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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958
SEC. 3.6
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
MR08-15 #5; OSO lts 5/9/08
BY dal NARA DATE 12/10/08
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Monday, February 16, 1976
9:35 - 10:10 a. m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
Kissinger: My own view is that if this fails, we should suspend SALT
until after the elections. This option is so much worse than Option II,
but you can't even get an honest discussion of the issues. Under IV,
DOD was willing to give them 230 Backfire. They are not planning
more than 450-500, they couldn't be. And with reductions, the Backfire
would be wholly offset. If the Soviets buy this, it will be in terms of
Backfire and cruise missile running free and no reductions. I am
lukewarm in support of Option II, but I am not bleeding for it.
President: Rumsfeld, Brown and those people don't understand. I agree
with you.
Kissinger: The smart way would have been to pick up their points and
build on them. If Reagan and Jackson get knocked out, the Soviets will
be tougher.
President: I was so irritated last night that I was ready to junk the
whole thing.
Kissinger: The cynicism of these people is sickening.
FORD
CLASSIFIED BY
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY EASYPIED ON Imp. to det.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2.
President: How do you reconcile the DOD attitude with their screaming
about the Soviets going all-out on Defense production? I think under the
circumstances we have to go with this option. I am not optimistic but
I think to go through the trauma it would take for Option II.
Kissinger: No, you can't do it. It is just that we must recognize that
it isn't the best thing to do.
I am going to Latin America, as you know. I'm leaving at noon.
I can't see anything dramatic. I will say on Panama only that we are
negotiating. No qualitative comment.
President: I answered a question on Panama in Florida by saying we
wouldn't sell out. It seemed to go okay.
Kissinger: The irony is the American people want tough talk about the
Soviets, but they don't want to do anything about it.
We may have a breakthrough on Law of the Sea. The Brazilians
have agreed to a formula which would enable private companies to mine
the deep seabed.
Treasury is on board, but I don't know how much the right will
complain about "socialist control of the seabed. 11
I am worried about China. Mao told you that Teng would be in
for years. Either he has changed his mind or the situation has changed.
It is a serious development.
[Discussion of the Nixon visit; press coverage; possibility of the
Chinese plane being attached, etc. ]
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 018362
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Note
DESCRIPTION
Brent Scowcroft's notes from meeting
with Ford and Kissinger
CREATION DATE
02/16/1976
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031400805
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER
17
FOLDER TITLE
February 16, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger
DATE WITHDRAWN
06/16/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
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"ocrText": "File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSEGRET/NODIS/XGDS\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958\nSEC. 3.6\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nMR08-15 #5; OSO lts 5/9/08\nBY dal NARA DATE 12/10/08\nPARTICIPANTS:\nPresident Ford\nDr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State\nBrent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President\nfor National Security Affairs\nDATE AND TIME:\nMonday, February 16, 1976\n9:35 - 10:10 a. m.\nPLACE:\nThe Oval Office\nKissinger: My own view is that if this fails, we should suspend SALT\nuntil after the elections. This option is so much worse than Option II,\nbut you can't even get an honest discussion of the issues. Under IV,\nDOD was willing to give them 230 Backfire. They are not planning\nmore than 450-500, they couldn't be. And with reductions, the Backfire\nwould be wholly offset. If the Soviets buy this, it will be in terms of\nBackfire and cruise missile running free and no reductions. I am\nlukewarm in support of Option II, but I am not bleeding for it.\nPresident: Rumsfeld, Brown and those people don't understand. I agree\nwith you.\nKissinger: The smart way would have been to pick up their points and\nbuild on them. If Reagan and Jackson get knocked out, the Soviets will\nbe tougher.\nPresident: I was so irritated last night that I was ready to junk the\nwhole thing.\nKissinger: The cynicism of these people is sickening.\nFORD\nCLASSIFIED BY\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\nEXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION\nSCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652\nEXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1,3)\nAUTOMATICALLY EASYPIED ON Imp. to det.\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\n2.\nPresident: How do you reconcile the DOD attitude with their screaming\nabout the Soviets going all-out on Defense production? I think under the\ncircumstances we have to go with this option. I am not optimistic but\nI think to go through the trauma it would take for Option II.\nKissinger: No, you can't do it. It is just that we must recognize that\nit isn't the best thing to do.\nI am going to Latin America, as you know. I'm leaving at noon.\nI can't see anything dramatic. I will say on Panama only that we are\nnegotiating. No qualitative comment.\nPresident: I answered a question on Panama in Florida by saying we\nwouldn't sell out. It seemed to go okay.\nKissinger: The irony is the American people want tough talk about the\nSoviets, but they don't want to do anything about it.\nWe may have a breakthrough on Law of the Sea. The Brazilians\nhave agreed to a formula which would enable private companies to mine\nthe deep seabed.\nTreasury is on board, but I don't know how much the right will\ncomplain about \"socialist control of the seabed. 11\nI am worried about China. Mao told you that Teng would be in\nfor years. Either he has changed his mind or the situation has changed.\nIt is a serious development.\n[Discussion of the Nixon visit; press coverage; possibility of the\nChinese plane being attached, etc. ]\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 018362\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nNote\nDESCRIPTION\nBrent Scowcroft's notes from meeting\nwith Ford and Kissinger\nCREATION DATE\n02/16/1976\nVOLUME\n2 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031400805\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. Memoranda of\nConversations\nBOX NUMBER\n17\nFOLDER TITLE\nFebruary 16, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n06/16/2004\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nGG"
}