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This file contains materials relating to Chiang Kai-Shek and Nguyen Van Thieu.
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1553664
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China, Republic of - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (1)
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China, Republic of - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (1)
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This file contains materials relating to Chiang Kai-Shek and Nguyen Van Thieu.
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Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)
East Asia and Pacific Country Files
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Soviet Union
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Vietnam (Republic)
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1975-04-30
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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "China, Republic of - State
Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (1)" of the Presidential Country Files
for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 5 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
OF
Department of State
UNITED
MAKE
/
TELEGRAM
STATES of
SEGRET 0039
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 05091 03 OF 03 1411332
12
ACTION 8S-30
TNFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1031 w
064535
R 1408002 AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2545
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USLO PEKING
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY SAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
SECRE T SECTION 3 OF 3 TAIREI 5091
EXDIS
SPECAT FOR MIL ADDRESSEES
UPON THE PRESENCE HERE OF A FORMAL us COMMAND STRUCTURE.
AT A MUCH FURTHER REMOVE, IT MAY RPT MAY BE
ASSURED BY MODALITIES OTHER THAN THE MUTUAL DEFENSE.
TREATY, OR THAT SECURITY COULD BE EFFECTIVELY GUARANTEED
EVEN AFTER THE ENF OF FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
C. THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP": IT IS GROC POLICY TO
CLING AS TIGHTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE US, AND TO LOOK TO US
AS THE ROC'S PROTECTOR AND PATRON. IN THE PAST FEW YEARS
WE HAVE BEGUN BACKING AWAY FROM THIS ROLE WHICH WE
PREVIOUSLY PLAYED FOR so LONG. AND IN MY FIRST PUBLIC
SPEECH (JUNE), I TRIED TO TAKE A FURTHER STEP BY OPEN DIS-
CUSSION OF THE BENEFITS OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AND OUR
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE PRC. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO MOVE
PROGRESSIVELY TOWARD A LESS PATERNALISTIC RELATIONSHIP.
! BELIEVE THE TIME HAS COME TO RECONSIDER THOSE PORTIONS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
29
EARM
do
STATE
Department of State
ORLINA
(
TELEGRAM
I
SECRET
PAGE 02 TAIREI 05091 03 OF 03 1411332
OF THE 1973 PARA WHICH STATE WE SHOULD "ENCOURAGE GROWTH
OF ROC ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES
THAT RECOGNIZE THE PRC"; NOR SHOULD WE PERFORM THE GROC'S
OWN FUNCTION BY GOING OUT OF OUR WAY TO "HELP MAINKTAIN"
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC CONFIDENCE ON TAIWAN IN THE STABILITY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, TO BE SURE, so LONG AS THE
FUTURE CONTINUES UNCERTAIN AND SEVERE SHOCKS WILL
THREATEN TAIWAN, IT WILL BE IN OUR INTEREST TO GIVE
REASONABLE SUPPORT TO THE GROC EFFORTS TO SUSTAIN ITS
ECONOMIC POSITION. BUT ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
DECISIONS THAT MAINTAIN OR WEAKEN POLITICAL STABILITY,
SUPPORT OR WEAKEN THE ECONOMY, MUST REST WITH THE GROC.
n. MILITARY PROFILE: THE PROGRESSIVE REDUCTIONS CARRIED
OUT SINCE LAST FALL HAVE BY AND LARGE GONE SMOOTHLY.
THE REMOVAL OF THE F-43 WENT PARTICULARLY WELL, SHOWING,
9 BELIEVE, THAT WE HAVE LEARNED THE APPROPRIATE LESSONS
FROM THE C-130 WITHDRAWAL. REDEPLOYMENTS ARE VERY MUCH
A PART OF THE CONDITIONING PROCESS AND WE SHOULD USE THEM
AS SUCH IN PURPOSIVE BUT SOPHISTICATED WAYS. PROBLEMS
CAN BE GREATLY EASED IF WE STAGE EVENTS CAREFULLY AND IN
SMALL RATHER THAN LARGE BITES! GIVE AMPLE NOTICE OF OUR
INTENTIONS, LINK CHANGES IN MILITARY POSTURE HERE TO SIMI-
LAR EVENTS ELBEWHERE IN THE REGION AND THE WORLD' AND LET
THE GROG, RATHER THAN THE us, DO THE EXPLAINING TO THE
PUBLIC HERE. LONG LEAD TIMES AND CAREFUL PLANNING ARE
ESSENTIAL. IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE I PLAN TO MAKE
RECOMMENDATIONS AS THE SHAPE OUR MILITARY COMMAND
STRUCTURE SHOULD ASSUME IN FY76 AND THEREAFTER.
E. OVERALL SECURITY POLICY: THE COURSES OF ACTION
ENUMERATED IN THE FY73 PARA SEEM SOUND AND SENSIBLE.
WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT AS WE REDUCE OUR MILITARY
PROFILE FURTHER, PARTICULARLY AS WE CUT BACK OUR MAAG
AND TDC STAFFS, WE WILL NEED TO HANDLE MILITARY AND AD=
VISORY RELATIONSHIPS WITH EVEN GREATER ADROITNESS AND
SOPHISTICATION THAN HTERETOFORE. ADDITIONALLY, WE ARE
PINDING THAT MODERN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY BLURRS THE FOR-
MERLY SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN "OFFENSIVE" AND DE-
PENSIVE" WEAPONRY, ULTIMATELY, WE MAY HAVE TO DEVISE A
NEW DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE -- ONE WHICH TAKES
TNTO ACCOUNT THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
FORM
29
do
STATE
Department of State
CELINA
/
TELEGRAM
STATES
or
SECRET
PAGE 03 TAIPEI 05091 03 OF 03 1411332
AS WELL AS THE PURELY MILITARY. ESSENTIALLY, ROC
SECURITY DEPENDS UPON THREE THINGS: (1) US DETERRENCE
WHICH, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, IS MORE POLITICAL THAN
MILITARY (WE NEED TO DO MORE TO MAKE THAT DIFFICULT POINT
ACCEPTED MERE: (2) THE ABILITY OF THE ROC MILITARY
TO EXACT A SIGNIFICANT PRICE IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK: (3)
THE DOMBSTIC CREDIBILITY OF THE ROC DEFENSE EFFORT
AND TWE OVERALL DETERRENT.
F, DEALING WITH PREMIER CCK: WE NEED TO BEAR IN MIND THAT MUCH
OF THE PREMIER'S EFFECTIVENESS AS A LEADER LIES IN PUBLIC
PERCEPTION THAT HE IS ABLE TO MAKE THE US TAKE INTO
FULL ACCOUNT THE BASIC NEEDS OF THE ROC AND THE CON-
CERNS OF ITS PEOPLE. IF WE HAVE A BITTER PILL TO ADMIN-
TSTER -- AND THERE WILL BE SUCH OCCASIONS IN THE FUTURE --
A MODEST AMOUNT OF SUGAR -COATING WILL OFTEN PROVE TO
BE A WISE INVESTMENT. WE HAVE SEEN THAT PROBLEMS OFTEN
STEM MORE FROM THE FORM AND PRESENTATION THAN THE SUB-
STANCE OF CHANGE. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES -- AND THEY
SHOW NO SIGN OF SIGNIFICANT EARLY ALTERATION -- CCK IS
IN CHARGE, IS A PRAGMATIC REALIST, AND IS BEST ABLE TO
BRING TAIWAN ALONG THE ROAD WE WILL WISH IT TO TRAVEL
WITHOUT COMING APART AT THE SEAMS. POLITICAL INSTABILITY
HERE, WHICH COULD RESULT FROM AN UNDERMINING OF HIS
POSITION, WOULD NOT ADVANCE US INTERESTS OR OVERALL
CHINA POLICY. ON THE CONTRARY, ANYTHING THAT MAKES IT
MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE PREMIER TO KEEP A TIGHT REIN ON THE
GROC MILITARY, THE SECURITY APPARATUS, THE KMT "OLD
GUARD", OR THE INDEPENDENCE-MINDED TAIWANESE, IS UN-
LIKELY TO BE OUR ULTIMATE ADVANTAGE.
14. I HAVE USED MY FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT FROM TAIPEI
TO PRESENT A RELATIVELY PERSONAL VIEW OF THE CURRENT
SITUATION OF THE ROC, ITS BASIC POLICIES AND WHERE I
BELIEVE IT IS HEADED, TOGETHER WITH THE IMPLICA-
TIONS WE SHOULD DRAW THEREFROM. THIS REPORT, TAKEN
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE REVISED COUNTRY BACKGROUND STATE-
MENT TO THE PARA (TAIPEI 2855) -- SUBMITTED BEFORE MY
ARRIVAL BUT WITH WHICH I CONCUR -- SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN
AS COMPLETING OUR "OFF-YEAR" PARA REQUIREMENT (EXCEPT
FOR STATISTICAL SECTIONS), PENDING NEXT YEAR!S SUBMISSION
OF A NEW PARA. UNGER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
29
FORM
DS-1652
OF
STATE
Department of State
CLINA AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES or
SECRET 9988
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 05091 02 OF 03 1411022
12
ACTION 5S-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1031 W
064127
R 140800Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2644
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USLO PEKING
CINCRAC
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
SECRET SECTION 2 OF 3 TAIPEI 5091
EXDIS
SPECAT FOR MIL ADDRESSEES
BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY, THE CURRENT
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, THOUGH NOT SEVERE BY CONTEMPORARY
WORLD STANDARDS, IS SERIOUSLY WORRYING.
8, CENTRALITY OF THE us RELATIONSHIP: I CANNOT EMPHASIZE
TOO STRONGLY THE DEGRZR TO WHICH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE
HERE CONSIDER THAT CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE ROC WITH ITS
PRESENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS, AS AN ENTITY
SEPARATE FROM THE MAINLAND, DEPENDS UPON WHAT THE US
DOES OR DOES NOT DO -- OR THE CIRTUAL UNANIMITY WITH
WHICH CONTINUED SEPARATION IS DESIRED ON TAIWAN.
THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT GROUP WHICH FAVORS UNIFICATION WITH
A COMMUNIST MAINLAND, AND THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT GROUP
WHICH DESIRES ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE
ASSOCIATION WITH THE KUS. DESPITE RUMORS THAT ONE OR
ANOTHER ELEMENT HERE MIGHT, IN EXTREMIS, BE READY TO EX-
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM DS-1652
OF
STATE
Department of State
CELINA
)
TELEGRAM
STATES
of
SECRET
PAGE 02 TAIPEI 05091 02 OF 03 1411022
PLORE A SOVIET CONNECTION, THE PREMIER'S POLICY OF NO
NEGOTIATIONS WITH PEKING, NO CONTACT WITH MOSCOW, TOTAL
RELIANCE ON THE US HAS SOLID, ALMOST UNANIMOUS BACKING.
O. SPECIFICALLY POLITICAL TIES TO ONE SIDE, THE US IS
THE ROCIS MOST IMPORTANT TRADING PARTNER, THE SOURCE OF
HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENT AND ESSENTIAL LOANS! THE
ONLY REASONABLY RELIABLE SOURCE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT,
ADVICE AND TRAINING; THE PLACE TO WHICH UPWARDS OF
2,900 UNIVERSITY STUDENTS GO EACH YEAR FOR GRADUATE
TRAINING, AND THE TRADITIONAL FRIEND AND PROTECTOR.
THESE ELEMENTS COMBINE TO CREATE THE LOCAL SENSE OF
SECURITY SYMBOLIZED BY THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY.
10, WHAT THE US DOES IN ITS RELATIONS WITH PEKING IS
SEEN AS THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE POLITICAL
FUTURE OF THE ROC. ALTHOUGH SENIOR OFFICIALS WILL ONLY
RARELY DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS -- AND THEN ONLY IN THE MOST
EXE
GUARDED TERMS -- MOST OF THE POLITICALLY SOPHISTICATED
IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT SEEM NOW TO BELIEVE US DIPLO-
MATIC RECOGNITION OF PEKING IS INEVITABLE. SOME OF THE
MOST SOPHISTICATED SPECULATE QUIETLY ON SPECIFIC RECOGNITION
FORMULAS THAT MIGHT BE USED, MOST, HOWEVER, FIND THE
PROBLEM JUST TOO WORRYING AND TOO DIFFICULT TO THINK
ABOUT, AND IN ANY CASE THE "PARTY LINE" DOES NOT SANCTION
SUCH DANGEROUS THOUGHTS. PEOPLE FERVENTLY HOPE THE EVIL DAY WILL
BE PUT OFF AS FAR AS POSSIBLE AND THAT WHEN IT COMES,
THE USG WILL ACT RESPONSIBLY AND (IN THEIR TERMS)
"MORALLY", so THAT TAIWAN WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST DISTINCT
FROM THE MAINLAND.
11. SENATOR JACKSONIS PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENTS AND
RUMORS OF SECRETARIAL AND POSSIBLY PRESIDENTIAL VISITS
TO PEKING HAVE RESURFACED ANXIETIES ABOUT THIS WIDELY
FEARED EVOLUTION OF us POLICY. IRONICALLY, THE SHANG-
HAT COMMUNIQUE IS NOW SEEN BY MOST AS AKN ACCEPTABLE BASIS
FOR US-ROC RELATIONS, LARGELY BECAUSE OF CONERN THE US
WILL ADVANCE BEYOND IT, THIS IS ANOTHER WAY OF SAYING
THAT WHAT IS DESIRED ABOVE ALL ELSE IS AN INDEFINITE PRO-
LONGATION OF THE PRESENT STATUS QUO, AND WHAT IS FEARED
ABOVE ALL ELSE IS THAT IN DEALING WITH PEKING, THE US
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED HOUTSERAUTHORIZATION OF E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM DS-1652
or
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA MAKE
TELEGRAM
STATES or
SECRET
PAGE 03 TAIPEI 05091 02 OF 03 141102Z
WILL AGREE TO ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL RESULT IN SUCH
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ENFEEBLING AS TO MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE
FOR THE ROC TO CONTINUE TO EXIST. TO THE EXTENT THAT INDI-
VIDUALS HAVE THOUGHT BEYOND PRESENT ARRANGMENTS -- AND TO
THE EXTENT THEY ARE WILLING TO REVEAL THEIR INNER THOUGHTS --
THEY TEND TO BELIEVE THAT IF THE STATUS
QUO CANNOT BE MAINTAINED, THE NEXT MOST DESIRABLE
SITUATION WOULD BE ONE IN WHICH CHANGE IS CONFINED SOLELY
TO THE DIPLOMATIC ARENA, LEAVING THE PRESENT ECONOMIC,
SECURITY AND TRAVEL LINKAGES WITH THE US ESSENTIALLY UN-
AFFECTED.
12. I ALLUDED EARLIER TO THE ROC'S "WEB OF RELATIONSHIPS"
POLICY, SEEKING TO BIND ITSELF TO THE INTERNATIONAL COM-
MUNITY IN CONCRETE, PRACTICAL WAYS so AS TO PREVENT
TRUE ISOLATION. SOMETHING SIMILAR TAKES PLACE VIS-A-
VIS THE US, ALTHOUGH HERE THERE IS ALSO AN ACTIVE CAM-
EXETS
PAIGN AIMED AT CREATING CONSTITUENCIES WHICH WILL SPEAK
FOR THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING CLOSE CONNECTIONS WITH
TATWAN. ACCORDING TO SRF INFORMATION, FUNDS FOR THAT
PURPOSE WILL INCREASE GREATLY DURING THE CURRENT YEAR.
WE MUST ANTICIPATE A HIGHLY DEVELOPED LOBBYING CAMPAIGN
TO PERSUADE THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND PEOPLE THAT THE
PRESENT US-ROC RELATIONSHIP SHOULD NOT BE CHANGED.
13. CUES FOR US POLICY
A. LEVERAGE: WITH THE ROC SO HEAVILY DEPENDENT UPON THE
US IN SO MANY KEY AREASK OF NATIONAL EXISTENCE, IT SEEMS
REASONABLE TO SUPPOSE THE US HAS ENORMOUS LEVERAGE
HERE. WE SHOULD BE MINDFUL, HOWEVER, THAT THIS VERY DE-
PENDENCY -- WHICH IS KEENLY FELT -- PRODUCES A NATURAL
DESIRE TO PROVE VIRILITY. IT IS IMPORTANT, THEREFORE,
TO AVOID THE TEMPTATION TO THROW OUR WEIGHT AROUND ON ISSUES
SIGNIFICANT TO US. WE ARE A FACTOR THEY MUST AND DO TAKE
INTO ACCOUNT. WE NEED HAVE NO QUALMS ABOUT CALLING THE
GROC TO HEEL ON ISSUES OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO US --
FOR EXAMPLE, ATTEMPTS TO SABOTAGE US-PRC RAPPROCHEMENT
OR TO HEIGHTEN TENSIONS IN THE REGION. BUT WE SHOULD
AVOID INTERVENING WHEN THE MATTER IS ONE OF US CONVEN-
TENCE (E.G. THE EXACT TIMING OR PUBLIC HANDLING OF OUR
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
FORM DS-1652
THANTMENT
or
STATE
is
Department of State
STATES AMERICA MIKE
TELEGRAM
of
SECRET
PAGE 04 TAIPEI 05091 02 OF 03 1411027
MILITARY REDEPLOYMENTS) RATHER THAN US INTEREST. ABOVE
ALL, WE WANT OUR INFLUENCE TO BE STABILIZING, RATHER THAN
ONE-SHOT FASHION. AND WE WANT TO AVOID DEEPENING
ANXIETIES TO THE POINT WHERE GOVERNMENT OR PEOPLE, FEEL-
ING THEMSELVES IN EXTREMIS, BEGIN TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER
ABANDONING THE PRESENT POLICY OF ACCOMODATING TO OVERALL
us CHINA POLICY.
B. THE CONDITIONING PROCESS: I AGREE WITH PAST EMBASSY
ANALYSIS THAT THE OPERATION OF A "CONDITIONING PROCESS"
HAS MADE DIGESTIBLE, IF NO TERRIBLY PALATAVLE, PROGRESSIVE
CHANGE IN ROC RELATIONSHIPS WITH US AND THE REST OF THE
WORLD. I BELIVE WE CAN AND SHOULD USE THIS PROCESS
WITH MORE DELIBERATION AND PLANNING. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE
GRADUALLY ACCUSTOMED ELITES HERE TO THE IDEA THAT REDUC-
TIONS IN US MILITARY PROFILE DO NOT ALTER OUR ABILITY TO
PROTECT THE ROC IF THE NEED ARISES, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT
AND CERTAINLY WOULD REQUIRE MUCH TIME, THOUGHT AND CAREFUL
HANDLING, BUT IT SHOULD ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH
THE IDEA THAT SECURITY FROM ATTACK DOES NOT DEPEND
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED ITHOUT SCCREUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM DS-1652
/
or
STATE
EXEM
assing AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES or
WH
SECRET 9962
PARE 01 TAIPEI 05091 01 OF 03 1410342
21
ACTION 85-30
TNFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1031 w
063913
'74 AUG 14 PM 3 59
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
R 140800Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2643
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMCONSUL MONG KONG
USLO PEKING
CINCRAC
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
EXPIR
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 3 TAIPEI 5091
MR02-22 #1; st. ets 3/6/02
EXDIS
dal NARA, Date 4/16/02
SPECAT FOR MIL ADDRESSEES
F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TW
SUBJECT: AMBASSADORIS REPORT: CUES FOR us POLICY TOWARD THE ROC
CINCRAC FOR POLAD
1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: THE GROC HAS ABSORBED THE
SHOCKS OF 1971-72 AND HAS ACHIEVED A NEW EQUILIBRIUM MORE OR
LESS ADEQUATE TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. WE MAY NOT BE CONTEM-
PLATING A MAJOR FORWARD STEP TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF
NORMALIZATION WITH THE PRC. IF so WE SHOULD BEGIN TO
FORMULATE A PROGRAM, FOR EARLY IMPLEMENTATION, DESIGNED
TO LEAD THE GROC TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE CAN BE YET A
FURTHER VIABLE, ALBEIT LESS ATTRACTIVE, EQUILIBRIUM FOR
TATWAN ONE WHICH IT WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT AND FOR WHICH IT
MIGHT WELL BEGIN TO PERPARE ITS OWN PEOPLE. THE NEW
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTETHE-AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ORM DS-1652
7
of
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
,
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 TAIPEI 05091 01 OF 03 141034Z
EQUILIBRIUM WOULD INVOLVE LESS FORMAL POLITICAL AND SECURITY
RELATIONS. WHAT FOLLOWS BELOW PROVIDES THE BACKGROUND
FOR THESE THOUGHTS, AND HIGHLIGHTS THE IMPORTANCE OF
PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO TO THE PROCESS. END SUMMARY.
2. BASIC SITUATION OF THE GROC AND ITS CONCERNS - WITH 92
COUNTRIES HAVING RECOGNIZED PEKING, AND WITH SOME OF ITS
CLOSEST SEA NEIGHBORS CONTEMPLATING SIMILAR ACTION, THE
FIRST CONCERN OF THE GROC IS THAT IT CONCINUE TO SURVIVE AS
A POLITICAL ENTITY DISTINCT FROM THE MAINLAND, ALTHOUGH IN
PRINCIPLE IT CONTINUES TO CLAIM THE SOLE RIGHT TO SPEAK FOR
ALL OF CHINA, THE ESSENCE OF THE GROCIS POSITION COULD BE
RESTATED AS: "WE CANNOT PREVENT YOU FROM DEALING WITH THE
PRC AS A SOVEREIGN ENTITY, BUT YOU MUST TREAT US ASSEFFEC:
TIVELY SOVEREIGN OVER TAIWAN. = PRESS REFERENCES TO THE
ROC AS A COUNTRY OF 16 MILLION PEOPLE AND EVEN PRESS USAGE
OF THE PHRASE, "ONE CHINA, TWO GOVERNMENTS" ARE NOW COMMON-
PLACE, THOUGH THE LATTER IS USUALLY ATTRIBUTED TO OUTSIDE
OBSERVERS CAMERICAN SCHOLARS, OVERSEAS CHINESE IN HONG
KONG OR THE US, ETC.: " CERTAINLY THE GOVERNMENT BEHAVES
TN THIS WAY IN ESTABLISHING A TRADE AND INFORMATION
OFFICE IN CARACAS, FOR EXAMPLE, OR
CONCLUDING AN INFORMAL AGREEMENT ON VISA ISSUANCE
WITH THE MALAYSIANS.
3. CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO HEAD OFF PHILIPPINE RECOGNITION
OF PEKING, ARE ANOTHER EXAMPLE, AND ARE BASED NOT ON
JURIDICAL CLAIMS, BUT RATHER ON APPEALS TO NATIONAL AND
REGIONAL SECURITY, PAST FRIENDLY COOPERATION, AND THE
POSSIBILITY THAT THE LARGE OVERSEAS CHINESE COMMUNITY IN
Id
THE PHILIPPINES WOULD BECOME A PRC FIFTH COLUMN. THE
GROC WILL WORK HARD TO PREVENT PHILIPPINE RECOGNITION
OF PEKING, BUT IF IT COMES WILL ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT WITH
JUA
THE GOP AS INSTITUTIONALIZED AS POSSIBLE A SET OF PRAC-
TICAL ARRANGEMENTS TO HANDLE TRADE, MILITARY COOPERATION
off
AND INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGES, VISAS AND TOURISM, NEWS-
GATHERING AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES, AND OFFICIAL LIAISON
RETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.
4. SECURITY ASPECTS OF THIS POLITICAL SURVIVAL ARE OF PARA-
MOUNT IMPORTANCE. WHILE WE SEE TENSIONS IN THE TAIWAN
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
FORM
your
OF
STATE
ORLINA
is
Department of State
TELEGRAM
it
or
SECRET
PAGE 03 TAIPEI 05091 01 OF 03 141034Z
STRAIT AT THEIR LOWEST EBB WITHIN RECENT MEMORY, THE GROC
SEES PEKING AS UNPREDICTABLE, INHERENTLY AGGRESSIVE AND,
ABOVE ALL, AS MANY TIMES STRONGER THAN ITSELF. IN TRYING
TO FORESEE THE FUTURE OF PRC-US-ROC RELATIONS, FOR THE
GROC THE ULTIMATE QUESTION IS: "HOW WOULD THE PRC BEHAVE
IF NO LONGER INHIBITED BY A us GUARANTEE OF TAIWAN'S SECUR-
TY?" THUS PEOPLE HERE ARE HYPER-SENSITIVE TO THE
POSSIBLE TERMINATION OF OUR DIPLOMATIC
TIES LEST THIS ALSO BRING TO AN END, OR LEAST CAST
SERIOUS DOUBTS ON OUR SECURITY COMMITMENT, AND THEY REMAIN
HIGHLY SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF RELYING IN-
CREASINGLY ON POLITICAL AS OPPOSED TO MILITARY DETERRENTS.
5, BEHING THE PHRASE, "FEAR OF DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION",
HIDES A MORE PRACTICAL FEAR: THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COM-
MUNITY WILL CEASE TREATING THE ROC IN CONCRETE WAYS AS AN
ENTITY OF 16 MILLION PEOPLE HAVING A DEFINABLE AREA OF
JURISDICTION CTAIWAN AND ASSOCIATED ISLANDS, NOT THE MAIN-
LAND), AND THAT, ACCORDINGLY, THE ROC WILL LOSE ITS
CARACITY TO DEAL WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN WAYS WHICH EN-
HANCE ITS TRADE AND ECONOMIC LIFE IN GENERAL. NO ONE HERE
DOUBTS THAT THIS DENIAL OF ACROSS-THE BOARD ACCESS IS
THE PRCIS INTENTION.
6. TO COUNTER THIS THREAT, THE GOVERNMENT CONDUCTS AN
ACTIVE AND INCREASING PROGRAM OF INVITATIONAL AND OSTENSIBLY
PRIVATE "PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE DIPLOMACY", IN MANY WAYS SIMI-
LAR TO PRC EFFORTS BEFORE IT ACHIEVED GENERAL RECOG-
NITION, IN ORDER TO CONVINCE AN MANY OPINION-MOULDERS AS
POSSIBLE OF THE IMPORTANCE AND VIABILITY OF TAIWAN" AL-
THOUGH SPORTS AND CULTURAL EVENTS PLAY THEIR PART, THE
KEY DEVICE IN ATTRACTING INTEREST MOST COMMONLY
LIES IN THE ECONOMIC AREA: TRADE, INVESTMENT AND CARE-
PULLY SELECTED ASSISTANCE PROJECTS.
7, THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMICS: EMBASSY REPORTING HAS
RIGHTLY EMPHASIZED THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF TAIWAN'S
"ECONOMIC MIRACLE" IN MAINTAINING DOMESTIC CONFIDENCE
DESPITE THE POLITICAL TRAUMAS OF THE PAST FEW YEARS.
EMPHASIS SHOULD ALSO BE PLACED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF
TAYWAN'S ECONOMIC ATTRACTIVENESS AS A TRADING PARTNER AND
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
DS-1652
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AMERICA NAME
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PAGE 04 TAIPEI 05091 01 OF 03 141034Z
FOCUS OF INVESTMENT IN KEEPING THE ROC FROM BECOMING
TRULY ISOLATED FROM THE WORLD COMMUNITY. IT IS THIS
ECONOMIC ATTRACTIVENESS WHICH HAS ENABLED THE GROC TO
CONDUCT A SUCCESSFUL "WEB OF RELATIONSHIPS" POLICY,
WHETHERIT IS A MATTER OF A TRADE OFFICE IN FRANCE, A
WEST GERMAN SPONGE IRON PLANT IN SOUTHERN TAIWAN, OR
AN ROC SUGAR MILL IN SAUDI ARABIA, AND THUS TO MAINTAIN
WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH MOST OF THE WORLD.
THE PREMIER'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO THE "TEN CONSTRUC-
TION PROJECTS" SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT. IT IS,
AT BOTTOM, A POLITICAL DECISION: TO MODERNIZE TAIWAN'S
INFRASTRUCTURE so AS TO INSURE FUTURE COMPETITIVENESS
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THUS ENCHANCE SURVIVABILITY AS
A POLITICAL ENTITY. ACCORDINGLY, WITH so MUCH AT STAKE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE VITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION ' THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM DS.1652
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012695
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RECEIVER'S NAME
SECSTATE WASHDC
DESCRIPTION
Re Madame Chiang Ching-Kuo
CREATION DATE
08/15/1974
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400127
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (1)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/26/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
3
of
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET 6250
Secwcroft
u
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 05482 3008132
15
ACTION $5-30
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1031 w
106683
R 300720Z AUG 74
PM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2818
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO JCS WASHDC
CINCRAC
COMUSTDC TAIPEI
CHMAAG TAIPEI
327TH AD
s E e R E T TAIPEI 5482
EXEMS
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
'74 AUG 30 PM 7:54
asnoh
TAGS: MARR, PFOR, TW
SUBJI FUTURE USE OF TAINAN AIR BASE
CINCRAC ALSO FOR POLAD
1. SUMMARY: I BELIEVE USAF PROPOSAL TO MAINTAIN
A GROUP OF 300 AT TAINAN AIR BASE FOR WAR RESERVE
MATERIEL STORAGE IS UNNECESSARY, WASTEFUL
AT A TIME WHEN PRESIDENT HAS CALLED FOR MAXIMUM
BUDGETARY SAVINGS, AND POLITICALLY MOST
"NADVISABLE. END SUMMARY.
2. I UNDERSTAND USAF HAS PROPOSED MAINTAINING
A GROUP OF 300 AT TAINAN AIR BASE FOR WAR RESERVE
MATERIEL STORAGE PURPOSES. IN THIS CONNECTION, I
WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT A STUDY CONDUCTED BY
FORD
MLITARY OFFICERS CONCERNED HAS DETERMINED
&
IT IS COMPLETELY FEASIBLE AND HIGHLY COST
EFFECTIVE TO CONTRACT WITH GROC FOR SECURITY AND
GERALD
LIBRARY
MAINTENANCE OF THIS WAR RESERVE MATERIEL, WITH ONLY
A FEW-- PERHAPS LESS THAN 20 -- US PERSONNEL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GG 4/23/01
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PAGE k2 TAIPEI 05482 3008132
OPERATING AS QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTORS. ESSENTIALLY,
THIS IS NOW THE SITUATION AT CHIAYI, EXCEPT THAT THE
QUALITY CONTROL PEOPLE ARE RESIDENT AT CCK AIRBASE
AND COMMUTE.
3. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, TO PLAN FOR 40-50
PEOPLE FOR PERIMETER SECURITY, ANOTHER 40-50 FOR
ROUTINE MAINTENANCE, AND 200 OR so TO PROVIDE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT, RUN SCHOOLS AND OPERATE
PXIS, CAN BE DESCRIBED ONLY AS UNNECESSARY AND WASTEFUL.
CERTAINLY, IT SEEMS IN CONTRADICTION TO THE PRESIDENTIS
INSTRUCTIONS TO SAVE EVERY POSSIBLE BUDGETARY DOLLAR.
4. ENTIRELY ASIDE FROM THESE CONSIDERATIONS OF COST
FFFECTIVENESS, I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE POLITICAL
DE
YNADVISABILITY OF THE USAF PROPOSAL, TO ENVISAGE A
PERMANENT OR EVEN SEMI-PERMANENT US MILITARY INSTALLATION
ON TAIWAN IS DIRECTLY COUNTER TO THE SHANGHI
COMMUNIQUE. HAVING MANAGED TO SECURE PREMIER
CHIANG CHING-KUO'S UNDERSTANDING AND ACQUIESCENCE IN
TAINAN APB GOING INTO CARETAKER STATUS--EXPLAINED AS:
MEANING A HANDFUL OF PEOPLE- BY THE END OF THIS CALENDAR
YEAR, I CONSIDER IT MOST INADVISABLE TO SEE THAT NUMBER
VASTLY INFLATED AND THEN AT SOME FUTURE TIME, BECAUSE
OF OUR OBJECTIVES AS STATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE, TO HAVE
TO RE-OPEN A HEALED WOUND AND EXPLAIN A NEW DECISION
TO REMOVE FORCES FROM TAINAN. IT SEEMS TO ME MOST
IMPORTANT THAT WE CONTINUE TO GIVE THE
PREMIER EVERY EVIDENCE THAT OUR ACTIONS ARE TAKEN IN
A FULLY PLANNED, FULLY COORDINATED AND HIGHLY
DEPENDABLE MANNER. DECISIONS TAKEN AND THEN HASTILY
UNTAKEN OR REVISED ARE TO BE AVOIDED.
UNGER
&
FORD
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LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT, SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012696
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RECEIVER'S NAME
SECSTATE WASHDC
DESCRIPTION
Re Republic of China
CREATION DATE
09/09/1974
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400127
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (1)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/26/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
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EXEMPTED 7/02
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Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
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....
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TYPE OF MATERIAL
Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RECEIVER'S NAME
SECSTATE WASHDC
DESCRIPTION
Re People's Republic of China and
Republic of China
CREATION DATE
09/14/1974
VOLUME
3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400127
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (1)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/26/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
EXEMPTED 7/02
4/28/10
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012699
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RECEIVER'S NAME
SECSTATE WASHDC
DESCRIPTION
Re Republic of China
CREATION DATE
09/20/1974
VOLUME
3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400127
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (1)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/26/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
sanirized 4/16/02
of
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Department of State
TELEGRAM
EX@-M EXPIS
UNITED STATES OF
WH
SECRET 2751
PAGE 01 TAIREI 05879 200847Z
12
ACTION SS=30
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 1031 W
086047
R 2007122 SEP 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO /SECSTATE WASHDC 2995
SECDEF WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
INFO CNO WASHDC
COMUSTDC TAIPEI
CHMAAG TAIREI
CINCPAC
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
SECRET TAIPEI 5879
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (d)
EXDIS
MR02-22, #4; et ltr. 3/6/02
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
By doe NARA, Date, 4/16/02
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MPOL, MARR, MASS, TW
SUBJI RDC ATTEMPT TO ACQUIRE EC-121
1. SUMMARY. SENIOR ROC MILITARY HAVE COMPLAINED TO
MISSION OFFICERS THAT STATE DEPT IS BLOCKING ACQUISITION
OF TWO EC-121 AIRCRAFT AND HAVE ASKED FOR COUNTRY TEAM
ASSISTANCE. WE HAVE INFORMED THEM EC-121 PROPOSAL DOES
NOT HAVE COUNTRY TEAM APPROVAL AND IS NOT ADVOCATED
BY DOD OR CNO. GROC WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR AIRBORNE
CAPABILITY. FOR THIS REASON, MISSION WISHES
URGE AGAIN THAT IT BE INFORMED AS EARLY AS
POSSIBLE ON ALL PROPOSALS WHICH SURFACE IN WASHINGTON FOR MAJOR
ROC EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS SYSTEM ACQUISITIONS,
INCLUDING ITEMS AS SENSITIVE AND POTENTIALLY PROVOCATIVE TO
PRC
END SUMMARY.
2. GENERAL LAI, CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, AND OTHER
SENIOR ROC MILITARY HAVE COMPLAINED TO SENIOR MISSION
OFFICERS THAT STATE DEPT IS BLOCKING ROC ACQUISITION
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
of
STATE
Department of State
of ITATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
EX@-& EXCIS
PAGE 02 TAIPEI 05879 200847Z
OF EC-121 AIRCRAFT DESPITE CNO AND DOD APPROVAL OF
THAT ACQUISITION. THESE OFFICERS HAVE VOICED A STRONG
DESIRE FOR ROC AIRBORNE SIGINT CARABILITY AND FOR
IMPROVED ELECTRONIC WARFARE KNOWLEDGE AND SELF-
SUPFICIENCY. THEY ARE AWARE OF EW DEVELOPMENTS AND
TACTICS IN MID-EAST OCTOBER WAR CA GROUP OF ISRAELI
DEFENSE OFFICIALS ARE CURRENTLY IN TAIPEI AND EW MATTERS
PROBABLY HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED), ALTHOUGH ROC EW
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE IS VERY LIMITED, ROC OFFICERS TEND
TO WANT ANY AND ALL OPTIONS,
3, AFTER DISCUSSION IN COUNTRY TEAM MILITARY SECURITY
COMMITTEE, FOLLOWING COORDINATED POSITION WAS GIVEN
GENERAL LAI BY CHIEF MAAGI
A : WE WILL CONTINUE WITH POSITIVE ASSISTANCE
AND ADVICE THROUGH EW ANNEX OF DATA EXCHANGE AGREEMENT
AND OTHER APPROVED EW PROJECTS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO
PROVIDE EW ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION.
B6 SOME ROC AIRBORNE EW INTERESTS ARE NOT
VALID MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND OTHERS CAN BE SATISFIED
BY OTHER MEANS. DEDICATED AIRBORNE ASSETS ARE VERY
COSTLY, OFTEN PROVOCATIVE, AND FREQUENTLY NOT EFFECTIVE.
C. COST ALONE OF INTRODUCENG AND MAINTAINING
EC-121 SYSTEM IS PROHIBITIVE, COUNTRY TEAM UNANIMOUSLY
AGREE IN NOT SUPPORTING EC-121 ACQUISITION. EC-121
ACQUISITION IS NOT ADVOCATED BY DOD OR CND AS ALLEGED
BY ROC MILITARY OFFICIALS.
4. GENERAL LAI AGREED EC-121 WOULD BE VERY EXPENSIVE
AND PROBABLY NOT COST EFFECTIVE, BUT FELT IT WOULD BE
EDUCATIONAL TOOL FOR CHUNG SHAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY AND MIGHT OFFER SOME AIRBORNE OPTIONS IN
CASE OF EMERGENCY. LAI PERSISTS IN WANTING AIRBORNE EW
CARABILITY, ARGUING HIS STAFF BELIEVE THERE ARE CERTAIN
EW TASKS WHICH CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVELY ACCOMPLISHED
AIRBORNE, HE CONCLUDED WITH PLEA THAT IF NOT EC-121, WE
HELP ROC DEVELOP CAPABILITY USING C-54, 0-119 OR 0-123,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
BEGRET
&
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES /
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
EXCE EXPIS EXCES
RAGE 03 TAIPEI 05879 200847Z
5.
HAD ESSENTIALLY SIMILAR CONVERSATIONS WITH
ADMIRAL WU, ROCN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF, AND ADMIRAL SOONG,
NAVY CINC.
6, COMUSTDC STATES ROC ACQUISITION OF TWO EC-121 AIRCRAFT
WOULD NOT ADD SIGNIFICANT CARABILITY TO U8/ROC DEFENSE
POSTURE.
" IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT ROC OFFICIALS WHO POSHED
EC-121 PROPOSAL WILL NOT BE DETERRED BY THIS ONE FAILURE
AND WE ANTICIPATE THEY WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR OPPOR-
TUNITIES TO BROADEN THEIR AIRBORNE
CARABILITY,
RERHAPS IN WAYS WHICH WOULD BE CONTRARY TO us INTERESTS.
FOR THIS REASON, MISSION AGAIN EMPHASIZES GENERAL RULE
THAT ROC MILITARY SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROPOSALS WHICH
SURFACE IN WASHINGTON--PARTICULARLY ITEMS AS SENSITIVE AND
POTENTIALLY PROVOCATIVE TO PRC AS
PROMPTLY REFERRED TO COUNTRY TEAM MISSION SECURITY
COMMITTEE FOR REVIEW.
UNGER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012701
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RECEIVER'S NAME
SECSTATE WASHDC
DESCRIPTION
Re Republic of China
CREATION DATE
12/31/1974
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400127
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (1)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/26/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
EXEMPTED 7/02
WH 8
of
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES of
SECRET 8052
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 01535 2712582
53
ACTION 53-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
003759
0 R 2700187 MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4586
AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDITE
INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
E e R E E-9 TAIPEI 1535
EXDIS
EO 11652 GDS
TAGS MASS vs TW
SUBJECT: LST LOAN
REF: A. STATE 069147 B. SAIGON 3595
:- CHIEF MAAG GENERAL NASH AND POL COUNSELOR CALLED
ON GENERAL LAi MING-TANG TANG TOGETHER WITH ADMIRAL
YU PO-SHENG LATE TODAY AND MADE APPROACH BASED ON
PARA (2) REFTEL B. GENERAL LAI, WHO HAD ALREADY
RECEIVED SIMILAR REQUEST FROM GVN RELAYED BY GROC
EMBASSY SAIGON, ASKED HOW MANY SHIPS WERE NEEDED.
NASH INDICATED THAT NEED WAS VERY GREAT, AND THAT UP
TO TWELVE COULD BE USED.
20 GENERAL LAI SAID THAT HE COULD MAKE TWO LST'S
WITH ROC CREWS AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY, AND THAT
ONCE THESE WERE ON THE SCENE ROC COULD CONSIDER
THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING ADDITIONAL SHIPS. HE
INDICATED THAT HE ALREADY HAD THE PREMIER'S APPROVAL
AND THAT TWO SHIPS WILL BE READY TO SAIL
"TOMORROW"AS SOON AS THE GROC HAS RECEIVED DETAILS
BEING REQUESTED VIA ITS EMBASSY IN SAIGON ABOUT WHERE
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
AND TO WHOM SHIPS SHOULD REPORT. GEN LAI ASSUMES
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
GG 4/23/01
24
of
STATE
of AMERICA UNITED
Department of State
EXPIN EXSTS
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 TAIPEI 01535 2712582
THAT BUNKERING, PROVISIONING, ETC. WILL BE PROVIDED
BY GVN. ALTHOUGH HE ADDED THAT TWO LST'S WOULD LEAVE
WITH PROVISIONS FOR ONE MONTH. THERE WAS NO RPT NO
MENTION OF FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS.
3. GENERAL LAI SAID THAT THE TWO SHIPS WOULD SAIL
WITHOUT ESCORT AND WOULD REQUIRE ABOUT SIX DAYSI
SAILING TIME. CAREFUL PRECATIONS WOULD BE TAKEN
TO KEEP SHIP'S DEPARTURE AND COURSE SECRET. THE
SHIPSI COURSE WOULD CARRY THEM WELL SOUTH OF THE
PARACELS.
4. AS BOTH GENERAL LAI AND ADMIRAL YU SHOWED EVERY
INDICATION THAT THE GROC WISHES TO BE BOTH RESPONSIVE
AND PROMPT IN MEETING THE GVNIS URGENT REQUEST FOR
ASSISTANCE, SUGGEST THAT EMBASSY SAIGON FOLLOW THROUGH
AND MAKE SURE THAT THE GROC EMBASSY IS GETTING THE
DESIRED INFORMATION ASAP FROM THE GVN.
5. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF LOANED SHIPS. WE ASSUME DEPT
WILL NOT NEED SHIP IDENTIFICATION FOR PRIOR NOTICE TO CONGRESS
CREF A PARA 7).
6. FYI. DOES EMBASSY SAIGON BELIEVE THAT ROCAF C-119'S, (WITH ROC AIR
CREWS) CARRYING APPROXIMATELY FIFTY PERSONS PER TRIP
COULD BE USEFUL AT THIS STAGE?
7. SUGGEST DEPT CONSIDER REPEATING THIS AND OTHER PERTINENT CABLES
TO SEDEF, JCS AND CINCPAC.
UNGER
R.
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECRET.
29
9
OF REATE
*
Department of State
STATE AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET 3944
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 01577 2910297
12
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
034275
o 2910132 MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4606
PHNOM PENH AMEMBASSY IMMEDIATE 279
SECRE T TAIPEI 1577
EXDIS
EO 11652 GDS
TAGS PFOR OVIP XB
SUBJECT: LON NOL VISIT TO TAIWAN
PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO PASSED TO ME TODAY, MARCH 29, A
MESSAGE THAT GROC REPRESENTATIVE IN PHNOM PENH,
AMBASSADOR KUNG LIN CHEN, WAS REQUESTED BY GKR PRIME MINISTER
LONG BORET TO ASK GROC TO RECEIVE VISIT FROM MARSHAL LON NOL IN
TAIPEI FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT.
ACCORDING TO PREMIER, GROC HAS ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPAL. THERE
WAS NO INDICATION WHERE VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE OR FOR HOW LONG
IT WOULD LAST.
UNGER
EXPIS
FORD
& LIBRARY GERALD
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GG 4/23/01
10
/
STATE
Department of State
UNITED of )
TELEGRAM
I
SECRET 4522
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 01581 3103352
EXEM EXSIS EXETS EXPIS
61
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 w
040942
0 310316Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4609
INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH IMMEDIATE
S FCRE F T TAIPEI 1581
EXDIS
F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR OVIP XB
SUBJECT: LON NOL VISIT TO TAIWAN
REF: TAIPEIH 1577
IN PENULTIMATE LINE REFTEL, CHANGE "WHERE"TO READ "WHEN"
REPEAT "WHEN".
UNGER
FORD LIBRARY & OERALD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT EROTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
DS-1652
9.66
GG 4/23/01
to & STATE
GRAND
Department of State
TELEGRA!
STATES
or
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
1164
,
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 91864 1009372
12
ACTION EA-00
TNFO OCT-01 83-14 180-00 INR-05 PRS-01 SP-02 CPR-01 PA-01
FB-03 1034 W
070000
R 1009137 APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4768
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TAIPEI 1864
STADIS
LIMDIS
F.O 11652 NA
TAGS PGOV, PFOR TW us
SUBJECT: LOCAL DISSATISFACTION WITH U.S. RESPONSE TO
PRESIDENT CHIANG'S DEATH
REFI TAIPEI 1840
" DURING THE COURSE OF APRIL 10 THE EMBASSY CONTINUED TO
RECEIVE CUMPLAINTS FROM AMERICANS AND BEGAN TO RECEIVE
DIRECT COMPLAINTS FROM INDIVIDUAL CHINESE ABOUT THE
SELECTION OF SECRETARY BUTZ TO REPRESENT THE U.S. AT
PRESIDENT CHIANG'S FUNERAL. THE MAIN THEME OF THE PROTESTS
WAS THAT WHATEVER THE POLITICAL SITUATION, THE U.S. SHOULD
REMEMBER THAT PRESIDENT CHIANG HAD LED AN IMPORTANT ALLY
of THE U.S. DURING WORLD WAR II. THEREFORE, THE U.S.
SHOULD SEND A HIGHER RANKING OFFICIAL TO SHOW PROPER
RESPECT FOR THIS GREAT WORLD LEADER.
2. AMERICANS WHO PROTESTED FREQUENTLY CHARACTERIZED THE
SELECTION OF BUTZ AS "HUMILIATING". THE PRESIDENT OF A
VERY LARGE AND LONG ESTABLISHED AMERICAN FIRM IN
TATWAN DESCRIBED THE APPOINT AS " A (CENSORED) SHAME,
FORD
AN INSULT, AND A VISGRACE."
GERALD LIBRARY
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
K or state
Department of State
& STATUS of
TELEGRAI
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
PAGE 02 TAIPEI 01864 1009372
3, ONE AMERICAN DESCRIBED CHINESE REACTION TO BUTZIB
SELECTION AS "STUNNED". ANOTHER, WHO HAS CLOSE CONTACTS
WITH A BROAD SEGMENT OF THE AMERICAN AND CHINESE BUSINESS
COMMUNITIES, SAID THE OVERWHELMING FEELING OF BOTH
COMMUNITIES WAS THAT THE SELECTION OF BUTL WAS "INSULTING"
1. CHINESE WHO INDIVIDUALLY CALLED THE EMBASSY EXPRESSED
THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SELECTION ANU HOPE THAT A
OFFICIAL
OF GREATER PRESTIGE COULD BE CHOSEN TO HEAD THE U.S.
DELEGATION. ONE KMT SOURCE TOLD AN EMBOFF THAT ALMOST
EVERYONE HE HAD SPOKEN TO IN THE KMT CONSIDERED THE
APPOINTMENT TO BE A SLAP IN THE FACE AND THAT THERE WOULD
RE UPEN CRITICISM OF THE APPOINTMENT IN THE PRESS AFTER
THF FUNERAL OCCURS.
5. IN SEVERAL INSTANCES, BOTH AMERICANS AND CHINESE CLAIMED
TO BE REPRESENTING THE VIEWS OF A GROUP RATHER THAN SPEAKING
AS INDIVIDUALS. SOME OF THOSE WHO REGISTERED COMPLAINTS
ASKED THAT THE EMBASBY RELAY THEIR VIEWS TO WASHINGTON.
OTHERS STATED THAT THEY PLANNED TO BEND TELEGRAMS TO
THP WHITE HOUSE,
UNGER
FORD
A.
GERALD
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
12
OF STATE
AMERICA UNITED
Department of State
TELEGRAM
EXETS EXPER
STATES OF
SECRET 5924
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02015 161550Z
44
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 1026 W
038403
0 R 1613312 APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4846
INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
SECRET TAIPEI 2015
EXDIS
E.O. 11652% XGDS-1
8/3/00
TAGS: OVIP (ROCKEFELLER, NELSON A.)
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KIM CHONG-PIL
1. VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER MET FOR APPROXIMATELY
FORTYFIVE MINUTES MORNING APRIL 16 WITH RIME
MINISTER KIM CHONG-PIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST. DEPTASSTSEC
ZURHELLEN AND VICE PRESIDENT'S ASSISTANT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS CAPT. HOWE WWERE
PRESENT AND MR. HAN SANG-KOOK ACTED AS INTERPRETER
FOR PRIME MINISTER.
DECLASSIFIED
12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE E.O. DEPT. GUIDELINES state visit
BY 4/23/01
NARA, DATE
2. PM KIM SAID THAT PRESIDENT PARK HAD ASKED
HIM TO CONVEY WARM PERSONAL REGARDS TO PRESIDENT
FORD. VICE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT HE WAS
GRATEFUL FOR THE MESSAGE AND HE KNEW
PRESIDENT FORD WOULD BE VERY PLEASED. VICE
PRESIDENT STATED THAT THE US HAS A FIRM
COMMITMENT TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND EXPECTS
TO LIVE UP TO IT. THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA
AND VIETNAM WAS SPECIAL AND DID NOT IMPLY
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
ANYTHING TOWARDS SOUTH KOREA AND THE REST OF THI
Retain Class'n
Change to
NORTHEAST ASIA AREA. WE HAVE EVERY INTENT TO
Declassify in part and excise as shown
KEEP AN AMERICAN PRESENCE AND AMERICAN FORCES
EO 12958, 25X( )( )( )
IN KOREA. WE HAVE
Declassify
After
FORD
With concurrence
R.
PS by IL
(not)(obtained
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION VIBRARD OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Date 8/3/00
SECRET
RALD
of
STATE
Department of State
OF / AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 TAIPEI 02015 161550Z
A STRONG AND CLEAR DETERMINATION TOWARDS THE
ROK AND WE APPRECIATE THE ROLE OF THE ROK IN
OUR OWN SECURITY.
3. THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT THERE IS A
EXATS
FREE PRESS IN THE US, HOWEVER, WHICH CRITICIZED
SOME OF THE METHODS USED IN THE ROK, AND THIS
CRITICISM WAS PICKED UP IN THE CONGRESS. ME
UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR MAINTAINING INTERNAL
DECEMBERIED
FO 15829 BEC 32
SECURITY AND HAD NO INTENTION OF TRYING TO
RIVIE DELL UNIDEFINED
3TAO AMM
TELL THE ROK HOW TO HANDLE ITS AFFAIRS, BUT
THIS CRITICISM DID EXIST.
4. PM KIM EXPRESSED HIS SINCEREST APPRECIATION
FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S HAVING RECONFIRMED
THE US DETERMINATION WHICH HE HAD WANTED TO
HEAR. HE FELT REASSURED. HE SAID THE US HAS
AN ABLE AMBASSADOR IN KOREA WHO COMMANDS
HIGH RESPECT. THE ROK WAS DOING ITS BEST
TO MAINTAIN UNFALTERING FRIENDSHIP AND THE
CLOSEST POSSIBLE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US
AND KOREA IN SEOUL. HE EXPLAINED HOW THE
ROK GOVERNMENT FEELS THAT NORTH KOREA IS
UTILIZING STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, ANTI-
GOVERNMENT MEETINS, AND OTHER MEANS OF
CAUSING DIFFICULTY WITHIN THE ROK. THE
SITUATION, HOWEVER, WAS NOT AS SERIOUS
AS EPOPLE ABROAD THOUGHT. SOMETIMES
PRESIDENT PARK TOOK STONG MEASURES BUT IT
SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE COMMUNISTS
WERE USING AGAINST SOUTH KOREA HTE SAME
MEHTODS BY WHICH THEY HAD DESTROYED THE
NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT IN CHINA AND DRIVEN
CHIANG KAI-SHEK FROM THE MAINLAND. THE
COMMUNISTS TODAY IN KOREA ARE PARTICULARLY
WORKING THROUGH RELIGIOUS GROUPS, ESPECIALLY
THOSE CONCERNED WITH URBAN EVANGELIZATION.
THE ROK HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED CLERGYMEN AS
ANTICOMMUNIST BUT THESE DAYS THIS WAS NOT
FORD
NECESSARILY THE CASE. THE EPOPLE ARE BEING
AGITATED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT BY SLOGANS
a LIBRARY GERALD
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
or STATE
*
EXPIS
Department of State
AMERICA ANITA MM
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 TAIPEI 02015 161550Z
AND CLAIMS THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS ANTI-
DEMOCRACY AND SUPPRESSES FREEDOM. THIS IS
MEANT TO CONFUSE THE PEOPLE AND INCAPACITATE
THE GOVERNMENT.
5. PM KIM SAID IN CONCLUSION HE WANTED TO
ASSURE THE US THAT KOREA WAS A STONG ALLY.
THE VICE PRESIDENT REPSONDED THAT WE WANT
IT TO STAY THAT WAY. HE WAS HAPPY TO HAVE
HAD THIS CHANCE TO MEET THE PM, EVEN THOUGH
UNDER SAD CIRCUMSTANCES, AND TO EXPRESS THE
DETERMINATION OF THE US. PM KIM SAID THAT
KOREA WOULD TAKE CASE OF ITSELF AND DO
ITS BEST TO MAINTAIN STABILITY AND NOT BECOME
A BURDEN ON THE US. HE HOPED THAT THE VICE
PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT FORD WOULD LOOK UPON
KOREA IN THIS WAY AND COUNT ON IT TO RESPOND
IF THE IME CASE WHEN WE HAD TO WORK TOGETHER.
UNGER
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
13
OF
STATE
*
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONFIDENTIAL 5042
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02013 161000Z
15
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-09 1026 W
033310
0 160949Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 4843
C I D N T 1 TAIPEI 2013
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: JA, OVIP (EMPEROR HIROHITO)
SUBJ: EMPEROR'S VISIT TO THE U.S.
1. PLEASE INFORM FONOFF OFFICE OF PROTOCOL THAT ROGER WALLACE
S/CPR OFFICER TRAVELING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY, WOULD
BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES DURING ONE HOUR
STOPOVER AT HANEDA ON APRIL 17. PLEASE CONFIRM IF THIS IS
CONVENIENT WITH FONOFF OFFICE OF PROTOCOL.
2. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY, TRAVELLING ABOARD AIR FORCE II
VC137 TAIL NO. 86970 WILL ARRIVE AS REQUESTED AT 1600 HRS
APRIL 17.
UNGER
EXPIR
FORD LIBRARY & OERALD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GG 4/23/01
OF STATE
of STATES UNITED AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET 2629
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02256 260535Z
10
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
056875
0 260455Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4970
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE
S E CR E 7 TAIPEI 2256
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR, VS, TW
SUBJECT: FORMER RVN PRESIDENT THIEU ARRIVES IN TAIPEI
1. ON APRIL 26 AT APPROXIMATELY 0420 LOCAL TIME FORMER
RVN PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU, FORMER PRIME MINISTER
TRAN THIEN KHIEM, AND TEN OTHERS ARRIVED BY US AIR FORCE
C-118 AT SUNG SHAN MILITARY AIRPORT, TAIPEI. THEY WERE
MET BY A MOFA DELEGATION HEADED BY ROC FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEN CHANG-HUAN, AMBASSADOR UNGER, AND MEMBERS OF THE
RVN EMBASSY INCLUDING THE WIFE AND SON OF AMBASSADOR
NGUYEN VAN KIEU, WHO REPORTEDLY WILL RETURN FROM SAIGON
LATER TODAY.
2. OTHERS IN THE PARTY ARRIVING FROM SAIGON WERE
COLONEL VO VAN CAM, COLONEL NHAN VAN THIET,
COLONEL TRAN THANH DIEN, COLONEL NGUYEN VAN DUC,
LT. COLONEL TON THAT AI-CHIEU, MAJOR HO VUONG MINH,
LT COLONEL DANG VAN CHAU, LT. COLONEL DINH SON THONG,
LT. COLONEL NGUYEN TAN THAN, AND DANG VU.
3. AIRCREW GAVE PAROLE DOCUMENTS FOR ALL OF THE ABOVE
TO AMBASSADOR UNGER, AND THE DOCUMENTS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY
HANDED OVER TO RVN EMBASSY THIRD SECRETARY NGUYEN NGOC HO
FORD
ON APRIL 26,
A. FOR SAIGON AND DEPT: IN EXAMINING THE PAROLE
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GG4/23/01
FORM
DS-1652
0.00
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
of I UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 TAIPEI 02256 260535Z
DUCUMENTS WE NOTED THAT THE DOCUMENT ORIGINALLY PREPARED
FOR A TRAN VAN PHAN HAD HIS NAME INKED OUT AND HAD SUB-
STITUTED THE NAME OF LT. COLONEL NGUYEN LIN THAN. WE
ALSO NOTED THAT SIX PEOPLE -- COL. VO VAN CAM,
COL. NHAN VAN THIET, COL. TRAN THANH DIEN, COL. NGUYEN
VAN DUC, LT. COL. TON THAT AI-CHIEU, AND MAJOR HO VUONG MINH
ARE INCLUDE JOINTLY ON ONE DOCUMENT IN THREE IDENTICAL
ORIGINALS; IN THIS CASE ALSO NAMES ARE HANDWRITTEN.
5. WE OF COURSE ARE NOT FULLY AWARE OF THE EMERGENCY
PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED FOR ISSUING PAROLE DOCUMENTS IN
SAIGON, BUT WISHED TO BRING THESE APPARENT DISCREPANCIES
TO YOUR NOTICE IN CASE THEY MIGHT RESULT IN DIFFICULTIES
IN OBTAINING ENTRY TO THE US.
6. WE DO NOT KNOW WHEN ANY MEMBERS OF THE PARTY PLAN
TO LEAVE TAIPEI FOR THE US BUT WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED, AS
INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE. UNGER
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
DS-1652
16
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
WH
EXETS
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET 2290
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02330 301020Z
21
ACTION SS=25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1020 W
105595
P 300948Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5010
S E e R T TAIPEI 2330
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SREF, vs. Tw
SUBJECT: PAROLE DOCUMENTS FOR MEMBERS OF EX-PRESIDENT THIEU'S
ENTOURAGE
REF: A. SAIGON 5672
B. STATE 97656
C. TAIPEI 2256
1. ON APRIL 30 RVN EMBASSY FIRST SECRETARY DANG DUC HIEN
CALLED AT HIS REQUEST ON EMBOFFS TO DISCUSS THE PAROLE DO-
CUMENTS HELD BY SIX OF THE GROUP WHO ARRIVED IN TAIPEI ON
APRIL 26 WITH FORMER RVN PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU. AS NOTED
TN PARA 4 REF c, SIX OF THE GROUP POSSESS A JOINT PAROLE DO-
CUMENT IN THREE IDENTICAL ORIGINALS.
2. HIEN SAID THAT SINCE THE SIX WOULD BE TRAVELING SEPARATELY
TO THE us AT AN UNSPECIFIED TIME IN THE FUTURE, THEY WOULD
REQUIRE SEPARATE ORIGINAL DUCUMENTS. ACCORDINGLY, HE REQUESTED
THAT EMBASSY TAIPEI REISSUE SIX SEPARATE PAROLE DOCUMENTS.
3. HIEN ADDED THAT AT LEAST ONE AND POSSIBLY MORE OF THE
GROUP HAD WIVES AND CHILDREN (NOT INCLUDED IN THE PAROLE
DOCUMENTS) WHO HAD COME EARLIER TO TAIPEI CAND ARE STILL
IN TAIPEI) AND WHO WOULD BE TRAVELING WITH THEIR PRINCIPALS.
4. EMBOFFS EXPLAINED TO HIEN THAT AT PRESENT EMBASSY TAIPEI
HAD NO AUTHORIZATION FROM THE DEPARTMENT TO AMEND ANY
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GG 4/23/01
DRM
DS-1652
66
OF
STATE
EXEMS
UNITED
Department of State
/
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 TAIREI 02330 3010202
PREVIOUSLY ISSUED PAROLE PAPERS AND THAT GUIDANCE FROM THE
DEPARTMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED HIFI LEFT THE THREE ORIGINAL
PAROLE PAPERS IN QUESTION WITH us PENDING RECEIPT OF
GUIDANCE. HE ALSO UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE US WITH INFORMA-
TION ON PRINCIAPLS' WIVES AND CHILDREN NOW IN TAIPEI.
5. REQUEST DEPARTMENT PROVIDE GUIDANCE ASAP ON HOW WE
SHOULD RESPOND TO HIEN'S APPROACH. IN THE EVENT THE DEPART-
MENT AUTHORIZES US TO RE-ISSUE PAROLE DOCUMENTS, WE WOULD
NEED DETAILED GUIDANCE ON THE APPROPRIATE FORMAT AND ANY
SUBSTANTIATING DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED. SPECIFICALLY,
SHOULD THE FORMAT BE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE PRESENT
PAROLE DOCUMENTS (SEE BELOW), MUST DEPENDENTS NAMES BE
INCLUDED, AND WHAT IS THE LENGTH OF TIME FOR WHICH THE
DOCUMENT IS VALID? (WE NOTE THAT THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTLY
HELD BY THOSE MENTIONED IN REF C DO NOT REPEAT NOT HAVE
ANY DATE UPON WHICH THE DOCUMENTS WOULD BECOME INVALID.)
6. FYI: THE DOCUMENTS NOW HELD BY ALL THOSE NAMED IN
REF C ARE APPARENTLY XEROXED ON EMBASSY LETTERHEAD, WITH
RAISED SEAL AND STAMPED CONSULAR OFFICER SIGNATURE, AND IS
ADDRESSED "TO THE EXAMINING IMMIGRATION OFFICER AT THE
PORT OF ENTRY". FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT:
A. "THE BELOW LISTED ALIENS HAVE BEEN GRANTED PAROLE
STATUS BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ENTRY INTO THE UNITED
STATES WITHOUT IMMIGRANT VISA.
NAME
RELATIONSHIP
B. "ALL ALIENS LISTED ABOVE WERE VERIFIED AS BELONGING
TO AUTHORIZED PAROLE CATEGORIES SPECIFIED IN STATE DEPART-
MENT TELEGRAM 91723 OF APRIL 22, 1975.
c. "EACH ALIEN HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BRING WITH HIM ALL
OF THE CIVIL DOCUMENTS IN HIS POSSESSION AND HAS BEEN
GIVEN A COPY OF THIS LETTER TO PRESENT TO THE CAPTAIN
OF THE AIRCRAFT TRANSPORTING HIM AND HIS FAMILY.
D. "THE NAMES OF THE ALIENS LISTED ABOVE ARE BEING CABLED
R.
FORD
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALI-
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
RM
DS-1652
66
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
OF / AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 TAIPEI 02330 301020Z
ZATION SERVICE CENTRAL OFFICE IN WASHINGTON.
E. "IMPORTANT NOTICE: THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT VALID FOR
ADMISSION INTO THE UNITED STATES AFTER
AMERICAN VICE CONSUL"
7. IN THE EVENT ANY OF THOSE WHO HOLD THE DOCUMENT DESCRIBED
ABOVE PLAN TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S., CAN THE DOCUMENT BE
CONISDERED VALID FOR ENTRY INTO THE US?
UNGER
EXEMS
GERALO FE FORD LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE
Department of State
of STATE UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 2629
S
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02256 260535Z
10
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-09 /026 W
056875
0 260455Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4970
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE
S ECRE T TAIPEI 2256
EXDIS
S
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR, vs, TW
SUBJECT: FORMER RVN PRESIDENT THIEU ARRIVES IN TAIPEI
1. ON APRIL 26 AT APPROXIMATELY 0420 LOCAL TIME FORMER
RVN PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU, FORMER PRIME MINISTER
TRAN THIEN KHIEM, AND TEN OTHERS ARRIVED BY US AIR FORCE
C-118 AT SUNG SHAN MILITARY AIRPORT, TAIPEI. THEY WERE
MET BY A MOFA DELEGATION HEADED BY ROC FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEN CHANG-HUAN, AMBASSADOR UNGER, AND MEMBERS OF THE
RVN EMBASSY INCLUDING THE WIFE AND SON OF AMBASSADOR
NGUYEN VAN KIEU, WHO REPORTEDLY WILL RETURN FROM SAIGON
LATER TODAY.
2. OTHERS IN THE PARTY ARRIVING FROM SAIGON WERE
COLONEL VO VAN CAM, COLONEL NHAN VAN THIET,
COLONEL TRAN THANH DIEN, COLONEL NGUYEN VAN DUC,
LT. COLONEL TON THAT AI-CHIEU, MAJOR HO VUONG MINH,
LT COLONEL DANG VAN CHAU, LT. COLONEL DINH SON THONG,
LT. COLONEL NGUYEN TAN THAN, AND DANG VU.
3. AIRCREW GAVE PAROLE DOCUMENTS FOR ALL OF THE ABOVE
TO AMBASSADOR UNGER, AND THE DOCUMENTS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY
HANDED OVER TO RVN EMBASSY THIRD SECRETARY NGUYEN NGOC HO
FORD
ON APRIL 26.
4. FOR SAIGON AND DEPT: IN EXAMINING THE PAROLE
S
GERALD ?
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GG 4/23/01
FORM DS-1652
0.00