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September 16, 1975 - Scowcroft, Ambassador Charles Whitehouse (Thailand)
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1553232
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document
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September 16, 1975 - Scowcroft, Ambassador Charles Whitehouse (Thailand)
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Thailand
Diego Garcia (British Indian Ocean Territory)
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1975-09-16
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1975
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1975-09-16
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9
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1975
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
a
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6
OSD 1/8/09
MR01-126 #3; state review 3/11/04
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
dal
NARA
DATE
3/26/09
PARTICIPANTS:
Charles Whitehouse, U.S. Ambassador to
Thailand
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Robert Miller, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asia
Thomas J. Barnes, Senior Staff Member,
NSC
DATE, TIME &
September 16, 1975
PLACE:
11:00 a.m.
General Scowcroft's Office
After an exchange of pleasantries, General Scowcroft commented
that things seemed to be looking up in Thailand.
Whitehouse: The situation has changed remarkably.
Scowcroft: There appears to be an entirely different atmosphere. Is
it just appearances or are the Thai settling down?
Whitehouse: The Thai were like new kids in March (when Prime
Minister Khukrit Pramot took office). It was just like Joe Alsop
taking over the American Government. (Khukrit was Thailand's
most prominent journalist.) A 14-mule hitch. Then came the fall
of Cambodia, the second belt from the collapse of Vietnam, and
finally the Mayaguez. The Thai naively thought they could romance
North Vietnam. They now know how hard it is to deal with the North
Vietnamese. They have become more prudent, and they are spending
their own dough on 16, 000 M-16s. The usual temptation for countries
like these is to buy an aircraft carrier.
From their perspective we have arrived at a reasonable solution
in that there will be no American combat-types in Thailand after
March. The political acceptability of the U.S. forces that remain
SECRET GDS
SECRET
2
will depend on Thai-izing them. By that time we could be well
down the pike in Thai-izing Ramasun (the 7th Radio Research
Field Station). Kokha (Air Station) could become a Thai base.
We could call it the "Joint U.S. -Thai Space Research Center".
There is no reason why the Thai Commander couldn't come in,
read all the fancy graphs on missile flights, and pass the word
to the Prime Minister of the things in the air. The Thai them-
selves can run the seismic thing (Detachment 415 at Chiangmai).
I like to avoid the words Diego Garcia. I believe we can work out
an aircraft transit agreement for Utapao. The words "re-entry
rights" scare the Thai. So I prefer to use the term "transit".
The planes could be in transit to anywhere -- not just to Diego
Garcia. Perhaps 200 to 300 fellows at Utapao would be enough.
They would man the TACAN (Tactical Aid to Navigation), and ALS
(Approach Landing System), and supervise a contract for mess
facilities. I think the Thai would be perfectly willing to have gaggles
of aircraft come in to Utapao if there was a typhoon.
Scowcroft: The decision will be forthcoming on the withdrawals.
Whitehouse: When Khukrit talks about combat forces, there is no
heartburn if a few guys are left behind nailing up crates after
March 20. On the other hand, it would be unfortunate to fiddle
around too long before getting a decision on the withdrawal of
combat forces. I would love to get instructions early in October.
The Thai have a lot of problems in relation to our withdrawals.
They will be inheriting a lot of real estate. They have to make
arrangements to mow the grass.
Scowcroft: What is the attitude about occasionally rotating squadrons
in?
Whitehouse: I raised this question in the context of exercises.
Khukrit asked why we would want to send in American planes. He
said the Thai aircraft would probably run into them.
We held a joint naval exercise with the Thai this summer. Hanoi
screamed about it. The Thai are not going on their knees to Hanoi,
but they do not want to appear truculent. They have recently chucked
out the Lao leaders who took refuge there. They want to avoid any-
thing that causes trouble with their regional neighbors.
SECRET - GDS
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3
Scowcroft: I had the impression that the Thai are relatively satisfied
with their Chinese neighbors.
Whitehouse: It is hard to explain. The Thai came back from Peking
convinced that the atmosphere of their talks, particularly those
with Mao, was highly favorable. Khukrit is not naive. He is
not taking the Chinese word that the radio station (the Voice of
the People of Thailand) is no longer emanating from Chinese soil.
It has been fixed at Kunming (capital of Yunnan Province) since
Marconi. But the Thai came away from China with a great sense
of reassurance. For one thing, they share Peking's perception of
Hanoi as the bad boy on the block.
Scowcroft: It seems as though the Chinese relaxed them a little
about us, too.
Whitehouse: We don't have any evidence.
Scowcroft: It seems to me
Miller: There have been some Chinese statements that the Thai might
want to keep some U.S. forces in Thailand, that the Chinese under-
stand Thai motives.
Barnes: There was also the Chinese parable about not letting the
tiger in the front door while you're letting the wolf out the back.
Whitehouse: The great word in Asia is hegemony. The Chinese talk
about Russian hegemony. The Russians talk about Chinese hegemony.
They both talk about North Vietnamese hegemony. I would like to get
the troop withdrawal thing settled. The kaleidoscope is fixed right
now. I would like to get the Thai pinned down before it moves, so
we can operate our gas station and hotel at Utapao.
Scowcroft: I will see whether I can pry that paper loose from Defense.
Defense professes to be in a hurry to draw down, but the paper is two
months overdue.
Whitehouse: It is hard to keep the boys busy in Thailand. Also, the
Thai have a sense of some uncertainty because of speculation that
the U.S. is abandoning the mainland of Asia, and retreating to island
SECRET - GDS
SECRET
4
defense. I recommend that we include references to the Thai,
along with Singapore and other countries, in Presidential speeches.
Scowcroft: There was the time he mentioned Taiwan when he
shouldn't have. We want to do what we can to reassure the Thai.
Miller: They seemed to be pleased with our stand on SEATC.
Whitehouse: If New Jersey Zinc comes in with a $90 million smelter
south of Chinag Mai, that will help. The Thai were told after Saigon's
fall that they were the next domino.
Scowcroft: We will do what we can. Jack Nicklaus did not go to
Thailand because he feared for his life. The Association called us
two or three times. We said there was no reason why he shouldn't
go.
Whitehouse: Instead of Nicklaus they are about to have Flip Wilson.
I would like to get the key issue of troop withdrawal resolved. A
minor item that might come up is that if everything (all residual
forces) falls under MAG, we would have to have MAP financing.
No reason why (Brig. Gen.) HeineAderholdt (JUSMAG Commander)
couldn't be two-hatted, and given court-martial authority (over forces
outside JUSMAG). The feeders and keepers at Utapao will not need a
super-duper command. I will talk along these lines at Defense.
Miller: My feeling after discussion with Bill Crowe and Mort
Abramowitz (ISA) is that this is more a technical arrangement.
Whitehouse: Perhaps he could be double-hatted as MAG Chief and
Defense Attache'.
Thai forces are a pretty flimsy outfit. I think we should lean on the
austere side in terms of residual presence so we don't have too
much to evacuate in the event of military necessity. If we can get
along without Kokha, let's do so.
There is not much hope for a U-2 program. The U-2 has the spy
plane tag hung on it.
Scowcroft: I think we can survive on that one.
SECRET - GDS
1b
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
6249
SECRET - GDS
ACTION
September 16, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES $
SUBJECT:
Memorandum of Conversation
Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of conversation covering your
meeting with Ambassador Charles Whitehouse on September 16, 1975.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the memorandum of conversation at Tab A.
APPROVE 10 DISAPPROVE
FORD
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in 6/3/04
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SCHLESINGER, J
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CODEWORD
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SUBJECT:
Minicor of Scowerg mt, of Anz Charles
Whitchouse or 16 Sep 1975
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