad recently
twice. He seems really dazed about what
might happen next. On the one hand he
anticipated a possible advance as a result of the Secre-
tary's recent trip. But on the other hand they do not know
quite what to do about things; they are not perfectly
clear about how to handle the present situation.
We believe that Syria is a possible target for Israeli
attack. In that event we believe the Israelis would use
both flanks to overwhelm rapidly the Syrians. One of
those flanks is composed of Jordanian territory. We do
not exclude the fact that we may be a target as well.
The Iraqis, as you know, have resolved their dispute
with Iran. There continues to be a small crisis between
Iraq and Syria over the Euphrates water. Hopefully that
can be settled. But there continue to exist very many
questions over the future role of the Iraqis in the area.
Considering Geneva we have to look at the question
of do we go there, and if SO what happens. We are deeply
concerned that failure in Geneva will be tantamount to
bringing on a war. At Geneva we believe the Palestinians
have to participate and that all Arabs feel this way.
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
-6-
There is also the question of whether attempts should
be made to go to the United Nations or to the Security
Council to seek a new mandate for Geneva. It would make
it more possible then to move comfortably to Geneva and
provide a possible solution to what we do next. Also
some limitation on the participants at Geneva might well
affect the chances for failure. However, we cannot have
the U. S. put into a position where it can no longer
play the central role which it now does in the Middle
East.
PRESIDENT FORD: While we have made no decision as to
what we will do and you should be sure
that in going ahead none of our views
are pre-determined, there are a number of things which
I can say to you.
First, as I made clear in my State of the World
speech April 10, the U. S. is firmly committed not to
allow stagnation or stalemate to take hold. We were all
badly disappointed at what happened on the Secretary's
last trip when we made a maximum effort. But I can
assure you that we are committed not to permit drift or
stagnation or stalemate in the Middle East.
While we are still thinking through whether and how
to go to Geneva, we believe that it is mandatory that
we make progress toward peace. The Israelis will have
to play their role. We believe there can be no move
toward military activity by them. I have said the same
thing to them as I am saying to you and the others in
the area. There must be no military action also by
the Arabs. Military conflict now will destroy any
possibility of constructive action by our joint efforts.
Also, as I noted in my CBS interview with Eric
Severeid and some others, as we see it there are pro-
bably three possible ways of proceeding. First, we
could attempt to resume the presently suspended
negotiating effort on an interim step. As we go along
this seems less and less promising. Secondly, we could
try for a broad or total settlement, and we are exploring
this possibility as we reassess our position. Third,
under the umbrella of a broad settlement, interim
negotiations and agreements could be reached in an effort
to try to implement that concept.
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
-7-
These are the three basic options which we all
face in the area. But I can assure you that any re-
turn to military conflict--through Israeli pre-emption
or Arab attack--will be very disruptive of what has to
be done.
KING HUSSEIN: Unfortunately, there is no guaranty that
military action will not take place.
PRESIDENT FORD: I agree, something like that might
happen. But it will destroy our role if it
does.
KING HUSSEIN: Also, if there is no progress toward peace,
those who have been moderate may not be in
the area for very much longer. I
sincerely believe this is SO. I am only one of them.
But should war come, we may not have the same faces
continuing on in the Arab world and there would be new
faces; they would be much less moderate.
There is the same danger in a continuing state of
no war, no peace. We are frankly afraid of the possi-
bility that the Israelis will attack. They are very strong
and their preparations are obvious to us. The U. S. has
supplied the Israelis with extensive military equipment.
The argument has always been used that this is a means of
providing for leverage. Now that situation reflects on
both the United States and on the rest of the world in
the efforts toward seeking peace. It is really not our
place, Sir, to interfere in an internal issue like your
military supply relationship with the Israelis, but on
the other side the danger appears to be great. We must meet
our own deficiencies in military equipment as soon as possible
and this particular plea relates to our need for air defense.
PRESIDENT FORD: We are very cognizant of and sympathetic
toward your military needs. As you know,
last year we asked the Congress for $100
million grant aid and $30 million in military sales credits
as well as some $70 to $80 million in economic aid for you.
Congress, I firmly believe, has been very short-sighted
in its reaction to our request. As you know, the full
total of our aid request was cut very heavily by the
Congress. I am convinced that it was not aimed by the
Congress at Jordan. I want to assure you we very much
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
-8-
understand your problems and want to be as cooperative
as possible. I will be following this up with you to-
night on some of the details, or quite possibly you
will be having lunch with the Secretary, and he can
work with you on it.
As for our budget for next year--the President's
requests we are asking again for $100 million in grant
aid and $30 million in military sales money and roughly
$80 million in economic aid. This is an indication of
the President's commitment to Jordan. We must however
convince Congress that they should not be as short-sighted
in the next year as they are in the present. I know that
you will be meeting over the next few days members of
the Congress. We hope that you will point out to them
as you have to us the volatility of the situation in the
Middle East. I hope you can stress to them the great
need for the United States to be firm and equitable in
our arms and aid programs. We must help to keep a
balance in the Middle East until we can get the peace and
territorial settlement. The Congress clearly respects
you for your background and for your moderate approach.
KING HUSSEIN: Thank you, Mr. President.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is one point on which His Majesty
can be of great help. I hope he will stress
with the Congress, as he did for us,
what will happen to the moderate leaders, particularly Sadat,
if no further forward movement is possible. The Israelis
are in the middle of a massive campaign selling Sadat as a
radical. I know His Majesty views Sadat as a moderate
who badly wants progress.
KING HUSSEIN: Yes, I had already planned to do that.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: (continuing) Otherwise all of the
leaders will slide in the direction of the Syrians and
the Iraqis and it will have enormous consequences.
PRESIDENT FORD: Your Majesty should keep on saying what
you believe; that if no progress is made
war is inevitable. If October of 1973
is repeated, there will be an oil embargo and a world
energy crisis with worldwide repercussions. Congress
should see these issues. They have great respect for
your views.
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
-9-
KING HUSSEIN: We will make these points to them. On
arms, as you know, we are now completing
a several years' program of assistance.
My first priority is now to meet all of our requirements
on air defense. I believe I can get financial help from
Saudi Arabia to meet these needs, but I must have the
weapons soon--not three or four years from now.
PRESIDENT FORD: I know you are referring to Redeye,
Vulcan, and Hawk. You should know that
we want to be as constructive as we
possibly can. I want to talk some more with the Secretary
on what additionally we can do. There is deep concern
on air defense which we know is vitally important to you
now. Given the greater speed and sophistication of
military aircraft today, you must be able to respond to
air attack. We will be as forthcoming as we possibly
can. Hawk is currently being upgraded and we do not
have all of these that we want in our own forces. We
do want your people to do the training on Hawk, and
we would like to begin this as quickly as we possibly
can, whatever the answers are on the issues of the numbers
and how soon we can provide the weapons. The Secretary
is now working on our best appraisal of what we can do.
These systems are vitally important to our own defense
and are not fully available to our own forces. We want
to talk to you about the details, perhaps tonight or
tomorrow with the Secretary.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: We understand you want three Hawk
batteries and we are working on
that question now.
KING HUSSEIN: We want 14 total.
PRESIDENT FORD: On the Vulcan we gather you want some
number of battalions now; is two of
the four total battalions right?
PRIME MINISTER RIFAI: Yes, that is what we would like.
PRESIDENT FORD: 270 Redeye missiles seem to be less of
a problem and we will provide those.
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
-10-
KING HUSSEIN: 1973 really exploded on us, and we had a
feeling after it was all over that it led
to something better. But we feel that no
good could come of another conflict right now.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I take it you very much fear attack
by the Israelis.
PRESIDENT FORD: Imminently?
KING HUSSEIN: No, but it could come.
PRESIDENT FORD: I take it you do not anticipate a frontal
attack.
KING HUSSEIN: Even if Syria is a target, we believe the
Israelis would try to move around the
flanks. We also need to keep in mind
that there has been a significant qualitative change in
the weapons available to Syria and Iraq, and we need to
improve our capability for the future.
PRESIDENT FORD: I take it that your economy continues
to improve, that your phosphate income
will increase.
KING HUSSEIN: Yes, exports are going ahead and the rail-
road to Aqaba is nearly complete. The
future looks quite good in this respect.
PRESIDENT FORD: This is encouraging.
KING HUSSEIN: On Oman, as you know, I recently went
there for a visit. We were approached by
the Omanis for help with the rebellion in
Dhofar. Also, there seems to be some increasing pressure
on South Yemen to call off its support of the rebels.
But the urgent point is the way the British friends seem
to be conducting their operations there. I want to say
very frankly to you, Sir, that they have left many parts
of the world and they will have to leave Oman, but we
believe that they should do so in the best possible way.
PRESIDENT FORD: Has their help been less than it should be?
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
-11-
KING HUSSEIN: That seems to be exactly the case. It is
exploitative, and perhaps even malevolent.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The British are in Oman in their
last colonial war. They seem to
want to perpetuate their presence
while at the same time taking no risks with the loss of
life. It is not a very effective way of pursuing the
job.
KING HUSSEIN: Even more than that, we have good reason
to believe that some of the British mer-
cenaries have tended to create incidents--
they have become the rebels themselves in the sense that
they harass our forces.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Really, I had not heard that.
PRESIDENT FORD: What progress are you making now?
KING HUSSEIN: It is a very funny war. In the area in
which our soldiers are moving there are
probably only ten to fifteen insurgents--
they are more like bandits.
PRESIDENT FORD: When we talked with the Sultan, he
seemed to be satisfied that progress
was being made.
KING HUSSEIN: Saudi Arabia, too, believes that there
must be as much support as possible for
Oman. On the difficulties with the British,
the Sultan faces some important choices. If they continue
on, he may well have to ask them to leave, or his own
people--his own officers who see all this going on--
might move against him.
PRESIDENT FORD: We are very sympathetic to the Sultan
and with his problems, though I under-
stand that you hope to discuss this in
your meetings with the British.
KING HUSSEIN: Yes, very much SO. We have told them fully
of our feelings. The problem in the area
is very simple, we seem to have been misled
by the British. They are getting enormous sums of money
from the Omanis which seems to have seriously affected
their financial situation.
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
- 12 -
SECRETARY KISSINGER: How much do the British get
from them?
KING HUSSEIN: They have an annual revenue of about
one billion, 200 million. Right now
they need $80 million to carry them
over. Their defense budget has just risen to K
180,000,000. That is over $500 million. That is three
times our own defense budget for a force of 5,000 men.
Prices are escalating and the Omanis are in difficult
shape. It is a very sad situation.
PRESIDENT FORD: And it is also not the way for the
British to solve their domestic
economic problems.
KING HUSSEIN: We will tell all this to the British
when we see them.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: May we tell all of this to the
British? They will be coming
here May 7-8.
KING HUSSEIN: Yes, we would be very pleased if you would.
I will be seeing President Sadat in Jordan
immediately on my return on May 15. Is
there anything I can tell him from you here?
PRESIDENT FORD: I would be grateful if you would assure
him that we are indebted to him for the
efforts that he has made. We feel
that he has been very forthcoming in the negotiations.
We want to keep a very close relationship with him.
We are determined that there will be no stagnation or
stalemate in our efforts in the Middle East. We want
to continue with him and others in the area to do our
best to avoid the war which you and our other friends
feel is SO difficult.
KING HUSSEIN: There is another fear that people have.
They are concerned that the forces that
seem to be pushing up in Southest Asia
might raise pressures for a very harmful reaction in
this country. Yes, I am worried about the possibility
of an over-correction in the direction of the Israelis.
SECRET/NODIS
SEGRET/NODIS
- 13 -
PRESIDENT FORD: I take it you are talking about forces
in the United States. The reaction will
be very hard to forecast. It is a
traumatic experience for the United States. I believe
that in the U.S. when it is all over people will be
very embarrassed by our failure. My own view, and I
know it is that of the Secretary, is that if Congress
had backed us when it counted earlier this year we
would have avoided the present situation. The people
of the United States, however, have not yet sifted out
their own reactions and this process may be delayed by
several months.
However, even the people who are strongly anti-
Vietnam in the United States still believe this country
should remain a world power. They agree that this
country should not back off and the United States
should play a strong role in world affairs. The elements
in the Congress which had a bad experience on Viet-Nam
are not now as strong as they were. As long as I am
here in this office I will continue with a strong role
for the United States in world affairs. This is mandatory
for us. The people will follow on this, and if they
do the Congress will come around. But this is a sad
day for this country.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I expect, too, there is a concern
that the United States might over-
react. This, of course, depends
upon how any war in the Middle East might get started.
If Israel pre-empts, we will oppose this and get Con-
gressional support. If the Arabs make a flagrant push
for war, we will support Israel. But one of our great
concerns is that we are absolutely determined not to
have a stalemate.
KING HUSSEIN: I am very afraid that if war starts,
people will forget the reasons, especially
if it is caused by Israeli intransigence.
PRESIDENT FORD: If Israel acts in flagrant fashion,
there will be an adverse public reaction.
But also the reverse will be true if
the Arabs do the same thing. Our public does not want
a war and believes there must be another way to settle
the question. But it is a very fluid situation and it
depends also who initiates the conflict and how it is
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
- 14 -
started. The war in Vietnam has made us sick and tired
of war, but in a crisis we will stand up. But at the
moment you understand why it is difficult to determine
our reactions.
KING HUSSEIN: This is a very bad period for me.
After my grandfather struggled SO hard
for the country and after 1948 then I
looked ahead to build it up. But in 1967, as you know,
we lost a good bit of it. We are moving ahead again
now and it is very sad for me to think of the possibility
of another war.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I remember in 1973 if Israel had
accepted your ideas--Your Majesty
made them a very reasonable
proposition--there would never have been a Rabat
Conference. You have been the most moderate and states-
manlike of any of the people I have called upon in the
area, and have always continued to be a staunch friend
of the United States.
KING HUSSEIN: We believe we have been your best friend
in the Arab world and now, of course,
we also want to keep our lines upon to
our Arab friends as well as to you.
PRESIDENT FORD: I want to assure you that we will
continue our very best efforts to
give you full and friendly support.
Meeting with you and working with you has been very
helpful. And we would, of course, like to have any
further evaluation and information you would care to
provide us.
SECRET/NODIS