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This file contains mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)
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1553509
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July 16, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
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1553509
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July 16, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
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This file contains mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)
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collections
Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Greece
China
Cyprus
Saudi Arabia
Taiwan
Turkey
South Africa
Africa
Germany (West)
Arms control
Foreign aid
Olympics
Soldiers
United States-Soviet relations
Helsinki Agreement, 1975
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1976-07-16
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7
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1976
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16
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1976-07-16
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7
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1976
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0
osper 3/30/05
MR MR05-09 x4. 3/13/04
dal
5/16/04
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice Chancellor
and Minister of Foreign Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Friday, July 16, 1976
11:00 a. m. - 12:29 p.m.
SUBJECTS:
Offset; African Aid; SALT; CSCE; Southern
Africa; Greece and Turkey; Saudi Arabia
[Discussion of latest economic indicators. ]
Schmidt: I think the aides of the two Secretaries of State have worked
out some drafts which seem satisfactory with the exception of a couple
of bracketed items. I suggest we conclude this today so the bureaucrats
don't get at it and stretch it out three more months.
Kissinger: I think we can reach agreement but I think we should run
it by Simon.
Schmidt: Could we each have a copy of the draft?
The President: While we are waiting for that, here is an up-to-date
on the Olympics. Canada has relented to the extent of permitting the
Taiwanese to use their flag and their national anthem but they can't
use a placard calling themselves the Republic of China. The Chinese
thus far haven't accepted it.
FORD & LIBRARY
CLASSIFIED BY
Brent Scowcroft
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b) (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
2
African Aid
Schmidt: We discussed yesterday afternoon, Henry and I, the
concept of economic support for Africa. I support the plan for aid to
African moderates; I just don't know how to finance it.
Kissinger: We discussed yesterday the problems of giving aid only
on technical considerations without political considerations. We are
reviewing for the US these bits and pieces of programs to see if they
shouldn't be put together.
Schmidt: We were thinking about, again, a meeting of the Shultz
group to conceptualize these problems.
The President: What figure was Giscard thinking of?
Schmidt: One billion over three years, divided into shares among us.
[Humorous discussion on Bavaria, HAK, etc. ]
[The language of the notes on offset and consultation is negotiated.
]
The consultation notes will be kept by the two of us, and shown only
to Defense Ministers and Chairman of the JCS.
Kissinger: We may have a Case Act problem.
The President: It would leak if the Congress got it.
Schmidt: That is more a problem for you than us.
We would not propose revealing to anyone, but if you decided that
a Congressional Committee has to get it, we would be compelled to
do likewise. [The offset press statement was agreed. ]
SALT
If we have a moment, could we mention SALT again? Would you
foresee that there is a chance for a new published agreement by the
time of the election, or would you only get a few steps further along?
The President: That depends on which option I choose. If I select a
variant of an earlier proposal, no. If I talk another option, maybe.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
FORD LIBRARY 0687
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
3
Schmidt: And what would it mean to your campaign?
The President: If I take the one option, I think it would be good.
I may be accused of doing it for political purposes, but I think it would
be beneficial.
Schmidt: My questioning stems from a feeling that movement in
MBFR will depend on SALT. It is my feeling that there is no movement
likely before 1977.
Kissinger: No way.
Schmidt: It involves a dispute with France, which I would rather not
have before my election.
Kissinger: We couldn't even get a SALT agreement before your
elections.
Schmidt: Can I say to the press we talked SALT and MBFR but it is
not for me to discuss details?
The President: Our problems are mostly internal.
Schmidt: I understand that.
CSCE
On the 1977 Belgrade meeting. There are people who seem to
want to upgrade it -- to make it at the level of Foreign Minister or
Head of State. What is your position?
The President: We have a complicating development here. The
Congress has established a CSCE Review Commission. I haven't
really thought much about it. Henry --
Kissinger: I am inclined to keep it at the lower levels, but I haven't
thought it out.
The President: I don't like the idea of East-West summits every two
years, but some of the smaller countries are pushing it -- and they
feel left out.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
3330 FORM
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
4
Kissinger: If it is a summit, the President would have to criticize
Brezhnev for non-performance. That is not good.
Schmidt: We need to have some way to make them feel engaged.
Perhaps at the official level we could have a meeting in Geneva to give
instruction to the Belgrade delegation -- like the meetings we had
prior to CSCE.
Kissinger: I expect the Belgrade meeting to be rather nasty.
Schmidt: I think Helsinki has helped the Communist parties stand up
to the Soviet Union in the recent conference.
Southern Africa
Kissinger: On South Africa. We have had good response from the
confrontation states. The chief question is whether or not the guerrilla
fighting can be stopped.
Schmidt: Vorster is a decent man but he is not looking far enough
into the future.
Kissinger: But suppose he came to you for advice? What would you
say?
Schmidt: Apartheid has to break down.
Kissinger: Continuation of the present system is not possible, but
neither is straight majority rule.
The President: How long does he have?
Kissinger: He has two years if the situation is stonewalled; maybe
five years or more if Rhodesia and Namibia work out.
The President: One question I have for you: How about Greece and
Turkey?
Schmidt: If the US does not ratify the Turkish base agreement, things
could get out of hand. The two parties in the coalition in Turkey are
leading to a situation where nothing can be done. Makarios is getting
into the position of being the opposition leader in Greece. I think
Karamanlis is a decent man, but Makarios is a real problem.
FORD
LIBRARY
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
3
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
5
Kissinger: The Greek-Americans listen to Makarios, not to
Karamanlis.
Schmidt: Karamanlis is an honest, decent person. Once he is
destroyed, things are out of hand in Greece.
Now the Greeks can accept a Cyprus solution only if they get
something on the Aegean. On Cyprus, time is running against the
Greeks; on the Aegean, probably against the Turks.
Demirel is inviting Communist leaders to Ankara this summer.
He is moving toward neutralism and Islam.
Saudi Arabia
I am deeply impressed by the moderation of Fahd. But I think
the King is naive. We are going to send an economic advisor to
them, at their request. They said they need someone who can give
them some advice.
[Walking out the door] Mr. President, I want formally to
thank you for inviting me here and allowing us to participate so
intimately in your bicentennial. It is an expression of the closeness
of our relations and our meetings have fully confirmed that again
for me.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 018451
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Note
DESCRIPTION
Brent Scowcroft's handwritten notes
from Ford, Kissinger, and Schmidt
meeting
CREATION DATE
07/16/1976
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031400940
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. Memoranda of
Conversations
BOX NUMBER
20
FOLDER TITLE
July 16, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, FRG
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
DATE WITHDRAWN
08/02/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG