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1553312
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November 26, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld
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1553312
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November 26, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Soviet Union
Department of State. 9/1789-
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1975-11-26
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1975
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1975-11-26
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1975
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950 Sec. 3.6
THE WHITE HOUSE
MR01- #13; 11/27/01 for
WASHINGTON
Ey dal Date 7/19/04
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Gerald R. Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, November 26, 1975
9:20 a.m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House
The President: This is the first meeting of the four of us. I hope we can
overcome the problem that Henry had before. All the contacts come from
Henry, not Schlesinger. I think these kinds of meetings will help that.
Henry - -
Kissinger: I didn't know it was going to be this sort of a meeting, so I am
not really prepared. I told Don I would take a DOD man along to Moscow
on the SALT negotiations. I hope it won't be played as being squeezed out
of me.
The President: You volunteered it.
Kissinger: And I would like a State man present when you see Peres.
The President: That was another problem. Schlesinger was continually
undercutting us on Israeli equipment.
Rumsfeld: I am not particularly interested in seeing these groups. Maybe
you and I should meet jointly with Peres.
Scowcroft: We used to have a Defense man in when you had defense-related
meetings in State.
CLASSIFIED BY Brent Scowcroft
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
FORD a. GENALD LIBRARY
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b) (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
2
[General agreement on meetings with foreigners.
]
Kissinger: We have a Verification Panel meeting today. I think we should
show the feud between our Departments is over.
Dobrynin said we should make another try. I said that we would have to
know there would be a constructive outcome. He said, "Send a letter. "
We did, and we got a reply in four days. We need to get a position or
there is no reason to go to Moscow.
Don, you should know that the Soviets will not agree to include Backfire.
If we count ALCM's as MIRV's, and SLCM's, individually, and ban cruise
missiles on other than heavy bombers, you take them out of the cruise missile
business. They couldn't do it without cutting out other systems.
The President: How about the reduction to 2, 300?
Kissinger: That in effect would mean counting 100 Backfire.
Rumsfeld: If you go with something which limits cruise missiles and lets
Backfire run free, it will not look balanced.
Kissinger: We can put as many cruise missiles as we want on bombers,
trading for Poseidon which we would give to NATO.
Rumsfeld: Do you have these on paper?
Kissinger: No, I don't want it floating through the system.
[Discussion of how to manage this. ]
[Discussion of SS-18's and MIRV versus single warheads. ]
Brezhnev may be willing to sing a letter restricting MIR V to 1, 200.
There is no sense in going to Moscow if we don't have a position. We could
have an NSC Friday or just after we come back from China.
Rumsfeld: I think it is important that the key people are all on board and
don't testify they were so rushed they didn't have a chance to analyze.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
FORD A. LIBRARY
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
3
The President: It has never been any different since I have been here.
Rumsfeld: I also think it should be as simple as possible because it is
otherwise too easy for Jackson to demagogue it.
The President: Henry has to have negotiating room. If he doesn't have
some flexibility, it is not possible to negotiate.
Rumsfeld: How would you do the VP?
Kissinger: I would just outline what is and is not possible. I don't think
I should advance any positions and make everyone against me.
Scowcroft: The Chiefs are tending toward signing the Vladivostok position
and exempting cruise missiles and Backfire.
Kissinger: The Soviets have rejected that firmly. If we can't agree, we
can't agree. I am not anxious for an agreement because it just gets me
into a brutal fight with Jackson.
Rumsfeld: Not if it is a good one.
Scowcroft: Yes, Jackson will attack it no matter what.
The President: We would be severely criticized if we didn't make a serious
effort -- or if we signed one which could be criticized.
Kissinger: I hear there is a new attitude in Defense toward State -- - - on
Panama, for example.
Rumsfeld: I have been putting that out with my staff. It will take time to
change both bureaucracies.
The President: Make a maximum effort in the meeting today.
Kissinger: We must look at the alternatives. Without an agreement, the
gap would grow rapidly.
Scowcroft: Schlesinger repeated Sunday that we wouldn't have to spend
more without a SALT treaty.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
FORD R. GERALO LIBRARY
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
4
[More discussion of agreement versus no agreement.
]
Kissinger: We could make our case to the public -- the consequences of
agreement versus no agreement. We can kill them.
I had some conservative Senators in and asked what their objections were
to SALT.
[The discussion turned to the DPQ and nuclear modernization.
]
Kissinger: The perception in Europe would be adverse if we took them out.
We paid for ten years for McNamara. He wanted all nuclear weapons under
U.S. control. He is in part responsible for deGaulle.
LIBRARY GERALD A. FORD
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
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DECL ASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6
MR01-101 213. OSD ets 3/2/04, stlts 11/27/01
BERALD B. FORD
dal NARA DATE 5/16/07
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BERALD FORD LIBRARY
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