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August 5, 1975 - Ford, Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki
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August 5, 1975 - Ford, Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki
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This file contains mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
(SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
7516292
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: August 5, 1975
The White House
10:00 a.m.
SUBJECT:
President's First Meeting with
Prime Minister Miki
PARTICIPANTS: Prime Minister Takeo Miki
Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa
Ambassador Takeshi Yasukawa
Toshiki Kaifu, House of Representatives and
Deputy Cabinet Secretary
Sadaaki Numata, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Interpreter)
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador James D. Hodgson
General Brent Scowcroft, NSC
James J. Wickel, Department of State (Interpreter)
President: First of all let me say that I am most grateful
for the warm reception I and all of my associates received
in Tokyo last fall.
Miki: I appreciate the cordial reception I, my wife and the
members of my party are receiving here in Washington.
Before I left Tokyo for Washington I had an audience with the
Emperor, who asked me to convey to you his warm appreciation
for the thoughtful arrangements being made for his visit to
the United States this fall, and for the personal consideration
you have shown, Mr. President, in several areas including
whales. The Emperor also asked that I convey to you his warm
personal regards, and to tell you that he is looking forward
to meeting you again this fall.
President: When you return to your country, Mr. Prime Minister,
please convey my warmest regards to the Emperor. I look
forward to his visit early in October, and I am delighted to
hear that the arrangements are proceeding smoothly.
EA/P: JJWickel:rd
mu
(Drafting Office and Officer)
CLASSIFIED BY.
(3)
FORM
DS-1254
2-65
GERAL RALO GE R. FORD /BRART
SECRET
GDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5, 3.6
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guid
By let/dae NARA, Date 1/21/20 9/7/01
MR
01-52,
7/10/01
SECRET
-2-
KUALA LUMPUR TERRORISTS
Miki: I regret the unfortunate incident that occurred in
Kuala Lumpur. I regret it particularly because the guid-
ing principle throughout my political career has been to
promote dialogue and cooperation. And I regret it
especially because the terrorists who resorted to blatant
violence are Japanese.
I was first informed of this unfortunate incident at 2:00 a.m.
day before yesterday. I immediately called Tokyo and
instructed the Acting Prime Minister to organize a Task
Force to deal with it. I instructed him that respect for
human life and the safety of the hostages are to be given
top priority. I have been informed that a plane carrying
five of the seven prisoners whose release was demanded by
the terrorists left Japan about 2:00 a.m. (EDT) this morning,
and arrived at Kuala Lumpur about 8:30 a.m. (EDT). The
other two prisoners refused to go. No one knows yet where
these terrorists and released prisoners wish to go, but I
fervently hope the hostages in this regrettable incident
are released without harm.
President: I know these terrorists acted totally independent.
It is unfortunate that they are Japanese, but we recognize
that other terrorists from other countries do the same thing.
I am grateful, Mr. Prime Minister, that you are personally
involved.
Our nation's view is, was, and always will be as long as I
am President, that we cannot and should not respond to the
demands of terrorists. I know that some may feel our policy
does not respond to the lives and safety of hostages, but
if it were our policy to respond to terrorist demands, the
United States would become the repeated target of terrorists
who operate around the world.
Our instructions to our diplomats are not to respond to
terrorist demands under any circumstances. That is the only
way I know to meet forthrightly those foreign terrorists who
want to disrupt the world. I told the Secretary of State,
and he has told the Foreign Service not to respond to
terrorist demands. I appreciate that this might cause
difficulty for others, but I wanted you, Mr. Prime Minister,
to know what our policy is.
SECRET
SECRET
-3-
PURPOSE OF VISIT
Miki: Mr. President, I hope to have as forthright a
discussion as possible with you this morning, within the
limits of the time available. Let me say that when I met
you last January, when you were Vice President and I was
Deputy Prime Minister, I did not expect to meet you again
on such an occasion as this, with you as President and I as
Prime Minister.
On my first trip abroad in 1929 the United States was the
first country I visited. Later I studied for several years
in a university in California, although my English has since
gotten rusty. As a result of these experiences my whole
life and my 38-year career in the Diet have been guided by
the ideals of freedom and democracy. We have something in
common, Mr. President, our long careers in our nation's
legislatures, and I share with you the same strong faith in
democracy.
My purpose in this visit is to discuss frankly the whole
range of Japan-US relations to affirm the unshakeable friend-
ship between our two countries. I hope you will forgive me
if I happen to offend you with some of my questions, but may
I ask you about several matters of interest.
President: By all means. If we could not speak frankly
with each other, this meeting would not be beneficial.
EUROPE - CSCE
Miki: Turning to Europe, Mr. President, you just returned
from there last night. In everyone's eyes the European
Security Agreement appears to have resulted from Soviet efforts
to realize their original concept of freezing the status
quo in Europe. I am aware that the United States and other
nations attached conditions to their acceptance of participa-
tion in the Helsinki Conference, but what I wish to ask,
Mr. President, is what is your foremost diplomatic objec-
tive in the United States' Soviet policy?
President: First, let me comment on the CSCE. I believe
there is a lack of sufficient background information on
what the CSCE really does. In the first place, with respect
to borders, it reaffirms the borders agreed to in treaties
signed in 1947 and 1948, and nothing further, except in the
case of Germany, where the CSCE reaffirms the borders agreed
to by West Germany in 1971. Therefore, the CSCE does nothing
more than reaffirm borders agreed to in 1947, 1948 and 1971.
This point is not well enough understood.
SECRET
SECRET
-4-
Second, the CSCE Agreement adds an element of integrity
and morality, in terms of the right way of doing things,
so that the Soviet Union would not do again what it did
in the cases of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.
The Eastern Europeans, if I may interpret what they said
in the meetings and elsewhere, believe the CSCE is a
document that will prevent the kinds of action from being
taken as in the instances I described. They do not say
this is guaranteed, but they seem to feel they have added
protection that they didn't have before. In that sense
CSCE is constructive. We will have a meeting in Belgrade
in 1977, to review what happens in the subsequent two years.
My endorsement of CSCE is based on the good faith of those
who agreed to it, including the Soviets. I expect all 35
signatories to live up to the agreement language.
In our relations with the Soviet Union we do not agree
with their system (nor do they agree with ours). We do
not feel that detente between the Soviets and the United
States is a solution to all the world's problems, but it
can be used, and has been in some cases, to ease tensions
and avoid confrontations. I expect it to continue as a
vehicle for those purposes.
Detente is a two-way street; it is not all one-way for
the Soviets (and won't be as long as I am President). It
is a mechanism for use at a time of rising tensions and
confrontation. In some cases it has been disappointing, in
other cases helpful. I do not mean that it is one-sided.
It is mutually beneficial, and hopefully, can help solve
some of the problems facing the world.
Secretary: If I may add a word, Mr. President, the debate
about CSCE is totally cynical. It is generated by those
who for 20 years advocated the exact opposite of what they
now say. As the President has said, there are two realities
in Europe, frontiers and political influence. There has
been Yalta, and then the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 and
1948, and the German Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971.
As a result there are no contested frontiers in Europe.
To talk about frontiers is to reaffirm Treaties and legal
language.
The political influence of the Soviets in Eastern Europe
is not related to this conference. The Soviet Union has
some 40,000 tanks between the Urals and the Elbe, and no
CSECRET
FORD a RALD LIBRARY
SECRET
-5-
Western nation wants to build that many tanks. Until some-
one does these critics are only engaging in an exercise
of expressing demogogic platitudes.
I'm talking very frankly, but then I didn't have much sleep
last night. I'm reading a new novel about Japan ("Shogun")
and realize everything I'm doing is totally wrong.
Strategically we wish to weaken Soviet political influence
in Eastern Europe, not confirm it. And we believe we can
weaken it more effectively by detente than we could by cold
war. During the cold war period we could use military
force, but under detente we must use diplomacy.
If the President can be welcomed by tens of thousands as
he was in Warsaw, Bucharest, Kracow, and Belgrade, this
weakens the Soviet Union. This could not have happened with-
out detente.
We are under no illusions about the Soviet Union. If they
have the opportunity to use pressure, they will do SO. We
(and you) must adopt positions that our domestic opponents
can't attack if we have to resist. I used the example yester-
day of the prize-ring - is it better for us to fight flat-
footed in mid-ring where we can be hit easily, or to move
around and make ourselves harder to hit? Then if the Soviets
do something, and we can tell our people we have done all
we can for peace, we will be in a stronger position to
resist.
If we look at the Middle East, detente has not helped the
Soviet Union. We do not aim at hegemony, and dividing
the world between us, because that would be suicidal. We
wish to contain the Soviet Union with modern methods, which
are not those of the cold war period but are entirely new.
SALT, MBFR
Miki: Based on the outcome of the CSCE conference what
prospects do you see for further progress in SALT and MBFR?
President: I had two meetings with General Secretary
Brezhnev, in which we made some headway on SALT. There
are some problems which are very technical, and some which
are very fundamental. I believe the odds on an agreement
are better than 50-50, but not certain. We will continue
to negotiate. I believe that SALT is in the interest of
the entire world as well as US-Soviet relations. We will
R.
FORD
SECRET
HALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
-6-
continue to work at it, but we will insist that whatever
materializes must be mutually beneficial.
Regarding MBFR, we recognize that the negotiations have
been stalled for some time. We are working with our
European allies to try to develop a position that might move
the talks forward, but this depends on the reaction the
Soviets have.
We believe that a MBFR that reduces military forces on an
equitable basis is in the best interest of Europe, but
the talks are stalemated. We hope the Soviets will be as
flexible as we will. We will continue to work closely
with our allies so that our efforts will lead to greater
unity and not split us.
When are the MBFR talks scheduled to reconvene Henry?
Secretary: September, Mr. President.
CSCE EFFECT ON ASIA
Miki: Turning to the repercussions generated in Asia by
the CSCE, the Soviets extended an invitation on July 30
to (LDP Diet Member) Hirohide Ishida, Chairman of the
Japan-Soviet Parliamentarians Friendship Association, to
hold a meeting to discuss an Asian Security Conference.
In the long term, although it may not be visible yet
except in special circumstances, what the Asians are most
sensitive to is Soviet and Chinese influence in Asia. The
Chinese, for example, view the Asian Security Conference
proposed by the Soviets as an attempt to encircle them
Secretary: They're right.
Miki:
and therefore oppose any third nation hegemony.
The Treaty of Peace and Friendship Japan is negotiating
with China, as you know, has been stalled by opposition to
the inclusion of the hegemony clause. It is obvious that
the Chinese are vigilant against any increase in Soviet
influence in Asia. What do you feel will be the effect
of the CSCE on this trend in Asia, in the context of Soviet
influence?
President: First let me speak about the United States'
relations with the People's Republic. Our relations were
initiated by Mr. Nixon. I fully support these relations,
FORD
SECRET
LIBRARY
SECRET
-7-
and believe they are of vital importance. I expect to
go to the People's Republic sometime late this fall. I
feel that our relations are moving along on schedule. The
Shanghai document is the basis for continuing and expand-
ing our relations. I see no serious problem developing in
that regard.
We all recognize that there is competition in Asia between
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic. We believe
that our continuing relations with China are important in
maintaining stability in Asia, and we will make every
effort, in a responsible manner, to broaden our relations
with the People's Republic. Secondly, we expect to main-
tain continued close relations with your government, Mr.
Prime Minister. We feel this is vitally important for the
stability and security of the Pacific. I have been
encouraged by our discussions in Japan, and this morning.
Tomorrow we can reaffirm the importance of our relations.
I recognize there are problems in the Pacific area, not in
our relations but in peripheral areas. We should be frank
in discussing those relations, as they refer to relations
between the United States and Japan.
Therefore, we seek to broaden our relations with China,
while maintaining and strengthening our relations with Japan.
This will have an impact on the influence of the Soviet
Union in the Pacific area. Henry, have you anything to
add?
Secretary: I was asked in Helsinki about an Asian collec-
tive security conference, and said if there is such a meeting,
it would take place without the United States. I do not
think Asia can be compared with the situation in Europe.
Miki: I agree.
Secretary: We will not partiopate in an Asian collective
security conference, or anything of that kind.
Second, we believe the Soviet Union is trying to encircle
China, and in no way do we wish to participate. China has
its own aspirations, and in ten years may cause trouble for
all of us, including Japan, but at the present time it is not
in our interest to weaken China. Therefore, we will not
cooperate with the Soviets in any anti-Chinese maneuver in
Asia. It was for that reason that we signed the Shanghai
Communique, with its hegemony clause. We knew what we wereford
doing, and made it explicit.
HALD
LIBRAR
SECRET
30
SECRET
-8-
SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION IN ASIA
Miki: How do you view the present state of the Sino-Soviet
conflict in Asia?
President: I might repeat what I heard from a number of
sources in Helsinki. The Soviet Union has 44 divisions on
the Chinese border. That certainly indicates to me that
their relations are not better, and may even be considerably
worse than before.
As the Secretary said, we do not adopt a policy of favoring
one over the other, but at the same time we will keep our
relations with you, Mr. Prime Minister, because of the
strong influence of our relations on peace and stability in
Asia.
Secretary: If there is a danger it is that Japan might
over-analyze our policy, and initiate a leap-frog exercise
that would be detrimental to both our interests. We are not
following a parallel policy with the Soviets in Asia, but if
Japan does something to get ahead of us, we might have to do
something. Thus it is very important that we coordinate our
policies toward the Soviet Union and China. We should not
cooperate in the Soviet efforts to isolate China.
Miki: On my part, I believe we should have a full under-
standing of your China policy. Therefore, I wish to ask
your view of the prospects for improving your relations with
China, and how far you might go, Mr. President, in develop-
ing your relations during your visit to China?
Also, I would appreciate hearing a frank explanation of your
long-term policy views regarding China.
President: As I said just a few minutes ago the Shanghai
Communique is the basic document by which we are proceeding
to develop our relations with China. We feel, and we believe
the People's Republic feels, that our relations are within
the context of the Shanghai Communique.
As I said, I will visit China later in the fall. There is
no agenda, and no details have been worked out. The Secretary
will probably go to the People's Republic before my visit,
and at that time the agenda will be finalized.
We have made no commitment at this time with regard to our
relations with Peking except in the context of the Shanghai
Communique.
&
FORD
SECRET
LIBRARY
SECRET\
-9-
Secretary: Peking has told us that we need not complete the
process of normalization to have a successful visit. We do
not believe it desirable this year, after the tragedy in
Indochina. On top of that we would not wish to bring about
a political change in our relations with Taiwan, all the
more so since if we did not recognize Taiwan, we could not
honor our defense treaty with a part of a country. We have
told the Chinese we have no desire for a change in the legal
status of our relations, but we do wish to improve our
relations.
Miki: I have the feeling the PRC wants to see the status
quo maintained in Taiwan for the present.
Secretary: That is our impression.
President: That is an interesting observation. They have
pressed us, but just enough to say they have pressed us.
Secretary: The biggest problem for us is our newsmen who go
to China and plead with the Chinese to say something about
Taiwan that they would never volunteer. As you know, Mr.
Prime Minister, we have the Jackson Amendment relating
emigration. I told Chiao Kuan-hua if China wants MFN treat-
ment, they will have to allow free emigration. Chiao replied
that we can have 30 million Chinese any time we want.
Miki: I accept your statements as authoritative, since you
know the Chinese psychology best. I myself feel confident
that Peking does not desire any abrupt change.
Secretary: I believe that is correct.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Miki: In preparation for these meetings, Mr. President, I
sent Saburo Okita, a well-known economist and President of
Japan Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, to the ASEAN
nations as my Special Envoy to get a feel for the post-
Vietnam situation. Also, our Chiefs of Missions from the
Southeast Asian countries met in Tokyo in July to discuss
the situation.
On the basis of Okita's report and the discussions in the
Chiefs of Mission Conference I have concluded that the real
intent of the SEA nations is to develop a greater degree of
stability. If they have learned one lesson from the
experience, it is that they must concentrate on
VietnamFORD LIBRARY
SECRET
SEGRET
-10-
stabilizing their own political situations and improving
the livelihood of their peoples. The leaders of these
nations currently are making many public statements that
create a certain superficial impression, but I believe they
are doing this for reasons of domestic politics. I believe
what they really want is a continued American presence.
President: Do you mean the Philippines?
Miki: Yes, and Thailand too. They realize that the United
States can continue to be a great force in assisting their
own efforts, and as the emotions of the Vietnam War cool
they are making a post-war assessment that they need the
great power of the United States. Therefore, I feel that
whatever the Thais say about opposing U.S. military bases,
or the Philippines say about ending American extraterri-
toriality on military bases does not alter what they have
in the back of their minds. The Prime Ministers of Thailand
and the Philippines have both recently visited Peking, follow-
ing which one may detect a subtle change in their statements.
I believe that Peking also wants the United States to main-
tain its presence, or course, in the context of the Soviet
threat.
I wish to make the point that it would be a mistake to argue
that the SEA nations are drifting away from the United States.
They believe there is a role for the United States to play,
and I believe it important for the United States to maintain
its interest in Asia.
Japan, of course, also has a crucial interest, and should
cooperate with the United States in this area. Indeed, Japan-
US cooperation is the basic premise underlying the peace and
security of Asia and the Pacific. What is needed at this
time is an understanding of the needs of these small, power-
less countries in Asia, and the dynamics by which they func-
tion.
President: I appreciate your frank views. I respect the
way you have assimilated the reports of your Special Envoy
and your Ambassadors. It offers us a good insight into the
problems of this area. But let me say frankly that American
public opinion, rightly or wrongly, is affected by what the
leaders of other countries say. All Americans are not
sufficiently sophisticated to detect what is happening behind
the scenes. In some cases American citizens have been dismayed
FORD
SECRET
SECRET
-11-
by the words of one leader of another country or another
around the world, not just in SEA, and this has an impact
on the Congress. I and the Secretary of State and you, Mr.
Prime Minister, understand there is a difference between
words and actions. However, leaders in other countries
should understand that the support I wish to give our
friends in Europe, Asia and elsewhere depends on public
opinion. I hope therefore they moderate their language as
we try to continue working with them. Otherwise the Congress
that I must work with won't give me the kind of support I
need.
I firmly believe the United States should play a global
role, in Europe and the Pacific, but to achieve this I need
the backing of the Congress, and this can be affected by
the words of foreign leaders, especially if Americans don't
see behind the scenes. We wish to work with you, and will,
but we won't be able to do our best without the support of
the American people, who have been deeply traumatized by
Vietnam.
That was a great disappointment, especially for me. I
believe the American people want us to be strong in the
Pacific -- I do -- but that requires the understanding of
the leaders of those countries.
Miki: As a fellow, life-long parliamentarian I can appreciate
how difficult your problems are. However, Mr. President,
I hope you understand that the end of the war in Vietnam
is a turning point in Asia. Freed of the emotional
complexities of the war the leaders there can now think of
the future of their own countries. They want to stake their
fate on a non-Communist future, but if they are to realize
their aspirations, it will be necessary to give them some
basis for confidence in the future. If not, they may become
confused about their destiny. We should extend them support,
otherwise if their determination wavers, they face an un-
certain future. Therefore, it devolves on us, the democracies,
to help them strengthen their own nations. We should try to
prevent any uncertainty, by which I mean their coming under
the influence of a Communist country. I hope you understand
that this is a great turning point. Japan will do its part,
and will keep in close touch with the United States.
President: I assure you, Mr. Prime Minister, that we will
keep close contact, liaison, and working relations. I
recognize the problems these nations face, and we want,
and will help, because it is important for the preservation
of the values and the kind of government we believe in.
R.
FORD
SECRET
SECRET
-12-
Close working relations will be necessary if we are to meet
the challenges presented in that part of the world.
Miki: It is in this spirit that I intend to call on the
leaders of the industrial democracies of the Pacific --
Canada, Australia, New Zealand -- to step up their coopera-
tion both bilaterally and multilaterally.
KOREA
Miki: Do we have time this morning to talk about Korea?
President: We could talk about it tonight, or tomorrow.
Secretary: With respect to Korea in the UN, the United
States absolutely cannot vote for the admission of North and
South Vietnam to the UN in the same year as the defeat in
Indochina.
Miki: Foreign Minister Miyazawa will convey our views to
you in detail.
Secretary: We can discuss this matter at lunch. We are not
asking Japan's support on Vietnam, but we do have Japan's
support for South Korea. If South Korea is admitted to the
UN, we could vote for both Vietnams.
President: We would wage a vigorous fight against the
admission of North and South Vietnam into the UN in 1975
without the admission of South Korea. We feel extremely
strongly about this.
Secretary: We could understand if you were to vote differently
on Vietnam, but we do ask your strong support on South
Korea.
Miki: I understand your position, Mr. President; Miyazawa
will elaborate our views at lunch.
President: I appreciate our candid, friendly exchange this
morning. It has been most constructive. It is a great
pleasure to see you again, Mr. Prime Minister.
Miki: I also appreciate your candor, Mr. President, and
look forward to seeing you again this evening.
B.
FORD
SECRET
HALD
2a
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
7516291
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: August 5, 1975
The White House
7:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
President's Tete-a-Tete with
Prime Minister
PARTICIPANTS: Prime Minister Takeo Miki
Masao Kunihiro, Advisor to Prime Minister (Interpreter)
The President
James J. Wickel, Department of State (Interpreter)
Miki: Thank you for taking the time to receive me this evening.
I know you. must be tired after your trip.
President: I feel good.
Miki: You're still in good shape because of your training as
an athlete.
President: No, I'm a has been. But I do sleep well on a plane.
I got 5 or 6 hours sleep on the plane and 4 more here last
night, I feel good.
Miki: I find it easy to talk to Parliamentarians who are
elected to office, like you, Mr. President.
President: I feel the same way, Mr. Prime Minister.
POLITICAL PROSPECTS: JAPAN
Miki: You and I, Mr. President, also came to our present
offices under similar conditions, you after Watergate and I
after Tanaka's financial scandal. However, I have led a long
life as a Parliamentarian and feel that the circumstances which
brought me to power were not limited to Tanaka's financial
scandal. I believe it involved a deeper problem that we face,
that is, that popular support for "conservative democracy" in
Japan is weakening, and if the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
wishes to remain in power, it must practice "liberal democracy."
EA/P:JJW1ckel:rd John 8/6/75
(3)
(Drafting Office and Officer)
CLASSIFIED BY.
FORM DS- 1254
CONEIDENTIAL/EXDIS
2-65
DECLASSIFIED
LERRARY GERALD FORD
GDS
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5,3.4
NSC By let/dae Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
NARA,
Date
9/7/01
52,
;
7/10
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
-2-
The LDP has become increasingly a "conservative democratic"
party. In each of the three elections conducted since 1967,
when its share of the vote first fell below 50 percent,
the LDP vote declined, to 46.9 percent in the most recent
General Election in 1972. In the Upper House election last
July its vote was 39.8 percent. But I believe strongly that
the LDP is the only force for stability in government.
However, I have also been telling the Japan Socialist Party,
the largest of the four opposition parties, that it should
act more responsibly like a "shadow government." As you know
the JSP and the other opposition parties differ sharply from
the LDP in defense and foreign policies. The JSP is chang-
ing a bit, but we will have to wait and see how much. In the
meantime, though, I can appreciate the fact that you, Mr.
President, might view this situation in Japan with some un-
easiness.
Like you, Mr. President, my accession to power was unexpected,
and I have not yet been "baptized" by the people; and late
this year, or next year I will have to seek the approval of
the people for my government in an election. I believe I
came to power because of the consistency of the positions I
have advocated throughout my 38 years as an LDP Dietman, and
I am confident that the election results will lead to a more
stable government supported by the people. I am also con-
fident that I will serve a full three-year term.
For these reasons, therefore, I wish to maintain a dialog
with you in the spirit of full candor. I might add there
may be some things you ask of me that I can do, and some that
I cannot. If I say I can do something, I will do it, and
if I can't, I will say so for I believe we can only continue
to cooperate on a basis of mutual trust.
President: That is the only way to do things.
Miki: Therefore, I hope to keep in close touch with you.
President: Mr. Prime Minister, first of all let me thank
you on a personal basis for the frankness and candor with
which you have reviewed the Japanese situation. Your leader-
ship is of the kind that could perpetuate strong support
for the leadership in Japan. In my Congressional experience
I have come to know those who can do this, and those who
can't. Based on our discussions today and several months
ago you seem to me to be the kind of leader we want as a
working partner.
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May I ask, Mr. Prime Minister, in your system do you have
the capability of deciding the timing of an election?
Miki: Yes. That is my biggest prerogative -- I can call
an election any time it is to my advantage.
President: In our system we have no choice.
Miki: Mr. President, I wish you every success next year.
President: Thank you very much. You seem to share the views
I have.
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
President: Japan is a good ally, West Germany is a good ally,
France is a very good ally which is a good development and
Britain is a good ally, as are other countries. If we are to
combat some of the trends that will come if we have bad
economic conditions, we must try to work together. My
impression of what Giscard, Wilson and Schmidt said is that
if we don't improve the economic climate, the political
climate could have an adverse effect on the developed indus-
trial nations of the world. Japan has a big stake in this.
Therefore we talked in general about the problem without
any commitment, but we all felt that it could be disastrous
for democratic government if we were to have adverse economic
conditions develope in the future.
Our economic picture is improving, but we can't do it alone --
we have to coordinate how we can work together to achieve
a coordinated plan. We wish to work with you because your
re-election is vital to Japan and the industrial nations we
represent.
COALITION POLITICS
President: I apologize for not knowing much about the JSP,
but I am always apprehensive about compromising with the wrong
people (based on my own experience in Congress). Is the
JSP responsibly led? Does it have good ideology? Would you
feel confident, and do you feel I would feel confident with
the JSP in a coalition?
Miki: I have no intention of forming a coalition. The LDP
must continue to hold the government for a considerable period,
but not permanently. Our views differ greatly from those of
the JSP, but I feel we need the JSP to understand our position;
in other words, to put the JSP in the position of agreeing to
disagree.
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The opposition parties all criticized my visit to the
United States, in the public press, to spare Japan becom-
ing subservient or overburdened. But privately the chair-
men of all the opposition parties, except the Japan
Communist Party (JCP) telephoned to wish me well. They are
in the process of changing, and I will continue my policy
of avoiding confrontation, and seeking dialog and coopera-
tion.
President: By way of analogy, we feel very strongly that
the problem in Europe is that some governments among our
allies will accept the Communist Party into a coalition.
We are totally opposed to such a coalition. NATO cannot be
strong with a communist party in the government in Italy or
elsewhere. We can't have a strong NATO on that basis.
I have told the Italians this, and I believe it is equally
true elsewhere.
Miki: Last year we had local elections in April, after I
became Prime Minister, and while the LDP couldn't recapture
the Governerships of Tokyo and Osaka held by opposition party
incumbents, we won all the other governorships. The LDP
also gained over 100 seats in local assemblies, while the
JCP lost some. I don't believe the JCP will continue to grow,
and I won't let them.
President: May I ask a question. You are the best authority,
but is the JCP internationally oriented, or domestically?
Miki: The JCP has some contact with the Soviet Union, but
it is generally domestically oriented.
President: Is it oriented more to Moscow than Peking?
Miki: The JCP is at loggerheads with Peking; their rela-
tions are very bad.
President: That's very interesting.
GISCARD PROPOSAL
Miki: I agree with your remarks, Mr. President, on Giscard's
proposal for a five-power economic conference, and did so
publicly in the press, that is that a preliminary conference
would be required to establish an agenda. I would hope that
this would come as a U.S. initiative. I believe Giscard's
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proposal to discuss only monetary problems is too "narrow",
and the five advanced industrial powers should discuss the
full spectrum of economic matters.
President: I think we should proceed on an informal basis,
rather than formal. I don't know your situation, but I
think an informal arrangement -- for discussions by a person
you would name, and persons named by Giscard, Wilson and
Schmidt -- would be a better way to lay the groundwork. We
have a great mutual interest in doing something, but the
minute this becomes formal, it complicates my problems at
home. What we want is results, not public acclaim. We
want success, and economic success would be of the greatest
importance economically and politically from the standpoint
of the developed industrial nations.
Our situation looks good, but we can't go it alone. All
the nations should improve their economic circumstances if
we are to be successful as nations in the free world.
Miki: May I infer that you would agree to convene a five-
power conference as long as preparations are made in informal
talks?
President: Generally, yes, but that depends on how well the
representatives of the five powers lay the foundation. It
would be disastrous if we entered negotiations at the Summit
with disagreements among us. We should agree in advance to
coordinate our views.
Miki: I agree.
President: We would agree to hold the conference if there
are adequate preparations, but if there are disagreements,
we could not hold it.
J.S.-JAPAN COOPERATION
President: Mr. Prime Minister, I believe our talks this
morning, and this evening man-to-man, have been construc-
tive. It is important that the United States and Japan
cooperate. You and I will do so. I wish you the best and
know you will enjoy success in your election. We expect to
succeed in our election, 14 months from now. All I can see
for you is pluses, not minuses.
Miki: I believe mutual trust between the top leaders is the
most important key to successful diplomatic relations. The
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leaders must know each other as human beings. With
your understanding and assistance I know Japan and the
United States can have that kind of successful relations.
As I said earlier, I will tell you "no" in all frankness
when there is something I can't do for you.
President: And the reverse of that is if I disagree, I
hope we can keep the level of our rhetoric low, because
a public display is not good.
Miki: Of course.
President: We should minimize any disagreement.
Miki: It is not good taste in a friendly relationship to
accentuate differences publicly.
President: In the Congress (and I am a product of the
Congress) there is an old saying "We can disagree without
being disagreeable. "
Miki: Like yourself, Mr. President, I am a product of the
Diet. My government is dedicated to clean politics and re-
form, which meets some resistance from some sectors of the
LDP, but not as much as the press reports.
President: Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister. This talk has
been very constructive. May I escort you downstairs to
dinner.
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26.
DePARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
August 12, 1975
UNCLASSIFIED
(with Secret attachments)
(and Confidential Exdis attachments)
MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Memoranda of Conversation
The President's Meetings with Prime
Minister Miki
The Department of State hereby transmits the
attached Memoranda of Conversation of the President's
meetings with Prime Minister Miki of Japan on August
5 and 6.
The Department is withholding distribution
within the Department of State and to the American
Embassy, Tokyo, pending your approval.
C.Arth
C. Arthur Borg
Acting Executive Secretary
Attachments:
1. The President's Tete-a-tete with Prime Minister
Miki
2. The President's First Meeting with Prime
Minister Miki
3. The President's Second Meeting with Prime
Minister Miki
UNCLASSIFIED
(with Secret attachments)
FRALO 18 R. FORD CIBRARY
(and Confidential Exdis attachments)
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