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July 27, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, Australian Prime Minister J. Malcolm Fraser
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July 27, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, Australian Prime Minister J. Malcolm Fraser
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Italy
Cambodia
China
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Vietnam
Diego Garcia (British Indian Ocean Territory)
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1976
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
E.O. 12858 Sec. 3.6
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
MR 01-56, $33, stltr 6/26/02
By dal NARA, 11/26/02
MEMOR ANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
J. Malcolm Fraser, Prime Minister of Australia
Andrew S. Peacock, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Amb. Nicholas F. Parkinson, Australian
Ambassador to the United States
John L. Menadue, Secretary, Department of
Prime Minister and Cabinet
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. James W. Hargrove, U.S. Ambassador
to Australia
DATE AND TIME:
Tuesday, July 27, 1976
10:55 a. m. - 12:27 p.m.
[The press came in to take photos. There were greetings and small
talk about the Olympics. The press then departed].
The President: I am delighted to have you here. Congratulations on
your victory -- not only your personal victory, but your party's. I
envy your majority. I wish we had it, but we are working on it.
Fraser: Thank you very much, Mr. President. It is great to be here and
I deeply appreciate the invitation during such a busy period. I wish you
well in your coming trial. A little luck is always useful.
We particularly wanted to visit in order to wash away a few vestiges
of difference between our countries.
The President: I very much appreciate the change. There has been
virtually complete change on the Indian Ocean and in general attitude
on national security problems, like letting our nuclear warships into
ports again.
FORD
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
-2-
We are determined to maintain a role in the Indian Ocean, and
we are working on the Congress to convince them of the need for
Diego Garcia. I think we will make it. I want close cooperation
with you. Perhaps we can cooperate with you on the P-3 flights
and other aspects of an Indian Ocean military presence. Perhaps
you could be of some help with Singapore on this too.
When I was in Congress I was known as a Hawk, and I can't
change now that I am in the White House. You might be interested
in where we are going on the defense budget. It's a much better
situation. Over the past decade they have regularly and systematically
cut Presidential defense proposals. They've cut all together over $50
billion. This year I recommended an increase of $14 billion in obliga-
tions and $10 billion in expenditures, and they'v cut less than one
percent. Some of their cuts were okay; some were not. There's been
a big change in public opinion.
Fraser: I'm glad to hear it. The history was discouraging. We've
had a similar experience. Appropriations will be increased signifi-
cantly this year and for the next four years.
I understand our experts are working on renewal of Pine Gap.
It had been on an annual basis, but I would propose renewal on a
ten-year basis if you would find that us eful.
The President: That would be very helpful.
Fraser: And I would welcome some sort of cooperative program
on the P-3's. We fly them, you know, and I think it would be good.
Some of the internal equipment may be different. When Admiral
Hayward was in Australia in April he asked if the airport at Learmonth
[Northwest Cape] would be of use [for transit flights to Diego Garcia],
but Hayward said it was too far South. But if you can use it, we'd be
willing, and maybe you could use it for the P-3's.
The President: [To Scowcroft]: Who's negotiating this for us?
Scowcroft: Probably Defense.
The President: I will tell our people to press the cooperative approach.
SECRET/NODIS/XGIS,
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
-3-
Fraser: I spoke to some of your Congressmen on Diego Garcia.
Kissinger: You gave them the answer they didn't want!
Fraser: I thought I had to lay it on the line. A number of countries
around the Indian Ocean privately approve of your moves to counter the
Soviets in those waters, even though they arent in a position to say so
publicly. China is an example.
The President: I appreciate the letter you sent me on your trip to China.
We hear nothing about Teng Hsiao-ping now.
Fraser: We got the same kind of demonstration in every village we
visited. Hua Kuo-feng still seems to be in charge.
The President: Chiao Kuan-hua is still Foreign Minister, isn't he?
He was farther down the line when I was there in '72 and he was very
articulate and bright. I liked him.
Fraser: He's impressive and forceful.
Kissinger: He's a minor edition of Chou.
Fraser: I would think he'd be a tough negotiator.
The President: Yes, except when he was with Teng, Chiao said very
little.
Fraser: And with us when he was with Hua.
The President: How about Mao?
Fraser: They stopped his appearances just before I came. They trotted
out Chu Teh two weeks before he died. They had him under careful
control and he seemed very vague and frail.
The President: I thought Mao was mentally very alert when I saw him.
Kissinger: Mao was better with you than when I had seen him the
previous month.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 4 -
Fraser: I got several impressions. First is that anyone who makes
predictions on China is foolhardy. I got the impression also that they
aren't going to make issues out of Southeast Asian problems or the Korean
situation or the Taiwan situation. They consider the Soviet problem over-
riding and won't let these less important problems complicate it.
The President: That's our impression too.
Fraser: They are taking a sharp line on Taiwan, for example in their
conversation with Senator Scott.
Kissinger: But he provoked it.
Fraser: One other impression, which may be a misunderstanding. There
was only an oblique reference. They wanted us to have the feeling there
was not adequate communication.
Kissinger: With Australia or with us?
Fraser, Peacock: With the United States.
Fraser: It's true on Australia particularly but the doors to China have
been shut so long and they have so much reason to be suspicious. But
the impression we got was they want more dialogue with you. One thing --
the SALT talks going on -- which we support -- and they are not a part of
it; they are concerned something may happen which would affect them.
This was just a general feeling we got. I think we all should try patiently
to draw them out and to encourage them as they emerge and engage them
more freely in some wider framework. Not that you are not doing that,
but I thought I should pass this on.
The President: I never had that impression during our talks in December.
They were critical of some of the things we do, but I never got the feeling
they thought there was a gulf.
Kissinger: The Chinese are masters. They are near-geniuses and cold-
blooded analysts of the balance of power. Sentiment is not something
they are concerned with. In fact, we brief them more than anyone else
but our close allies. Whenever we are about to meet with the Russians
at a high level, we brief them in detail. And they tell us nothing. Now
they are concerned that we are weak. They see Vietnam; they see Angola;
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 5 -
they see Turkey. And they would like to freeze us into total hostility to
the Soviet Union. That would get them off the hook. And then they can
organize the Third World against us both. Their game is very complicated
but they are doing their best to maneuver us into a position where we have
no options. Their policy is becoming more transparent because their
leadership is less competent now. We need to maintain our options with
respect to both. Being frozen into hostility with the Soviets would worsen
our relations with China, not help them.
Fraser: We don't want that. Hostility to the Soviet Union appears
absolute now but the possibility of reconciliation we must keep in mind.
We have to offer them an alternative home to the Soviet Union. They
shouldn't feel a need to repair their relations with the Soviets.
Kissinger: Yes, we must walk this line. It isn't easy. They should
feel they can count on us but not take us for granted.
Fraser: Any enduring relationship with China has to take into account
your relations with Western Europe too.
The President: We have kept our allies fully abreast of our SALT II
negotiations.
Kissinger: And the Chinese. And on MBFR.
The President: In SALT, we think a good foundation was laid in
Vladivostok. The problems now are how to negotiate these ambiguous
systems like Backfire and cruise missile. I happen to think SALT is
in everyone's interest. I won't sign a bad agreement just to sign an
agreement. We won't compromise principles but I want an agreement.
Fraser: We certainly support that.
The President: We are after an agreement. Otherwise both sides will
have to move ahead with major programs. So we are looking for an
agreement through 1985. We don't have much time, since the Interim
Agreement ends in '77.
Kissinger: And if we went into competition, in ten years we would be no
better off really. Our estimates are that we would lose as many as 125
million people in a nuclear war if we didn't strike first, and 110 million
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
-6-
if we did. Even with our 6-to-1 advantage in warheads. We need to spend
the money on conventional forces.
The President: We have a study underway now on our Navy. The figures
you see are misleading since alot of their ships are used for coastal defense
and minesweeping. Our tonnage is almost double theirs. But we are taking
a hard look at whether we need an extra push on Navy.
Of course we are also debating with Congress on what to do with the
B-1. An evaluation will be complete by 1 November. I think we need it --
the B-52 is aging.
Kissinger: It would be a disaster if the B-1 were scrapped. The thing
the conservatives don't realize is that their SALT opposition has left
open the B-1 to attack.
The President: Carter supports a $7-9 billion cut in the defense budget.
I don't think it can be done.
Kissinger: Did you see the defense advisers who met with Carter yesterday?
$7- 9 billion cut is just the tip of the iceberg. They would have to cut in
Asia and Europe and the B-1.
The President: There's no question they would stop the B-1 and try to
modify the B-52. Humphrey tried to stop R&D on the cruise missile.
Fraser: Would they reduce the commitments to match?
Kissinger: Not necessarily.
The President: The cruise missile isn't the ultimate weapon but it's still
necessary.
Fraser: How do you see the economy going? Was the Puerto Rico meeting
a success?
The President: Yes, it was. I think things are going well. At Rambouillet
we were all in the trough of the recession; we tried to coordinate our pro-
grams for recovery. At Puerto Rico the recovery was under way -- with
our economy way ahead. We all recognized the need to curb inflation while
reducing unemployment. We also discussed North-South and East-West
economic issues.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
-7-
[Describes domestic recovery, with relevant statistics and trends. ]
It's much better than even in January. The trends are all in the right
direction.
Fraser: That must be nice for later this year.
The President: Yes, though we would rather have the employment higher
and the inflation lower. How about you?
Fraser: We are getting back, but it is difficult. The previous government
just gave the unions anything they wanted. I think now we are in the early
stages of recovery, but some indicators are going in each direction. I
think inflation is the chief problem and we can't move until we get that
licked. We cut $3 billion off the budget this year and there are signs
inflation is coming down. We've had trouble getting the unions to restrain
their wage demands. Treasury is convinced the recovery is underway,
but slowly.
The President: I notice the British have taken some tough decisions, but
I notice they had some defectors. He can't afford too much defection.
Fraser: No. It is always difficult taking on these very tough programs.
I think it is probably better that Labor does it than the Conservatives.
The President: Callaghan called me and told me he has had to defer
some defense spending, in order to insist on deferral of some social
program costs, but he said it was no more than a temporary defense
deferral.
Fraser: Are the NATO countries increasing their defense spending?
The President: Yes, but not as much as we would like. We are trying
to improve cooperation and standardization.
Kissinger: General Haig is doing a superb job of utilizing what he has.
The President: I am very worried about the situation in Italy.
Peacock: Hasn't Carter said he could live with Communists in the Italian
government?
Kissinger: Yes. And that is disastrous. The Communists will bide their time
until the U.S. election, hoping for a Carter victory and an easier posture
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
FORD LIBRARY
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
-8-
from the new Administration. If the US backs down, that'll be a disaster,
because France will then follow the same road.
Once you get to arguing how much participation is okay, you are lost.
Fraser: Isn't this how Czechoslovakia went?
Kissinger: I had a study made showing that the East European Communists
were making precisely the same kind of statements in 1945 to 1948. They
sound just like Berlinguer and the French Communists today. I will give you
a copy tomorrow.
Fraser: Yes, I'd like that.
President: Our hard line in Portugal seems to have paid off well.
Kissinger: But Italy is more complicated. Like on Diego Garcia, many of
the Europeans agree with us on Italy but criticize us in public.
Fraser: That is bad. It reminds me of Vietnam.
Kissinger: It's interesting that all the crazies who were protesting the
killing in Vietnam and elsewhere are totally silent about the 500, 000 who
almost certainly were killed in Cambodia.
Fraser: At least.
Peacock: The Cambodians have come to us in Peking to suggest that we
establish diplomatic relations by 6 August. We couldn't do it by then but
I wanted to discuss that. There might be some advantages but that may be
too soon.
Kissinger: The Chinese want to build a barrier to the Vietnamese. While
the Cambodians are dreadful, it does make some sense.
Fraser: We would have to disclaim any idea of approving their actions.
Peacock: We could perhaps be useful to you -- I want to talk about it in
more depth.
Kissinger: It might be a good idea. Anything that would help to contain
Vietnam would be good. Though I consider the Cambodian Government
loathesome.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
-9-
The President: Do you have relations with North Korea?
Fraser: Yes. It was established by the previous government. We have
kept them.
Kissinger: How do they treat you?
Fraser: There is virtually no contact. We were kicked out quickly because
they didn't like the way we abstained on the UNGA vote.
The President: Well, we are looking forward to seeing you at dinner this
evening.
Fraser: There is one domestic problem I need to raise for the record --
your beef imports.
The President: Yes, we have the same problem. I'm getting pressure
from meat producers here.
Kissinger: I was hit with it when I was in Oregon for a speech.
Fraser: We are having a serious drought and people are killing the
cattle. There are arguments on both sides of the question and I would
simply like to say I mentioned it.
[There was additional brief discussion of the prospective grain crops
in Australia and the U.S. The conversation then ended.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
2
DECLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
MR01-125 #16: st.etr 5/29/02
Memorandum of Conversation
By dol NARA, Date 6/19/02
DATE: July 27, 1976
Place: The White House
Time: 11:00 A.M.
SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Prime Minister Fraser
PARTICIPANTS:
US
AUSTRALIA
President Gerald R. Ford
Prime Minister J. Malcolm Fraser
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock
Ambassador James W. Hargrove
Secretary, Department of Prime
Mr. Brent Scowcroft
Minister and Cabinet
John Menadue
Ambassador Nicholas Parkinson
After initial pleasantries the President expressed to the Prime
Minister his pleasure at the actions of the Prime Minister's
government, particularly with respect to national security matters.
He mentioned specifically the reversal of position on Diego Garcia,
the admission of NPWs into Australian ports again, and the improved
cooperation on the joint US-Australian defense facilities. He said
he considered it vitally important to have a military capability in
the Indian Ocean and would continue to attempt to convince Congress
of the necessity for improving Diego Garcia; he believes he is
making headway on this. The US is anxious to work out arrangements
for cooperative P-3 surveillance flights with the Australians, the
President said, and perhaps the Australians could be some help with
Singapore on this matter, too.
The President cited the improved situation on Defense appropri-
ations this year. Over the past decade Congress had regularly and
systematically cut the presidential proposals; a total of more than
$50 billion had been cut over this period. This year, however, he
had recommended an increase of $14 billion in obligations and
$10 billion in expenditures and the Congress had cut less than 1%.
Some of their suggested cuts were acceptable; others were not.
The Congress' attitude reflected a changed American public opinion,
he said.
James W. Hargrove (Amb.)
7/28/76
(Drafting Office and Officer)
SECRET - XGDS (3)
FORM DS-1254
2 - 65
CLASSIFIED
HENRY A. KISSINGER
GERATO REFURE
- 2 -
The Prime Minister indicated he was heartened by this news
and that the history was discouraging. Australia had had a
similar experience; defense appropriations there were to be
increased significantly this year and for the following two years
as well.
The Prime Minister said he understood negotiations are
being conducted to put the arrangement for the joint facilities
at Pine Gap on a new ten-year term instead of its present year-
to-year term. He said he would be happy to see it put on the
long-term 10-year arrangement. The President commented that his
support would be very helpful.
The Prime Minister said Australia would also cooperate
on P-3 surveillance of the Indian Ocean if that is possible. When
Admiral Hayward was in Australia in April he had asked if the airport
at Learmonth (North West Cape) would be of use (presumably for
transit flights to Diego Garcia -- notetaker's comment) but
Admiral Hayward had replied that he thought it was too far south.
However, the Prime Minister said if it can be used by the US,
Australia would be willing, and perhaps it offered possibilities
for cooperative P-3 flights.
The President asked Mr. Scowcroft who was negotiating this
matter for the US and speculated that it would be Defense. He said
he would speak to them about it.
The Prime Minister said a number of the nations peripheral
to the Indian Ocean privately approve of the US moves to counter
the Soviet strength in those waters although they are not in a
position to do so publicly. He cited China as an example.
The President thanked the Prime Minister for his letter about
his trip to China. There then followed a general discussion of the
leadership situation in China, the position of Teng, the health of
Mao, and the present Chinese Foreign Minister. The Prime Minister
thought him impressive and forceful; Mr. Kissinger thought him a
minor edition of Chou. The Prime Minister thought he would be a
tough negotiator.
The Prime Minister said he got the impression from his trip to
China that the Chinese were not going to make issues out of
insurgencies in Southeast Asia or the Korean situation or the
Taiwan question, that they considered the Soviet problem to be
overriding and didn't want to complicate it with these less important
problems. The President said that was our impression also.
- 3 -
Another impression from his trip, the Prime Minister said,
something as to which there was only an oblique reference, was
the feeling that there hadn't been adequate government-to-government
communication and that they wanted more.
Mr. Kissinger asked if he was speaking of communication with
Australia or with the US? The Prime Minister and the Foreign
Minister both replied: "With the United States." The Prime
Minister thought they were afraid that something might happen to
inhibit their long-term interests. The Prime Minister thinks our
types of countries need to build up a framework of long-term (maybe
as long as 25 years) relations with China to draw them out of their
ideological position.
The President said he hadn't had any impression that the
Chinese felt neglected by the US when he visited with them in
December of 1975. Mr. Kissinger said the Chinese were near-geniuses
and cold-blooded analysts of balance of power politics but that
loving people was not their specialty. We have, he said, actually
briefed the Chinese more than anyone else except our closest allies.
Whenever we are about to meet the Russians at a high level we brief
them in detail about our plans. Their basic problem is they think
we are becoming weaker (as in Viet-Nam, Angola and Turkey, for
example) and they don't like it because it doesn't fit their plan.
They would like to get the US into a posture of irreconcilable
hostility with the USSR and then they would mobilize the Third World
against both powers. Their policy is becoming more transparent
with the lower level of competency in the Chinese leadership since
Chou's death. We need to maintain our options with respect to both
powers. Freezing into hostility with the Soviets would worsen
relations with China, not help them.
The Prime Minister believed it to our interest that China
should not feel a need to repair their relations with the USSR, he
said. Mr. Kissinger agreed, adding that the Chinese should feel
that they can count on us but not take us for granted. The Prime
Minister said he thought any enduring relationship had to take into
account our relations with Western Europe as well. Mr. Kissinger
again agreed, saying that we are keeping Western Europe and China
both fully advised of our MBFR and SALT negotiations. The President
said he is convinced a good SALT agreement is essential, although
he would not sign a bad agreement just to have an agreement.
Emphasizing the importance of a good SALT agreement,
Mr. Kissinger said our estimates are that the US would lose as
many as 125 million people in a nuclear war if we didn't strike
LIBRARY
- 4 -
first and as many as 110 million if we did (not a significant
difference) even with our six-to-one advantage in warheads now.
We need to divert resources from nuclear weapons to conventional,
he said.
The President agreed, especially in respect to naval forces,
remarking on our present shipbuilding program and the possibility
of acceleration. However, he made the point that figures on
comparative naval strength are misleading because of the large
number of Soviet ships in coastal and minesweeping use. Our
tonnage is almost double theirs. Nevertheless, we are taking a
hard look at an extra push in the naval program. He also commented
on the debate in Congress on the B-1, a program which he thinks
is essential in view of the age of the B-52s.
Mr. Kissinger agreed that it would be a disaster if the B-1
program were scrapped. The President noted that Jimmy Carter's
proposed reduction of $7 billion in the defense budget would be
terrible, as would his proposal to reduce strength in Korea.
Mr. Kissinger thought the Carter advisers on defense matters were
a problem, that they would probably reduce commitments in Western
Europe as well as in Korea. The President said there's no question
that they would stop the B-1 and try to modify the B-52. He noted
Humphrey tried to stop R&D on the cruise missile, which the
President thinks is not the ultimate weapon but is still necessary.
The Prime Minister asked for the President's comments on the
economy. Did he think the Puerto Rico summit was a success? The
President thought it was indeed. It was a necessary follow-up
to Rambouillet, this time to emphasize the problem of renewed
inflation instead of recession recovery as at Rambouillet. He
quoted current statistics indicating the situation in all respects
looked better in the US than it had in January of 1976. How about
Australia's economy, he asked the Prime Minister? The Prime
Minister replied that Australia had started its program of recovery
later and had to turn around from a very extreme position in which
the previous government had put them. They have cut $3 billion
off the budget this year and there are signs inflation is coming
down. They have had trouble getting the trade unions to restrain
wage increases, but there are some encouraging signs. Treasury
is convinced the recovery is under way, but slowly.
A discussion followed of Great Britain's problems and the
prospects for Prime Minister Callaghan's success in this program.
The President said the British Prime Minister had called him to
tell him he had to defer some defense expenditures in order to
insist on deferral of some social program costs, but that it was
no more than a temporary defense deferral. The Prime Minister
asked if NATO was increasing its force level and the President
- 5 -
answered it was increasing some, but slowly, and that he'd like to
see it do better. Mr. Kissinger commented that General Haig was
going a superb job of utilizing what he had.
A discussion of Italy and the problem of the Communist
participation in government followed. Mr. Kissinger thought the
Italian Communists would bide their time until after the US elections
in hope of a Carter victory and an easier posture with the new
administration. A back-down in the US position would be a disaster,
he thought, since France would soon follow the same road. He
said he had some research done on what the Eastern European
indigenous Communists were saying in 1945-48 and that they sounded
exactly like Berlinguer and the French Communists today. He promised
to give a copy of the research work to the Prime Minister, who
said he would like to have one.
The President said our hard line in Portugal seemed to have
paid off well. There was general agreement, but Mr. Kissinger
added that Italy was more complicated. He added that, as in the
case of the nations peripheral to the Indian Ocean, many of the
European nations agreed with our position on Italy in private but
criticized us in public. The Prime Minister thought that was very
bad, and that it was reminiscent of the situation in Viet-Nam.
There were comments on the atrocities in Cambodia.
The Prime Minister commented that three days ago the Australian
Ambassador in Peking was asked if Australia would consider resuming
relations with Cambodia on August 6. He thought there might be
some advantages in re-establishing relations but he thought the
precise date was much too soon. Mr. Kissinger said the PRC would
like to see Cambodia re-established as a block to Vietnamese
ambitions. The Prime Minister said if they did establish relations
he would want to disclaim any idea of approving the actions of the
Cambodians. The Foreign Minister said he'd like to discuss this
matter with Mr. Kissinger in more depth. Mr. Kissinger replied
that might be a good idea and that anything that would help to
contain Viet-Nam would be good, although he considered the Cambodian
government "loathesome."
The President asked if Australia maintained relations with
North Korea and the Prime Minister noted that they had established
them but in a short space of time they were evicted from North
Korea because they didn't like the way Australia abstained on
a UNGA vote on the Korean situation.
Just before departure, the Prime Minister asked if they
could include a brief discussion of the meat importation problem
LIBRARY
- 6 -
in the report of the conversation, in view of his domestic
problems in this regard. The President agreed, noting however
that he was getting some pressure on the same subject from US
domestic meat producers. Mr. Kissinger noted he had been hit
with it recently in Oregon. The Prime Minister acknowledged
that there were arguments on both sides of the question and he
would simply like to note that the subject had been raised.
After a few brief additional comments on the drought in
Australia and in Europe and the prospective grain crops in the
US and Australia, the meeting adjourned at 12:20 P.M.
Horper by
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3
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smoket doest X line exerp as/ you,
Yeshings we can carps are P-3 finglits & other
appears of Indian 0 ORDER hil presence
In eng I hurn cer a bank + & can't
change how In WA, 3 you no just be
in where nd as going on of
enlyet. (Describes c 21 beight
F we are also working an a 5 eye prep Th
one engabilities.
Important one experts and working ou
common of line Grp. gt had been an and
have has I d world propose recent
Once 104a boxes if you world ford that
useford
P That small be why balyford
F and I world metwore 2020 sent f every
pera one P-3's we fly am you Gerry
+ 8thick it and he good. Since of c instrant
doing maybe dif. prizs enry approach
P I will an one prople to bh reti Rones -
F & sport to of you long an Diago
K you gove then C asswer they didn't went
F & tht & ha la log it one his.
P & applic you litters on china We has
writingon They how
F We got smell his of clumination in
buy we conseted. Hna still
yems to H in change
P Chiao is still FNN excet he? He not
forther dmm/ his wound was three in 72
and he my every articitate a hight. & thank
him
F 2 cmld think hina tomyo nyot
P Yes, experpt w/ They, Chino said my hith.
F and w/no w/ Hna.
P Harr about Thas
F they stopped M just before to &
came, They trother and Chn Teh 2 and
hoppe he did. Tray hn I him much
congual intel + he birther wined
they engus + finil
P Itht Undo was mentally very about
K mas was better Then when?
presis we month.
F I got Fernal hypienes. Frast is anyour
How F how ant Scott cours w/ mar.
who moss production as on China is food-
hardy. another minimum is L sharp
bird they one CMA Coping - on Torrison for
expangele in them lnm. w/ Sh with
K Bit he provided it,
F One other requiresion which may be
They no as has fuling these was not
artigants communication - that true on ant. part-
but drug DB China have her shot so lmg
+ thing have To much waser to h surpriors- but
congram we got cro they wont more
chalague w/ you. One thing - the ENT
tanks your tren whicher suggest + they
not a part X converned soulding my higher
which would affort them. This worgest 6
good friting 2ml grt. 8 think use aM should thing
patienth to draw then out & to through Then
to energe any ye more fully. Zwt that
you int 1mg that but 20ht dohald poss this
on
P I wher had ctreet mysism ching and tmks,
They were entrid forme of C Chip are do,
but I hundr got. forting they cht * there was a
gerlf
K Tan Chenks an I master Sentiment
is wrt something thing one envernation In
pet we his am more then any one any lbs
but on else allis. and they tell no whith
how they am universed ml and awork. and
They world him to frerze in into Intal hishlity
to - SU. Th at would get then off C hoh.
Than gome is very enopheated but they
Postivla date
doing this let 4 movemn by into patric
whire cut home ho oftime
F we lon't went that, Histity to SS from absort
amer ht. posibility of vimit. an must help
in mind. we hns I offerther am att,
hms to - sc,
K
Yes and nust wolk this him. St risut iny.
P
Wehme hept on Mis fruth about T are
Smt II engot
K and - PQC
P In Sart, few this a your foundation was land
in Vend. Then forms now one show & sugs
these anaying got like Kashpire & M.
Jhoppen A think Smit in everyoner intirest,
we wont unprovise penerples has 2 writ
one aparement
F We entiming supert that
P We after on a personal Otherise anth
will hmr to brown page. So me
borking for an against thus 1985. we drit
hml minh time, since Inter and in 27.
K and if me what into competition, in yes
we would he hi better we mude special
PW C usually on crow, faces.
P we have 6 study sunder my that our one honey
We lnking a hand lnk at whith are ever on
Xtraprish on Mmy.
Opera whate chirting w/ Comp on What A A
lous/B-1, E val enights ly' Wer, I Think
und heed it = B-52 is agring
K Ten thing c Criservation dnit has whis is
that - their Sult Hasating has left offer
C B-1 & attack.
P was Carth supports a 7-9 bird ent he bp Indyet
& dnit think it cm he love.
K Did you all c dif athisis who met w/ Carth
yestering? 2-9 hit ent is just - ty of -
engling They used have cut in Obed t
Em + B-1
F would they richnce C crastruts to match
K not in missing
P (Dirussed B-1 & ern a hit more)
F How dryon zu easy open
P 1 thrit Things and you will. at Rannh cm
wheall inc tomphefe - ressions we will to
carl any progo for every at P.R. C
We heal to enib inglation while
vicentry evasember way, w/ Ms way ahead.
uldning we also disissed
N-S K E-W em issues.
(Describes drinstic encountry, w/ whent
statistics bur trinks.)
The trends are all in c enght dratin
F That must he mil /or later This year
P Yes, the we would rather have buydont
hugher - inflation brands. Honn about you
F w 1 and getting hanch, but it is chy. Two prin
gest just gowe < unins any this They
wonted. Jthnk now are and en in - each
High f recovery, but sound which are
gones in each & think inflution
is chif pub + and cont mar the are
get that sik
P I which Buts have taken have tough
decegious, ht I vaties some lifectors. He and
affert Too much diffiction.
F no. It is always diy laking on hayhe that why
tough progo. & think NA per better 4x lab it
them Conservation
P
H e has had to byn some of spending
F
an - Nato contribute increasing their of
P Yes, your but not as much as we would like are
an trying & injoye crop + standardiation
dana why werred about C set in staby.
Pensarch Hasn't canths I and he would his w/ curts in
gest.
K yes. and that is disartrous. O nce you pt
to arging hmo much partic, you are
lat.
F Int this how by creat
K Lhma study shing E, Emro moting periods
L forme hand of statements in eachin ydars.
devil give you a copy Trunsfer
(Unne obsignous p Staty P-Curry whating)
Item interesty that all L emics who were
bellings in UN Y abouture ON truthy sight
on C 5ro, or who about eartering we filled
in
F
at. least.
Penurek Tun Embrahams have came to no in Puting &
Jany yest dip watning 6 any. We emplint
deet by the but revented Is chs crass Check
K The Chise went to hurld a brien to -
Vinese, white i - Combining are chendford, it
any mohe some sense.
Yearnh Wiscould perhypshe unsepect to you - 2 not
to with about it
P do you home watring w/ VM
F yes, Estab by C promon Govt, We home hept
them
K
How do they trant you
F
There is write me intant.
P
well, had Inhing Provout to Jung you at
chrines this way
F There iscre charactic jost devel to raise for -
records your help M
P Yes, Burth eve have c sume purh
(Beswassin & Rivo + despiste
over emeting of M.)
F we hmming a Hnors changht t peoplease hilhing
c cwth. - It would helpief I mults m d mantraid
it.