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May 18, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues
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May 18, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 09-119; #7
state rev 3/12/09 DOElla 9/23/09. Nscets
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
By dal Dato 5/5/10
4/2/10
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, President
of the French Republic
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Kenneth Rush, U.S. Ambassador to France
Amb. Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, French
Ambassador to the United States
DATE AND TIME:
Tuesday, May 18, 1976
10:15 - 11:49 a. m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
SUBJECTS:
Rambouillet II; Lebanon; Djibouti; Nuclear
Non-proliferation
Ford: I thought we might discuss further the idea of a second
Rambouillet. I have asked my people to say just what might lend itself
to a substantive outcome. North-South relations would certainly be one,
to include your African initiative, and other topics. [He reads the topics
from the draft talking points at Tab A]. The way we did it the last time
was for the private group -- George Shultz for our side -- laying out the
details. For us, the results of Rambouillet I were very good and I have
that impression from the others. I think the same thing could ensue from
a follow-on meeting.
Giscard: I think there are two general items which could be discussed.
(1) What will be the general attitude in a period of renewed economic
activity and toward inflation. It would be interesting. I don't know
whether we could find practical solutions but it would be a useful
discussion. Also, it is useful to have a discussion of the North-South
CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
2.
dialogue. We can't accept the demands of the developing countries,
but there is still a large gap between your position and ours and the
developing countries. I don't know whether you are ready to advance
in this field.
Kissinger: All the advances we have made have been through the
President's intervention with the economic agencies. Otherwise the
movement is marginal. Therefore a conference would help us
internally to get motion.
Ford: We do have internal differences and the pressure of having to
have a position facilitates movement.
Giscard: We shouldn't get too technical, but we are thinking of things
like a research institute to look into commodities arrangements, and
perhaps a fund which would finance stocks. The developing countries
want to go farther to a single fund managed by themselves. But a
mixture of your ideas and ours might work. I would center it on
Nairobi rather than the North-South dialogue, because of the partici-
pants. I think George Shultz should look at the substance of a possible
communique as he makes his travels.
Next is the question of the time and place. Both Helmut [Schmidt]
and I are coming to the United States and it would look awkward for us
to come back here again so soon. Helmut suggested meeting in Germany,
but I am against that. It would get into their election campaign. Perhaps
an island in the Atlantic or in Scotland or Ireland. It would be difficult
to come to the United States again so soon.
Ford: We have been thinking of the last part of June. It would be
difficult for me as we get into July. We have been thinking of here, but
not in Washington or Camp David. Someone mentioned Bermuda.
Giscard: Or the Virgin Islands or some place in the Caribbean.
[Discussion of some spots. ]
I think somewhere in the Caribbean would be fine. The end of June is
a lousy time for all of us. I am going to Great Britain and I have to
leave on Friday morning, the 25th. I should really go back to France
on the 1st. How about July 1 and 2? That would give you one day
before your festivities.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
3.
Ford: I probably can do that.
Scowcroft: I will look into it.
Giscard: Then the question of participants. Japan I assume would be
there. Then the issue of Italy and Canada. We would not stand in the
way on Canada.
Ford: If we held it in this hemisphere, we feel it is best to have
Canada.
Giscard: Let us start with Italy.
[Discussion of why Italy was invited to Rambouillet I and where
they will be with their elections.]
If Italy does not come, I think it would be hard to have Canada.
Ford: I see that problem, but since Italy will be a big topic of conver-
sation, it might be best to have them present.
Sauvagnargues: It depends on the outcome of the election.
Ford: Yes. There may be discussions that they should not attend.
Arthur Burns called me this morning. He had met with Schmidt, who
proposed a meeting among France, Germany, and the US to propose
consortium loans to Italy if they didn't go Communist and we would state
they'd get no loan if they did. I thought I should mention it because it
relates to this discussion.
Sauvagnargues: It is impossible without the British.
Giscard: We can make hints about such a thing. It must be known by
the Italian voters, but in a very discreet way.
Ford: It might backfire otherwise.
Giscard: But it would be difficult to have the Italians present if the
Communists increase their strength or stay the same. I suggest we have
only the normal five. If there is some reason to have Italy to explain its
case, we can ask them at the last minute.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
4.
Ford: If we don't have Italy, it is easier to leave out Canada.
Kissinger: If Canada comes in, the British will press for the EC
President. That would, by happy coincidence, be Den Uyl.
Ford: Puerto Rico might be very good. There is a new hotel.
Giscard: It is a question of facilities. Send George Shultz around.
Pierre-Brossolette is our man.
On Lebanon, our man is waiting to see Sarkis. We do not in
any way support Frangieh. He is a foolish man who has done harm.
Sauvagnargues: Our Ambassador has gone two times to Frangieh to
make that clear. There can be no doubt whatever.
Giscard: Perhaps we could have him go to Sarkis to try to accelerate
the process.
The next issue is intervention. It is a question of sending a few
thousand troops if we are asked by the Lebanese authority and if they
would be useful. They would go only if Sarkis asked. We would have
to avoid the impression of collusion among the US, Syria and France.
We must remain in a more balanced position. We have some modest
Iraqi support and some Egyptian support. We can keep this only if
we demonstrate balance. So Gorse will go to Egypt and Iraq to main-
tain this contact.
Ford: What is the reaction of Asad to what you have in mind?
Giscard: At the beginning, they wanted a joint French-Syrian action.
Now they are more reserved because they are afraid it might weaken
the Syrian position. We would have to be careful about that.
Kissinger: We first thought it would be good to have the Syrians clean
up on the left; we were then afraid that they would then clean up on the
Christians.
One can conceive of your force in two ways: one is to limit the
gains of any one faction there; or to be a stalking horse for the Syrians.
The Syrians may want to match your force. Yours could leave some-
time, with then Syria left in control. The Israelis are already suggesting
there is a French-Syrian collusion to get massive Syrian troops into
Lebanon.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
5.
Sauvagnargues: The force would be in Beirut and as a buffer to the
South.
Kissinger: The Syrians would not be allowed to introduce matching
forces? You would be, as I understand, partly protecting the left from
the Syrians.
Sauvagnargues: It is to keep all forces separated.
Giscard: We need to talk to Sarkis and the Egyptians. We will let you
know before we do anything. It will take several days.
Kissinger: It would be very helpful if we could get an explicit statement
that this wouldn't import Syrian forces. Otherwise we would have Israel
and the Jews all over us.
Ford: Would you discuss Djibouti?
Giscard: We are seeing a sort of peaceful invasion by the people of
Somali and Ethiopia for whom it is a kind of paradise. We are being
asked to avoid leaving the area, especially the port facilities, to the
benefit of the Soviet Union.
We have a local government headed by a man called
We planned to make him the head of state, but the situation is getting
out of hand. There is agitation against him led by the Somalis.
Perhaps a coalition government is best. If that is not possible we could
force the resignation of the present man. The Somali-supported forces
would dominate and eventually it would be annexed.
Ford: Is it a viable state?
Giscard: No. There is nothing there. The other option would be to
support the present government. There would be some violence then.
My preference is to give them the kind of government they want
and just hold on to the naval base there. It would be irresponsible not
to hold that.
Ford: One item I wanted to bring up again is the nuclear reprocessing
issue. We would be willing to refuse reprocessing plants by all
suppliers.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECREF/NODIS/XGDS
6.
Giscard: France for years has wanted to develop its nuclear capability.
When I came in I didn't know the situation. I do not want France to be
the cause of nuclear proliferation. I resisted the sale of a plant to
South Korea. If the question were open, I guess we would accept a ban
on all reprocessing plants. The fact is we don't know the position of the
other suppliers -- especially Germany. It is curious to see the way the
Brazilian deal was done. Even the normal controls were not accepted.
There is not a very clear line between the reprocessing plants and
institutes of research. Some of the research results in plutonium. I
think we need to go more deeply into the problem. One may be as big a
problem as the other.
The Shah seems to be making a big issue of his request. Iran
says it doesn't intend to build a nuclear bomb. I presume they are
sincere.
Kissinger: It is irrelevant what they now say.
Giscard: If they are building a number of nuclear plants, they do have
a need for reprocessing. It is a difficult question here. And they say
they have a German and a US offer.
Kissinger: No. Not from us. The German aspect could be. It is an
option to build one if it appears needed over the next 10 years. We
don't like that. We originally thought we could support regional plants.
That looks more dubious now and we would prefer no plants at all.
Sauvagnargues: Is there a German offer of a reprocessing plant to
Brazil?
Kissinger: No, not specifically.
Our common studies indicate that the sale of reprocessing plants
should stop. And Congress may prevent us from providing enriched
uranium in dealing with countries that are selling reprocessing plants.
That would be a very bad situation -- Congressional legislation against
our allies.
Giscard: That wouldn't hurt us. We are self-sufficient.
Kissinger: It would be counterproductive; it would induce other countries
to build enrichment facilities.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
7.
Giscard: Politically and for our own sake, I will study this issue. I
have it under review now and I am not satisfied with the answers yet.
Kissinger: Could we have some bilateral discussion on it before
putting it to the wider group -- the difference between reprocessing and
research institute?
Giscard: We should study the Iran case to see what kind of guarantee of
supply we could give them.
Kissinger: Could we each designate someone so we are not competing
with each other?
Giscard: The Iranian matter is a difficult one.
Kissinger: We have not agreed with Iran, but we think they are so
confident they can get the plant in Europe that they are accepting whatever
restrictions we ask.
Giscard: There is for the future the question of stopping the transfer
of reprocessing plants.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
FORD 4,
Tat
Used by President 43 Talking Paper
with Giscard
TOP SECRET
5/18/76
IC
Specific Results of Proposed Summit Meeting
A central focal point of a summit discussion would necessarily be
the problem of Italy. It will be a prominent issue over the next several
months because of the political and economic implications of what
happens there, especially their significance for the future of the European
Community, the Western economic system, and the Western political
and security system. One objective at the summit would be to find ways
of minimizing the potential damage from possible adverse developments
in Italy, and maximizing our efforts to help Italy move in constructive
directions. This could include an effort to be supportive of the Christian
Democrats in the immediate post-election period. It would also include
consideration of the sorts of fiscal and wage stabilization measures we
should encourage Italy to take to stabilize the growth of government
expenditures, reduce the relative share of consumption in GNP, and
thus make room for faster growth of investment and exports to support
these efforts, and consideration of what assistance the western democracies
can provide to support an effective stabilization program, and what role
the IMF can play.
However, because a discussion of the Italian problem does not
lend itself to publicity, efforts should be made to avoid portraying the
summit as a meeting focusing on the Italian situation. Therefore, we
TOP SEGRET
DECLASSIFIED
NSC MEMO, 11/2 E.O. GUIDELINES State 3/12/04
BY wh
NARA. DATE 1/26/04
TOP SECRET
- 2 -
must attempt also to achieve concrete results on a list of items which
do lend themselves to public focus and which are also intrinsically
important to the industrial democracies. This list of specific results
could include:
North - South Relations
Agreement on industrialized country strategy for the second
half of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. This
could include a marriage of the French approach to commodity buffer
stock financing and the American approach to resources development,
a common approach to the future role of the Energy Commission of the
CIEC, and means of improving technology transfer drawing on the French
and US UNCTAD initiatives.
An African Package
Agreement to proceed on an African aid effort. The summit could
support a broad approach to African aid, including improved donor-recipient,
multilateral-bilateral aid coordination. It could provide a focus on the
main priorities such as the transportation network in Southern Africa, the
Sahel, and countries of highest political and economic significance.
TOP SECRET
FORD
&
GERALD
TOP SECRET
(b) 3 as
Trade
Agreement to reinforce the Rambouillet and OECD pledges to
avoid restrictions on imports, to work toward a constructive tariff cutting
formula in the MTN containing an important harmonization element and
aiming at a significant reduction in duties, to uphold the common commit.
ment to the basic tenets of an open and nondiscriminatory trading system
as contained in the GATT, and to undertake a more intensive process of
consultations among the major industrialized nations in order to avoid and
manage problems which might weaken the system. Privately, agreement
might be reached on how to deal with the possibility that Italy will impose
import restrictions which violate GATT and EC rules.
Medium Term Growth Strategy
Agreement on a strategy for stable economic expansion. Most
industrialized democracies are now moving from recovery to expansion.
The Rambouillet summit contributed to a more favorable economic climate
and improved confidence, thus helping to facilitate the present economic
upturn. As industrialized nations move to economic expansion, however,
they will need to resist pressures for excessive stimulation in order to
avoid its inflationary consequences. Thus while working to ensure expansion
by all industrialized nations at a sustainable rate, they must also cooperate
to avoid overexpansion. This subject will be discussed at the OECD
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
- 4 a
Ministerial Meeting on June 21-22. Agreement could be reached at the
summit on an approach which gives political sanction and impetus to
agreement reached at the OECD.
International Financial Issues
Agreement could be reached on ways to deal with acute financing
problems, including an approach to the LDC debt issue which avoids a
generalized rescheduling but which examines the problems of each country
in relation to its specific position and needs. The anticipated problem of
Italy's repayment of its short term debt would be examined including its
impact on financial insitutions in other countries; and means would be
sought by which Italy and the industrialized nations can manage the problem
in a manner consistent with sound financial practices and Italy's particular
economic and political requirements.
The European Community
Agreement on the economic and political significance of a
strong and prosperous European Community. While there might be some
reluctance on the part of European leaders to discuss Community issues
in this context, there might be a discussion of ways in which Europe could
evolve over the next several years and how the other industrialized nations
might be most supportive of Europe's efforts. There might also be a
discussion of how stringent internal measures in Italy might affect the
European Community, and how the Community, and the industrialized
nations in general, should react.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
- 5 -
Investment Issues
Agreement on means of extending the investment package to
be adopted at the OECD Ministerial to deal with such problems as bribery
and to encourage an improved framework for the settlement of inter-
national investment disputes.
Energy
Agreement to continue intensified energy cooperation among the
industrialized democracies through strengthened technical and research
cooperation, strong conservation efforts as demand increases with the
pace of economic recovery, and increased efforts to encourage energy
development in Third World non-oil exporting nations.
International Institutions
Agreement to identify possibilities for combining or eliminating
international institutions in order to avoid duplication or redundancy.
FORD
&
GERALD
List & instt argaties,
2
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1015 - -1149
18 may 16
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DECLASSIFIED
state rw 3/12/04. Docer 9/23/09, useer
infertion, It sheeld he which - 2 int have
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
whether we could ford pration solitions hat
MR # 09-119 #
By dal NARA, Date 5/5/10
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R.FORD LIGHTS
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K yes no, not specifically (?)
Our an shilles indicate that suh of
plunts (perviding should enrected their and cony every
prevent us prom A leating w/ anothers selling
upporting plants That womed be a why
bad fat- Coung legis a yourst am whis.
G That worldn't hurt us. we an
K It world be it would be include
other emathies to hand envilment facility
G Politically 6 for am chme safe, drall study
this issued & hmr it arm X 2
not sutisfied of c chesmes yet.
K Card he have some interested on it
byon writting it or writer group- the by hat reprocessing
+ research inst.
G we shmed standy c Iran case & we what hind
of guarantee of supply un cauld give Then, ,
K cend we each disig someone so me unt
computing w/ each other.
6 The haman matter is a difficult one,
K we hme not apread w/ Iran, but and trick they
so emprolint they c on get C plant in Em that
GREATO URN
they are accepting whatever we ack.
b
Then is for fortune c prestion of ctoping the transfer
of reprocessing plants.
The 2 ageld that c methods
wed for crud any industrial rentral
nur plass of world like Illigant
fort of
6 freed that could of Rambonellt
Unit 90 on in J new phose of
ecor sit.
Bilotred
ME E / Lebrur
Billetnel issue
The proby pub.
Econ
Marishi issues
Trade
Corcholets of atries
11 1 is of topics
SEALTH UND TOTAL - 11