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June 27, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
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1553147
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June 27, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Middle East conflicts
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1975-06-27
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1975
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation
Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
[cowcrft file
la
MEMORANDUM
(orig. in Dinitz file)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel
Mordechai Shalev, Minister of the Embassy
of Israel
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Friday, June 27, 1975
FORD
9:58 - 10:09 a. m.
&
PLACE:
The Oval Office
GERALD
The White House
President: As you know, we have sent to Sadat the plan that was submitted
to us. I am sure you understand their reaction. Sisco will give you the
details. Their reaction is understandable. We submitted it without comment.
In brief, they rejected it and the reaction was that they would immediately
call for the convening of Geneva.
Henry will meet with Gromyko on July 11. At that meeting we
will discuss Geneva, and indicate one way or another whether we will go
to Geneva.
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state lev. 3/10/04
I have a letter here [Tab A], which I would like you to transmit
to Prime Minister Rabin as soon as possible. It is a frank letter setting
forth what has happened since I came into office, and it lays out factually,
and I think accurately, what has taken place. I am convinced that if there
NARA, DATE 5/20/04
is to be any chance of success, there has to be movement out of the passes
and a better situation in the south. I have looked at the map that was in the
New York Times, and there is little similarity, either in the north or south.
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
If we are to progress, the New York Times map is more acceptable but for
DECLASSIFIED
the passes. I want an interim agreement, but we have to get action on the
passes and the oilfields.
CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
BY. Mr
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 58(1) (3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
-2-
It is a frank and factual letter. I have tried to be strong in
my conviction that we need action in order to continue the relationship
we have had in the past. My record in favor of a strong independent
Israel is clear. But I think the only way to keep that is to move on an
agreement. I want to work with the Prime Minister; I will work with him,
but we have to move. I do not think it useful to get into a political confron-
tation with the' Jewish community in the United States. I have dear personal
friends in the Jewish community. I want to work with them cooperatively
for the goals we both seek. But we must have progress. Any political
activity would be very, very unhealthy. It would not be good for your
country, for my country and for our relationship. To come back to my
point, we can get a settlement. We can get an interim agreement, but
there has to be some give.
Dinitz: May I say a few words, Mr. President?
President: Of course, but I don't think we ought to get into a debate on
the substance.
Dinitz: I thank you for inviting me in. We never doubt your friendship
for Israel. I want to say just a word on the New York Time S map. It
is not our map. On the road to the south, the problem is the topography.
We will make the zone as wide as the topography permits. We want to
work in harmony, not confrontation, with the United States. I know your
many friends. No good can come to Israel by taking a divergent course.
President: It is not good for either of us, or for the peace of the world,
for us not to work together. We are concerned about peace in the area
and the world.
FORD
A
GERALD
Usmb
Treside Ford
to
9:50
Fri, 6/27/75.
1b
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 27, 1975
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
We have now presented to President Sadat the Israeli
positions on an interim agreement between your
government and Egypt, and we have reported to you
separately the Egyptian reaction. This is a time,
therefore, to review where matters stand and the
choices before us.
I want first to recall the main elements of the strategy
which Israel and the United States have pursued to-
gether since I became President. In our first conver-
sation last September, you asked that we give the
Israeli Government time to consolidate its position
in order to pursue an effective peace strategy. You
urged that we undertake a maximum military supply
effort which would strengthen the Israeli sense of
security. I can recall vividly the point you made to the
effect that a secure Israel would be a flexible Israel.
We acceded to your requests in the spirit of trust and
friendship that has grown up between us. We did not
urge negotiations for many months -- despite very
great pressures to do SO. I substantially increased
the amount of military aid recommended unanimously
by all our departments.
From the beginning we made clear two points that
would have to be met if an interim agreement between
GERALD
LIBRARY
Egypt and Israel were to succeed: (a) It would have
to involve Israeli withdrawal from the two strategic
passes in the Sinai and the Abu Rudeis oil fields.
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET - XGDS (3)
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
State
5/20/04
3/10/04
- 2 -
(b) Egypt could not in such a partial agreement sub-
scribe to a full declaration of non-belligerency. The
latter points led to extended discussion between us of
the elements of non-belligerency and how those of
most concern to Israel could be met in practical ways
short of a formal declaration of non-belligerency.
Your Government provided us with its own views on
alternative ways of dealing with this problem.
Our records show that these points were made either
by me or by Secretary Kissinger on numerous occasions.
The record is clear that at no time did you or Foreign
Minister Allon state that these were unfulfillable
conditions. On the contrary, your Government pressed
the United States to assist the parties, to undertake
several missions to the area within the framework
which had been discussed frequently between us. If
I had thought that Israel would not accept the context
which we had described, I would not have committed
the United States to continue the step-by-step approach,
and I would not have sent the Secretary of State to the
Middle East to conduct negotiations which were fore-
doomed to failure.
In the course of the negotiations, we have met the
Israeli concerns one by one on most of the principal
issues. In case of an agreement, Egypt would be
prepared to give assurances that it would not use
force to resolve the remaining problems between
Israel and Egypt. On the question of the duration of
the agreement, we believe the formula proposed by
Israel -- that this agreement would remain in effect
until superseded by another agreement -- would be
accepted. We have also informed your government
of an arrangement which we believe would be possible
for assuring continuation of the mandate of the UNEF
for several years. Several solutions have been
suggested to deal with the problem of the Israeli
intelligence station which would meet the requirement
TOP SECRET XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
- 3 -
of early warning and add to the durability of the agree-
ment. As you know, some progress has been made in
easing the boycott.
In my recent conversation with you I stated frankly that
I was deeply disappointed -- indeed disillusioned - - with
the position taken by the Israeli Government which led
to the suspension of the negotiations last March. I
presented to you several modifications I thought possible
in the Egyptian position following my talks in Salzburg.
In light of this, and after the misunderstandings last
March, my hope was that as a result of our most recent
conversations Israel's position would have evolved
further to embrace those minimum requirements of an
interim agreement which we have described to your
Government over the past year.
As you know, I consider the changes you communicated
to me during the recent discussions to be inadequate,
and I informed you that I would transmit the Israeli
position to President Sadat without recommendation.
In our conversations in Washington, there was no
essential change in Israel's position on the passes,
and the manner in which access to the oil fields was
offered presents significant pro blems. Given his well-
known position which we have described to you for a
year, the reaction of President Sadat was to be expected.
With the formulation of your latest position and President
Sadat's reply, we are now at a point where fundamental
decisions must be made.
I do not regard standing still a realistic choice. It
runs an unacceptable risk of leading to another war
and to a coalescence of the same international forces
which Israel faced in 1973 and early 1974. Since such
a situation would jeopardize fundamental U.S. interests --
TOP SECRET XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
- 4 -
most of which are also of deep concern to Israel -- the
U.S. cannot be expected to underwrite such a course
of action.
Our judgment is that Israel's position is forcing the
evolution of negotiations toward an outcome which runs
counter to the interests of the United States and the
world. We therefore want to hold open the opportunity
which I presented to you in our telephone conversation
to reconsider the Israeli position within the parameters
which we have discussed with you since last summer --
parameters which in our considered judgment pose no
threat to the vital interest which Israel and the United
States share in the security and well-being of your
country. No lesser proposal can now meet the need.
If your Government does not feel able to do this, we
must reserve our course on next steps, and explain to
our people the Administration's appraisal of our national
interest in this matter.
Mr. Prime Minister, the matter before us goes to the
very core of American-Israeli relationships. It is
not a public relations problem; it is not a matter of
a difference of view between the Legislative and
Executive Branches of our Government since, when
all the facts are known, the Congress will support my
conclusions as to the national interest. It is a matter
of whether our two Governments over the coming
months and years will continue to work in common
endeavor as we have in the past. I need not add that
I hope very much that close cooperation for the future
will be the outcome.
Mr. Prime Minister, it is a source of profound regret
to me that matters have reached such a point --
particularly since the impasse is so unnecessary.
I have written this letter with candor, in the spirit of
TOP SECRET XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
- 5 -
friendship, in understanding of the values we share,
and in continuing commitment to the survival of Israel.
It is in this spirit that I request a reconsideration of
the position of the Israeli Government and an early
reply.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Yitzhak Rabin
Prime Minister of Israel
Jerusalem
TOP SECRET = XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES stateleries 3/10/04
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
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