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September 25, 1975 - Ford, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership
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1553241
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September 25, 1975 - Ford, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership
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Michel, Robert Henry, 1923-2017
McFall, John J. 1918-2006
Byrd, Robert Carlyle, 1917-2010
Marsh, John O., 1926-
Cannon, James M. (James Monroe), III, 1918-2011
Moss, Frank E., 1911-2003
Eastland, James Oliver, 1904-1986
Loen, Vernon Carroll, 1931-
Albert, Carl Bert, 1908-2000
O'Neill, Thomas Philip, Jr., 1912-1994
Lynn, James Thomas, 1927-2010
Rockefeller, Nelson A. (Nelson Aldrich), 1908-1979
Zarb, Frank G., 1935-
Rumsfeld, Donald, 1932-
Hartmann, Robert Trowbridge, 1917-
Cheney, Dick 1941-2025
Kissinger, Henry, 1923-2023
O'Donnell, Patrick Emmett, 1937-
Scowcroft, Brent, 1925-
Nessen, Ron, 1934-
Leppert, Charles, 1932-
Buchen, Philip W. (Philip William), 1916-2001
Morton, Rogers C. B., 1914-
Mansfield, Mike, 1903-2001
Loeffler, Thomas Gilbert, 1946-
Curtis, Carl T. (Carl Thomas), 1905-2000
Kendall, William Thomas, 1921-
Wolthuis, Robert K., 1935-
Ford, Gerald R., 1913-2006
Anderson, John Bayard, 1922-2017
Scott, Hugh Doggett., Jr., 1900-1994
Greenspan, Alan, 1926-
Friedersdorf, Max L. (Max Lee), 1929-
collections
Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
subjects
Greece
Turkey
Cyprus
Israel
Helsinki Agreement, 1975
Sinai Accord between Egypt and Israel, 1975
Arms transfers
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1975
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1975-09-25
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1975
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
6475
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ADMINISTRATIVELY
CONFIDENTIAL
September 25, 1975
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Vice President Rockefeller
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Rogers Morton, Secretary of Commerce
Bipartisan Congressional Leadership (list attached)
Leslie A. Janka (note taker)
DATE AND TIME:
Thursday, September 25, 1975
8:00 - 9:15 a. m.
PLACE:
The Cabinet Room
The White House
SUBJECT:
Energy, Turkey and the Middle East
Agreement
The first 45 minutes of the meeting were taken up with a discussion of
the status of energy legislation on the Hill. Discussion centered on the
DECLASSIFIED
NSC MEMO, 11/34/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Deview B/11/04
unlikely possibility that acceptable legislation would emerge from the
House-Senate Conference. The President committed himself to meeting
with the conferees to discuss potential areas for compromise.
NARA, DATE 6/3/04
Turkey
The President: I appreciate very much the vote yesterday granting the
rule for Turkey. I understand the vote is programmed for next Wednesday.
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
We feel that lifting the embargo is critically important, and I want to
assure you that the Administration will maximize its efforts in achieving
an affirmative vote.
?
ADMINISTRATIVELY
CONFIDENTIAL
GERALD
BY
CLASS.,
ADMINISTRATIVEY
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Representative Anderson: We are hearing arguments that the United States
would be meddling in the Turkish elections by voting on the embargo now.
Some are calling for a delay of 30 days in the vote.
Speaker Albert: I have been presented with a scroll of the names of
150,000 Cypriot refugees. This is just an indication of how active the
Greeks are calling on members to press their case. Of course the sad
part of the story is that the Turks indeed did force the removal of these
refugees.
Representative Anderson: But we can counter that argument by saying
that the United States is for a settlement which will permit the refugees
to return and that we want to help them recover their homes.
Senator Mansfield: My daughter returned home after hearing John
Brademas speak and asked me why I voted to lift the embargo. I told
her I did so because I was pro-Greek and I wanted to help the Greek
Cypriots.
The President: One of the worrisome indications we have seen is the
potential action of the Turkish Cypriots to declare an independent
Turkish-Cypriot state. This is especially discouraging since the
parties have already agreed to a bizonal federal arrangement. I would
think that an independent Turkish Cypriot would be the last thing the
Greeks want. They have to recognize that the Turks have 30 to 40,000
troops on the Island. Who can stop the Turks if they decided to go
independent? The United States certainly won't go in to prevent that.
Therefore, the only way to get the parties together to settle the refugee
problem, and even more importantly, to protect our own security
interests, is to lift the arms embargo.
Representative O'Neill: Mr. President, you've got to think about what
happens if you should lose the vote. What would that do to the Turkish
election?
The President: I think it is clear that we must take our action based on
our own security interests and on the realities we face now. Another
defeat of this legislation would deteriorate the situation to an absolutely
irretrievable level.
The Vice President: The Turkish election is between the man who
put the troops on Cyprus in the first place and the moderate
ADMINISTRATIVELY
CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVEYY
CONFIDENTIAL
3
who's seeking a reasonable solution. If the Congress fails to vote to lift
the embargo, they will in fact be helping the radicals in Turkey.
Representative Anderson: NATO Security General Luns spoke to several
of us on the Hill last week and expressed the concern of our European
allies over the situation regarding Turkey. I don't see a stronger
argument than the impact on NATO of the U.S. embargo.
The President: If the Congress takes off the embargo, the negotiations
can get started on a Cyprus settlement. We have made it very clear to
the Turks that if the embargo is lifted, they have got to make substantial
movement. What assurances does the pro-Greek lobby have that a con-
tinuing embargo will solve the problem? There are all sorts of vehicles
available to Congress to reimpose the embargo if there is no progress
on Cyprus. There will be many opportunities to change course if
the Turks do not perform but it is absolutely critical that we act now.
The Vice President: Mr. Dean Alfange, the former President of AHEPA,
has been talking to a large number of his Greek friends and supporters
on the Hill. He supports the Administration's view and is saying that
the only way to get the refugees back to their homes is to achieve a
negotiated settlement, which can occur if the embargo is lifted.
General Scowcroft: Mr. President, I think it is important to point out
that the U.S. embargo is going to be a factor in the Turkish election
whatever we do. Prime Minister Demirel is under great pressure
from the former Prime Minister Ecevit, the man who invaded Cyprus
in the first place. Demirel can only go two ways. He can try to be as
tough as Ecevit on the United States, or he can point to the fact that he
got the embargo lifted.
The President: I want to assure you that we will do all that we can.
Every element of the Administration will be going all out to achieve an
affirmative vote. Our national security is very much involved in this
issue.
Middle East
The President: Let me turn now to the Sinai Agreement. I want to point
out to you that the Israelis have refused to sign the Protocol to the Agree-
ment until Congress approves the U.S. proposal on civilian technicians
in the Sinai.
ADMINISTRATIVELY
CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE>
CONFIDENTIAL
4
General Scowcroft: That is correct, Mr. President. The Agreement
cannot begin to take effect until Congress approves the U.S. proposal.
Speaker Albert: I think the Israelis should have signed immediately.
They will build a lot of resentment by trying to pressure Congress in
this way.
Senator Scott: We are in executive session today but one group wants
public disclosure of all papers. Clifford Case tells me that while there
is strong pressure to declassify all of the documents relating to the
Agreement, a majority of the Committee would be satisfied with a full
disclosure to the Committee members without public release.
Representative O'Neill: The House will probably act next week, but I
should tell you that the International Relations Committee is not at all
satisfied that it is getting all the answers on U.S. arms commitments
to Israel, and they are unhappy that no aid bill has yet been sent up.
The President: I am waiting to send up the aid bill until Congress
approves the Sinai Agreement. I am holding up because if the Agreement
does not take effect, we will have to totally reconsider our aid to Israel
in the context of the absence of an Agreement.
Representative O'Neill: (He read a list of several questions regarding
the possibility of the U.S. providing the Pershing missile to Israel.
Has it been committed to Israel? How many have been committed? Will
it carry a nuclear warhead? Was the Defense Department informed of
U.S. plans to provide the missile? etc.)
The President: Tip, let me answer all of those questions for this group.
Last September, Rabin came to see me. During his visit he presented
Israel's military equipment needs. There were several short-range
needs we took care of. They also presented their long-range shopping
list, called MATMON B. At that time, we said we could not consider
that list. It was premature. After the Sinai Agreement was reached,
they resubmitted their list. That list contained the Pershing missile,
as did the list presented last year. In our negotiations with Israel on
the recent agreement, all we said is that we would study the request
for the Pershing. There is absolutely no commitment beyond that.
I think you all recognize that the Israelis are very tough negotiators.
They want an awful lot of hardware. We will be make a very detailed
ADMINISTRATIVELY
CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY
CONFIDENTIAL
5
study of the Israelis' arms request and the Pershing missile will be very
carefully studied.
The Department of Defense saw the MATMON B shopping list last year,
and the Pershing missiles were on that list. We also told the Defense
Department that we would be studying all the items on the list.
Senator Scott: Whatever we do for Israel, we should not draw down
further our active military stocks. This would endanger our own
security and would lead to a public outcry.
The President: That's absolutely right, Hugh. Orders have been given
in the Administration that we are not to draw down our active stocks to
provide equipment to Israel. The Israelis know about this. The United
States is now procuring new and sophisticated weapons from our manu-
facturers but Israel will not be put ahead of the United States on the
production line. Israel's needs will not preempt U.S. procurement.
They will get what they need from later production after our own needs
have been met. The Israelis are very well protected with the weapons
they now have. They will not be allowed to jeopardize our security
and this has been made very clear to the Israelis.
General Scowcroft: Mr. President, I want to point out that there is
some urgency on the approval of the Agreement for two particular
reasons. First, the Israelis and the Egyptians hammered out with
great difficulty at Geneva a withdrawal timetable. If there is any
delay in approving the agreement, this timetable would have to be
renegotiated and frankly it may not be possible to do so. Second,
Sadat is under great pressure, as you know, from the other Arabs.
Further delay by the United States would seriously undercut him
because congressional questions about the value of the agreement
would make it appear that the Congress agrees with his Arab
detractors.
Senator Mansfield: Did you say the military aid request would be delayed?
The President: I will not send up my dollar request until the Sinai Agree-
ment is fully set. It makes a big difference on what figures we send up
on whether we have an agreement or not. As I have said, we are taking
a gamble on peace, and I feel deeply that our military assistance will be
a good investment. I have discussed this with the Jewish leaders and
our Jewish Community friends are supportive of the agreement. It is
clear to me that the Sinai Agreement is good for the United States as
well as for Israel and Egypt.
ADMINISTRATIVELY
CONFIDENTIAL
GERALD
PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
SENATE
John Eastland
Mike Mansfield
Hugh Scott
Bob Byrd
Carl Curtis
Frank Moss
HOUSE
Carl Albert
Tip O'Neill
Jack McFall
Bob Michel
John Anderson
STAFF
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Morton
Don Rumsfeld
Bob Hartmann
Jack Marsh
Phil Buchen
REGRETS
Ron Nessen
Jim Cannon
Secretary Schlesinger
Jim Lynn
Senator Griffin
Max Friedersdorf
Rep. Rhodes
Alan Greenspan
Rep. Burton
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Seidman
Dick Cheney
Bill Baroody
Frank Zarb
Vern Loen
Bill Kendall
Pat O'Donnell
Charles Leppert
Tom Loeffler
Bob Wolthuis
&
GERALD
PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
SENATE
John Eastland
Mike Mansfield
Hugh Scott
Bob Byrd
Carl Curtis
Frank Moss
HOUSE
Carl Albert
Tip O'Neill
Jack McFall
Bob Michel
John Anderson
STAFF
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Morton
Don Rumsfeld
Bob Hartmann
Jack Marsh
Phil Buchen
REGRETS
Ron Nessen
Jim Cannon
Secretary Schlesinger
Jim Lynn
Senator Griffin
Max Friedersdorf
Rep. Rhodes
Alan Greenspan
Rep. Burton
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Seidman
Dick Cheney
Bill Baroody
Frank Zarb
Vern Loen
Bill Kendall
Pat O'Donnell
Charles Leppert
Tom Loeffler
Bob Wolthuis
&
GERALD
642
6787
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ADMINISTRATIVELY
CONFIDENTIAL
September 26, 1975
ATTACHMENT
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
LES JANKANN
SUBJECT:
Bipartisan Congressional Leadership
Meeting, Thursday, September 25, 1975
Attached for your review is a Memorandum of Conversation drawn
from my notes of the President's meeting with the Bipartisan
Congressional Leadership on Thursday, September 25, 1975.
RECOMMENDATION
That you review and approve the Memcon at Tab A.
B
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
ADMINISTRATIVELY
CONFIDENTIAL
ATTACHMENT
12.
DOC
RECD
OG NBR
INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORRE SPONDENCE PROFILE
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
926926
18
750
FROM: KISSINGER, Janka H
REFERENCE: 6487 CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
TO: PRES
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
KISSINGER
COLBY, W
OTHER
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
SCOWCROFT X
SCHLESINGER, J
C
EYES ONLY EXDIS
DAVIS
ST EX SEC
S
CODEWORD
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT: Memcon of her mtg w/ Bipartisor
congressonal leadership on Sept 25
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO.
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT
FOR
MEMO FOR HAK
(
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STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
(
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REPLY FOR
FAR EAST
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APPROPRIATE ACTION
(
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ECOMMENDATIONS
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LATIN AMERICA
JOINT MEMO
(
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REFER TO
FOR:
UNITED NATIONS
(
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ECONOMIC
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
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)
t
SCIENTIFIC
CONCURRENCE
(
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL
OCEANS POLICY
INTELLIGENCE
DATE
FROM
TO
S
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):
CY TO
9/26
Scrift
X
Decision (10/5)
onkley
clift
7/29
NSC/S
Cscowerd tapproved memcan
ganger
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
DISPATCH
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:
MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
NSC/S DISP INSTR
NOTIFY
& DATE
BY
BY
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
OCT2
1975
WSA
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CROSS REF W/
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
x
OPEN CRT CLOSE ID: 6AB
HP
NS
FOLDER:
WH
EP
PA
DY
(
NSC 75-22
575-600
)
A quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations
arily for Government use. Not ended
as a comprehensive U.S. policy statement.
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (correction)
1. Background: The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies have pressed for
a European conference on security and cooperation since 1954, in-
itially to be limited to European states. In 1970 they agreed to
US and Canadian participation, as NATO members with vital interests
in the area. NATO took the position that concrete progress must
be made in the Berlin Four-Power negotiations before preparatory
talks on such a conference could be opened, and this condition was
fulfilled with the implementation of the Quadripartite Protocol
on Berlin in June 1972.
The Multilateral Preparatory Talks beginning in November 1972
established enough common ground among the participants to warrant
reasonable expectations that a Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe would produce satisfactory results. CSCE opened
formally at the foreign minister level in July 1973 at which time
the agenda was adopted and it was agreed that decisions would be
taken by consensus. The working phase of CSCE began in Geneva in
September 1973 and concluded on July 19, 1975 with the announce-
ment that a final document would be signed by the 35 participants
at a July 30-August 1 summit meeting in Helsinki, Finland.
2. The document is a political statement of intent; it is neither
a treaty nor a legally binding agreement under US constitutional
usage. It will, however, carry considerable moral and political
weight since it is to be signed at the highest level. There are
four main sections:
- Security in Europe: Ten principles of interstate relations deal
with respect for sovereignty; non-use of force; inviolability
of frontiers; territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of dis-
putes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms; equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples; cooperation among states; and fulfillment
of international obligations. These principles are manifestly
incompatible with the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty.
At Western insistence the principles include a statement that
borders may be changed by peaceful means. There is also pro-
vision for announcement 21 days in advance of largescale mili-
tary maneuvers and for invitations to interested observers.
- Economic, scientific, technical, and environmental cooperation:
commercial exchanges, industrial, scientific, and technological
cooperation, and promotion of tourism.
PA/MS
JULY 1975
Editor: Miss Fahey Black
ext. 20736
For copies: ext. 29859
DEPARTMENT
OF
The Secretary
STATE
of State
UNITED
AMERICA
STATES
OF
PressConference
July 25, 1975
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Office of Media Services
MAJOR TOPICS: President Ford's Trip to Europe,
CSCE, Mideast, SALT
THE PRESS: There is a statement here that
made to settle political conflicts will help the
the White House has put out on the trip. In it, the
humane values that they espouse.
President says the Helsinki declaration will further
This was the basis for Chancellor Brandt's
the aspirations of the people of Eastern Europe,
Ostpolitik in 1969, in which he faced within his
and he restates our commitment to the peaceful
country the question of whether the objectives
changes.
that he sought were best achieved by a policy of
In a specific way, can you tell us how some-
political confrontation or by a policy of easing
how this will further the aspirations of the people
tensions.
now locked into the Soviet sphere?
He gave the answer, he made the decisions as
SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, one
far as the Federal Republic and the German ques-
has to analyze what the phrase "locked into the
tion was concerned, which in turn was at the heart
Soviet sphere" means.
of the European problem.
Q: Lithuania, Latvia, and part of the Soviet
The agreement by the United States to attend
Union.
the European Security Conference [CSCE] was in
A: In those countries, the existing situation in
fact made conditional on progress on the German
Europe reflects, among other things, a balance of
question, and particularly on the solution of the
forces and a state of affairs that has continued for
Berlin issue.
a generation. It was not created by a document and
So, therefore, it is, I believe, that the easing of
it will not, as such, be changed by a document.
tensions in the world and easing of tensions in
Therefore, the question that has had to be
Europe will help ease the lives of people and may
answered in the entire postwar period, and has
contribute to an evolution in which the problems
been answered in different ways at different times,
that produced the cold war can be dealt with more
is what is more helpful for a humane evolution: a
effectively.
policy of confrontation or a policy of easing
No document is going to change the existing
tensions; whether peoples can realize their aspira-
balance of power on the Continent and therefore
tions better under conditions in which there is
there are limits to what any agreement can achieve,
political, and a threat of military, conflict, or under
but this is the sense in which the President used
conditions in which the two sides are attempting to
that paragraph.
settle their disputes and ease tensions.
Q: Mr. Secretary, what do you foresee as
The judgment that has been made-and it is
being the consequences of yesterday's House vote
important to remember that it is not only that of
on the Turkish arms embargo? Do you see any
the United States, but of all West European
progress in-
countrics-is that a policy in which an attempt is
A: I would like to answer that in the second
PR 387/64
THE DEPARTMENT
FUNUR
OF STATE
News Release
July 25, 1975
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Office of Media Services
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
The following is a statement by President Ford
pended upon. They express concern, however, that
prior to his departure July 25, 1975 for the
the result will be to make the free governments of
Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation
Western Europe and North America less wary and
in Europe via Bonn, Warsaw, and Krakow, and sub-
lead to a letting down of NATO's political guard
sequent visits to Romania and Yugoslavia.
and military defenses.
If I seriously shared these reservations I would
I am glad to have this opportunity, before
not be going, but I certainly understand the histori-
taking off for Europe tomorrow, to discuss with
cal reasons for them and, especially, the anxiety of
you frankly how I feel about the forthcoming
Americans whose ancestral homelands, families,
European Security Conference [CSCE] in Helsinki.
and friends have been and still are profoundly
I know there are some honest doubts and dis-
affected by East-West political developments in
agreements among good Americans about this
Europe.
meeting with the leaders of Eastern and Western
I would emphasize that the document I will
European countries and Canada-35 nations alto-
sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on
gether.
any participating State. The Helsinki documents in-
There are those who fear the conference will
volve political and moral commitments aimed at
put a seal of approval on the political division of
lessening tensions and opening further the lines of
Europe that has existed since the Soviet Union in-
communication between the peoples of East and
corporated the Baltic nations and set new bound-
West.
aries elsewhere in Europe by military action in
It is the policy of the United States, and it has
World War II. These critics contend that participa-
been my policy ever since I entered public life, to
tion by the United States in the Helsinki under-
support the aspirations for freedom and national
standings amounts to tacit recognition of a status
independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe--
quo which favors the Soviet Union and perpetuates
with whom we have close ties of culture and
its control over countries allied with it.
blood-by every proper and peaceful means. I
On the other extreme there are critics who
believe the outcome of this European Security
say the meeting is a meaningless exercise because
Conference will be a step-how long a step remains
the Helsinki declarations are merely statements of
to be tested-in that direction. I hope my visits to
principles and good intentions which are neither
Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia will again dem-
legally binding nor enforceable and cannot be de-
onstrate our continuing friendship and interest in
THE DEPARTMENT
CUNUMS
OF STATE
News Release
August 1, 1975
Bureau of Public Affairs
Helsinki, Finland
Office of Media Services
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERA-
TION IN EUROPE
President Gerald R. Ford addressed the following
what all of us already know: that nations now have
remarks to the Conference on Security and Co-
the capacity to destroy civilization, and, therefore,
operation in Europe at Finlandia Hall, August 1,
all our foreign policies must have as their one
1975:
supreme objective the prevention of a thermonu-
clear war. Nor have I come to dwell upon the hard
Mr. Chairman, my distinguished colleagues:
realities of continuing ideological differences, poli-
May I begin by expressing to the Governments of
tical rivalries, and military competition that persist
Finland and Switzerland, which have been superb
among us.
hosts for the several phases of this conference, my
I have come to Helsinki as a spokesman for a
gratitude and that of my associates for their effi-
nation whose vision has always been forward,
ciency and hospitality.
whose people have always demanded that the
Particularly to you, President Kekkonen, I
future be brighter than the past, and whose united
must convey to the people of the Republic of Fin-
will and purpose at this hour is to work diligently
land, on behalf of the 214 million people of the
to promote peace and progress, not only for our-
United States of America, a reaffirmation of the
selves but for all mankind. I am simply here to say
longstanding affection and admiration which all
to my colleagues: We owe it to our children, to the
my countrymen hold for your brave and beautiful
children of all continents, not to miss any oppor-
land.
tunity, not to malinger for one minute, not to
We are bound together by the most powerful
spare ourselves or allow others to shirk in the mon-
of all ties, our fervent love for freedom and inde-
umental task of building a better and a safer world.
pendence, which knows no homeland but the
The American people, like the people of
human heart. It is a sentiment as enduring as the
Europe, know well that mere assertions of good
granite rock on which this city stands and as
will, passing changes in the political mood of gov-
moving as the music of Sibelius. Our visit here,
emments, laudable declarations of principles, are
though short, has brought us a deeper appreciation
not enough. But if we proceed with care, with
of the pride, industry, and friendliness which
commitment to real progress, there is now an op-
Americans always associate with the Finnish
portunity to turn our peoples' hopes into realities.
nation.
In recent years, nations represented here have
The nations assembled here have kept the gen-
sought to ease potential conflicts. But much more
eral peace in Europe for 30 years. Yet there have
remains to be done before we prematurely con-
been too many narrow escapes from major con-
gratulate ourselves. Military competition must be
flict. There remains, to this day, the urgent issue of
controlled. Political competition must be re-
how to construct a just and lasting peace for all
strained. Crites must not be manipulated or ex-
peoples.
ploited for unilateral advantages that could lead us
I have not come across the Atlantic to say
again to the brink of war. The process of negotia-
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
7517077
REFERRAL
To: The Secretary of State
Date:
August 27, 1975
ACTION REQUESTED
X Draft reply for:
President's signature.
X
Undersigned's signature.
NOTE
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Description:
X
Letter:
Telegram: Other:
To:
The President
From:
Jonas Talandis, 2560 Oakwood Terrace, Olympia Fields, Ill. 60461
Date:
August 7, 1975
Subject: Writer opposes U.S. recognition of Soviet control of Baltic States.
By direction of the President:
R
ALD
Roland L. Elliott
Director of Correspondence
RLE:JRH:PAN:PB:emp
(Copy to remain with correspondence)
0115/75
NATIONAL LITHUAN' N-AMERICAN REPUBLICA FEDERATION
Jonas Talandis
2560 Oakwood Terrace
Chairman
Olympia Fields, Illinois 60461
August 7, 1975
To the President of the United States
7517077
Honorable Gerald Ford
White House
Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Mr. President:
As I have outlined in my telegram sent to you to Helsinki many
people of our Lithuanian community are greatly disturbed with
your participation in the Helsinki Conference and in particular
the deletion of a paragraph in your speech upon departure to
Europe specifically dealing with the non-recognition of the
Soviet incorporation of the Baltic nations.
Now a new problem has developed: meetings, demonstrations
and petitions are being organized to speak strongly against
you, Mr. President.
Our organization is concerned with the loss of votes in the
upcoming election year. We need urgently some material
from the White House for the purpose to devert the wrong
assumptions and to reassure our community of your friendship
toward US.
Hoping to hear from you soon, we remain
Very sincerely Talands, yours,
Jonas Talandis, Chairman
JT:mf
GERALD
NATIONAL LITHUANIAN-AMERICAN
REPUBLICAN FEDERATION
Jonas Talandis
7 PM AUG ILSUE
Chairman
1975
2560 Oakwood Terrace
Olympia Fields, Illinois 60461
To The President of the United States
Honorable Gerald Ford
White House
Washington, D. C. 20515