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1553222
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September 9, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership
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1553222
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document
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September 9, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership
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collections
Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Israel
Egypt
Foreign aid
Middle East conflicts
Sinai Accord between Egypt and Israel, 1975
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1975-09-09
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9
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1975
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1975-09-09
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9
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1975
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
PRESIDENT FORD
Bipartisan Leadership
Secretary Kissinger
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
DATE AND TIME:
Tuesday, September 9, 1975
Cabinet Room
SUBJECT:
Middle East -- Sinai Agreement
Kissinger : The events of 1973 show us that the Middle East conflict produces
a danger of great power conflict, and also enormous economic dislocation.
Also, our commitment to Israel produces our involvement in any conflict.
A comprehensive approach would have been easy to devise but it tends to
put the radicals in the driver's seat ; it gives the Soviet Union a strong role,
and it forces Israel to make many decisions all at once which it is not equip-
ped to do. So we chose an interim approach.
Egypt is the largest Arab state and the leader of the Arab world. The problem
has been to reconcile Egypt's concrete territorial needs as against the intangible
political needs of Israel. The March negotiations failed when the gap between the
these could not be bridged. Both Egypt and Israel preferred that we continue the
interim approach.
This is the first agreement between Israel and Egypt execpt in the aftermath of
a war. It makes far-reaching moves toward peace and a new relationship between
the two countries.
[He describes the map, the zones of limited armaments, and the surveillance
stations].
The Israelis insisted that unless there were purely Americans in the passes, they
wouldn't withdraw. Egypt said she couldn't accept unless Israel withdrew, so
we reluctantly agreed. The American technicians are in the UN zone. Their
function is to reassure the two sides in time of peace. If conflict breaks out,
their function is over, so we would have no problem withdrawing them in case of
conflict--or on a joint resolution of congress to do this. Those people shouldn't
be compared to Vietnam but to the UN forces in the neutral zone.
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
CONFIDENTIAL
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state 3/10/04
GERALD
BY
NARA. DATE 6/2/04
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
Bellmon: How about the danger of attack by terrorists?
Kissinger: It would be about impossible for them to get at them in the zone.
It is within the UN zone and is uninhabited. There is more of a danger at
their bases in Egypt than on duty, but any American anywhere in the Middle
East is a target. It is almost imposs ible to guard completely against terrorism.
Sadat, himself, is in great jeopardy. He has taken risks for peace. But he
is the only one who has thrown over the Soviet Union and the only one who has
gained anything from this settlement. If we can make this work, it will be a
good object lesson on cooperating with the U.S.
The aid package should not be looked at as payment for the agreement. Israel
asked for $2. 6 billion before the agreement. The increment resulting from the
agreement is slight, even thought we will provide less than $2.6 billion. We
haven't arrived at a figure for Egypt, but it is important to show the benefits
for cooperation with the U.S. It is essential that we show our interest in Egypt's
economic development.
CONFIDENTIAL
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12058, SEC. 3.5
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