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1553348
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January 26, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Rumsfeld
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1553348
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document
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January 26, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Rumsfeld
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Soviet Union
Arms control
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1976-01-26
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1976
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1976
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
dal
7/20/04
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Monday, January 26, 1976
9:25 - 10:30 a. m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
SUBJECT:
Secretary Kissinger's SALT Discussions
with Brezhnev
Kissinger: Wade did very well.
FORD a GERALO LIBRARY
Rumsfeld: He was very pleased. It worked well.
The President: Henry, why don't you bring us up to date ?
Kissinger: They totally rejected Option IV. I then went to Modified
Option III because I thought it was better for them. They rejected that
on grounds that Backfire couldn't be counted. They will give us in
writing the range of the Backfire and a commitment that it wouldn't be
upgraded or used in an intercontinental role. It is not a lie based on
design mission profile.
I think if we wrote down some specifications and some constraints,
they would at least look at them.
They accepted the ALCM proposal. We can say we are giving
something up, but since they wanted to count each missile, they gave
up -- especially their agreeing to 2500 kilometers.
CLASSIFIED BY
Brent Scowcroft
SECREF/NODIS/XGDS
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY
5(b)(3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2
They accepted SLCM from subs, but not surface ships.
They want 600 kilometers for land-based. We made the mistake
of going from 5500 to 2500. It called their attention to it.
Then they gave us the heavy missile definition.
Rumsfeld: This will defuse the violation argument on SALT I.
Kissinger: The soft areas are surface-ship SLCMs and land-based cruise
missiles.
I get wildly different interpretations of the utility of surface-ship
SLCMs. We could maybe count them as MIRV with an upper limit.
Maybe if we counted land-based in the 2400.
Scowcroft/Rumsfeld: That won't solve the European problem.
Kissinger: They will hang tough, I think, on 2500 kilometers on land-based.
We can probably solve the surface-ship SLCMs.
Rumsfeld: But in Europe they are just like FBS.
Kissinger: But from Europe and Japan we can cover four-fifths of the
USSR and they can just cover Europe.
We have insisted on 2500, but I think they won't buy it.
Rumsfeld: There is also the nuclear versus the conventional warhead.
Another issue is third country acquisition. If you bar conventional, you
are barring the possibility of replacing some present systems.
I have never seen so much leaking as came out of your party.
Kissinger: It was done because it would have leaked after I briefed NATO.
Rumsfeld: Don't blame it on NATO.
Kissinger: Cruise missile verification is really their problem through
'85. That can be our excuse for the nuclear versus conventional.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD LEBRARY F FORD
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
3
Rumsfeld: Cruise missile verification is a horror.
Scowcroft: You have the same problem with range if you allow 5500.
The President: I think we should look at all the issues and reach a
judgment. What is the time schedule ?
Kissinger: I think we should get something back to them before their
Party Conference.
Rumsfeld: I was thinking we could get the VP Working Group going and
try to get back to Dobrynin by 8 or 10 February.
Kissinger: One way would be to count all land-based over 600. That way
we could have a few.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
FORD R. GERALD LIBRARY
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 018354
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Note
DESCRIPTION
Brent Scowcroft's notes from meeting
with Ford, Kissinger, and Rumsfeld
CREATION DATE
01/26/1975
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031400783
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER
17
FOLDER TITLE
January 26, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger,
Scowcroft, Rumsfeld
DATE WITHDRAWN
06/16/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG