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June 16, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger
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1553123
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June 16, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Greece
Romania
Israel
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Angola
Germany (West)
President (1974-1977 : Ford). Commission on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Activities within the United States. 1/4/1975-6/6/1975
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Helsinki Agreement, 1975
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1975-06-16
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1975
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1975-06-16
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1975
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Scowcroft file
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8
state depe review 3/9/04
MR04-78 #4, CIAltr 4/4/05
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
dal Data 6/28/05
PARTICIPANTS:
President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Monday, June 16, 1975
9:22 - 10:24 a.m.
PLACE:
Oval Office
Kissinger: I met with Rabin yesterday in New York. He didn't change
his position. He said he couldn't. He can't ignore what you have said.
But I think now we shouldn't spill too much blood over an American
interim plan. If you have to cram it down their throats, it may be
better to go all the way.
President: When will we hear?
Kissinger: They will send someone back from Jerusalem with a map
on Wednesday, after they have a Cabinet meeting on Tuesday. Even if
they change, I would send the first position to Sadat, unless Eilts thinks
it would cause a blowup.
We have problems with Turkey. [He describes his conversations
with Esenbel and his cable to Demirel]. Esenbel says they don't listen to
him anymore. I'm afraid Demirel has decided he has to gain support
by some anti-American moves. I'm afraid they may do something today --
perhaps close down our five bases that we have against the Soviet Union.
FORD
President: I talked to Rosenthal. He will bring in Hamilton, Fascell,
?
GERALD
LIBRARY
Whalen, and we will try to set up something tomorrow morning. Could
have a paper?
CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det,
File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2.
Kissinger: I have an options paper. I think even if they close the bases,
we ought to get the embargo lifted.
President: I think that is best. If you propose something, they
immediately will start bargaining.
President: Rosenthal told me they were trying to find some way to move.
Kissinger: It is a silly thing. The Laurence Stern article in Foreign Pol-
icy
President: It was a total distortion.
Kissinger: Yes. The Europeans were not willing to use force, and we
weren't about to recognize Sampson. What we wanted to do was avoid
giving a legal excuse for intervention. There were soreheads in State
I got rid of them who wanted right away to pressure the Junta. Had
we done that, we would now be pressuring Greece to make concessions.
[He describes the line on the Israeli map at considerable length. ]
[He reads the message from Caglayangil.]
I think it is largely the domestic situation there. Ecevit is trying
to push them into a corner. If Demirel settles, Erbakan will leave the
coalition and Ecevit will push for elections.
I want to discuss Angola for a bit. There are three groups there.
With the aid of Portugal and the Soviet Union, the MPLA is on the
offensive and may even take Luanda. We have been diddling around.
We have given Roberto a bit, but he needs weapons and discipline.
Kaunda doesn't have the horsepower. Mobutu is a bloody bastard but he
is the only hope.
We don't want to see a Communist government in Angola. It is
not in our interest to knock off a white regime right now, which is what
would happen with a Communist Angola. I think we should have a
meeting over the next two weeks to discuss it. No agency supports
doing anything -- State, JCS.
President: CIA?
Scowcroft: They haven't a position really.
FORD a LIBRARY GERALD
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
3.
Kissinger: That is another problem. Colby is a disaster. [He describes
the NIE problem. Colby promised Church to give him documents which
we were discussing whether to give.
President: I think we can move quickly now that the report is in.
Kissinger: On the Scheel visit: His constitutional position is non-political,
so the conversation must be in general terms. He's a good friend of the
U.S. A little weak. I don't know what he will raise the nuclear
reactor business perhaps; the unity of Europe. He will announce at the
McCloy ceremony $1 million for the Fund and then four million tonight
at the toast.
President: He is speaking to a Joint Session tomorrow.
Kissinger: He will give a supportive speech. He is probably bored now.
Just do a general review of American policy.
President: Where is he from? Isn't his party on the right wing?
Kissinger: I am not sure. Yes. It is right of the Socialists and used to
be right of the CDU, but now I am not sure.
Let me read you the Thursday night memcon so you see how I pulled
it out of them. [He reads parts of the memcon of the meeting Thursday
night June 12, at Dinitz's residence.]
President: How did the lunch in New York go?
Kissinger: Extremely well. It's the best meeting with a Jewish group
I have had. I told them that Jewish groups take the position that the U.S.
is never right and Israel always is, and that is laying the basis for
massive anti-Semitism here. I said: "You should be here as Americans,
not as Israeli supporters. " I think two-thirds of them were enthusiastic.
I will meet with them again and maybe you should meet with them.
President: I would like to.
Kissinger: Klutznick -- the organizer -- is something of a renegade.
President: Did you see what Jackson said to Ceausescu?
FORD
FL
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
4.
Kissinger: I'm afraid he will decide that the U.S. can't be a counter-
weight to the Soviet Union because we are subjected to too much
pressure. I also told the group they couldn't attack American power
everywhere in the world except with respect to Israel.
President: What are the chances for Romania on the Hill?
Kissinger: They can drag into September. There are only ten months
left. The Soviets saved us. If we had MFN, Jackson would be holding
hearings on it all year building the campaign platform.
I think we have a SALT fight brewing. The New York Times has
a front page article on the cruise missile. [Discuss the cruise missile
problem. ] We either must count them or do away with them -- at least
on ships. Maybe on bombers.
President: Who generated the story?
Kissinger: DOD. I don't know whether it's Schlesinger himself. I don't
know how he feels about it. Schlesinger has Kaufman working for him.
What he would really like is to move nuclears out of Europe and do that
function from offshore -- the cruise missile might be good for that.
[Mrs. Ford calls.
It is now 50-50 about CSCE. The Europeans are toughening their
position for 50 kilometers. We should stay out of it. I have said if
there is no SALT agreement, there is no point in having a summit.
President: I agree with that.
Kissinger: On cruise missiles, I proposed a 2500-kilometer limit on
missiles carried on planes, and counting them on ships. We can't get
away with keeping them free. Then there is the Backfire problem. We
maybe can't solve them all -- in which case there is no point in having
a summit.
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 018015
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Note
DESCRIPTION
Brent Scowcroft's handwritten notes for
memcon
CREATION DATE
06/16/1975
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031400556
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER
12
FOLDER TITLE
June 16, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/28/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG