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    "id": "1553594",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Southeast Asia (7)",
    "description": "This file contains materials concerning the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1553594",
    "collections": [
        "Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)",
        "East Asia and Pacific Country Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Malaysia",
        "Thailand",
        "Singapore",
        "Soviet Union",
        "Cambodia",
        "China",
        "Japan",
        "Laos",
        "Korea (North)",
        "South Dakota",
        "Indonesia",
        "Vietnam",
        "Strategy",
        "Vietnam War, 1961-1975",
        "International relations"
    ],
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    "coverageEndDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1976-09-30",
        "month": 9,
        "year": 1976
    },
    "coverageStartDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1976-01-01",
        "month": 1,
        "year": 1976
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    "seq": 1,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/ford/grf-0324/186734/1553594.pdf",
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 1, folder \"Southeast Asia (7)\" of the\nNational Security Adviser. Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at\nthe Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\n/\n1a\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nCONFIDENTIAL GDS\nJanuary 27, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nJohn A. Wickham, Jr.\nMajor General, U.S. Army\nMilitary Assistant to the Secretary\nDepartment of Defense\nSUBJECT:\nPacific Force Structure\nThe NSC has no objection to DOD's removal of the temporary\nmoratorium imposed May 7, 1975 on U.S. Army reductions and\ninternal realignments in Japan. We approve the planned reduc-\ntion of 2000 U.S. Army military support personnel and 6000\nlocal national employees.\nWilliam G. Hyland\nDeputy Assistant to the President\nfor National Security Affairs\nGERALD LIBRARY R FORD\nGONFIDENTIAL GDS\nKBH 1/14/00\nif MH\nMEMORANDUM\n177\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nwalt\nACTION\nGONFIDENTIAL GDS\nMEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM G. HYLAND\nWASH January 19, Signed\non\nFROM:\nJAY TAYLOR\nFORD & LIBRARY OERALD\nSUBJECT:\nU.S. Army Reductions on Japan\nLast May, following the Southeast Asian events, DOD imposed a temporary\nmoratorium on U.S. Army reductions and internal realignments in Japan.\nThis moratorium affected reductions scheduled to take place by FY 1977\ninvolving some 2000 military personnel and 6000 local national employees,\nall of whom performed support functions.\nDOD has informed us that it would like to remove the moratorium and pro-\nceed with the scheduled reductions (Tab B). The DOD's proposed imple-\nmenting memorandum (Tab C) directs that in implementing the reduction\nprogram, logistics and facilities in Japan should not be diminished to the\npoint they can no longer support a Korean contingency. Support functions\nthat are still required will be transferred for the most part to other services.\nThe memorandum also directs that, in implementing the reduction, efforts\nbe made to minimize the impact on civilian employees by transferring as\nmany as possible to the service assuming the function previously performed\nby the Army.\nDOD points out that the political considerations behind the moratorium have\ndiminished in importance and that further deferment would result in in-\ncreased budgetary problems for the Army.\nM\nSecretary Kissinger has been informed of this proposed move. The Depart-\nment of State has no objection.\nI also concur in the proposed move.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you sign the memorandum at Tab A to General Wickham approving\nthe planned reductions.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nCONFIDENTIAL\nNSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines DOD Directive\nBy\nKBH\n, NARA, Date 1/17/00\nCONFIDENTIAL\nstaff 177\nOF DEFENSE\nIC\nOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20301\nUNITED STATES UF AMERICA\n8 January 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT\nFOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS\nSUBJECT: Pacific Force Structure\nLast May, following the Southeast Asia events, a temporary moratorium\nwas imposed by DOD on U.S. Army reductions and internal realignments\nin Japan. These reductions, to take place by FY 1977, would involve\nsome 2,000 military personnel and 6,000 local national employees, all\nof whom perform support functions. The support functions that are\nstill required will be transferred, for the most part, to other Services.\n(Some portion of the local national work force will be transferred along\nwith the residual functions.) The intent of the moratorium was to pre-\nclude any immediate adverse political reaction to further military with-\ndrawals from Asia, even though the programmed reductions involve only\nsupport elements.\nThe political considerations behind the moratorium now have diminished\nin importance. Continued U.S. military presence in Asia has allayed\npolitical fears of U.S. withdrawal. Therefore, we believe reduction\nactions should be resumed. Further deferment would serve no good\npolitical purpose, and only result in increased budgetary problems for\nthe Army.\nAccordingly, the attached draft memorandum lifts the moratorium. I am\ninformed that the State Department at staff level has no objection to\nthe memorandum. Unless the NSC staff has objections, the Department\nintends to issue the attached memorandum no later than 16 January.\nAttachment\nJOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.\nAs stated\nMajor General, USA\nMilitary Assistant\nFORD & LIBRARY QERALD\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nDOD Directive\nNSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines\nBy KBH 9 NARA, Date 1/14/00\nAMERICAN REVOLUTION\n0071\n1776-1976\nSec Def Cont Nr. X-\nCONFIDENTIAL\n1d\nCONFIDENTIAL\nTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20301\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE Secretaries of the Military Departments\nChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff\nAssistant Secretary of Defense, Installations and\nLogistics\nSUBJECT: Pacific Force Posture (U)\n(c) The political considerations that led to the 7 May 1975 moratorium\non PBD 280CR actions in Japan have diminished in importance. Accordingly,\nthe program of reductions and transfers deferred in May may be implemented,\nunder ASD/I&L administration. Internal U.S. Army realignments deferred by\nthe moratorium also may be implemented.\n(c) Two considerations must be kept in mind while implementing the re-\nduction program. First, the logistics organization and facilities in\nJapan should not be diminished to the point that they can no longer sup-\nport a Korean contingency.\n(c) A second consideration is the potential adverse political impact of\nthe sizeable RIF associated with the U.S. Army drawdown in Japan. Careful\ntiming of RIF announcements can limit that impact. Transfer of civilian\nemployees to the Service assuming a function previously performed by the\nArmy also can limit RIF impact. Finally, any adverse impact can be par-\ntially offset by an accompanying release of any facilities and areas no\nlonger required.\nGERALD R FORD LIBRARY\nClassified by\nASD/ISA\nSUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF\nEXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMITICALLY DOWNGRADED\nAT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 81\nCONFIDENTIAL\n3789\nSEC DEF CONTR No.\nX\nKBH 1/14/00\nle\nDOC\nRECD\nG NBR\nINITIAL ACTION o\nNSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\n/\n8\n/\n7600177\nBaneo\nWickhom,5\nREFERENCE:\nCIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE\nTO: PRES\nFROM:\nS/S\nUNCLAS LOG IN/OUT\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nKISSINGER\nCOLBY, W\nOTHER 0071\nLOU\nNO FORN\nNODIS\nSCOWCROFT x\nSCHLESINGER, J\nC\nEYES ONLY EXDIS\nDAVIS\nST EX SEC\nS\nCODEWORD\nTS\nSENSITIVE\nSUBJECT: moretorium Paufec force structure re lytery of Dud\nINTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION\nREC\nACTION REQUIRED\nACTION\nINFO.\nCY\nADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT\nFOR\nMEMO FOR HAK scowed +\n)\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO FOR PRES\n)\nFAR EAST Braner\nK\nREPLY FOR\n(\n)\nSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\n)\nDISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nMID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA\nMEMO\nTO\n(\n)\nEUROPE / CANADA\nRECOMMENDATIONS\n)\nLATIN AMERICA\nJOINT MEMO\n)\nREFER TO\nFOR:\nUNITED NATIONS\n(\n)\nECONOMIC\nANY ACTION NECESSARY?\n)\nSCIENTIFIC\nCONCURRENCE.\n)\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nNSC PLANNING\nDUE DATE: 1/14\nCOMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)\nCONGRESSIONAL\nOCEANS POLICY\nINTELLIGENCE\nDATE\nFROM\nTO\nS\nSUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):\nCY TO\n1-19\nHyland\nx\nSgn Its to Wickham (1/24)\n1/26\nNSC/S\nHejland sgd Wickham\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nDISPATCH 1/27/76 a)inside/outsike lept a\nCY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:\nMICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nNOTIFY\n& DATE\nBY\nBY\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION:\nM/F'D JAN\nCRT ID:\n291976\nSF\nCROSS REF W/\nHP\nNS\nSUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:\nX\nFOLDER:\nCLOSE\nOPEN D MAK\nWH\nEP\nPA\nDY\n( NSC 575-600 75-22 )\n2\nMH\nMEMORANDUM\n1029\n2a\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nURGENT ACTION\nFebruary 20, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nTHOMAS J. BARNES\nSUBJECT:\nProposed Presidential Message to the\nASEAN Summit\nFollowing up on a telegraphic recommendation (Tab C) from Ambas-\nsador Newsom in Jakarta, the Department of State has forwarded to\nyou a proposal (Tab B) for a Presidential message (Tab A) to the\nASEAN Summit. The Summit is scheduled to convene February 23.\nIn informal consultations with State, we have discovered that there are\nmixed feelings about the proposal, and no universal enthusiasm for it.\nState does not want to take the onus for quashing an Ambassadorial\nrecommendation out of hand, and I agree that we should make the\ndecision on the issue here.\nMy View\nI recommend against the sending of this message for the following\nreasons:\n-- The President endorsed ASEAN in his December 7 Honolulu\nspeech. In the opinion of some, the manner of the endorsement, which\nthe President's personal speech writers arranged, was too effusive.\n-- We should thus avoid a further Presidential embrace of\nASEAN at this juncture.\n-- ASEAN leaders recently turned off Japanese and Australian\nrequests to participate in the ASEAN Summit. They would have been\neven less enthusiastic about such a request from us had we exhibited\nthe lack of wisdom to proffer it.\n-- We broached the subject of economic consultations with\nASEAN over a year ago, and have yet to receive a meaningful ASEAN\nresponse.\nFORD\nCONFIDENTIAL - GDS\n& LIBRARY QERALD\nKendwing advised\nKBH 1/14/00\n8:37pm\nCONFIDENTIAL\n2\n-- Our most successful dealings with ASEAN countries have\nbeen on a bilateral basis and should continue that way.\nMoreover, a Japanese foreign office official, whom I have known\nsince 1958 and have a great deal of respect for, paid a call on our\nEmbassy in Tokyo February 20. He offered a suggestion that the\nU.S. refrain from sending a congratulatory message to the ASEAN\nSummit (Tab D). He based his stance on his conversation with the\nlocal Thai Ambassador. The Ambassador said that a message\nfrom the United States or other superpower would be embarrassing\nin view of ASEAN sensitivities toward involvement with superpowers\nduring its delicate formative state.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat the President not send the message at Tab A to the ASEAN\nSummit meeting.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nShould you disapprove my recommendation, I have prepared a memo\nat Tab I from you to the President recommending that he approve\nsending the message at Tab A.\nGERALD LIBRARY R FORD\nCONFIDENTIAL - GDS\n26\nMEMORANDUM\n1029\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nGONFIDENTIAL\nACTION\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nSUBJECT:\nProposed Presidential Message to the\nASEAN Summit\nAmbassador Newsom in Jakarta has suggested that you may wish\nto send a congratulatory message to the ASEAN Summit meeting\nscheduled to convene in Bali February 23. There is a precedent\nfor such messages in that both you and former President Nixon sent\nmessages to the summit meetings of the Organization of African\nUnity. A message would be particularly appropriate because this\nis the first summit meeting since ASEAN establ ishment some nine\nyears ago. We wish to encourage regional cooperation among\nASEAN's five countries -- Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indo-\nnesia, and the Philippines -- since we enjoy friendly relations with\nall.\nThe message at issue is addressed to President Suharto, who is\nhosting the conference. We propose to keep the message private\nin consonance with our objective of maintaining low-key relations\nwith ASEAN. We would have no objection if the ASEAN leaders\nthemselves wish to release the text.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you send the congratulatory message at Tab A to the ASEAN\nleaders.\nGERALD LIBRARY ? FORD\nCONFIDENTIAL - GDS\nKBH 1/14/00\n2c\nProposed Presidential Message to ASEAN Leaders\nDear President Suharto:\nThe first meeting of the ASEAN Chiefs of Government in\nBali is an event of historic importance. On this occasion I\nwould like to convey through you, as host for the Conference,\nmy best wishes to each of the assembled leaders and my sincere\nhope that their deliberations will yield many positive benefits to\nthe peoples of the ASEAN nations.\nSincerely,\nGerald R. Ford\nGERALD A. FORD LIBRARY\n7601029\n2d\nS/S 7603524\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWashington, D.C. 20520\nCONFIDENTIAL\nFebruary 19, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nSubject: Proposed Presidential Message for\nthe Summit of the Association of\nSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN)\nAmbassador Newsom has proposed that the\nPresident send a letter of greeting for the ASEAN\nleaders to President Suharto who will be host\nto the ASEAN Summit Meeting, which convenes\nFebruary 23. The U.S. has sought to avoid any\nover-identification with ASEAN which might prove\nembarrassing to this group which seeks to convey\nan image of independence and moderate non-align-\nment. At the same time we do not wish to appear\naloof or unfriendly, particularly if other coun-\ntries were to send similar greetings. Moreover\nthere are precedents for such messages. For\nexample, both Presidents Ford and Nixon have sent\ngreetings to the Summit Meetings of the Organi-\nzation of African Unity.\nOn balance, the Department of State believes\nthat a Presidential message along the following\nlines would be useful as a demonstration of good\nwill towards ASEAN's five member countries.\nDear President Suharto:\nThe first meeting of the ASEAN Chiefs\nof Government in Bali is an event of\nhistoric importance. On this occasion\nGERALD LIBRARY ? FORD\nI would like to convey through you,\nCONFIDENTIAL\nGDS KBH 1/14/00\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 2 -\nas host for the Conference, my best\nwishes to each of the assembled leaders\nand my sincere hope that their delibera-\ntions will yield many positive benefits\nto the peoples of the ASEAN nations.\nSincerely,\nGerald R. Ford\nWe would propose to keep the message private,\nin line with our desire, and particularly that\nof the ASEAN nations, to keep our relations with\nASEAN low key. We would have no objection, of\ncourse, if the ASEAN leaders wish to release\nthe text although that is unlikely.\nIt is accordingly recommended that the\nattached telegram to Embassy Jakarta agreeing to\nthe text of a letter from the President be approved.\nis\nGeorge S. Springsteen\nExecutive Secretary\nAttachments:\n1. Incoming telegram Jakarta\n2160\n2. Draft telegram\nFORD & LIBRARY QERALD\nCONFIDENTIAL\n2e\nARTMENT\n:\n23\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nof STATE AMERICA ORING\nTELEGRAM\nCONFIDENTIAL 9605\nPAGE 61 JAKART 02160 180453Z\n22-12\nACTION EA-09\nINFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CPR-01 TO-11 OIC-02 NSC-05 NSCE-00 SS-15\nSSO-00 1044 W\n127145\nn 180441Z FEB 76\nFM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA\nTO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 2752\nINFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE\nAMFMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE\nAMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE\nAMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE\nAMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE\nAMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE\nC-A-N F I D E N TAL JAKARTA 2160\nF.O. 11652: GDS\nTAGS: PDIP, ASEAN, ID\nSUBJ: PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE FOR ASEAM SUMMIT\n:. IT OCCURS TO us THAT FIRST ASEAN SUMMIT MFETING\nREING HELD FEBRUARY 23-25 WOULD RE APPROPRIATE\nOCCASION FOR PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE OF GREETING. SINCE\nNO INDIVIDUAL IS DESIGNATED AS CHIEF OF ASEAN ORGANI-\nZATION, WE SUGGEST THAT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE BE\nDIRECTED TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AS HOST OF\nCONFERENCE. WE RECOMMEND THAT MESSAGE BE TREATED AS\nPRIVATE AND THAT LEAVE TO GOI QUESTION OF RELEASE.\n2. FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED TEXT: DEAR PRESIDENT\nSOEHARTO: THE FIRST MEETING OF ASEAN CHIEFS OF\nGOVERNMENT IN BALI IS AN EVENT OF HISTORIC IMPORTANCE.\nON THIS OCCASION I WOULD LIKE TO CONVEY THROUGH YOU,\nAS HOST FOR THE CONFERENCE, MY BFST WISHES TO EACH\nOF THE ASSEMBLED LEADERS AND MY SINCERE HOPE THAT\nFORD\n&\nTHEIR DELIBERATIONS WILL YTELO MANY POSITIVE\nRENEFITS TO THE PEOPLES OF THE ASEAN NATIONS.\nSINCERELY, GERALD R. FORD. END TEXT.\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDEPARTMENT 00 STATE\nDepartment of State\nAMERICA UNITED\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES of\nCONF\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPAGE 02 JAKART *216* 1804532\n3. IF MESSAGE APPROVED, RECOMMEND WE RECEIVED TEXT\nRY NO LATER THAN FEBRUARY 21 IN ORDER TO INSURE\nDEI IVERY BY OPENING OF CONFERENCE.\n4. WE HAVE NO CLEAR INFORMATION YET AS 10 INTENTION OTHER\nGOVERNMENTS. THERE IS SOME EXPECTATION THAT AUSTRALIANS\nAND PERHAPS EASTERN EUROPEANS MAY SEND MESSAGES.\nNEWSOM\nCONFIDENTIAL\nIf\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 009881\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nCable\nCREATOR'S NAME\nHodgson\nCREATOR'S TITLE\nU.S. Ambassador to Japan\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nHenry Kissinger\nRECEIVER'S TITLE\nSecretary of State\nTITLE\nCongratulatory Messages to ASEAN\nCREATION DATE\n02/02/1976\nVOLUME\n2 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n032400022\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL\nCOUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE\nPACIFIC\nBOX NUMBER\n1\nFOLDER TITLE\nSoutheast Asia (7)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n01/10/2000\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nKBH\nthe\nDBCLASSIFIED with portions exempted\nE.O. 12958, See. 3.5\nState Dept. Guidelines State visit 8/00\nBy KBH . NARA, Date 5/18/01\n2f\n0\nL*******E COPY\nOP IMMED\nTKI895\nDE RUEHKO #2574 0511020\n0 200950Z FEB 76\n:\nFM AMEMBASSY TOKYO\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7063\nTXB\nINFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 4998\nAMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1935\nAMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 2479\nAMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 1508\nAMEMBASSY MANILA 6837\nAMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 1649\ne\n0\nN\nD\nE\nN\nTOKYO 2574\nE.O. 11652: GDS\nTAGS: PFOR, ASEAN, US\nSUBJEC: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES TO ASEAN\n1.\nCALLED FEBRUARY 20 TO OFFER \"PERSONAL SUGGESTION\" THAT US\nREFRAIN FROM SENDING CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO OPENING\nOF ASEAN SUMMIT FEB 23. HE BASED SUGGESTION IN PART ON\nCONVERSATION BETWEEN\nAND THAI AMBASSADOR\nDURING LAST FEW DAYS. LATTER, RESPONDING TO CASUAL\nQUESTION\nON SUBJECT OF CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES,\nSAID ASEAN WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEMS WITH MESSAGES FROM JAPAN\nAND AUSTRALIA, COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. ON THE OTHER HAND\nMESSAGE FROM US OR OTHER SUPERPOWER WOULD BE EMBARRASSING\nIN VIEW OF ASEAN SENSITIVITIES TOWARD INVOLVEMENT WITH\nSUPERPOWER AT DELICATE FORMATIVE STATE.\n2.\nSAID HIS \"SUGGESTION\" ALSO BASED ON REPORT\nFROM EMBASSY WASHINGTON THAT US SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING SENDING\nMESSAGE. HE ADDED PERSONAL ADVICE THAT ANY MESSAGE US MIGHT\nSEND WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE AS COMMENT ON RESULTS OF\nCONFERENCE AFTER CLOSE. A SIMILAR LOW KEY SUGGESTION WILL\nBE PASSED IN WASHINGTON, HE CONCLUDED.\n3. COMMENT: PERSONAL SUGGESTIONS OF THIS SORT BY GOJ\nOFFICIALS ARE HARDLY EVER PERSONAL, BUT RATHER REPRESENT THE\nLOWEST LEVEL FORM OF OFFICIAL DEMARCHE.\nFORD\n?\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nRECALLED\nN:002976\nPAGE 01\nTOR:051/10:22Z\nDTG:200950Z FEB 76\n1\nB\nF\nD\nE\nN\nI\nA\nCOPY\nDECLASSIFIED with portions exempted\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nState Dept. Guidelines State Visit 8/00\nBy KBH NARA, Date 5/18/01\n*******CDNFIDENTI [*******E COPY\nHODGSON\nBT\nGERALD\nFORD LIBRARY &\nRECALLED\nPSN 002976\nPAGE 02\nOF 02\nTOR:051/10:22Z\nDTG:200950Z FEB 76\n9\nD\nE\nCOPY\n2g\nCONFIDENTIAL\nEA/RA:RJMARTENS: AP\n2/19/76 22912\nEA:RHMILLER\nS/S -\nNSC\nFORD\n&\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nIMMEDIATE\nJAKARTA\nIMMEDIATE\nKUALA LUMPUR, MANILA, SINGAPORE, TOKYO, CANBERRA\nRHM\nE.O. 11652: GDS\nRJM\nof\nTAGS:\nPDIP, ASEAN, ID\nS/S\nNSC\nSUBJECT:\nPRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE FOR ASEAN SUMMIT\nREF:\nJAKARTA 2160\nEMBASSY IS AUTHORIZED TO TRANSMIT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT\nSUHARTO IN CONNECTION WITH ASEAN SUMMIT MEETING PER\nTEXT IN REFTEL.\nWE WISH TO AVOID OVER-IDENTIFICA-\nTION WITH ASEAN ORGANIZATION THAT COULD EMBARRASS ASEAN\nMEMBERS OR BE CONSIDERED BY THEM TO BE INJURIOUS TO IMAGE\nTHEY SEEK TO CONVEY. AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT\nWANT ASEAN COUNTRIES TO FEEL WE ARE EXCESSIVELY ALOOF.\nYOU SHOULD INDICATE TO INDONESIANS THAT MESSAGE IS PRIVATE\nONE TO OUR ASEAN FRIENDS AND NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION.\nWE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION IF ASEAN\nLEADERS WISH TO PUBLISH IT. YY\nCONF IDENTIAL\nKBH 1/14/00\n2h\nDOC\nRECD\nLOG NBR\nNSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\nX\n19\n2\n20\n//\n7601029\nBarnes INITIAL ACTION o\nREFERENCE:\nCIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE\nTO: PRES\nFROM: KISSINGER, H\nS/S 7603524\nUNCLAS LOG IN/OUT\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nKISSINGER\nCOLBY, W\nOTHER\nLOU\nNO FORN\nNODIS\nSCOWCROFT +\nSCHLESINGER, J\nC\nEYES ONLY EXDIS\nproviting SUBJECT DAVIS has ST EX SEC for X the Summit asin TS S SENSITIVE CODEWORD the\nnations\n(ASTEAN Southeat\nINTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION\nREC\nACTION REQUIRED\nACTION\nINFO.\nCY\nADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT\nFOR\nMEMO FOR HAK\n(\n)\nSTAFF FAR EAST SECRETARY Barnes\nMEMO FOR PRES\n(\n)\nX\nY\nREPLY FOR\n(\n)\nSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\nI\n)\nDISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nMID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA\nMEMO\nTO\n(\n)\nEUROPE / CANADA\nRECOMMENDATIONS\n(\n)\nLATIN AMERICA\nJOINT MEMO\n(\n)\nUNITED NATIONS\nREFER TO\nFOR:\n(\n)\nECONOMIC\nANY\nSCIENTIFIC\nCONCURRENCE ACTION NECESS to state ( X ) )\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDUE DATE:\n2-22\nNSC PLANNING\nCOMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)\nCONGRESSIONAL\nOCEANS POLICY\nINTELLIGENCE\nDATE\nFROM\nTO\nS\nSUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):\nCY TO\n2/20\nScuft\nA\nN5C/5\nDecision (2/22)\n2/21\nC\nScoweroft approved recom\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\nFORD & LIBRARY\nDISPATCH\nCY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:\nMICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nNOTIFY\n& DATE\nBY\nFEB\nM/F'D\nBY\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION:\nCRT 24 1976 ID:\nSA\nSF\nCROSS REF W/\nOPEN\nSUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:\nFOLDER:\nTAT\nHP\nNS\nCLOSE\nWH\nEP\nPA\nDY\n(\nNSC 75-22\n575-600\n)\n3\n3a\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\n4101-add on\nJuly 23, 1976\nBud:\nAs you requested, we have prepared an\nexpanded paper on international develop-\nments in Southeast Asia since the fall\nof Vietnam and Cambodia.\nThomas J. Barnes\nGERALD LIBRARY ? FORD\n3b\nSEGRET\nForeign Policy Ramifications of the Fall of Indochina\nSummary\nGERALD A. LISAARY FORD\nWhile the internal political, social, and economic consequences of the\nCommunist victories in Indochina have clearly emerged in the past year,\nthe international ramifications and the effects upon U.S. foreign policy\nare just beginning to come to the surface. The disengagement of U.S.\nforces from mainland Southeast Asia has left a partial vacuum requiring\nall countries to readjust their positions. There is no doubt that the fall\nof Vietnam has caused some of our friends to reappraise their relationship\nwith us, move closer to other powers in the region, and question the\ncredibility of U.S. commitments. Others are moving quickly to fill the\nvoid which our military departure created. Our adversaries, Vietnam\nand the Soviets, are on the offensive seeking to expand their influence\nand further reduce U.S. power and prestige. Our allies, Thailand and\nthe Philippines, partially in response to these pressures, are seeking\naccommodation with Communist powers and are moving away from their\npreviously tight relations with the U.S. Other friends, Singapore,\nMalaysia, and Indonesia, alarmed at the prospects of Communist gains,\nare hoping the U.S. will remain involved in the region to counter the\npresence of the Communist powers.\nOur Adversaries\nThe Soviets\nThe Soviets have made advances in Southeast Asia since the fall of Saigon.\nA prime inidication of this progress is the fact that the People's Republic\nof China (PRC) now privately cautions Southeast Asian leaders to be care-\nful not to \"let the bear sneak in the back door after driving the tiger out\nthe front. \"\nSoviet foreign policy goals in the area appear to be to:\n-- end the U.S. military presence and diminish U.S. influence in the\nregion;\n-- increase its own diplomatic, economic, and intelligence presence;\n-- enjoy good state to state relations with all nations;\n-- create an image of the Soviet Union as a benign super power seeking\nto preserve peace and stability through peaceful coexistence, while labeling\nChina as the cause of instability because of its support of local revolutionary\nmovements.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nNSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidellnes State visit 7/00\nSECRET\nBy KBH , NARA, Date 5/18/01\nSECRET\n2\nTo achieve these ends, Moscow is seeking to strengthen its relationship\nwith Vietnam and Laos, and use them as the cornerstone of its policy in\nthe area. Other Soviet activities in support of these goals have run the\ngamut from heightened diplomatic, political, and economic initiatives to\ncovert intelligence operations.\nThere is no doubt that the Soviets see Vietnam as the firm base of their\nforeign policy in Southeast Asia, especially since Vietnam's deteriorating\nrelationship with the People's Republic of China over territorial disputes\nhas caused Hanoi to definitely tilt toward the Russians. Vietnamese\nCommunist Party First Secretary Le Duan's trip to Moscow and Peking in\nOctober 1975 offered clear evidence of this Soviet advantage. During\nhis stop in Russia, the Soviets promised Duan lavish support for Vietnam's\neconomic truction. In contrast, during an earlier stop in Peking,\ndiscussions were apparently so sterile that the two Communist states did\nnot even issue a final communique, a most unusual omission indicating\nthe depths to which Sino-Vietnamese relations had plunged.\nThe Soviets and the Vietnamese are cooperating to try to further reduce\nthe U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia and thereby diminish our\npower and prestige. Some Asian officials believe that the Soviets are\nbehind harsh Vietnamese verbal attacks against Thailand and the Philippines\non this subject. While it would be wrong to consider the Vietnamese as\nSoviet frontmen or puppets, they at least see a common goal with the USSR\non this subject.\nMoscow is also seeking to manipulate Thai domestic politics, apparently\nto help ensure that anti-U.S. elements remain strong. While it would be\nwrong to consider Soviet influence in Thailand to be extensive, or that\nSoviet diplomacy has entranced Southeast Asians outside Vietnam and\nLaos, Soviet agents reportedly have been active in covertly infiltrating\nstudent and labor movements in Thailand, while at the same time conducting\novertcultural programs at Thai universities. Thailand saw as its own\nself-interest its recent decision to end U.S. military presence in that\ncountry, and Soviet and North Vietnamese efforts helped to make up the\nThai mind.\nThe Soviets have also been busy making inroads in other countries. In\nMalaysia, on a government to government basis, they are seeking to\nfinance the large Tembeling hydroelectric project. They have also under-\ntaken an ambitious cultural program which encompasses the press, trade\nunions, students, and literary circles. The Malaysians are extremely\nSECRET\nFORD\n&\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nSEGRET\n3\nreluctant to get further involved with the Soviets, but top officials are\nreportedly finding it difficult to rebuff all Soviet proposals. At the same\ntime, the Soviets are taking steps to indirectly increase their influence\nin internal Malaysian politics. Since 1974, apparently as part of an effort\nto penetrate Malaysian unions, they have invited over 40 trade union\nrepresentatives to visit the USSR. Most of their attention is directed at\nethnic Malays, raising the spectre that the Soviets wish to take advantage\nof the strong racial antagonism which exists between Malays and Chinese\nin Malaysia. Apparently conceding that ethnic Chinese will look to Peking,\nthe Soviets are attempting to make themselves known as friends of the\npoorer Malay farmer. There apparently is a program of covert activity\nas well. After some members of the class became involved in unusual\npolitical activity, the Malaysian government recently closed a Russian\nlanguage course which a Soviet national taught.\nSoviet activities are more limited in Indonesia and Singapore which are\nboth well known for their tough anti-Communist regimes. Nonetheless,\nRussia does carry on a brisk commerce in Singapore through its Narodny\nBank, and from having its ships repaired in Singapore port facilities.\nWhile Singapore had been reluctant to admit Soviet vessels to its government-\nowned Sembawang shipyard (where U.S. Navy ships are serviced), the recent\nworldwide downturn in shipping made the Soviet business too attractive\nto resist.\nPerhaps the Soviets' most significant inroad since the fall of Indochina\nhas come in the Philippines, one of the U.S. 's oldest friends. Philippine-\nSoviet relations began improving after the war, and in May 1976 President\nMarcos and Foreign Secretary Romulo went to Moscow on a state visit.\nWhile there, they formally agreed to establish diplomatic relations and\nalso signed a joint trade agreement. Displays of Soviet military power\nand scientific capability in Moscow greatly impressed both Marcos and\nRomulo. During the visit, the Soviet leaders told Marcos that the presence\nof U.S. bases on sovereign Philippine soil made him look like a U.S.\npuppet, and urged him to terminate the U.S. use of these bases, and no\nlonger permit U.S. forces on Philippine soil. Marcos replied that while\nhe could not end the American presence now, he might do so in about five\nyears. While Marcos is still probably formulating his ultimate intentions\ntoward a U.S. military presence in the Philippines, the fact that he would\nsuggest the possibility of terminating our use of Philippine bases indicates\na breach in our close relationship.\nSince the PRC has the inside track with all insurgent movements in\nSoutheast Asia, Moscow is not involved in directly supporting any armed\na\nFORD\nSECRET\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nSECRET\n4\ninsurgents in Southeast Asia, and appears rather to be concentrating its\nactivities on state to state relations and covert activities aimed at urban\ninterest groups.\nVietnam\nAfter a year of concentrating on consolidating power in the South, Hanoi\nhas once again turned its attention to foreign affairs. Its major goals would\nseem to be:\n-- maintaining its position of influence, verging on control, over\nLaos;\n-- further eroding U.S. influence in Southeast Asia, and ending or\nrendering ineffective the U.S. military presence in Thailand and the\nPhilippines;\n-- supporting, to the extent possible, revolutionary activities in\nNortheast Thailand, while vying with the PRC for influence with the Thai\ninsurgents;\n-- establishing diplomatic relations with all states in the region and\nobtaining the maximum amount of economic assistance from them;\n-- seeking foreign technology to exploit its unproven oil reserves.\nOne of Vietnam's main concerns during the past year was Thailand's\ntoleration of U.S. bases on its soil. Hanoi made it clear that as long as\nthese bases remained, relations between the two countries could not\nimprove. Hanoi added to its pronouncements explicit expressions of\nsupport for groups in Southeast Asia seeking \"genuine independence. \"\nThe message to the Thai was perfectly clear: If you continue to allow\nU.S. bases on your soil, we will support the growing insurgency in your\ncountry. The Thai, under major influence from this pressure, ordered\nall U.S. forces out of the country by July 20, 1976. As a result of\nThailand's ending its special relations with the U.S., Hanoi now appears\nready to normalize relations with Bangkok and exchange ambassadors.\nA Thai delegation will travel to Hanoi in August 1976 to discuss this\npossibility.\nHanoi's willingness to open relations with Thailand comes at a time when\nVietnam is seeking to sweeten its diplomacy throughout the region. In\nSECRET\nGERALD R. FORD LIBRART\nSEGRET\n5\nJuly, Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien went on a goodwill mission to\nIndonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines -- all of the ASEAN\ncountries except Thailand. Later he made stops in Burma and Laos.\nWhile the Vietnamese clearly designed this trip to improve Hanoi's state\nto state relations with these countries, Hanoi is apparently not ready to\nrenounce supporting revolutionary groups. When Singapore Prime Minister\nLee Kuan Yew asked Hien directly whether Vietnam would continue to aid\ninsurgents, he evaded the question by saying he was authorized to discuss\nonly formal state to state matters. From his refusal to answer, Lee\nconcluded that Vietnam is really trying to \"lull its non-Communist neighbors\nto sleep\" and have them drop their guard. He believes that Hanoi, like\nthe PRC, will follow a two pronged policy of supporting insurgent groups\nthrough its party apparatus, while maintaining good government to govern-\nment relations.\nOne of the major successes of Hien's trip was obtaining agreement in\nManila for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Philippines.\nIn this process, Hanoi did not miss another opportunity to attack U.S.\nmilitary capabilities. In the communique announcing the agreement, the\nVietnamese inserted language stating that neither country will allow its\nterritory to be used as a base for foreign aggression, or for direct or\nindirect intervention against the other or any other country in the region.\nThe Philippines agreed to this provision. Since the Vietnamese and the\nSoviets consider practically any U.S. military operation to be either an\naggression or an intervention, the Vietnamese have thus laid the groundwork\nfor future complaints should we use our Philippine bases to conduct opera-\ntions such as: rescuing another Mayaguez; transporting military equipment\nto Israel; or projecting U.S. power into East Africa as we did in support\nof Kenya after the Entebbe raid. That the Philippines would agree to such\nlanguage is another indication of the changing situation in Southeast Asia.\nHanoi continues to exhibit an interest in the insurgency in Northeast\nThailand, but is competing with the predominant PRC influence on the\nThai Communists, and combating an almost visceral Thai dislike for the\nVietnamese. The Vietnamese have political cadre among the approximately\n90, 000 Vietnamese who reside permanently in Northeast Thailand, and\ntrain some Thai insurgents in Vietnam. There is no evidence, however,\nto suggest any significant increase in these activities since the end of the\nIndochina war.\n&\nFORD\nSECRET\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nSECRET\n6\nPeople's Republic of China\nPeking set the example for Vietnam of striving for good state to state\nrelations while maintaining support for Southeast Asian Communist parties,\nalmost all of which are Maoist in orientation. While it has achieved\nsuccesses in establishing diplomatic relations with all Southeast Asian\ncountries except Singapore (and has yet to revive them in the case of\nIndonesia), the PRC has a difficult balancing act since it is ideologically\nor logistically involved with insurgents in Burma, Thailand, the Philippines,\nMalaysia, and perhaps Indonesia, not to mention its substantial troop\npresence in Laos. Thailand's diplomatic embrace of the PRC carried the\nhope of Chinese willingness to lessen support for insurgents, and to help\nstave off the Vietnamese.\nIf the case of Malaysia is any example, at least PRC moral support for\nthe rebels will continue. Malaysia in May 1974 became the first ASEAN\nstate to enter into diplomatic relations with Peking. Kuala Lumpur has\nbeen severely disappointed that its actions has not brought about a reduction\nin propaganda broadcasts from the \"Voice of the Malaysian Revolution\"\nlocated in southwest China. In addition, the Malaysians are upset that\nthe PRC Embassy has been \"cultivating\" the ethnic Chinese population\nand that their trade balance with the PRC remains unfavorable. Thailand\nis already learning this lesson as the China based Voice of the People of\nThailand radio continues its vitriolic railing against the government in\nBangkok.\nCambodia\nCambodia represents China's great triumph in Southeast Asia. Pro-\nPeking Khmer cadre gained control of the Communist Party, and severed\nall command relationshipswith the Vietnamese Lao Dong Party which had\noriginally founded it. With the end of a Vietnamese role, Soviet influence\nin the country ended as well. China is the primary external influence\nin Cambodia today. While they refuse to label themselves as Communists,\nthe Khmer leaders espouse a Maoist line and are carrying out a radical\neconomic and social revolution which has parallels only in left wing Chinese\nCommunist programs. The unceremonious way in which the Cambodian\nCommunists literally booted the Soviets out of the country, and the exclusive\nuse of Chinese military supplies during the last three years of the war\nare further evidence of Peking's unique hold on that country.\nWhile its international role will be limited, Cambodia has indicated\nthrough its public statements that it will follow a harsh anti-American\nline in the third world and non-aligned movements.\nFORD\n&\nSECRET\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nSEGRET\n7\nLaos\nThe new Lao government is beset with difficult international problems,\nmost of which are located within its own borders. Approximately 20, 000\nChinese engineering troops are in northwest Laos with no apparent in-\ntention to leave anytime soon. The North Vietnamese also have a sizable\npresence with some 32, 000 military spread throughout the eastern and\nsouthern parts of the country. Soviet advisors are present in considerable\nnumbers, and a Cuban advisory team is on hand. The Lao Communists\nseem to have balanced off these contending parties so far, and have main-\ntained better relations with the PRC than have their Vietnamese mentors.\nThe Lao, with Vietnamese support and backing, provide support to the\nThai insurgency. Thai Communists have safe havens and logistical\nstorehouses in Laos. Supplies from the PRC and perhaps Vietnam are\ntransshipped through Laos. Lao and Vietnamese are continuing to train\nsome insurgents.\nOur Friends\nThere is no doubt that our withdrawal from Indochina and the subsequent\nCommunist victories caused our allies and friends in Southeast Asia to\nreconsider their relationship with us, and reevaluate the credibility of\nour commitments and our pledges to remain involved in the region. These\nreactions have taken various forms and have caused them to act in varying\nways.\nThailand\nThe U.S. disengagement in Indochina had a special effect on the Thai,\ncausing them to seriously question U.S. commitments to their security\nunder the Manila Pact. This perception, combined with North Vietnamese\nveiled threats that a continued U.S. presence would result in Vietnamese\nsupport for Thai insurgents, caused Thai leaders to see accommodation\nwith Vietnam as their safest course. Hence their mid-1976 deadline on\nU.S. troop withdrawals, despite PRC endorsement for a continued U.S.\npresence. Thai Foreign Minister Phichai, in a recent major foreign\npolicy speech, indicated that friendly relations with the Communist states\nof Indochina will be one of the cornerstones of Thai policy. In actual\nterms, Thailand still remains closer to the U.S. than to either the PRC\nFORD\nSECRET\n&\nBERALD\nLIBRARY\nSECRET\n8\nor Russia. We still give $16 million a year in security assistance and\ncontinue certain limited security cooperation by sharing intelligence,\nbut the Thai move toward the Communists has clearly lessened U.S.\nability to collect regional intelligence, support Indian Ocean operations,\nand project power into Asia.\nWhile the Philippines has not gone so far as to terminate our military\npresence there, nor sought to abrogate our mutual defense treaty, it too\nis moving away from us. The Philippines took the lead in dismantling the\nformal SEATO organization, and is seeking to restrict how we use our\nmilitary bases. While there is no question but that the GOP still considers\nthe U.S. its closest ally, President Marcos has taken a number of major\nsteps to improve his country's standing in the third world, and to achieve\nmore balance in its relationship with the super powers. In the past year,\nhe has traveled to both the PRC and the Soviet Union, and opened diplomatic\nrelations and signed trade agreements with them. In addition, he moved\nto achieve a leadership position among Third World and non-aligned\ncountries through chairmanship of the Group of 77 meeting in Manila,\nand acting as its spokesman at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi.\nOthers\nSingapore and Indonesia, while equally concerned about a possible U.S.\nretreat from Southeast Asia, have reacted in a different fashion. While\ntrying not to give the outward impression of doing so, they have endeavored\nto move closer to the United States and to enhance their security relation-\nship with us. President Suharto, in talks in both Washington and Jakarta,\nexpressed reservations about Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese intentions\ntoward his country. He made a strong request for a continued U.S. military\nrole inthe area and for significantly increased military assistance. Cuts\nin our assistance to Indonesia have undermined efforts to assure the GOI\nthat we are genuinely concerned with helping it to remain strong. In the\nfirst joint U.S. -Indonesian consultations, held June 25-29 in Washington,\nIndonesian representatives made it clear that our actions so far had not\nmatched our words and that, as a result, they were beginning to wonder\nwhether we are really interested in playing a positive role in Southeast\nAsia.\nSingapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has a pessimistic view of both\nMalaysia and Thailand's chances of dealing with their Communist insurgencies.\nSECRET\nFORD\n&\nOERALD\nLIBRARY\nSECRET\n9\nHe believes there is a strong chance that Communist forces will threaten\nSingapore from Malaysian territory in the next five to ten years. To\ncounter this threat, Lee has sought to purchase significant quantities of\nU.S. military equipment and to obtain U.S. help in training his forces.\nLee has also urged that the U.S. retain a military presence in the area\nand the Indian Ocean to counter increasing Soviet pressure. Singapore\nForeign Minister Rajaratnam recently publicly called for the U.S. to\nstay involved in the region as long as the other super powers are present,\nand chided certain ASEAN colleagues who have haively' called for a\nprecipitous U.S. withdrawal. To facilitate our remaining, Singapore has\nallowed the servicing of U.S. naval ships in its ports, and permits the\ntransiting of a limited number of Diego Garcia support flights.\nMalaysia has an ambivalent approach to the new situation in Asia and has\nattempted to hedge all its bets. Publicly it has continued to support late\nPrime Minister Razak's call for a zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast\nAsia. The current Prime Minister Hussein Onn, however, troubled by\nthe increasing level of the insurgency, privately has told top U.S. officials\nthat he supports a continued U.S. presence in the area. He has asked us\nfor credits to purchase U.S. military equipment.\nConclusions\nThe fall of the non-Communist governments in Indochina has set off a\nprocess of readjustment which may have profound implications for U.S.\nforeign policy. A unified Vietnam in close concert with the Soviet Union\nis slowly moving to expand its influence as a regional power. Moscow\nis gradually increasing the role it plays in the region despite PRC efforts\nto keep it out. Thailand and the Philippines clearly have rethought their\nprevious extremely close relationship with the U.S., and are seeking to\nmove some distance away from us. Thailand ended our military presence\non its soil and the Philippines is at least thinking about following suit in\nthe mid term. Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia all look to a continued\nU.S. military involvement in the area as the key to continued stability.\nThe final conclusion therefore must be that a continued U.S. security role\nis the key to political developments in Southeast Asia.\nGERALD LIBRARY ? FORD\nSECRET\n3c\nmH\nMEMORANDUM\n4101\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nINFORMATION\nJuly 15, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nTHOMAS J. BARNES M\nSUBJECT:\nAssessment of Developments in Indochina Since the\nEnd of the War\nBud indicated that you wish to have a detailed assessment of developments\nin Indochina since the communists came to power. The paper at Tab A\nsummarizes events there and points out general trends which have emerged\nboth internally and in the foreign relations of each country. The paper\ndeals first with regional comments, then in depth with Vietnam, and\nfinally Cambodia and Laos.\nPerhaps the most interesting aspect of the study is that it points up the\nconsiderable political and economic changes Hanoi instituted in South\nVietnam. Most journalistic accounts have tended to portray life there\nas relatively unchanged from the Thieu period.\nFORD & LIBRARY OERALD\nScowe has\n3\nOne Year After the Fall of Indochina\nThe internal political, social, and economic consequences of the\ncommunist victories in Indochina have clearly emerged in the past\nyear. The international ramifications and the effects upon U.S. foreign\npolicy are just beginning to come to the surface.\nLife in Cambodia has been radically altered amidst what can only be\ncalled a brutal bloodletting. In Vietnam and Laos, changes have come\nmore gradually, but in South Vietnam the patterns for the future seem\nunmistakably clear. Laos, as it always did in the war, is following\nslowly in the footsteps of its Vietnamese brethren.\nInternational Aspects\nThe international impact of the communist victories and the U.S. pull-\nback from Asia is becoming clearer. Vietnam and the Soviets are on\nthe offensive; Thailand and the Philippines are seeking accommodation\nwith communist powers; and Singapore and Indonesia are hoping the\nU.S. will stay around. The Thai, anxious to appease the North Vietnamese\nwhom they consider their greatest threat, have ended their special\nrelationship with the United States. Certain limited cooperation will\ncontinue, but the Thai have deliberately moved toward a more \"balanced\"\nforeign policy which includes good relations with the new communist\ngovernments of Indochina, and acquiescence in Hanoi's demand that all\nU.S. bases be removed. Thailand has been communicating with Cambodia\nfor some time, and a Thai delegation will visit Hanoi in August to consider\nnormalizing relations.\nSingapore and Indonesia are more pessimistic about being able to deal\nwith communist regimes. Singapore in particular has been outspoken\nabout the need for a continued American presence in Southeast Asia\nas long as the \"other super powers\" are present. Malaysia is disappointed\nthat its establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC has not\ndampened the ardor of its communist insurgents.\nThe Soviets have continued to take steps to gradually increase their\ninfluence in Southeast Asia, and have established diplomatic relations\nwith the Philippines. Numerous Soviet and Cuban advisors are in Laos\nhelping \"socialize\" that country.\nFORD\n?\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n2\nAfter a year of limited activity, newly united Vietnam has embarked\non a diplomatic campaign aimed at improving state-to-state relations\nin Southeast Asia. Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien is currently\non a good-will mission to all of the ASEAN countries except Thailand,\nand announced July 12 the opening of diplomatic relations with the\nPhilippines. One feature of the joint communique was agreement to not\nallow their territories to be used as bases for foreign aggression or\nintervention against each other or other countries in the region.\nVietnam has serious problems closer to home with both China and\nCambodia, and has had border skirmishes with both. Hanoi has\ndeparted from its previous balancing act between the USSR and the\nPRC, by clearly tilting toward the Soviets. Laos feels compelled to\nbe more even in its approach to these two powers, particularly since\nthe PRC has some 20, 000 troops on its soil, but Laos remains under\nthe principal tutelage of Hanoi, which still has about 32, 000 troops\non hand.\nLife in South Vietnam Under Communist Rule\nMany recent accounts have portrayed life under the communists in\nSouth Vietnam as relatively unchanged from that under the Thieu\nGovernment. Careful reading of communist media, statements from\nrefugees fleeing there, and available intelligence, however, show\nthat life in South Vietnam has changed considerably, since the North\nVietnamese have:\n-- Moved to eradicate the vestiges of \"capitalism, 11 eliminate\npolitical opposition, and construct a socialist state.\n-- Incarcerated a large number of former GVN officials.\n-- Instituted more stringent political restrictions and harsh\npunishments, including the death sentence.\n-- Undertaken a campaign to lessen the influence of religion.\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\n3\n-- Begun a significant cultural transformation.\n- Started to restructure the economy along collectivist lines and\nrelocated portions of the urban population to remote areas to begin\nagricultural production.\nSpecific details about each of these subjects are listed below.\nAdministrative and Political Control: Who is really in charge\nSenior NVN General Van Tien Dung's recent article detailing how the\nNorth Vietnamese Politburo planned the final attacks on Saigon and\nhow the North Vietnamese Army executed it, should have ended any\nquestion about who really ran the war for the communists. All\nsources of information indicate that the South is really in the hands\nof the North Vietnamese, and that southerners are just beginning to\nrealize that the basic fact of the war is that the North conquered the\nSouth. Southern Viet Cong cadre are reportedly so few in number,\nand so inept that northerners give them office only as front men.\nEveryone who has left Saigon recently indicates they have dealt with\nnortherners in all of the ministries of the former government in\nSaigon.\nCommunist media have revealed that in some provinces the North\nVietnamese Army has had to put soldiers into all villages and hamlets\nto administer the government.\nRefugees report that in the Saigon area North Vietnamese soldiers\nare quartered in people's homes, and that there they perform a\nfunction of political control and watching over the population.\nExecutions and Death Sentences\nThe Communist Government in SVN established on March 23, 1976 a\nnew set of punishments for both ordinary and political crimes which in\nFORD\n?\nBERALD\nLIBRARY\n4\neffect makes activity against the new government punishable by death.\nIn contrast, under the Thieu Government, no one had ever been executed\nfor any crime. The premiership of Nguyen Cao Ky was the last time\nwhen the government executed anyone, a Chinese rice merchant who had\nallegedly been hoarding during a period of extreme shortages. The new\ncommunist decree provides the death penalty for a large number of crimes\nincluding \"plotting to overthrow the government, spying, stealing public\nproperty, murder, and rape. \" The new code, however, also provides\nthe death penalty for such \"crimes\" as producing faked goods, illegal\nbusiness transactions, forgery, speculation, hoarding, raising and\nlowering prices, corruption, burglary, and for actions aimed at \"sabotaging\nnational unity, unification and national defense. \" While there is no\nevidence to suggest that there has been a \"bloodbath, \" communist media\nhave reported the sentencing of at least 17 men to death in the last year.\nVietnamese communist media have also announced that the Can Tho military\ntribunal tried a number of ARVN officers, including the former Province\nChief of Chuong Thien, and sentenced them to death. A refugee who\nescaped from Can Tho stated that he witnessed a number of these executions,\nand said that there may have been 30 over the past year. Many of the\nexecutions were by strangulation, including some in which men were choked\nto death with barbed wire. Others died by having their throats cut. The\nChuong Thien Province Chief had his trachea torn out by hand. Most\nother executions that we know of occurred by the firing squad. Giai Phong,\nthe South Vietnamese communist newspaper, carried a picture May 27, 1975\nof one man being killed by a firing squad in Saigon. Both the Washington\nPost and the New York Times also carried photos last May of \"peoples'\ntrials\" which ended in executions. The Times article showed one man about\nto be shot. While Giai Phong states that all of those executed were men\nwho committed crimes such as murder or rape, some refugees have\nstated that at least some are men accused of \"political crimes\" while\nserving in the old government. Giai Phong on September 6, 1975, for\nexample, reported a death sentence for a former GVN village chief,\na police sergeant, a CIA agent, and the commander of a reconnaissance\nunit.\nPolitical Restrictions\nWhile prior to the fall of Saigon the communists had promised political\nfreedom and voiced support for \"third force\" and neutral elements\nwithin Vietnamese politics, following their takeover of South Vietnam,\nFORD\nthey have taken a number of steps to restrict political activity and the\n&\ndissemination of ideas opposed to theirs. For example, they:\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n5\nIssued a decree May 20, 1975 ordering all political parties in\nSouth Vietnam to cease activities. Included in this order were a number\nof \"reactionary parties\" such as the VNQDD, the Dai Viet, and the\nCong Nong, all of which had been independent of or in opposition to\nPresident Thieu. Shortly thereafter, on May 23, the Saigon Military\nManagement Committee ordered that \"all organizations, associations,\nand parties (except the Communist National Liberation Front) must\nregister with the government and may function only after government\napproval has been granted. \" To date there has been nothing to indicate\nthat any organization or association or party has received such approval.\nAlong with this order to halt activities was a strict prohibition against\nerecting signs, holding meetings, or raising funds.\nCompelled the leaders of these \"reactionary political parties\"\nto undergo \"collective reform\" and sign statements acknowledging anti-\nrevolutionary activities and pledging to end all opposition to the new\nadministration. These political party leaders along with other party\nofficials have also lost all rights of citizenship, although the government\nmay restore them after a period of \"good behavior. 11\nMost notable in this group is Vu Hong Khanh, the head of the VNQDD,\nwho had been an anti-French revolutionary since 1925. The communists\nhad previously thought so much of Khanh that in August 1945 they made\nhim a Deputy Minister in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's first\ngovernment in Hanoi. He later broke with the communists and joined\nthe Bao Dai government, thus probably accounting for his being branded\na dangerous reactionary.\nSuppression of Religion\nWhile publicly acknowledging freedom of religion, the communists have\nalso publicly stated that they will not allow those, elements within any\nreligion who might cause them any trouble to continue their activities.\nTo achieve this end they have conducted a coordinated and systematic\ncampaign to gain a degree of control over organized religion.\nTheir attack on the Catholic church began shortly after the takeover of\nSaigon with a \"popular campaign\" to drive the apostolic delegate, a\nFrenchman, from that city. Following demonstrations against him, the\nPRG ordered him to leave June 5, 1975. Bishop Nguyen van Thuan, the\nauxiliary bishop of Saigon and incidentally a nephew of Ngo dinh Diem,\nalso known for his staunch anti-communism, was exiled to Nha Trang\nFORD\na\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n6\nshortly thereafter. At that time, communist spokesman Mai Chi Tho\njustified the government's actions by saying that the appointment of all\nbishops within the country is a matter which the state must approve.\nIn the fall of 1975, the French bishop of Kontum, along with a number\nof French priests and nuns, was told to leave the country without being\ngiven any reason. This attack on foreign clergy continued until July 1976,\nwhen the last group of non-Vietnamese priests and nuns arrived in\nBangkok after the PRG evicted them. A purge of the Vietnamese clergy\nreportedly began in the latter part of 1975. Communist media indicated\nthat priests who were known for their anti-communist activities were\nbranded as criminals and accused of \"abusing religion. 11 Communist\ncadres organized meetings of their parishoners at which they denounced\nthese priests. Some refugees have reported that some priests were then\narrested and sent to prison. In at least two cases, the refugees said they\nknew the men were executed. Other priests have reportedly undergone\ntorture such as being staked out in a tiger cage. The communists have\nused force against some Catholic parishes and may be resorting to false\ncharges to arrest their most obstinate opponents. There is evidence\nthat the regime based the Vinh Son incident, in which troops stormed a\nchurch and arrested the rector and several other persons on charges\nof resistance activities, on pre-fabricated information. The intention was\nto discourage outspoken clerics.\nAnother part of the anti-church campaign has been the physical takeover\nof church buildings. The state has confiscated all private schools and,\nin some cases, closed seminaries. In other cases, North Vietnamese\nsoldiers have moved into church properties. North Vietnamese soldiers\nregularly camp and conduct exercises on Catholic church grounds in\nSaigon. Refugees say that churchgoers believe that anyone attending the\nchurch thus comes under NVA scrutiny. Moreover, the North Vietnamese\nsit in the church during the services and listen carefully to every word\nspoken. The result is that attendance at mass and church is down,\nand the authority of the clergy is breaking down.\nThe regime recently permitted the Archbishop of Hanoi to travel to the\nVatican so that the Pope could elevate him to the rank of Cardinal. A\nseemingly liberal act, the real purpose of it was probably to further\neclipse the power of the Archbishop of Saigon, who in the newly unified\nVietnam will now have less prestige than the Hanoi Cardinal, who over the\nyears has proven no impediment to government policies.\nFORD\n?\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n7\nAttacks on the Buddhists are not so well reported as those on the\nCatholic church. There is nevertheless evidence of a similar campaign\nagainst the Buddhists. Communist radio broadcasts state that a number\nof Buddhist monks were denounced as being false religious leaders. In\naddition, some refugees indicate that pagodas in Can Tho and other\nparts of the Mekong Delta have been closed and that some monks were\nsent away for re-education. Other refugees say pagodas are open but\nonly the most elderly monks remain. Particularly significant is the\napparent disappearance of Thich Tri Quang, the leader of the anti-Thieu\nAn Quang Buddhist faction in Saigon who has not been heard of since the\n\"liberation\" of Saigon. The government may be sending these religious\nand other opinion leaders to forced labor camps. Recent newspaper and\nradio articles indicate that priests and monks, along with artists and\nintellectuals, are being sent to do \"voluntary\" manual labor in the new\neconomic areas.\nThe communists have also disbanded the governing boards of the Hoa Hao\nBuddhist sect, no doubt because the Hoa Hao has always been anti-communist\nand continues toresist to this day.\nThe Anti-Decadent Culture Campaign\nOne of the first programs which the North Vietnamese instituted was\nthe campaign to \"eradicate the decadent U.S. puppet culture in the\nSouth. \" This effort, which began in May 1975, initially took the form\nof \"students\" being sent into the streets to collect books, songs, tapes,\ncassettes, and any other type of printed or written material which\nexemplified the \"decadent culture\" which the United States \"had brought\"\nto South Vietnam. American and French journalists reported that while\ncommunist soldiers kept the press from getting too close, they observed\nthat the students entered book stores and emptied them of every type of\npublication except for mathematical and technical books. The students\nnext reportedly removed \"objectionable items\" from private homes.\nAccording to a French journalist's report, while some of the items they\nrounded up were \"pornographic\" publications such as Playboy and Oui,\nthey also picked up every type of political writing and Vietnamese history\nalong with translations of all foreign works. Since then the authorities\nhave extended the campaign to include a prohibition against singing songs\nwhich the new regime has not approved, as well as a total proscription\nagainst foreign music unless specific prior approval is obtained. This\nFORD\n&\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n8\nmass roundup of literature seems to have taken on striking proportions.\nAt the end of the campaign's first month, Radio Saigon reported that\nseveral \"tons\" of books had been collected. In one village alone in the\nSaigon area, almost 50, 000 books and close to 20, 000 tapes and cassettes\nhad been collected in that month. The campaign has continued for a\nyear and continues to receive considerable press attention. An official\nlist of blacklisted authors and books was published, and the roundup of\nforbidden material continues. An amusing sidelight to this campaign\nis that communist cadres are apparently not destroying all of these\nobjectionable materials. Recently, Vietnamese media have complained\nabout the proliferation in Hanoi of wild American rock music and nude\npictures that North Vietnamese cadre and troops returning from the\nsouth have brought home.\nDestructions of Symbols of the Old Government\nMany remember that the communists tore down the large monument\nfeaturing ARVN soldiers charging toward the National Assembly building\nin downtown Siagon. Few have regretted its loss from an aesthetic point\nof view. A more disconcerting report we have heard from several\nrefugees is that communist forces descrecrated the large ARVN cemetery,\njust outside Saigon, where hundreds of soldiers are buried. Included in\nthis action was the destruction of the large monument which had been\nerected in memory of these men.\nCorruption and Other Social Problems\nOne thing that has seemingly not changed from the old regime is the\nextent of the corruption which permeates the new communist government.\nRefugees tell stories of demands or bribes from officials at all levels,\nand comment that in this respect there is absolutely no difference between\nthe new government and the old. Many Vietnamese who have left Saigon\non French flights report paying bribes of several thousand dollars for\nexit permits. Communist media have indirectly acknowledged this problem\nand prescribed penalities for those caught. The refugees describe North\nVietnamese soldiers as the only ones now regularly having any amounts\nof money and as dealing wildly on the Black Market. They can buy hard\nto get items now such as rice and meat from state commissaries, and\nare reselling their purchases on the Black Market with large profits.\nProstitution is proving as persistant as financial corruption, and may\nhave even increased because so many people are out of work. Reportedly,\nonly the North Vietnamese have enough money to pay the going rate.\nFORD\n&\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n9\nCollectivization of the Economy\nWhile private individuals still own land, major changes in agriculture\nhave taken place:\nLabor exchange teams now operate throughout the country. These\nteams, made up of all farmers in an area, pool all-manual labor, farm\nmachinery and animal resources to collectively plow, plant and harvest\nthe rice crop. While most individual ownership of land plots has not\nended, the establishment of these labor exchange teams is apparently\nthe first step on the way to total collectivization.\nCollectivized state farms in which all land is worked in common are\nin existence in a few areas. These entities, which cover 4000 to 5000\nacres, are so far found only in the new economic zones, areas which the\ngovernment only recently reclaimed and to which it is relocating urban\ndwellers.\nWhile the state has not collectivized the harvest on individual farms\nofficially, the state is in fact taking a large part of the rice crop. A new\nrice tax has resulted in farmers being forced to give up anywhere from\n50 to 75 percent of their rice crop to the government. While an individual\nhas his own plot of land and theoretically gets to keep what is grown on\nit, the communist tax is so high that the state is achieving just about the\nsame results as it would through a collectivized system.\nIn urban commerce, the communists have taken more direct and drastic\nsteps to gain control of the economy. In the fall of 1975 the government\nbegan a campaign to arrest the \"comprador bourgeoise,\" leading ethnic\nChinese businessmen who exercised a cartel over many important\ncommodities such as rice, metals, and textiles. In a nationwide roundup\nthe police arrested these men and summarily confiscated all of their\ngoods and property. For a time their fate was uncertain but in late May\n1975 the government issued a news circular indicating that they would be\ntried and that minimum sentences for those guilty of speculating or\nhoarding would be five years while in the most serious cases the death\npenalty would be exacted.\nIn addition, the North Vietnamese have stripped Saigon of certain\ntechnical equipment such as medical x-ray machines and shipped them\nNorth. Perplexingly, in view of the current food shortage and the U.N.\ndesire to provide food aid, they also disposed of the valuable huge rice\nsupply which the U.S. left in Saigon by selling at least part of it to\nforeign countries.\n&\nFORD\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n10\nReeducation\nThe communists themselves have admitted that over one million former\nGVN officials have registered with the new government, and that at\nleast 500, 000 have undergone reeducation. Some reeducation was done\nin place while other higher ranking persons have gone to reform camps.\nOf those sent away, some lower ranking officers have returned home,\nmany reportedly suffering from a number of diseases and extremely\nemaciated. Refugees confirm, however, that most of those who have\ngone off to reeducation have never returned, and their ultimate fate is\nuncertain. At first the new government stressed the leniency of its\npolicy. But in late May 1976 it issued a new statement which revealed\nthat those who had been stubborn or unreformed, presumably this category\napplies to all of those who have not yet returned, may have to undergo\nreeducation for at least three years. Furthermore, the new statement\nindicated that those guilty of crimes with \"blood debts\" to society will\nstand trial. We do not know the exact nature of reeducation, but the few\nreports available indicate that it includes much hard labor, little to eat\naside from rice, and large doses of communist propaganda about how bad\nthe Americans were. Other unconfirmed reports indicate that some\nreeducatees are being forced to clear mine fields, and that some have\nbeen killed while doing so.\nNew Economic Areas\nOne of the most vigorous communist campaigns has been a year-long\nconcerted effort to have people leave Saigon and other cities, and resettle\nat locations -- referred to as new economic areas which had lain fallow\nor had never been farmed. In many cases the land is almost untillable,\nand is located in a remote area where farming is difficult under the best\nof circumstances. The new government has told people moving there\nthat there will be a house ready for them, as well as free tools and a\nmonetary stipend. Many people, lured by government promises, apparently\nat first went voluntarily. Later as the word seeped back to the cities\nthat the government's promises were hollow, the refugees said the\nauthorities introduced a degree of coercion. Local security forces\nphysically rounded up some people, particularly young men not having\nany means of employment, and sent them to these areas. At the end of\n1975, Radio Saigon reported the existence of a campaign to round up such\n\"bad elements. 11 In other places the authorities used a quota system in\nwhich they required large families to send a certain number of family\nFORD & LIBRARY OERALD\n11\nmembers to the new areas. They also C hose persons who signed up for\nfree rice at government stores, thus indicating that they h a d no job\nor income in the city. In at least one case they used religion to draw\npeople there. First, they required a Catholic priest to relocate to one\nof the new areas. After a short time, they brought him back to make a\nspeech to his parishoners describing the new zone in laudatory terms and\nurging that they return there with him. The relationship between priest\nand parishoners being what it is, most people reportedly did go with\nhim en masse.\nElections\nAn election for a new unified national assembly was held in both North\nand South Vietnam on May 25, 1976. There were four noteworthy aspects\nabout the election: First, no politicians from the previous GVN period\nran or were elected with the exception of several \"third force\" figures\nwho most official Americans believed to be at least communist fellow\ntravellers. Secondly, 605 candidates ran for the 492 seats available,\npractically a one-to-one ratio. Thirdly, the ranking members of the\nNorth Vietnamese Politburo who ran all received 99. 5 percent of the\nvotes cast in their district or higher. These totals are an interesting\ncontrast with President Thieu who, running alone in 1971, received only\nslightly over 93 percent. Finally, in the new government formed under\nthe unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam, no NLF/PRG personality is\nin a position of any real power. Unconfirmed intelligence reports\nindicate that the southern communists are resentful over their diminished\nrole.\nFORD & LIBRARY OERALD\nCambodia's New Regime\n12\nSince their April 17, 1975 capture of Phnom Penh, the communists have\nmoved ruthlessly to establish their domination over the people, and have\ntried to reduce or eliminate all vestiges of such basic institutions as\nfamily, religion, and education. Millions of people, including the sick\nand aged, have been uprooted and forced to work in the countryside,\nunder extremely austere conditions, on agricultural and reconstruction\nprojects. Disease pervades everyday life, malaria and dysentary are\ncommon, and there is little or no medicine available.\nNumerous interviews with Cambodian refugees who have fled to Thailand\nand information available from other sources indicate that the Cambodian\ncommunists are radically reconstructing that country using extremely\nharsh and brutal methods including large scale executions to implement\ntheir policies. Some of the more notable aspects of their rule are:\n-- The regime is extremely anti-intellectual. One former school\nteacher described book burnings in Phnom Penh following the communist\ntakeover including one instance in which the entire contents of the National\nLibrary were destroyed.\n-- Education has virtually ceased to exist save for some ideological\ntraining for children between the ages of 7 and 12.\nOrganized religion is apparently being eradicated. Monks are\nforced to do work in the fields. Most pagodas have been either dismantled\nor are being used for other purposes such as to store grain.\nStandards of health have apparently declined seriously, and disease\nis rampant. There are reports of widespread epidemics of malaria,\ndysentary, and cholera in various parts of the country. Remaining\nmedical facilities are open only to communist cadre. Most doctors are\nno longer allowed to practice but are either forced into manual labor or\nexecuted.\nIn several areas the family unit is being destroyed with children\npermanently separated from their parents, and husbands and wives\nplaced in separate work groups.\nNew Government\nPhnom Penh formalized its new governmental structure under the\nconstitution announced in early January. On March 20 communist\nauthorities staged nationwide elections to elect representatives of the\n13\n250-member National Legislative Assembly. The Khmer Communist\nParty (KCP) maintains overall control of the governing apparatus.\nKhieu Samphan will chair the State Presidium, but we do not believe\nhe is the top man. Prince Sihanouk has been relegated to the role of\nelder statesman and will play no consequential part in Cambodia's\nfuture. The new Prime Minister, who may be Saloth Sar under the\npseudonym of Pol Pot, is probably the overall leader of the Party and\nthe country.\nExecutions\nRefugee reports and other information indicate that arbitrary executions\nare commonplace, and there is a widespread fear of arrest and sub-\nsequent elimination. Members of the former government's political\nelite, bureaucracy, and military -- including doctors, educators, and\nengineers -- apparently have no immunity and are prime targets for\nexecution along with their families.\nReports say that since January 1, 1976 the communists have even executed\nformer teachers, students, and even low ranking enlisted men of the Lon\nNol military forces. These killings are reportedly widespread and in\nmany cases members of the entire family of former government officials\nor soldiers are executed along with the head of the family. According to\none report, the communists executed approximately 700 Lon Nol officers\nfrom Battambang Province in late April 1975. Another report indicates\nthat they machine-gunned to death over 350 soldiers who returned from\nThailand where they had been in training.\nJournalistic Accounts of Atrocities in Cambodia\nJournalists have also documented communist brutality following the\nconquest of Phnom Penh. Henry Kamm in the New York Times July 15, 1975\nreported refugee accounts of brutal executions, old people and children\ndying in the forced exodus from Phnom Penh, and the mass resettlement\nof the Cambodian population. The April 26 Asian edition of Time\nmagazine estimates that, \"Since the Communist victory, 500, 000 to\n600, 000 people -- roughtly one-twelfth of Cambodia's population --\nhave died from political reprisals, disease or starvation. \" It also\nreports that a Khmer Rouge order went out to kill all Army officers\nand civilian officials in the Lon Nol government. It describes one such\nexecution as follows:\nFORD\n&\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n14\n\"At Mongkol Borei, the local Khmer Rouge commander\nordered\na squad of young Communist soldiers to punish\na group of civilian officials of the fallen government\nThe\n15 Khmer Rouge rounded up ten former senior civil servants and\ntheir wives and children about 60 people tied their hands\nbehind their backs\nand drove them\nto a banana plantation\n11\nScattered about the place were the bodies of people killed\none or two days earlier\nThe Khmer Rouge thrust each\nofficial forward one at a time and forced him to kneel between\ntwo soldiers armed with bayonet-tipped AK-47 assault rifles.\nThe soldiers then stabbed the victim simultaneously through the\nchest and back\n\"\nAs each man lay dying, his anguished, horror-struck wife\nand children were herded up to the body. The women, forced to\nkneel, also received the simultaneous bayonet thrusts. The\nchildren, last to die, were stabbed where they stood.\n\"Of the 60 or so executed, only about six were spared the bayonet.\nThese were very small children, too young to fully appreciate\nwhat was happening. In a killing frenzy now, the two executioners\neach grabbed a limb one an arm, the other a leg and tore the\ninfants apart. \"\nAccording to the Time story, other larger scale executions took place\nas well. In Battambang, hundreds of former officers were found,\nloaded onto trucks, and machine-gunned outside the city. In other\nplaces, execution by shooting was considered a waste of bullets.\nSome victims were clubbed with wooden hoes or tied together and\nburied alive by bulldozers; others suffocated when plastic bags were\ntied over their heads; still others died by bayoneting and dismemberment.\nWhile their brutal methods have received most attention following the\nfall of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, the Khmer Communists actually\ninstituted the use of terror and execution prior to that date. An\nAmerican Embassy Saigon study on Communist rule in Southern Cambodia\ndated February 19, 1974 noted that, \"Harsh punishment is widespread\nwith reports of it emanating from every province. \" It added that \"death\nsentences are fairly common\n\" Journalistic accounts from this\nsame period tended to confirm this conclusion. The Washington Post\non November 24 quoted refugees who fled to South Vietnam as saying\nthat the communists punished infringements of even minor rules by\ndeath.\n15\nDonald Kirk in the Chicago Tribune of July 14, 1974 reported a refugee\nas seeing the Khmer Rouge \"saw off the neck of a civilian with the sharp\nedge of a sugar palm leaf. 11 Kirk added that this episode was not an\nisolated case but \"one of many I heard during visits to refugee camps. \"\nTammy Arbuckle in the April 10, 1974 Washington Star News wrote\nthat refugees told him that \"people who protested against the Communist\npolicy of food distribution were taken into the forest and beheaded and\nmutilated with ax and hammer. 11\nAccording to U.S. Embassy reports, the communists executed approximately\n700 civilians and surrendered soldiers in Battambang Province on July 1,\n1974. Five minutes after the surrender, the communists began firing\nindiscriminately into the group killing 200 people.\nFollowing that, they systematically executed all the men remaining alive\nby stabbing them with bayonets while the men were sitting on the ground\nwith their hands tied behind their backs. They marched off the women\nand children, and put them to work in the fields.\nRadical Social-Economic Changes\nPractically everyone in the country is now engaged in collectivized\nrice farming. Private land holdings have ended and people live and\nwork in commune arrangements, often segregated by sex. Although\nCambodia has managed an ample rice harvest, grain is carefully rationed,\nand little else is available to augment the basic diet.\nDespite this lack of nourishment, the population is being forced to work\nlong, arduous hours on a variety of agricultural and reconstruction\nprojects. Working conditions are described as severe, with little\nmechanized equipment available. As a result, most people who escape\nto Thailand are emaciated and describe the populationas badly underfed.\nResistance\nIndications of armed resistance to the communist regime have periodically\nsurfaced, but the dissidents lack the strength and organization to pose\na serious threat. Resistance forces with bases in Thailand have proven\nineffectual, and their forays amount only to harassment. Although\nincreasing popular dissatisfaction has been reported, communist brutality\nand stringent population control have prevented a viable opposition from\norganizing.\nFORD\n&\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n16\nDiplomatic Relations\nCountries with resident diplomats in Cambodia include the PRC, North\nKorea, Vietnam, Albania, Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Laos. Resident\nenvoys live an austere existence, and their activities are closely\ncontrolled with the exception of the Chinese.\nCambodia recently expanded its international contacts, and has now\nestablished ties with all ASEAN nations except Indonesia. Outside\nASEAN, relations with Burma and Denmark are normalized. Japan\nhas also been investigating the possibility of establishing a diplomatic\ndialogue and has apparently broached the subject to Cambodian officials.\nMoscow is still anathema to the KC. While Phnom Penh may be softening\nits position, any significant warming between the two would irritate Peking.\nCambodia would probably not do anything that might endanger its close\nrelationship with China and will probably not renew ties with the Soviets.\nBecause of continuing border incidents and disputed claims to offshore\nislands, relations with Vietnam are correct but strained.\nTies with China\nThe KC rely heavily on the PRC for external support and assistance.\nUp to 2000 Chinese advisors may now be in Cambodia working on agricultural,\nmechanical, and industrial projects. Peking also provides aircraft to\nfly KC diplomatic missions around the world. Despite the KC refusal to\nacknowledge that it has any ties with communism, there is obviously\na close ideological relationship between the two parties.\nProspects\nThe Khmer leadership will most likely maintain its xenophobic orientation,\nand will concentrate on internal matters for some time. Selective\nexecutions and disregard for human rights will continue. In foreign\naffairs, Phnom Penh will probably continue to expand its international\naffiliations and seek to play an expanding role in the non-aligned movement,\nthe U. N., and other international fora. Resistance poses no threat to\ncommunist control, although some dissident activity is likely. Periodic\nborder clashes with Thailand and Vietnam will persist but remain\nlimited in magnitude.\nFORD & LIBRARY QERALD\n17\nLaos\nThe communist takeover in Laos was accomplished in more gradual\nfashion employing traditional political tactics during the 19 months\nthat a coalition government existed. The communists, in response to\n\"popular\" demonstrations, formally dissolved both this government and\nthe monarchy on December 2, 1975 and replaced them with the People's\nDemocratic Republic of Laos. Prince Souphanouvong is the nominal\nChief -of-State but Communist Party Secretary-General Kaysone\nPhomvihan holds the real power in his position of Prime Minister.\nKaysone has a long history of close ties with Hanoi and may be a member\nof the Lao Dong Party politburo. Because of this relationship, we still\nbelieve Hanoi is providing a good deal of guidance to the Lao Party on\nboth internal and international affairs.\nSince their takeover, the communists have begun a number of programs\nsimilar to those in Vietnam aimed at imparting significant political,\nsocial and economic change: civilian and military leaders of the non-\ncommunist element of the coalition government have been sent off for\nreeducation and most have not returned; a small number of executions\nhave been reported; the old currency has been replaced with new liberation\nKip;\" political dissidents have been rounded up; the State has taken over\nsome business operations; and some people have been sent to new economic\nzones.\nResistance to the communists has been more virulent in Laos than in\nVietnam or Cambodia. Meo tribesmen in the north and former FAR\npersonnel in the south have both engaged Pathet Lao forces in significant\nmilitary actions, at least one of which necessitated the sending of NVA\ntroops to halt insurgent advances. While the resistance will continue as\na prickly problem, it poses no real threat to the communist government's\nsurvival.\nThe new Lao government is beset with a difficult set of international\nproblems most of which are located within its own borders. Approximately\n20, 000 Chinese engineering troops are in northeast Laos with no apparent\nintention to leave anytime soon. The North Vietnamese also have a\nsizeable presence with some 32, 000 military spread throughout the\neastern and southern parts of the country. Soviet advisors are present\nin considerable numbers, as well as a Cuban advisory team. The Lao\nCommunists seem to have balanced off these contending parties SO far,\nand have maintained better relations with the PRC than have their\nVietnamese mentors.\n18\nThailand is a problem as well. The Lao have engaged in several\nmilitary confrontations with Thai forces along their extensive common\nborder. These incidents have soured Thai-Lao relations and resulted\nin Bangkok temporarily closing its border to Laos' economic detriment.\nRecent Thai public overtures for better relations may signal a mend\nin this rupture, but mutual suspicions will remain, and any improvement\nwill be gradual.\nAvailable evidence suggests that the leaders of the Thai insurgency\nstill haven in Laos, which serves as a logistics highway for weapons,\nammunition, and other supplies emanating mainly from China and\ndestined for Thailand. So far there has been no indication of significant\nescalation of Lao, Vietnamese, or Chinese assistance to the Thai\ninsurgents.\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\n3e\nDOC\nRECD\nLOG NUMBER\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\nINITIAL ACTION o\nNSC CORRESF ONDENCE PROFILE\n7\n15\n7\n16\n16\n7604101\nTO: PRES\nFROM: SECSIATE\nBarned 5/5\nUNCLAS OG IN/ OUT\nSCOWCROFT +\nSECDEF\nLOU\nNO FORN\nNODIS\nHYLAND\nDCI\nX REF\nC\nEYES ONLY\nEXDIS\nDAVIS\nSTATE\nEXSEC\nS\nCODEWORD\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nSUBJECT\nOnfo Mem OTHER re Gressment TS SENSITIVE of\nin Indockine Sine\nthe INTERNAL End ROUTING of AND DISTRIBUTION the Cretname REC ACTION REQUIRED was\nACTION\nCONCUR-\nCOOR-\nINFO\nCY\nRENCE\nDINATE\nFOR\nAOV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH\nMEMO FOR SCQWCROFT\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO FOR PRES\nCONGRESSIONAL\nREPLY FOR\nECONOMIC\nDISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\nEUR/ CANADA OCEANS\nMEMO\nTO\nFAR EAST/ PRC\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nINTELLIGENCE\nJOINT MEMO\nLATIN AMERICA\nREFER TO\nFOR:\nMID EAST/ NO. AFRICA\nANY ACTION NECESSARY?\nNSC PLANNING\nCONCURRENCE\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDUE DATE:\nSCIENTIFIC\nCOMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS\nSUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN\nDATE\nFROM\n7/15\nSingh\nSTATUS\nSUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:\nDUE\nCY TO\nCIX\nDifo\n23\n7/28\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\nC nated by Scrwcrift\nrigs Retained By draft\nGERALD ? TIBRARY FORD\nDISPATCH\nNOTIFY\nMICROFILM & FILE RQMTS\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nD\nBY\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION:\nIF\nCRT ID\n1976\nNS\nDY\nSPECIAL INDEXING:\nAUG.\nWH SA FP\nCY\nATTACHED\nX\nPA\nSUSPENSE\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976\n(\nNSC 76-21\n599-022\n)\n4498\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\n4\nAugust 6\n4a\nTO BUD MCFARLANE\nI question the necessity of\nsending this to the President. If\nit does go forward, it should be\ndrastically shortened.\nJWD\nFORD & LIBRARY OERALD\n4b D\nAH\nMEMORANDUM\n760 4498\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nGDS\nACTION\nAugust 6, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nTHOMAS J. BARNES\nSUBJECT:\nAmbassador Underhill's Assessment of the U.S.\nPosition in Southeast Asia: \"For the time being,\nwe're ahead in Southeast Asia. 11\nAmbassador Underhill cabled July 29 his analysis of the balance of\npower in Southeast Asia one year after the fall of Saigon. He also\nincluded U.S. policy recommendations. His analysis is unusually\nthoughtful, and contains novel observations. Because it is intellectually\nprovocative and illustrates the positive aspects of the American versus\nthe Soviet and Chinese presence, I have prepared a summary (Tab I)\nfor you to send to the President.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.\nThis is an interesting\n8/7/75\nprice, int & think time just\nforthe artis B\nFORD & LIBRARY OERALD\nCONFIDENTIAL GDS\nKBH 1/14/00\n4c\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nCONFIDENTIAL GDS\nANALYSIS\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nSUBJECT:\nAmbassador Underhill's Assessment of the U.S.\nPosition in Southeast Asia: \"For the time being,\nwe're ahead in Southeast Asia. 11\nFrancis Underhill, our Ambassador to Malaysia, recently cabled to\nthe State Department his assessment of where the U.S. stands in\nSoutheast Asia. From the title of his analysis, Underhill clearly\nbelieves we are one up on the Soviets and Chinese there. Because his\ncommentary looks at the problem from an unusual perspective, I\nthought it worthy of providing you the following summary of his assess-\nment.\nUnderhill begins by rejecting what he says is the usual framework we\nuse in looking at the area. That framework sees the U.S., USSR, and\nPRC in competition for power and influence with each trying to limit\nthe others' presence while seeking a dominant role for itself. Instead,\nUnderhill begins at the other end by assessing those basic strengths\nwhich the non-communist nations of Southeast Asia have demonstrated.\nHe posits that these states have reached a level of political organization,\neconomic development, and regional cohesion that keeps them from being\neasily susceptible to outside interference or manipulation. They are\ngoverned by authoritarian, relatively sophisticated, nationalist regimes\nwhich are alert and sensitive to any such attempts.\nWhile intra-regional differences exist, Underhill sees ASEAN as providing\na framework of conciliation and copperation, thus further reinforcing each\ncountry's fundamental strength. Dissident movements, where they do\nexist, are too weak, and their prospects for power too slim, to justify\nany of the major outside powers taking the risk of providing direct support.\nMoreover, with the end of the Vietnam War, a de facto zone of peace,\nfreedom, and neutrality is evolving which will not attract or encourage\nforeign intervention.\nGONFIDENTIAL GDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nKBH 1/14/00\nCONFIDENTIAL\n2\nWhile admitting that China and the Soviet Union have made gains in\nthe past year, Underhill sees them as still without significant influence.\nSoutheast Asian nations regard both with deep suspicion, particularly\nsince they suffer from the ideological handicap which obliges them to\nassert a difference between party-to-party and government-to-govern-\nment relations, a distinction completely unacceptable to the ASEAN\ncountries.\nUsing Malaysia as an example, Underhill points out that neither Moscow\nnor Peking is making any extraordinary effort to win influence there.\nThere have been no high-level visits of senior officials of either country\nin the past 12 months, nor has either sent a major cultural or sports\nattraction. Their low-level trade further accentuates their impotence.\nThe USSR provides .1 percent of Malaysia's imports and takes 4.1 percent\nof its exports. The PRC furnishes 2 percent of Malaysia's imports,\nand receives 9 percent of its exports. In contrast, the U.S. accounts\nfor 9.5 percent of Malaysia's imports and 14 percent of its exports.\nUnderhill further notes that this limited Soviet and Chinese economic\ninvolvement pertains to ASEAN as a whole, The USSR exports 2 percent\nand imports 1.5 percent of ASEAN's goods, while the PRC handles 2.2\npercent of its exports and imports 2.1 percent from ASEAN.\nUnderhill then takes note of the Soviet attempt to hasten the closing of\nAmerican bases in Southeast Asia in the belief that the removal of an\nAmerican military presence will reduce our influence. Such an expecta-\ntion is wishful thinking, he contends. Our experience in Southeast Asia\nclearly shows that a military presence, while it may bring other benefits,\nis a net consumer rather than a producer of influence. Underhill, there-\nfore, clearly expects that with the departure of our military units from\nThailand, influence will rease. This is an interesting thesis which\nprobably has a number of adherents in the U.S., but also elements of\nnaivete.\nUnderhill comments that \"It is evident we are not now making a major\neffort in Southeast Asia. \" He sees us devoting less attention to the area\nand allocating it fewer resources. Our acceptance of Thailand's decision\nto end our military presence is a clear demonstration to him that we see\nno overriding U.S. interest at stake in the region. The Ambassador adds,\nhowever, that it would be wrong to describe this change as a withdrawal\nor a retreat. It is rather a correction of past gross imbalances in the\nallocation of our resources, and a re-establishment of a proper relation-\nship between involvement and national interests.\nFORD\n&\nCONFIDENTIAL\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nCONFIDENTIAL\n3\nUnderhill concludes that the current popular assertion that American\ninfluence in Southeast Asia is on the wane is \"pure bunk. \" Our influence\nis so pervasive and widespread that we do not notice it. The non-communist\ncountries, he argues, have adopted our mixed public-private approach\nto national development, our social values, our business methods and\nmanagement techniques, and our definition of the good life. He notes\nthat, while they do not practice our political ideals, they at least play\ntribute to them by holding elections. The elites of these countries are\nin fact closer philosophically to the U.S. than they are to their own masses.\nThe PRC and the USSR models have no current appeal. He proves this\nthesis by asking rheotorically \"Who would buy a Russian computer or\nconsult an economist from Peking?\"\nUnderhill turns finally to the question of what is the proper role for the\nU.S. and what should be the direction of U.S. policy. His answer\nincorporates the following guiding principles:\n-- We should give up the search for regional equilibrium since South -\neast Asia is under no significant danger from either Moscow or Peking.\n-- We should not devote U.S. resources to resisting aggression and\nmaintaining territorial integrity in Southeast Asia. So many of the\ncountries are already involved in minor squabbles with each other over\nterritorial questions -- Timor, Sabah, the Spratly Islands, Northeast\nThailand -- that we do not need to get involved. We should permit Asian\nsolutions to emerge to Asian problems.\n-- The ASEAN nations are most threatened from weaknesses within\ntheir own societies and not from outside aggression or insurgencies.\nWe can help only indirectly by assisting the governing elites to aqquire\nthe resources and knowledge needed to cope with these problems. Such\nassistance would come in commodity price stabilization, trade concessions,\nprivate investment, training programs, and educational exchange.\n-- For military relationships, we should move to make these contacts\nas \"politically sterile\" as possible while at the same time allowing our\nfriends to acquire the military equipment and technology they need. We\nshould end forever the \"patron-client relationship\" which our military\nassistance groups have fostered.\n-- Finally, we should endorse the ASEAN concept of Southeast Asia\nas a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. Even though we would not\nfully adhere to it because we would maintain our military presence in\nFORD\n&\nCONFIDENTIAL\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nCONFIDENTIAL\n4\nthe Philippines, our public endorsement would nonetheless be welcomed\nand would generate positive support for us.\nWhile a ready embrace of all of Ambassador Underhill's premises\nwould be imprudent, his approach to analyzing Southeast Asia allows\nus to see the area in a better and more balanced light. Too often we\ntend to focus on shortcomings and inadequacies of our allies. In examining\ntheir strengths, we become more cognizant of their self reliance, and\nmore confident that they will be able to maintain their integrity and their\nnon-communist systems.\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nCONFIDENTIAL\n4d\nDOC\nRECD\nLOG NUMBER\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\nINITIAL ACTION o\nNSC CORKESPONDENCE PROFILE\nFROM: SECSTATE 8 Barnes\n6\n7604498\nTO: PRES\nS/S\nUNCLAS LOG IN/ OUT\nSCOWCROFT\n+\nSECDEF\nLOU\nNO FORN\nNODIS\nHYLAND\nDCI\nX REF\nc\nEYES ONLY\nEXDIS\nDAVIS\nSTATE EXSEC\n$\nCODEWORD\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nOTHER\nTS\nSENSITIVE\nSUBJECT Cent Underkill Consent of the\nU.S. Positia Re Soulteat Gaid In\nthe time INTERNAL ACTION ROUTING AND CONCUR- Ling DISTRIBUTION COOR- We INFO REC re CY ACTION aler REQUIRED asia in Soultant\nRENCE.\nDINATE\nFOR\nADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH\nMEMO FOR SCOWCROFT\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO FOR PRES\n(\nCONGRESSIONAL\nREPLY FOR\n1\nECONOMIC\nDISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\nEUR / CANADA / OCEANS\nMEMO\nTO\nFAR EAST/ PRC\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nINTELLIGENCE\nJOINT MEMO\nLATIN AMERICA\nREFER TO\nFOR:\n,\nMID EAST NO. AFRICA\nANY ACTION NECESSARY?\n(\nNSC PLANNING\nCONCURRENCE\n1\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDUE DATE:\nSCIENTIFIC\nCOMMENTS: INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS!\nSUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN\nDATE\nFROM\n8/6\nShift\nTO\nSTATUS\nSUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:\nDUE\nCY TO\ncit\nDifo\n8/13\n8-9\nNSC/S\nNotedby Scowcupt\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\nBarnes\n8-16\nNSC/S\nC\nany further action\nOBE- Do Further action\n(per Ken QUINN)\nGERALD ? FORD\nDISPATCH\nNOTIFY\nMICROFILM & FILE ROMTS\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nM/F'D\nBY\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION:\nAUG 1\nCRT ID:\n1976\nNS\nSPECIAL INDEXING:\nOPEN MIX\nWH\nБА FP\nY\nCLOSE Ao Aec\nPA\nSUSPENSE CY ATTACHED\nNSC 76-21\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976\n599-022\nMEMORANDUM\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\n4996\nACTION\nSeptember 8, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT\nF\nFROM:\nWILLIAM GLEYSTEEN by\nSUBJECT:\nRecommended Meetings with Ambassadors Holdridge,\nWhitehouse and Sullivan\nAmbassadors John Holdridge, Charles Whitehouse and Bill Sullivan\nwill be in Washington the week of September 13-17 on consultation, and\nall three have asked to call on you. I believe your meeting with each\nof them would be useful in providing you an update on where we stand in\nSoutheast Asia and also to give them the benefit of White House thinking\non their countries. If you approve receiving them, I will work out the\ntiming of their calls with Lora and with State.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you meet with Ambassador Holdridge.\nAPPROVE\nB\nDISAPPROVE\nThat you meet with Ambassador Whitehouse.\nAPPROVE B\nDISAPPROVE\nThat you meet with Ambassador Sullivan.\nAPPROVE B\nDISAPPROVE\nFORD & LIBRARY QERALD\nDOC\nRECD\nLOG NUM\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\nINITIAL ACTION o\nNSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE\n9\n8\n9\n8\n17\n7604996\nTO: PRES\nFROM: SECSIATE\nSCOWCROFT +\nThey teed S/S\nUNCLAS LOG IN/ OUT\nSECDEF\nLOU\nNO FORN\nNODIS\nHYLAND\nDCI\nX REF\nc\nEYES ONLY\nEXDIS\nDAVIS\nSTATE EXSEC\n$\nCODEWORD\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nOTHER\nTS\nSENSITIVE\nJohn Holdings, Charles Whiteboure Col\nSUBJECT lequest for Get w/ Short for Cant\nWilliam INTERNAL ROUTING Sullinan AND DISTRIBUTION Week of 13 Sept 1976\nREC\nACTION\nREQUIRED\nACTION\nCONCUR-\nCOOR-\nINFO\nCY\nRENCE\nDINATE\nFOR\nADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH\nMEMO FOR SCOWCROFT\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO FOR PRES\nCONGRESSIONAL\nREPLY FOR\n1\nECONOMIC\nDISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\nEUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS\nEMO\nTO\nFAR EAST/ PRC\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nINTELLIGENCE\nJOINT MEMO\nLATIN AMERICA\nREFER TO\nFOR:\nMID EAST/NO. AFRICA\nANY ACTION NECESSARY?\nNSC PLANNING\nCONCURRENCE\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDUE DATE:\nSCIENTIFIC\nCOMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS\nSUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN\nDATE\nFROM\nShoft\nTO\nSTATUS\nDUE\n9/8\nX\nDericioe SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:\n9/13\nJane\nCY TO\n9/10\nNSe/S\nC\nScroft approved all necom\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\nFORD & LIBRARY\nDISPATCH\nNOTIFY\nMICROFILM a FILE ROMTS\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION:\nSE 1976\nBY\nIF\nCRT ID:\nSPECIAL INDEXING:\nMAKE WH SA FP\nDY\nX\nOPEN CLOSE B\nPA\nSUSPENSE CY ATTACHED\nNSC 76-21\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976\n599-022"
}