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1553122
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June 13, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger
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1553122
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document
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June 13, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger
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collections
Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
subjects
Brazil
Israel
Syria
Turkey
Egypt
Germany (West)
Arms transfers
Middle East conflicts
Nuclear energy
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1553122
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13
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1975-06-13
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6
year
1975
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day
13
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1975-06-13
month
6
year
1975
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995f01f95a55050f
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Scewertttile
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of
State and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
DATE & TIME:
Friday - June 13, 1975
PLACE:
The Oval Office
SUBJECT:
Rabin Visit; FRG-Brazil Nuclear Deal;
Turkish Aid; Iranian Oil Deal
Kissinger: They are a bloody minded bunch. There could be some dispute
about whether they said they would get out of the passes. There can be no
dispute that we have been telling them for months that getting out of the
passes was the sine qua non of an agreement. Of that there can be no
doubt. [Rockefeller calls]
GUIDELINES 3/9/04
State laview
Kissinger: Then they raise duration and warning stations. We settled
duration and I showed them Sadat's letter without saying he had brought
it.
President: What was their reaction?
NARA, DATE 5/18/04
Kissinger: They slobbered. Then we gave them the warning stations.
Last night I asked for precision about where they would be in the passes.
He said they would be deep into the passes.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT.
President: You tell him I understood they would have the eastern end and
Egypt the western end.
FORD
&
LIBRAR
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
BY.
BERALD
CLASSIFIED BV Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 2 -
Kissinger: I am meeting him again at 5:00. If it turns out we get into
another endless haggle
On Syria, he said he would consider a unilateral move but he would never
do it. Then there is the question of armaments and thinned-out zones --
again it was unsuccessful.
President: I thought last night we should start a specific proposal for
an overall settlement.
Kissinger: We are well along on that Let me meet with him and tell him
that an interim arrangement won't work.
Scowcroft: [Described the Presidential statement.
Kissinger: There just cannot be an Egyptian arrangement with nothing
at all on Syria. We would be beaten to death and I think it would be better
not even to go into it.
I don't think Sadat will accept each side being at the respective ends of
the passes unless the positions are symmetrical. Much of this is pure
Israeli domestic politics. He said publicly in February that he would give
up the passes only for nonbelligerency; he can't wriggle off the hook now.
I wanted just to have a line at the eastern end without defining it at the
end of the pass -- so Sadat would say they are out of the pass and Israel
would know they weren't, I didn't get that far.
President: Let's refine this, pass it to Sadat, and see his reaction. If
it doesn't work, we will go to a comprehensive settlement.
Kissinger: That is probably the best. I think we should not spill too much
blood for an interim settlement.
President: One argument is that it looks forthcoming if we put in the
manned warning stations than if we go for an overall settlement.
Kissinger: They are almost irrational. It is 90 percent domestic politics.
President: Betty found Mrs. Rabin very demanding and aggressive.
Kissinger: Let's see where we are tonight. If they are close, you might
think of making an American proposal , but not before we see Sadat's
reaction.
5
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 3 -
You will see Max Fisher. They are constantly telling me they are getting
to you. I say go ahead. They said a leading Jew told you that your place
in history depends more on what you do for the Jews than for what you do
for the Arabs.
I'll tell Max there has been some progress but there are still some issues
on passes. Sadat has made some concessions.
President: Why not say I have ordered a comprehensive plan?
Kissinger: We have a problem on nuclear power and West Germany.
President: Yes. I raised the Soviet-German reactor with Brent.
Kissinger: There I would make an exception because it is power for Berlin,
but absolutely insist on LAEA safeguards hereafter.
President: Okay.
Kissinger: We have another problem -- the German sale to Brazil.
This is a real mess. We have leaked all over, we have a problem with
Germany, and we have a problem with Brazil. And the Congress is upset.
But we have absolutely no control over it and it tends to defeat efforts to
get more suppliers' safeguards. I think we have to explain to the Congress
what the situation is and what the dilemma is.
Then there is the Turkish embargo. The question is one of legislative
tactics. Isn't it better to start in the House with the Senate Bill and fall
back later, rather than begin with a compromise and be driven back to
nothing?
President: I told you I spoke to Rosenthal. He is planning to come up
with a compromise proposal, on his and the others' behalf.
Kissinger: That is the best way -- having it be their initiative.
On Greenspan and the Iranian oil deal: I would like to wait until Robinson
returns, then the three of us will talk.
President: Fine. And only with Greenspan.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERAL
P/K
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FORD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state leview 3/9/04
BY by
NARA. DATE 5/18/04
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