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    "localId": "1553550",
    "label": "October 1, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, USSR Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko",
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    "title": "October 1, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, USSR Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1553550",
    "collections": [
        "Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)",
        "Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations"
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        "Arms control",
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    "ocrText": "File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nPresident Ford\nHenry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State\nWilliam G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the\nPresident for National Security Affairs\nHelmut Sonnenfeldt, Counsellor, State Department\nAndrey Gromyko, Foreign Minister\nG. Kornienko, Ministry of Foreign Affairs\nA. Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to the US\nDATE & TIME:\nFriday, October 1, 1976, 4:15 p.m.\nPLACE:\nThe Oval Office\nPresident: It's been a year since I've seen you; there have been ups\nand downs. The long range objectives established in Vladivostok and at\nthe Conference in Helsinki I want continued in the future, as long as\nI am in office. The road is not smooth, but basically it is where it was\nwhen I took office. SALT has slowed down because of the campaign. I\nassure you that after November 2 it can again become serious. We are\ntrying to be constructive in South Africa, and events should proceed with\na minimum of outside involvement. We have no interest in a permanent\nrole there.\nOver the next four years, we should move ahead on MBFR, also on the\nMiddle East. Let me repeat what I said to the General Secretary: our\ntwo countries must continue to put relations on a better basis; despite\ncertain international problems, I believe we can carry it out.\nGromyko: Generally pleased to hear your introductory remarks, the\nmeaning of which is that you confirm that you follow and intend to\nfollow the course that has been taken in recent years, and that this is\nthe basic line of the US and Soviet Union. This is also the basic problem\nI wanted to take up. Also SALT and the Middle East.\nDECLASSIFIED\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nE.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5\nXGDS (3,1)\nNSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 3/13/04\nPer = Brent Scoweroft\nBY has\n, NARA DATE 7/30/04\nSEGRET/SENSITIVE\n2\nOn both sides there are repeated statements, also by you, in favor\nof development of relations between Soviet Union and US on the basis\nof peaceful coexistence. Also notably in behalf of party and country by\nLeonid Brezhnev. Trust you are familiar with his remarks to the XXV\nCongress. Thus you and we have several times confirmed that we intend\nto continue on peaceful coexistence line, which is the most reasonable\nposition. Recall this basic underlying concept embodied in US-Soviet docu-\nments: (1) Principles, (2) the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear\nWar, and (3) Vladivostok understanding; though not yet finalized, its\nimportance is immence, provided both sides finalize it. All that is well and\ngood but I would be wrong if I didn't call attention to statements by the\nUS not fully or at all in accord or even running counter to the line in\nthese documents. I won't list who said what, where and on what occasion.\nEvery day people have hammered into their minds we are arming without\nlet up and that the US should increase its arms, as if the US were\nprodded by the Soviet Union. We categorically reject this. An unbiased\nobserver knows that the facts are opposite. Second, the Soviet Union\nallegedly is acting contrary to the line, bringing influence to bear on\ncountries in remote areas to further unilateral interests and trying to\ngive detente a one-sided interpretation. Not just officials but others.\nBut the state of affairs is not discussed, and no rebuff is given to these\nstatements. So we ask ourselves where is the essence of US policy?\nThe President, when he speaks in public on various occasions, or to\nus at high-level meetings, or at a different place. We make no statements\nrunning counter to our agreed line. Just a few days ago I made a statement\nat the UN.\nThe other specific example relates to the MIG 25 which accidentally came\ndown on Japanese territory. We were taken aback by the US line (so\nalso by the Japanese line). As soon as that happened, a statement on\nBelenko by the White House: \"If he wants asylum we'll grant it. A very\nhostile act. The plane is still not given back. US and Japan took the\nplane apart as if they owned it, like spoils of war. We can't qualify this\nas anything but hostile. In 1970, during the Vietnam war, a US transport\ncarrying large group came down on Soviet territory. We at once let\nthem go. So there was another plane with two US generals in South\nCaucasus and we let them go. That is the practice of civilized countries.\nBut that line didn't suit the US and Japan. We are entitled to believe that\nthe US would give Japanese friendly advice how to act, but no press\nstories, Belenko acted voluntarily. We don't believe a word of it. Force\nwas used. Confirmed by doctors. Don't know what your military will do,\nbut incident has injected great doubt into relations, especially as far as\nconfidence is concerned. We now understand situation better than before:\nthere is great difference in word and deed of US. General Secretary\nBrezhnev told us to tell you he is very bitter and indignant. How could\nyou do it. How could you meet and look each other in the eye, and raise\nglasses and drink to friendship. Brezhnev says he just can't conceive of\nthe whole thing. Has caused great indignation in the whole country.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\n3\nPresident: Some preliminary comments: 1) What I said at the outset\nis policy. What I have said publicly is that the relationship has ups and\ndowns. Basic relationships must continue for peace.\nBut the President has a responsibility to maintain our security, as you do.\nOur efforts will fall within limits of Vladivostok agreement. We will\nmaintain forces sufficient for security. Not incompatible with SALT\nagreement.\n3) We have important differences over actions in far-off lands. We told\nyou your actions in Angola were not helpful and hope it won't happen again.\n4) On Belenko: We have traditional asylum policy. All the information\nwe have shows he did it voluntarily. You were granted an interview with\nyour officials. Your remarks about the transport and the two generals\nare quite different cases. They wanted to come back; Belenko wanted\nasylum. So, they are not comparable. General Secretary has to\nrecognize there is a difference. If Lt. Belenko wants to go back, we'll\naccommodate his wishes. But he doesn't. But that sort of incident is\nno reason to cut relations. We did not precipitate the incident. This\nincident should not interfere with our broad relationship.\nGromyko: Time will pass and you will realize you've been misled,\nand you'll see the true circumstances concerning the plane and the\ndesires of the pilot. Other occasions other people found themselves\nabroad and were asked to go back to tell the story of how they were\ntreated. If we had used other means on American planes, some of them\nwould have stayed in the Soviet Union.\nNow on South Africa, there are no lack of statements that the Soviets\nare trying to interfere. Not a single soldier has ever been there. But\nUS persons traveling there to advance US interests. We can't approve.\nOur attitude on racialism well-known since 1917. That's one view of what\njustice is all about, should be in the hands of majority people. Racism is\nnot in anyone's interest. I took part in UN Charter drafting. Many\nclauses due to the collapse of the colonial system due to US-Soviet\ncooperation after war, and that went into the UN Charter. Now you\nassert we are taking bad position. We have no desire to interfere. No\none should say we are white and you are black, therefore we know better\nwhat's good for you. My own speech in UN consistent with this.\nWe are endeavoring to display tact and delicacy in your election campaign.\nWe favor development of relations and line that has taken shape.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\n4\nPresident: I appreciate that. US has never believed in colonialism.\nWe gave freedom to the Philippines. And that is the best evidence we\ndon't believe in it. We have no racism in the US and don't believe in it\non a world-wide basis. So what we are doing in Africa is not in behalf\nof colonial ambitions. We want Africans to solve African problems and\nareglad to discuss it.\nGromyko: Can we take up SALT.\nPresident: Sure.\nGromyko: We believe as before that this problem is of exceptional\nimportance. We will finally abide by Vladivostok understanding. Both\nsides should make all effort to translate understanding into a new\nagreement. Should be in strict conformity with Vladivostok principles.\nTwo basic differences stand in the way of a new agreement: (1) Cruise\nmissiles. We set out our position in detail to Dr. Kissinger when he\nwas last in Moscow. On that occasion the US side set one position. At\nthat time we thought there was a basis for agreement. Dr. Kissinger\nsaid it would take more time to think it over; still no reply has been\nreceived. (2) Backfire: the position of the US side on this bomber is\nstill being talked about, but we have on more than one occasion set\nforth that the Backfire is not a strategic bomber; doesn't have\nattributes and we gave you arguments and reasons. Those were\ngiven to Dr. Kissinger by the General-Secretary. We can't take any\nother positions. It cannot be a strategic bomber and can't be so regarded.\nGeneral Secretary said not only is it not a strategic bomber, not will\nwe make it one. This has been said at a responsible level, so you can see\nhow embarrassing it would be if it were discovered to do SO. It can't be\nhidden.\nOur cruise missile position is the same as when Dr. Kissinger was in\nMoscow.\nDon 't think we should prohibit only ballistic missiles above certain level\nbut not prohibit cruise missiles. At one point US told us all to resolve\nthe MIRV question for confidence: what missiles shall be counted as\nMIRV. We agreed if missile tested once with MIRV, all missiles of that\ntype would be counted. Not easy for us, a major concession. But\nstressed it was only valid if cruise missile and Backfire also settled\nas organic whole. In February we got your proposal to leave suspended\ncruise missile/Backfire while talks go on.\nPresident: In February.\nSEGRET/SENSITIVE\n5\nGromyko: This was tantamount to saying what is acceptable to the US\nshould be solved but what is not acceptable should be only talked about.\nThis is not good. We don't want an agreement to be unclear and things\nleft unclear. We want a new SALT agreement and assume so does the\nUS. We urge you to take another look; perhaps the advice some of\nyour agencies give you is not in the broader interest of the US. Don't\nknow if it can be done before or after the election. But we are prepared\nto go ahead. If not, we will regret it deeply; if it is bogged down and\nfails it would damage the interests of both countries and peace.\nPresident: I wanted it a year ago. Dr. Kissinger went in January and\nthought there was a narrowing of differences. In February I wrote General\nSecretary Brezhnev to suggest a settlement of cruise missile and Backfire\nby 1979. You rejected it in March. Hoped if you disagreed you'd make\na new proposal, but you didn't. After November it will be possible to\nsit down; if you have a proposal, we'll listen. If the interim idea is no\ngood, then we should talk. Henry?\nKissinger: Thought maybe we should reflect on what has been said.\nIn a letter we could let them know about a reasonable timetable in a\nweek or SO. As I had understood, the General Secretary is prepared\nto reduce 2400 to 2300 or below.\nGromyko: This is not excluded.\nKissinger: As I understand it, the Soviets reject deferral. So you,\nMr. President, have not yet considered with your advisers how to proceed.\nDobrynin: You gave us a reply.\nPresident: But yours was a rejection.\nGromyko: Think it over. If there is any possibility alone the lines\nspoken of by Kissinger, it would be attractive. Something in that area\nmight get us out of dilemma. The Middle East?\nGromyko: Points of settlement are: 1) Return of occupied territory.\n2) Solution of Palestine problem. But from the outset, to place matter\non realistic basis, those two should be supplemented by two others\n(in terms of principles). First, recognition by Arabs and all states of\nrights of Israel and others to independent existence. Second, end to\nstate of war in Middle East.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\n6\nPresident: UN resolutions 338 and 242 offer a basis. Problem is to\nget over hump on PLO. If some mechanism can be found maybe all\nfour points can be settled at same time.\nGromyko: We feel these four major items for Geneva agenda have been\nrecognized by all parties. True not each party gives some importance\nto each time. But they all recognize items. So why not reconvene\nGeneva and place them on the agenda. We gave Dr. Kissinger our\nproposal and also to other parties. Want them to think it over. We\ndon't think accept some other separate conference and start into a new\njungle.\nRe Palestinians -- it is interwoven with all other questions in the Middle\nEast. On adopting agenda without Palestinians, they'd have to be\nconsulted. Then commissions. But can't have full conference without\nPalestinians. Question of war and peace is more important than\nprocedure. But the agenda can be adopted in one meeting. One single\nGeneva conference. No preliminary separate conference. No one can\nbelieve these four points solely in Soviet interest. Involve all the\nparties. So why not try. Find common language and cooperate or have\ncontact. If Palestinians agree, there could be opening meeting to\napprove agenda, without Palestinians. Only one meeting. But there\nwould be understanding that as soon as agenda is approved, the\nPalestinians come in. If that takes time, then it is OK, but no separate\nconference.\nPresident: Suggestion merits careful consideration. I'll sit down with\nHenry and we'll be in touch.\nPresident: We'll contact Palestinians and let you know.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE"
}