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1553248
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September 27, 1975 - Kissinger, William Clements, General George S. Brown
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1553248
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document
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September 27, 1975 - Kissinger, William Clements, General George S. Brown
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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1975-09-27
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1975
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1975
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Scowcrott file
(Sensitive)
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
E.O. 12956
SEC. 3.8
oso the 10/24/08
MR08-81, #34; state see 3/11/04
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
BY, del NARA DATE 3/10/09
PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Under Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr.
General George S. Brown, USAF, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Saturday - September 27, 1975
11:50 a. m. - 1:25 p.m.
PLACE:
Secretary Kissinger's Office
The White House
Kissinger: I want to tell you where the negotiations are, where I think we
are, and where I think the country is going.
I think we are in a real mess.
George, I am extremely pained by the military. I have depended on your
weapons systems, your budget, in a crisis, etc. But to immediate issue
I had breakfast with Schlesinger. I told him I was seeing Gromyko on Sunday
and had to say something. Here is what we worked out:
[He described the American proposal.
Gromyko asked me some questions about it -- like the theory of including
Backfire. He said it wasn't capable of reaching the U.S. except on one-way
missions. He said only four people on the Politburo understand SALT but
that all of them understand Backfire. They don't understand the bitterness
in the U.S. on SALT. They think they gave us 1200 units at Vladivostok
CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON ImptoDer.
EXEMPTION CATEGORY
5(b)(3) 5
File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 2 -
which fit the Backfire definition -- capable of reaching the other side. By
the Backfire criteria, all should be counted. Then we came back with
cruise missiles which add thousands on our side, and Backfire which takes
hundreds from them. He pointed to their big concessions on verification,
forward based systems, and silo dimension. He said on cruise missiles,
above 600 was ridiculous because you couldn't verify it. On ALCM he said
this would give us 3,000 more reentry vehicles they hadn't counted on.
They are leery about a summit in December. I think they don't want a SALT
agreement before February. Gromyko says they are bitter about Backfire
and the history of the past 15 months where they have made all the concessions
-- equal aggregates, high MIRV limits, heavy missile defense, verification,
forward based systems, etc. He also said they had played Vladivostok as a
major achievement, whereas the President got clobbered here for the agree-
ment.
I think they think that if they make more concessions, they are not sure we
will agree even then, and even if we do that, they're not sure all hell won't
break loose.
So, I don't think there will be an agreement.
But I do have a grievance against DOD. We haven't had a working relationship
for two years.
Clements: That is right.
Kissinger: You must realize that we have a strong group of liberals, press,
etc. which is basically against the military, against defense budgets, etc.
Right now they are quiescent, because they hate the Republicans so much.
The strategic gap isn't caused by SALT. It is caused because for ten years
we didn't start any major strategic programs for ten years while the Soviets
were working like hell.
It is detente which keeps these guys under control, because we have pre-
empted the peace movement. We will reenter the Cold War with great élan,
but within two years we will be struggling again to defend against the assaults
to cut back. So I think we are killing ourselves with our SALT position.
DOD has ceased being part of the government and has become a political
party -- positioning itself both to the right and left of the Administration.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 3 -
SALT got off the track because never did we sit down and analyze where we
were and what we wanted. I met all the time with Tom Moorer on SALT I
and never put something forward without checking it.
Clements: That is not the way George and I want it.
Kissinger: I know that. But what will happen without SALT? Do you think
Muskie, Mondale, etc are going to fight for five years of big defense budgets?
This is where I think we stand. If we get this country divided again on the
peace issue -- when DOD is accused of increasing tensions
Clements: I had a helluva time finding out what happened at that breakfast.
We finally did, and then we had a two and one-half hour JCS meeting.
Wickham says the result of the breakfast was "assured acquiescence. " I
said this was wrong.
I left the NSC meeting with the impression you two would meet and there
would be VP and NSC meetings. But I guess you assumed that because Jim
agreed, we didn't need a meeting because we were on board. That is not so.
Kissinger: Schlesinger knew I was going to do it.
Clements: We know now, but we didn't then. He never told us anything about
it. In fact he told me he was really opposed to the position but if it was the
best you could do, we would have to live with it. But I know, he will lie
behind the log with you out in front and snipe at you saying he opposed and
you are selling it out.
[There was a discussion of what went wrong after Vladivostok -- with cruise
missiles and Backfire becoming burning issues. ]
[Kissinger leaves and returns.
Clements: You can't fire Schlesinger. If you think Zumwalt is bad [out of
office], you have no idea what Jim would do. What you should do is fire Laitin.
Laitin is his mouthpiece. Fire him and put in the President's man. That
would discipline Schlesinger and partially stop the leaking.
Kissinger: But where are we? What is wrong with the position?
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 4 -
Clements: It is too complex; people won't understand; it blows equal
aggregates, etc.
Kissinger: That is true. I don't like it either. What do you recommend?
[Much discussion]
Kissinger: If SALT ever gets going again, could the four of us sit down and
discuss what is on your mind on SALT?
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 018291
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Note
DESCRIPTION
Brent Scowcroft's handwritten notes
from Kissinger, Clements, Brown meeting
CREATION DATE
09/27/1975
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031400682
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER
15
FOLDER TITLE
September 27, 1975 - Kissinger, William
Clements, General George S. Brown
DATE WITHDRAWN
06/15/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG