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August 4, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito, Foreign Affairs Secretary Milos Minic
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August 4, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito, Foreign Affairs Secretary Milos Minic
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Yugoslavia
Israel
Japan
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United Nations
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Middle East conflicts
Presidential trips
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1975-08-04
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1975
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECRET NODIS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
DATE AND TIME: August 4, 1975, 9:50 a.m.
PLACE: Federal Executive Council Bldg.
Belgrade, Yugoslavia
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Yugoslavia
President Tito
Dr. Vladimir Bakaric, Vice President, SFRY Presidency
Edvard Kardelj, Member, SFRY Presidency
Dzemal Bijedic, President, Federal Executive Council
Milos, Minic, Vice President, Federal Executive Council,
and Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Dimce Belovski, Member, Council of the Federation
Lazar Mojsov, Deputy Federal Secretary for Foreign
Affairs
Toma Granfil, Ambassador to the United States
Aleksandar Sokorac, Chief of Cabinet of the President
of the Republic
Nikola Milicevic, Assistant Federal Secretary for
3/10/04
Foreign Affairs
Andjelko Blazevic, Foreign Policy Adviser to the
President of the Republic
Svetozar Starcevic, Director for the North American
Department, Federal Secretariat for Foreign
Affairs
U.S.
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NARA, Date 5/24/04
CLASS
The President
The Secretary of State
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Guidolines
Ambassador Silberman
Counselor to the President Hartmann
Press Secretary to the President Nessen
Lt. General Scowcroft
Deputy Assistant to the President Cheney
Counselor Sonnenfeldt
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs
By
EUR: AAHartman/gw
SECRET NODIS
A
EX GDS 1
SECRET NODIS
-2-
Tito:
What kind of tree did you plant?
The President:
It was a Colorado pine and I was helped
by the Secretary of State, my son and
the Secretary's son. Us old men need
young people to help us. I felt that
way even more this morning when I
went out for a swim. The water was
very cold but that is a beautiful pool
that you have.
Tito:
We can now resume our talks. What
priority do you want to give to the
issues?
The President:
Secretary Kissinger has brought to my
attention a very shocking situation which
is of deep concern to all of us and I
would like to have him tell you about it.
The Secretary:
This concerns an act of terrorism. The
Japanese Red Army has taken some 40
American citizens and 3 Swedes and captured
them. They are demanding the release of
7 Japanese terrorists in Japan. Our
position is, as it has always been, that
we refuse to negotiate and to pay ransom
in these cases. We do this in order not
to encourage the capture of other Americans
for the same purpose. We refuse to dis-
cuss the case with anyone. In Tanzania
one of our Ambassadors violated this rule
and he will now be released. The American
Government will always refuse to negotiate
because that is the only way we can keep
demands from being made upon us.
Tito:
How many Japanese are there?
The Secretary:
Seven, and they have a machine gun. They
all seem to be on one floor and they fire
the gun from time to time. The Japanese
SECRET NODIS
SECRET NODIS
-3-
have asked for an airline plane to take
the prisoners from Japan and then to come
to Kuala Lumpur and pick up the terrorists.
They've extended the deadline twice now and
it's due to come up again at 10:30 this
morning our time.
The President:
It's our strong feeling that if we were to
breach this hard line that we take there
would be no end to the demands being made
upon us. We have to be tough and that is
right in the long run.
Tito:
There seem to be a large number of people
involved and, of course, this kind of
terrorist is ready for suicide.
The President: Yes, they are sort of kamikazes.
The Secretary:
These Japanese are the same ones responsible
for the Tel Aviv killings.
The President:
If we could move on to the Middle East in
which we both have a deep interest, I would
like to make a general comment. Because
of your interests and the impact that
Yugoslavia can make in the situation I would
like to fill you in on our thinking and also
to hear your views.
We are convinced that if a stalemate con-
tinues, war is inevitable in the Middle
East and this time it will be bloodier,
more costly and could involve a confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet
Union. All of this could be avoided if we
could make progress toward a solution on the
basis of UN Resolutions 242 and 338. What
we need is to have some time and this is why
we have been in favor of an interim settle-
ment. This is not an easy question and we
SECRET NODIS
SECRET NODIS
-4-
have spent a lot of time trying to see
whether we can successfully pursue these
negotiations. If they break down we face
other prospects which would not be good
for the world or for the Middle East.
Tito:
Our opinion is that the possibility for
progress lies with Israel because Israel
has not complied with the UN Resolutions
which you mentioned, 242 and 338. We had
hoped that some results would be achieved
from your step by step negotiations--those
carried on by Secretary Kissinger. But
only one step has been achieved. Now we
seem to be in a stalemate. We think that
Israel shouldn t be allowed to do as it wishes.
We think that Israeli behavior has brought
about all this talk of the possibility of
expulsion from the UN. It would be a
very unhappy development for the UN. It
would be bad for the UN and it would
bring divisions in the non-aligned world.
But Israel continues to violate the will
of others and therefore we think more
pressure should be put on Israel.
In Kampala there was a moderate resolution
that was finally passed but there is
growing pressure to expel Israel from the
UN. Divisions appeared at Kampala. Ghana
and Zaire both wanted a more moderate
resolution and they were successful but
it does show what happens if Israel doesn't
change its position--how it can bring
about division in the non-aligned world.
Sadat was even against the more radical
Arab suggestions.
You are quite right, we are very much
interested in this problem. We have
always tried to find a solution. We have
exchanged visits with Egypt. I have gone
SECRET- NODIS
SECRET NODIS
-5-
there and they have come here. We
always have tried to find a peaceful
solution to this problem.
I have had several conversations with
Naom Goldman, the head of the World
Jewish Congress. He is much more
realistic and he looks much farther
ahead.
One has to look to the future. One has
to look ten or 15 years ahead when the
Arabs will be completely armed; there
will be 150 million of them against
only 5 or 6 million Israelis. Under
such conditions the Arabs might be
tempted to do what they threatened to
do years ago, that is, to throw Israel
into the sea. As a general principle,
aggression should not pay. And the
country that commits aggression should
suffer the consequences.
I went to Egypt in 1967. Kardelj was
with me and we met with Nasser. I said
to him that Israel is a reality and it
should be recognized. It is a member
of the United Nations. I said there
was no way for the Arabs to throw Israel
into the sea. They didn't like what I
said. They kept silent. But the next
day, Nasser said--you are right.
I know it is very difficult for Iraq
and Syria with the Palestinian situation
the way it is but Israel must withdraw
and in return it must be recognized as
a fact, as a State. As I told Goldman,
Israel is a highly developed country that
could help its neighbors in peace. Goldman
agreed. I'm aware that you can't do these
things over night but each step should not
take ten years.
SECRET NODIS
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-6-
The President:
In my meeting with Sadat, I got the
impression that you have given--that the
Arabs are now in a position to recognize
Israel. It would be a major step.
I look forward to meeting Asad. I have
a very favorable impression of him. He
seems to be a leader who is willing to
be constructive.
We have spent a maximum time trying to
convince all of the Arab leaders that a
move must come and now we are working on
Israel. We are in favor of a step forward
now but later we recognize that there
must be a general settlement.
It is of great concern to us that there
not be abrupt action in the United Nations.
All it would do would be to make Israel a
martyr and disturb progress toward a
solution. I have sought this solution
with all my power and, therefore, I hope
that it will be possible for you to urge
moderation, particularly before the meeting
in Lima.
There are good prospects that a step for-
ward can be reached and that this will be
a move toward a final negotiation. I think
on the basis of what I know of Sadat's
attitude and the attitude of Israel that
we will be able to take another step. We
are prepared to put on significant, very
significant, pressure to achieve this.
Tito:
I read in today's paper that the inter-
national meeting of socialists in Stockholm
has adopted a resolution which seems to be
very protective of Israel. It seems to
me that these unilateral positions do not
help. There is no question of protecting
SECRET NODIS
SECRET NODIS
-7-
Israel or expelling Israel. The two
things go together.
The President: Our position on the UN has to be well
spelled-out. We are dedicated to the
UN. We put a lot of money and time into
that organization. But it cannot be
organized and controlled by blocs. The
Secretary has made a very good speech
on the subject in Milwaukee and that is
the position of our Government.
In the meantime, it is Israel's responsi-
bility to make progress within the frame-
work of the UN Resolutions. We don't
wish Israel to be expelled. And if I may
add a postscript to what I have said. If
there is no progress, I mentioned at the
outset the probability of conflict--perhaps
of an oil embargo. The repercussions
would be world-wide and indeed the
underdeveloped countries would suffer
even more but it would also jeopardize
economic recovery of the United States.
If that were to happen, our capabilities
of helping others would certainly be
undermined.
Therefore, it is a matter of maximum
importance to avoid these consequences
and bring the countries together in the
manner that I described. You might be
interested in some of the Secretary's
observations because he has spent a
great deal of time and effort in working
on the situation. Therefore, some
intimate observations by him might be
helpful.
Tito:
Yes.
SECRET NODIS
SECRET NODIS
-8-
The Secretary:
The present outline of our basic approach
is that getting together a meeting of
all the parties to discuss all the issues
would play into the hands of those Israelis
who do not wish to have any progress. Just
as an example, if the Palestinian issue
were raised first, it could easily hang
things up six months or more. Then we would
be in the United States in a re-election
period. The stage when all these issues
have to be discussed will come, but it is
not yet here.
The most important problem is to avoid
backward movement. If we can get Israel
to bring about some progress, it would help
in this negotiation in an important psyco-
logical way. This is why we would like to
deal with one issue at a time. This way
we can avoid delay even though that is
what some Israelis are trying to develop
as a tactic.
On another question, Syria seems to think
that we are trying to split the Arabs.
I have great personal affection for Asad.
He is a real man but the only way that we
can help to make progress on Syria is that
we must take a step first with Egypt and
once progress is made, then we can move
elsewhere. That is our policy.
Right now we think that the negotiations
can succeed because we have a strong
Presidential position. People don't take
Secretaries of State seriously but they do
take the President seriously and it is
his personal intervention with Israel that
has enabled us to get propositions from
Israel that we feel now meet the basic
demands of Sadat for the first time. But
there still are an enormous number of
SECRET NODIS
SECRET NODIS
-9-
details and, of course, the Israelis
are not known for their excessive
generosity in these matters. But we
have established certain principles and
we feel that there is a chance to
finish by the end of August. Once we
can get that kind of agreement then we
can turn to the Syrian problem. After
that, we can move to an overall solution.
On the Israeli side, their strategy is
that they are much more comfortable with
the radical Arab leaders than with the
moderates. If the Arabs are anti-American
and pro-Soviet then the Israelis feel that
they can appeal to the groups in the
United States that are anti-Soviet and
that, therefore, they have a better chance
of getting their positions accepted.
It is very important for you, Mr. President,
to influence the Arabs to keep on a moderate
course. It is in their own interest to
continue a policy of moderation that they
have been pursuing. This has already had
a beneficial effect on American policy which
is now fully engaged in an even-handed
way. The objective conditions are not here
yet for an overall solution which is what
President Tito wants but we must continue
the moderate position and curb some of the
Arab desire for epic cavalry charges. It
is in this sense that the UN issue is a
major problem. If Israel is suspended, all
support will go toward Israel in the United
States and the Israelis will come to us and
ask--how can we rely on UN forces to police
a settlement when we are not even in the
United Nations. We do think that we do
have a chance to make progress and that is
what we are trying to do now.
SECRET NODIS
SECRET NODIS
-10-
Tito:
Our Minister for Foreign Affairs Minic
will go to Lima. His position will not
be easy but he will do what he can. But
if one wants to be against something one
needs arguments. We are aware of the con-
sequences and we are against having Israel
thrown out of the UN. It would be a very
unhappy situation. I have great confidence
that extreme measures will not be applied.
But there are other intermediate measures.
We are not against sanctions. You should
try to convince Israel because in this
matter they are very short-sighted.
The Secretary: But if I go to the Middle East before the
non-aligned meeting in Lima, you can assume
that there is a great chance that we are
assured of success. Because the President
has said to me that I must not go to the
Middle East again unless we are 90 percent
assured of success. You could be very
helpful in convincing the Syrians that
we are not interested in splitting the
Arabs. We had no contact with the Arab
world for ten years. We certainly don't
want to move them back toward radicalism.
We want them to continue to be moderate.
It is in our own self-interest to make them
even more moderate and we certainly don't
want to isolate either the Syrians or the
Algerians and you can help us convince them
of that. It is in our own self-interest.
We have a very high regard and good relations
with Boumediene and these are in fact better
relations than might be indicated by our
respective public statements. I hope that
Mr. Minic will try to convey these views
for us. In any case, we will speak
directly to the Algerians. If I go to
the Middle East, I will try to stop in
Algiers. We have good relations with
him. He is a strong and thoughtful man.
SECRET NODIS
SECRET NODIS
-11-
Minic:
Yes. He is a very good man.
The Secretary: His trouble on economic issues at any
rate is that he cannot take "yes" for
an answer.
The President:
I would like to add in conclusion that
we are interested in strengthening the
forces of peace and that we know that
we must work together to do this. But
we cannot do it all. We can't solve
the Middle East problem alone. Our
cooperation is crucial and we want to
have a broadened ability to help the
less-developed countries, the non-
aligned and all those who want peace.
Tito:
Are there any comments from my Ministers?
Minic:
If I may ask a question, what do you,
Mr. President, and the Secretary, think
will happen if there is no success?
You mentioned war but what other ideas
apart from your efforts do you have?
The President: If we fail in our current efforts we
will have to proceed with our reassessment.
One possibility is that we will move to
Geneva and advocate a broad settlement even
though we know that that is a less desirable
course of action. But it might temporarily
help to avoid a conflict but for the moment
we strongly feel that a step-by-step policy
is superior.
The Secretary:
That is the reason that we have been
reluctant to go to Geneva right away. The
Arabs must ask for the PLO to be included
and that could lead to a deadlock that
might last for months. Also, those who
know Arabs feel that, with four groups of
them in the room, the oratory would not
exactly be calm. It would play into the
SECRET NODIS
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-12-
hands of the Israeli strategy for
delay. The President would find it
difficult to be effective in an
election period but we are definitely
committed to go to Geneva at some
point. It is just a question of timing
to use our action to the maximum effect.
Tito:
Should present efforts fail, you suggest
Geneva. Would you go with the Soviets?
The President:
The Secretary has had recent talks with
Gromyko on this. He could discuss it.
The Secretary:
The basic strategy of the Soviets is to
take credit for our actions. But at the
right moment, in any case, we will
have to go to Geneva. If we fail, we
will also have to go to Geneva and then
put our ideas forward for an overall
settlement. We will not, however, go
there as the lawyer for one party.
Minic:
Would the Soviets accept to go if the
present efforts fail?
The Secretary:
They would happily go to Geneva. But
their capacity to produce anything is
very limited. They would go together
with us if our efforts fail. Even then,
it depends on what we can do with the
Israelis. For the President of the
United States this is a domestic problem.
What we want is permanent peace, with-
drawal and guarantees on all fronts.
That is our basic position.
The President:
If we go to Geneva and put a broad
proposal forward and then get in a brawl
about the PLO, it could actually lead
further toward UN expulsion. The domestic
problemsin the United States would become
monumental.
SECRET NODIS
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-13-
The Secretary:
Beside we have no intention of failing.
The President is not as gentle as he
appears in his behavior.
The President:
I show my true nature with my old friends
in Congress. Speaking of Congress you
have a good delegation coming here with
the Speaker of the House. They have
great respect for you and Yugoslavia.
I think it would be useful for you to
have a frank discussion with them and
give them your analysis of the Middle
East situation. That would be very
helpful to us.
Tito:
I would be glad to do that.
The President: The Speaker is third in line for succession.
The Secretary:
The President is always extremely nervous
when he (Albert) moves up (to second
place) as has happened two times before.
The President:
I might say that, back in the times when
I used to talk to John Foster Dulles, he
told me of the excellent relations we had
with Yugoslavia on the question of arms
sales. I realize that there may be some
people in the bureaucracy who have not
given the proper attention and expedited
the request that you have made but when
I get back I will give this my personal
attention and I can assure you that the
matter will be resolved.
Tito:
We have bureaucrats on both sides. It
was very good of you to raise the question
because that saved me the trouble of
raising it.
The President:
I can speak very frankly about bureaucrats.
SECRET NODIS
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-14-
Tito:
I cannot because my Prime Minister is
here.
Kardelj:
I wonder if I could add a point about
the economic situation. Yugoslavia
has moved on now from the stage of
being a less-developed country. It has
great need for capital because it is
still developing. We believe that the
greatest source of capital can come from
the United States. We want to have a
larger connection of American capital to
our industry. In industry, agriculture,
technology, know-how, we would like to
get more from the United States. Although
our systems differ, we have a system that
enables us to use both public and private
groups to work to build our country. We
are preparing a new law on investment
which will make things easier for investors
from abroad. But we notice that there is
still mistrust in certain American circles.
It would be good for the United States
Administration to support this effort more
to help to create an atmosphere under which
trust can be developed in this cooperation.
The President:
I have been very impressed by what I have
seen and I understand that American industry
and capital have been very well received
here in Yugoslavia and have achieved many
successes. This has certainly strengthened
our ties. If there are special areas of
particular interest on the industrial side,
I would be glad to get into this matter, as
I have already said I will get into the
matter of military hardware.
I should add to what I said earlier that
the capacity of American industry depends
on our own economic strength. We have been
SECRET NODIS
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-15-
in a serious economic recession over
the past six to eight months but by
firm policies we have started to recover
in a constructive way. We are well ahead
of other major developed countries in our
recovery. But any outside impact, such as
an oil embargo, would severely affect our
ability to recover from recession and
that could set us back six months to a
year or longer. We want to expand our
relations throughout the world and to do
this we need a healthy American economy.
Minic:
If we want to improve the economy, we
also need to have better cooperation between
developed countries and less-developed
countries. That is why we are very interested
in the Seventh UN Special Session. We know
that the United States will play a key role
and indeed the outcome will depend in large
part on the position of the United States.
If I can ask a question I would like to
hear what your attitude is going to be on re-
lations between developed countries and
less-developed countries, especially since
the United States had reservations about the
way the Sixth Session went.
We have a very serious and explosive situation.
Thirty to forty less-developed countries
are in a catastrophic economic situation.
According to the GATT, there is a 30 to 40
billion dollar deficit on the trade account
for the LDCc. This is a problem that con-
cerns the whole world. We expect to have
a harsh debate in the UN and you will need to
have patience. One of the things that con-
cerns me is that, as I understand, there
has not even been an agreement yet on the
agenda for the meeting.
SECRET NODIS
SECRET -NODIS
-16-
The President: We will go to the UN session with a
very constructive attitude. The
Secretary will go there and indicate our
attitude. In the history of the United
States in the post war period--during my
whole term in the Congress since 1949--we
have been sympathetic and we have provided
leadership in helping the less-developed
countries. We have world-wide relations
and bilateral relations. The present crisis
is not our fault. It is due to the extreme
increase in oil prices. We want to work to
avoid a catastrophe. The Secretary will
have a constructive attitude. We recog-
nize the realities we find in the world
today.
Minic:
It is also fair to say that inflation has
played a role in the basic economic problems
of our world.
The Secretary:
The basic issue is--are we going to have
another ideological confrontation and no
practical results? If we defend the existing
system and you say the "new economic order"
is better, we will accomplish nothing. I
have made a tremendous effort and we are
telling all of our people to stop defending
the economic system.
We want to get down to special cases and see
whether we can't make progress. We will
make specific proposals on energy, raw
materials, financing, and development
designed to even out the fluctuations in
our economic trends. We are not in favor
of price stabilization schemes. We are in
favor, instead, of income stabilization which
would allow a certain amount of price fluc-
tuation to occur. We think that price
stabilization schemes would benefit mainly
countries like the United States and the
SECRET NODIS
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-17-
Soviet Union who are raw material
producers. But income stabilization
would help the least developed countries.
Minic:
As far as we know the less-developed
countries do not intend to have a philo-
sophical debate on the new economic
order. They intend to raise, however,
their special problems but I am worried
that it is impossible to reach an agreement
even on the agenda. The "Seventy-Seven"
have put forward the following list of
things to be discussed: trade in raw
materials; trade in industrial products;
monetary problems; technology problems;
and changes in the structure of the
United Nations to deal with development.
Your delegation has added "food" and "the
problems of the most seriously affected
countries (MSA) " We have been wondering
why there is already a tense atmosphere
on the agenda and we hope that you Americans
will help to make progress in this session.
The Secretary:
I have not followed in detail the question
of negotiations about the agenda but I can
tell you that we will have a constructive
attitude. We'll also support the consumer-
producer dialogue and we feel that, while
the UN session can discuss policy issues,
we can get down to specific negotiations
in the three or four commissions set up
under the Energy Conference. These
commissions would be on energy, raw materials,
development and finance.
Tito:
I would also like to have a discussion on
the relations between the United States and
the non-aligned world but I guess we do
not have time now. I would like to see how
we can establish contact. Maybe you and
Mr. Minic can discuss this in the car.
SECRET NODIS
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The Secretary: That is an excellent idea. We certainly
do lack this kind of contact.
The meeting ended at 11:30 a.m.
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