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Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
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1553706
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Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
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Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)
East Asia and Pacific Country Files
subjects
Angola
Soviet Union
Saudi Arabia
Thailand
Japan
Lebanon
Syria
China
Military aircraft
Defections
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1553706
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1976-12-31
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12
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1976
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1976-10-01
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10
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1976
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The original documents are located in Box 7, folder "Japan - MIG - Incident (7)" of
Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 7 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 1974-77 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013760
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re MIG-25
CREATION DATE
10/06/1976
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Saintizal 9/12/05
9/28/10
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-1-9
DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 09-141. #12
CIA ltr 9/28/10
By dal NARA, Date 12/14/10
:1
MIG-25P RADAR GROUND OPERATION
25X1
25X1
GERALD
FORD & LIBRARY
THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING
CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0417 76
25X1
1. THERE IS A GROUND CHECK OF THE MIG-25P RADAR PERFORMED BY
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL
THIS CHECK
REQUIRED COOLING AIR (NOT REFRIGERATED) PROVIDED BY AUXILIARY GROUND
(1)
EQUIPMENT (AGE)
THE EQUIPMENT IS CONNECTED .5
4
4
3
THERE IS ALSO A RADAR SYSTEM CHECK WHICH CAN BE PERFORMED BY THE PILOT
3
2
1
2
JUST PRIOR TO TAKEOFF AND CAN BE PERFORMED USING EXTERNAL POWER OR
1
.
SECRET
Approved For and P-7-8-1-9
(Classification)
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-1-9
X1
ENGINE POWER; BATTERY POWER IS INSUFFICIENT.
2. THE TEST SEQUENCE DESCRIBED BELOW CAUSES THE AIR INTERCEPT
RADAR TO CHECK ITSELF FOR MALFUNCTIONS. THE SWITCHES ARE LOCATED ON
A PANEL ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE COCKPIT JOINT BELOW THE S0-63 PANEL.
TO PERFORM THE TEST, PLACE THE SWITCH IN THE TOP ROW, IN THE UP
("VKL APPAR") POSITION. THEN THE LOWER LEFT SWITCH (IN THE THIRD
ROW LABELED "KONTR") IS PLACED IN THE UP ("AVTOM") POSITION. THE
RADAR SCOPE SHOULD ILLUMINATE AND THE CHECK OUT WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY
ACCOMPLISHED AS FOLLOWS: A VERY SHORT SIMULATED INTERCEPT WITH
MOVING "BLIPS", ETC., APPEARS ON THE RADAR SCREEN IF THE SET IS
WORKING PROPERLY. IF THE SCOPE IS BLANK, GOES OUT, OR FAILS TO LIGHT,
THE PILOT KNOWS THERE IS A MALFUNCTION. COOLING FOR THIS TEST IS
PROVIDED BY THE ON-BOARD ALCOHOL COOLING SYSTEM.
:1
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3
2
PALO A 2 4 3 5 DERAIT
1
1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-1-9
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013761
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
TITLE
Daily Summary
DESCRIPTION
Re Syria, Soviet Union (including
MIG-25), Angola, Thailand, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, and China
CREATION DATE
10/08/1976
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Exempt 1/9/07
FBIS 36
AFP: USSR WILL TO DISCUSS JAPAN'S RETURN OF MIG 25
OW091351 HONG KONG AFP IN ENGLISH 0957 GMT 9 OCT 76 OW
(EXCERPT) TOKYO, OCT 9 (AFP)--THE SOVIET UNION IS READY TO
ENTER INTO TALKS WITH JAPAN ON THE RETURN OF A MIG-25 "FOXBAT"
FIGHTER WHICH A DEFECTING RUSSIAN PILOT LANDED AI HAKODATE,
HOKKAIDO ON SEPTEMBER 6.
MINISTER COUNSELLOR AI THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN TOKYO IVAN
TSEKHONYA CONVEYED THIS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HERE TODAY.
MR TSEKHONYA, HOWEVER, GAVE NO INDICATION OF WHAT HIS
GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE WOULD BE TO A JAPANESE REQUEST TO PAY
COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES THE SUPERSONIC FIGHTER DID TO THE
AIRPORT FACILITIES AT HAKODATE WHEN IT LANDED THERE.
LAST WEEK, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY INFORMED THE SOVIET UNION
FORD
JAPAN WOULD RETURN THE MIG ON OR AFTER OCTOBER 15 AND SOVIET
&
AUTHORITIES SHOULD COLLECT IT AI A JAPANESE SEA PORT TO BE
NAMED LATER.
GERALD
LIBRARY
AT THAT TIME, THE MINISTRY ALSO ASKED THE SOVIET UNION TO
PAY THE DAMAGES AND PACKING AND TRANSPORT EXPENSES INVOLVED.
9 OCT 1534Z DEH/KK
scowerft Ayland,
4
MIKI SCORES USSR FOR ATTACKS ON JAPAN OVER MIG INCIDENT
OW011819 HONG KONG AFP IN ENGLISH 1610 GMT 10 OCT 76 OW
(TEXT) TOKYO, OCT 1 (AFP)--PRIME MINISTER TAKEO MIKI
TODAY HARSHLY CRITICIZED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT FOR ITS ATTACKS
ON JAPAN OVER THE MIG-25 AFFAIR INSTEAD OF APOLOGIZING FOR THE
AIRCRAFT'S INTRUSION INTO JAPANESE AIRSPACE.
IN HIS FIRST REPLY TO THE REPEATED ATTACKS BY THE SOVIET
UNION, MR MIKI DECLARED THAT THE SOVIET WOULD BE WARNED
AGAINST A RECURRENCE OF SUCH AN INCIDENT WHEN JAPAN RETURNS
THE AIRCRAFT.
THE PREMIER WAS REPLYING TO A DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST INTERPELLATOR
IN THE BUDGET COMMITTEE OF THE LOWER HOUSE WHO ACCUSED THE
GOVERNMENT OF BEING "WEAK-KNEED" IN COUNTERING THE SOVIET STANCE.
MR MIKI SAID THAT IT WAS NATURAL FOR JAPAN TO CARRY OUT A
COMPLETE EXAMINATION OF THE PLANE ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL
PRACTICE.
AS TO WHY JAPAN HAD TO ASK FOR U.S. HELP IN EXAMINATION
OF THE PLANE, STATE MINISTER MICHITA SAKATA, DIRECTOR OF THE
DEFENSE AGENCY, SAID A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TECHNOLOGICAL HELP FROM
U.S. EXPERTS WAS ESSENTIAL.
WHILE ATTACKING THE INCOMPETENCE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
IN HANDLING THE CASE, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS SUGGESTED THE
CREATION OF A DIET COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE PROBLEM.
THE GOVERNMENT IS SCHEDULED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS
SATURDAY WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY REGARDING THE TIMING AND
METHOD OF RETURNING THE MIG-25 FOXBAT TO THE SOVIET UNION.
ADJUSTMENTS OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE
DEFENSE AGENCY HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND FOREIGN MINISTRY
SOURCES THOUGHT THAT THE PLANE COULD BE RETURNED TO THE SOVIETS
BY OCTOBER 10, AT THE EARLIEST OR BY OCTOBER 20, AT THE LATEST.
IN THE MIG-RETURNING TALKS, THE JAPANESE SIDE WILL PROPOSE:
--TRANSPORTATION BY LAND FROM HYAKURI AIR FORCE BASE IN
IBARAKI, 100 KILOMETERS (60 MILES) NORTHEAST OF TOKYO, WHERE
THE AIRCRAFT IS NOW HELD, TO THE PORT OF HITACHI, 70 KILOMETERS
(42 MILES) AWAY;
--THE PLANE BE PUT ABOARD A SOVIET FREIGHTER AT HITACHI
PORT. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS EXPECTED TO REQUEST THE
SOVIETS TO PAY COMPENSATION FOR THE DAMAGE DONE TO HOKKAIDO:S
SAPPORO AIRPORT FACILITIES, SUCH AS THE CONTROL TOWER
ANTENNA, BY THE MIG-25 ON MAKING A FORCED LANDING AND EXPENSES
FOR TRANSPORTING THE PLANE FROM SAPPORO TO HAYAKURI AND FROM
FORD
HAYAKURI TO HITACHI.
&
1 OCT 1935Z BB/SAJ
GERALD
LIBRARY
-43-
DEFENSE
Joseph C. Harsch
The MIG-25 is a 'Potemkin village'
When on Sept. 6 Soviet Air Force pilot Viktor
ant villages from which charmingly dressed
Belenko flew his Soviet MIG-25 plane to a
peasants emerged to wave their grateful obei-
Japanese air base 1- we of the Western world
sance to their sovereign. What those on the
were told that this was an event of major mili-
barges did not know at the time was that the
tary importance.
peasants came from the various theaters of St.
Well, it was. But not for the reason generally
Petersburg and the villages were stage sce-
assumed at that time.
nery taken down each night and put up again
The first reports of the event referred to the
the next day - downstream.
Soviet MIG-25 as being the world's fastest,
The MIG-25 is not in the true sense a Potem-
highest-flying, longest-range, and most pow-
kin village. It was, after all, a serious attempt
erful fighter-interceptor in the world. We were
to build the answer to what Moscow expected
about to find out the secrets of Moscow's great
the Americans to be doing next in aviation. Its
aviation triumph.
workmanship is described as practical and ef-
That was a month ago. Since then Japanese
fective. It would have been a good answer to
and American experts have gone over that
the American B-70, if the Americans had gone
MIG-25 plane - thoroughly. They have also
on building the B-70.
asked a lot of questions of Soviet pilot Belenko.
And they have had a lot of answers. The ques-
Guessing wrong in weaponry is not a Soviet
tion now is whether the facts and answers are
monopoly. There have been American mis-
more embarrassing to the Soviets or to the
takes too. But the story of the MIG-25 should
Western military community.
remind us that the Soviets are not always 20
The MIG-25 turns out to be the fastest and
feet tall. Yes, they have the second largest
highest flying interceptor-fighter in the world
number of men under arms of the big powers.
- for altitudes where no one else flies. But
China is ahead of them. Yes, they build good,
down where other planes fly it is heavy, slug-
practical aircraft - and a lot of them. Yes,
gish, and slow, with out-of-date technology. As
they have more tanks (19,000) facing Western
a fighter it is inferior to the U.S. Navy's F:14
Europe than the members of the NATO al-
and to the U.S. Air Force's F-15. As an inter-
liance can muster against them (7,300). But,
ceptor it would be splendid - up where there is
they don't always get it right.
ching to intercept, but useless for inter-
Today, we know that they misguessed when
Lepting the latest Western bombers which fly
they committed themselves to the MIG-25.
low. The MIG-25 has no "look-down" radar
Perhaps they have misguessed about tanks.
ability.
The credibility of their invasion threat against
In other words the Soviets' vaunted and
Western Europe is important to their diplo-
feared superfighter-interceptor turns out to be
macy. But they have built this on the assump-
a plane designed for the wrong mission at the
tion that the big battle tank is still queen of
wrong time. It was designed against the high-
battle. But is it? The 1973 war in the Middle
flying American B-70 bomber which was can-
East was the graveyard of tanks. Anti-tank
celled way back in 1960 when the Soviets shot
weaponry had jumped ahead of the tank. The
down Gary Powers in his U-2: Ever since the
United States has been working hard ever
U.S. has been working on low-flying bombers.
since to perfect new and still better anti-tank
So for 10 years now the Soviets have been
weapons. Besides, NATO forces are equipped
flying a plane which was virtually useless be-
with tactical nuclear weapons. Is it conceiv-
fore it was issued to the Soviet Air Force. And
able that they would go unused if a major So-
so also, for some 10 years Americans have
viet armored force started moving across the
been worried about supposed and alleged So-
north German plain? A mass of big battle
viet air superiority.
tanks would present an easy target for tactical
From 1774 to 1791 Russia was ruled by Gri-
nuclear weapons.
gori Alexandrovich Potemkin, first minister to
the Czarina Catherine the so-called Great. He
Soviet diplomacy depends heavily on the as-
is remembered for the splendid tour he ar-
sumption of Soviet offensive capability. To un-
derestimate that capability would be criminal.
FORD
ranged for the Czarina, her court, and foreign
ambassadors down the Volga. The purpose of
But to overestimate it - plays directly into the
&
the trip was to show how happy the Russian
hands of Soviet diplomacy.
peasants were under the allegedly benign rule
of Czarina Catherine.
viets bluff us into thinking they are 20 feet tall,
GERALD
LIBRARY
Too much of the time, I think, we let the So-
As the imperial barges sailed majestically
when in reality they are only about five feet
down the mighty river they passed pretty peas-
six inches - if that.
C.S. Monitor, 10/14/76
-44-
DEFENSE
ox Chicago Tribune
ladh
TOKY
PHOTOS
SPECS
PLANS
'No, he's not a U.S. Air Force official a ! He's a representative of the Toatsie Toy Company!"
Chicago Tribune, 10/14/76
FORD LIBRARY & OF
b
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013762
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
....
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re MIG-25
CREATION DATE
10/13/1976
VOLUME
3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
EXEMPTED
1/26/10
1
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013763
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re MIG-25 crash in 1969
CREATION DATE
10/13/1976
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Sanitized 9/21/05
1/4/10
DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
E.O 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MINI 09-141; #15
CIA-tr 1/4/10 DIACtr3/29/10, AFltr5/31/11
By dal NARA, Date 8/24/11
25X1
25X1
5X1
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25X1
:1
1.
(THEN) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF , APVO, KADOMTSEV, WAS
ILLED IN 1969 WHILE TEST FLYING A MIG-25. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED PRIOR TO
ONTRACTING FOR PURCHASE OF THE MIG-25 FROM THE AVIATION INDUSTRY. KADOMTSEV
AD REFUSED TO BE BRIEFED ON THE AIRCRAFT EJECTION SYSTEM AND WAS KILLED
5
4
3
GREATO CRATO a FORD LIBRARY
2
1
SECRET
(classification)
25X1
/HEN THE AIRCRAFT CAUGHT FIRE AND CRASHED. THE AIRCRAFT WAS BROUGHT INTO
'HE ACTIVE INVENTORY DESPITE THE ACEIDENT BECAUSE OF U.S. SR-71 ACTIVITIES.
2. (AIR FORCE COMMENT: OTHER SOURCES INDICATE THAT A GENERAL-
EYTENANT ANATOLIY LENONIDOVICH KADOMTSEV, DEPUTY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FOR
VIATION OF AIR DEFENSE, DIED IN APRIL 1969 AS A RESULT OF AN AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT. )
:1
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5
FORD
a
5
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3
LIBRARY
4
3
2
2
1
1
SECRET
(classi/ication)
(dissem controls)
of
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013764
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re MIG-25
CREATION DATE
10/14/1976
VOLUME
3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Saintizal 9/12/05
1/4/10
8
ES
ECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
E.O. 13523 (es amended) SEC 3.3
MR 0 09-141
CIA ltr 1/4/10; DIA er 3/29/10; AF ltr 5/31/11
By dal NARA, Date 8/24/11
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
1. THE MIG-25P WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO COUNTER THE U.S. XB-70
BOMBER. SINCE THE XB-70 DEVELOPMENT NEVER REACHED FRUITION, THE
PRIMARY MISSION OF THE MIG-25P HAS BECOME TO INTERCEPT THE SR-71. THE
5
5
4
FORD
4
3
a
3
2
2
1
1
.
SECRET
(classijication)
25X1
MIG-25P
ALSO POSSESSES A LIMITED CAPABILITY AGAINST LOWER
ALTITUDE TARGETS.
:1
2.
THE ONLY WAY THE MIG-25P CAN SUCCESSFULLY
INTERCEPT THE SR-71 IS FROM A HEAD-ON SNAPUP ENGAGEMENT. THIS IS
TRUE so LONG AS THE SR-71 REMAINS IN ITS HIGH-ALTITUDE, HIGH-SPEED
ENVIRONMENT; HOWEVER, IF THE SR-71 DEVELOPS MECHANICAL PROBLEMS AND
IS FORCED TO DECELERATE AND DESCEND, IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY VULNER-
ABLE TO REAR HEMISPHERE ATTACKS.
:1
3.
ALL INTERCEPTS ARE DIRECTED/CONTROLLED
BY GCI DATA LINK. THE PILOT MERELY FOLLOWS THE INDICATIONS DISPLAYED
IN THE COCKPIT. SPECIFICALLY, HE MANIPULATES THE THROTTLES TO MAIN-
TAIN THE GCI DIRECTED AIRSPEED AND FIRES THE SEMIACTIVE AND/OR
INFRARED MISSILES WHEN THE INTERCEPT IS COMPLETE. DUE TO RAPIDLY
CHANGING ENGAGEMENT PARAMETERS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH-SPEED, HIGH-
ALTITUDE TARGETS (SR-71) AND TO SOVIET PREFERENCE FOR GCI (DATA LINK)
CONTROLLED INTERCEPTS, AUTONOMOUS ENGAGEMENTS ARE UNLIKELY.
4. THE HEAD-ON INTERCEPT PROFILE, FLOWN AGAINST THE SR-71,
ESTABLISHES THE MIG-25P 7,000 METERS BELOW, THE TARGET. AN INTERCEPT
SPEED OF MACH 2.34 IS MAINTAINED BY THE MIG-25P TO UTILIZE THE BEST
5
FORD
4
3
LIBRARY
2
1
SECRET
(classification
25X1
FUEL CONSUMPTION RATES, TO AVOID EXCEEDING AFTERBURNER OPERATIONAL
LIMITATIONS, AND TO OPTIMIZE THE SEARCH AND TRACK FUNCTIONS OF THE
:1
MIG-25P RADAR.
THE 7,000-METER SEPARATION AND MACH 2.34
INTERCEPT SPEED WOULD BE MAINTAINED EVEN IF THE TARGET AIRCRAFT CHANGED
ALTITUDE AND AIRSPEED.
5. THE MISSILE CARRIED BY THE MIG-25P HAS BOTH A RADIO AND AN
OPTICAL FUZE. THE RADIO FUZE IS THE PRIMARY FUZE FOR WARHEAD DETONA-
TION; THE OPTICAL FUZE IS A BACKUP. IF THE TARGET SPEED EXCEEDS
3,250 KILOMETERS/HOUR (1,760 KNOTS), THE RADIO FUZE IS UNABLE TO
LIBRARY
DETECT THE TARGET. THEREFORE, AT TARGET SPEEDS GREATER THAN 3,250
KILOMETERS/HOUR, THE MISSILE IS DEPENDENT UPON THE OPTICAL FUZE FOR
WARHEAD DETONATION. THE MAXIMUM CLOSURE RATE THAT THE FUZING AND
FIRING CIRCUITRY CAN ACCOMMODATE IS 2,800 METERS/SECOND (APPROXIMATELY
5,440 KNOTS). AT HIGHER CLOSURE RATES, THE MISSILE WARHEAD WOULD
DETONATE AFTER PASSING THE TARGET. WITH THE MIG-25P MAINTAINING AN
INTERCEPT SPEED OF MACH 2.34, THE TARGET PLATFORM WOULD HAVE TO EX-
CEED MACH 4.4 FOR THIS TO OCCUR.
2
]
SECRET
(classification)
9
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013765
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
....
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re MIG-23 and SU-9
CREATION DATE
10/20/1976
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Exempt 9/21/05
1/4/10
10
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013766
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re MIG-25
CREATION DATE
10/26/1976
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Sanitizal 9/21/05
1/4/10
10
DECLAS SIFIED w/ portions exempted
E.O 13020 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 09-141; #18
CIACULT 1/4/10; DIACCU3/29/10; AFlth5/31/11
By dal NARA, Date 8/24/11
25X1
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EMERGENCY ORDNANCE DROP AREA NEAR CHUGUYEVKA
25X1
25X1
25X1
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(1
1.
THERE IS AN EMERGENCY ORDNANCE DROP AREA NEAR
RALO a FORD TERRITO
CHUGUYEVKA AIR BASE (44-04N, 133-52E), USSR. IT IS LOCATED ON A
HEADING OF 270 DEGREES AT A RANGE OF 25 TO 30 KM [FROM THE
5
5
4
4
AIR BASE 1. THIS AREA IS OVER DRY LAND BUT IS VERY RARELY USED
3
3
2
BECAUSE OF THE HIGH COST OF R-40 - MISSILE ORDNANCE FOR THE MIG-25P. 2 1
1
SECRET
9
Page 2 of 2 Bages
Entire page redacted.
a FORD LIBRARY
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013767
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re MIG-25
CREATION DATE
10/29/1976
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Sanitizal 9/21/05
9/28/10
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-0-4
DECLASSI ED w/ portions exempted
E.O. 12
SEC 3.3
09-141;# #19
C/A Its 9/28/10
By dal NARA, Date 12/14/10
X1
INFORMATION ON THE MIG-25P ENGINES
25X1
25X1
THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING
CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0488 76.
X1
1. THE ENGINE POWERING THE MIG-25 IS CONSIDERED
TO BE RELIABLE.
HOUGH INSTRUCTORS
INDICATED THE ENGINES WERE PREVIOUSLY USED ON A PILOTLESS
[ICLE AND ADAPTED TO THE MIG-25 DESIGN, THE ENGINE PERFORMS ALMOST FLAWLESSLY
5
DIA review(s) completed.
USAF review(s) completed
GENALD a FORD FORANT
4
3
2
1
SECRET
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ITS MIG-25 ROLE. THERE WAS NO KNOWN AREA WHERE THE AFTERBURNER OR MAIN
25X1
GINE WOULD FLAME OUT, EVEN IN A ZOOM CLIMB TO 30 KILOMETERS.
2. IN ADDITION TO THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED MAXIMUM AFTERBURNING THRUST
11,200 KILOGRAMS, A THRUST OF 8,500 KILOGRAMS WAS PROVIDED AT MAXIMUM
25X1
N-AFTERBURNING (MILITARY) POWER. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT:
PREVIOUSLY
PORTED 11,200 KILOGRAMS THRUST FOR ENGINE IN
DATED
25X1
SEPTEMBER.) THE ENGINE IS REPORTED
TO BE 6,385 MILLIMETERS IN
NGTH AND 1,640 MILLIMETERS IN DIAMETER. WEIGHT OF THE ENGINE IS 2,635
25X1
LOGRAMS.
WHETHER THIS WEIGHT IS WITH OR WITHOUT
CESSORIES.
25X1
3. AFTER 250 HOURS OF OPERATION, THE ENGINES ARE REMOVED FROM THE
RCRAFT AND RETURNED TO THE FACTORY FOR OVERHAUL.
4. THE MIG-25 AIRCRAFT PRODUCES A TELLTALE PUFF OF SMOKE WHEN THE
TERBURNER IS CUT OFF ON CLIMBOUT FROM TAKEOFF.
25X1
4
3
2
1
SECRET
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(dissent BUTISTON,
12
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013768
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re Soviet Air Force
CREATION DATE
11/04/1976
VOLUME
6 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Samitized 9/21/05
9/28/10
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-7-1
DECLASE
w/ portions exempted
E.O. 1
concerned
SEC 3.9
09-141; 1&20
C/A ltr 9/28/10
By dal NARA; Date 12/14/10
SUBJECT APVO COMBAT FLIGHT TRAINING
25X1
25X1
THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING
CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0446-76.
1. AT AN APVO TRAINING REGIMENT IN SALSK, THE AIR-TO-
AIR COMBAT TRAINING IN THE MIG-17 (COMBAT EMPLOYMENT) LASTS
APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AND STUDENTS FLY ONCE EACH DAY, FIVE
5
DAYS PER WEEK. THE COURSE OF INSTRUCTION IS COMPRISED OF
5
4
4
3
33 TO 35 SORTIES AND IS BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS:
3
2
GERALD of FORD VIGRARY
2
1
DIA review(s) completed,
1
SECRET
USAF review(s) completed
(classification:
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-7-3
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-7-3
25X1
A) ONE AGAINST ONE, NO MANEUVERS: AN INST UCTOR PILOT (IP) FLIES
THE LEAD (TARGET) AIRCRAFT AND DOES NOT ENGAGE IN ANY MANEUVERS.
THE STUDENT FLIES BEHIND THE IP AIRCRAFT AND MANEUVERS IN "S"
PATTERNS IN AND OUT OF GUN RANGE (300-800 METERS; MINIMUM
RANGE IS 200 METERS). THIS AREA OF TRAINING INCLUDES FOUR
TO SIX DUAL SORTIES [IN A TWO-SEAT TRAINER WITH AN INSTRUCTOR]
AND FOUR SOLO SORTIES.
B) ONE AGAINST ONE, MANEUVERING: THE INSTRUCTOR PILOT,
AGAIN IN THE LEAD AIRCRAFT, FLIES AGGRESSIVE (BUT PREBRIEFED)
MANEUVERS INCLUDING ROLLS AND VERTICAL MANEUVERS. THE STUDENT
TRIES TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY TO TRACK AND
FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTOR. THIS IS DONE IN A SERIES OF THREE DUAL
SORTIES AND TWO SOLO SORTIES.
C) ONE AGAINST ONE INTERCEPTS DURING DAY VFR (VISUAL
FLIGHT RULES) CONDITIONS: THE INSTRUCTOR TAKES OFF SEVERAL
MINUTES AHEAD OF THE STUDENT AND FLIES IN A PREBRIEFED TRACK
IN A DESIGNATED ZONE. THE STUDENT INTERCEPTS THE INSTRUCTOR'S
AIRCRAFT AND A PREBRIEFED ENGAGEMENT, AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH
1B ABOVE, ENSUES. THIS SECTION OF TRAINING INVOLVES TWO DUAL
5
4
SORTIES AND THREE SOLO SORTIES.
3
D) TWO AGAINST ONE INTERCEPTS IN DAY VISUAL FLIGHT RULES
2
1
SECRET
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5X1
CONDITIONS: THE INSTRUCTOR PILOT TAKES OFF SEVERAL MINUTES
AHEAD OF THE STUDENT WHO IS FLYING AS WINGMAN FOR ANOTHER
INSTRUCTOR PILOT. THE STUDENT/INSTRUCTOR PILOT ELEMENT
ACCOMPLISHES INTERCEPT OF THE TARGET AND MILD MANEUVERING
ENSUES. THIS TRAINING IS CARRIED OUT IN TWO DUAL SORTIES AND
THREE SOLO SORTIES.
E) TWO AGAINST ONE IN DAY INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES CONDI-
TIONS (VISUAL FLIGHT RULES CONDITIONS ABOVE THE CLOUDS):
THE SCENARIO FOR THIS EXERCISE IS THE SAME AS FOR THAT IN
PARAGRAPH ID ABOVE EXCEPT FOR THE WEATHER CONDITIONS. IF THE
STUDENT IS IN A DUAL PLACE TRAINING AIRCRAFT (WITH AN INSTRUCTOR
IN THE OTHER SEAT) HE WILL STAY ON HIS ELEMENT LEADER'S
WING UNTIL THEY ARE ABOVE THE CLOUDS. IF HE IS SOLOING, THE
STUDENT WILL TURN 15 DEGREES AWAY FROM HIS ELEMENT LEADER FOR
10 TO 15 SECONDS AND FOLLOW A PARALLEL COURSE UNTIL BOTH MEM-
BERS OF THE ELEMENT ARE ABOVE THE CLOUDS. IF IN-FLIGHT VISI-
BILITY IS BETTER THAN 50 METERS, THE STUDENT WILL STAY IN
POSITION ON THE ELEMENT LEADER'S WING. THIS EXERCISE IS DONE
IN ONE DUAL SORTIE AND TWO SOLO SORTIES.
5
G) ONE AGAINST ONE AT NIGHT UNDER VISUAL FLIGHT RULES
4
3
CONDITIONS: THE TRAINING SCENARIO IS THE SAME AS IN PARAGRAPH
2
1
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5X1
1C ABOVE EXCEPT THAT IT OCCURS AT NIGHT AND WITH NO MANEUVERING.
THE STUDENT IS VECTORED TO A POINT TWO KILOMETERS FROM THE
INSTRUCTOR PILOT'S AIRCRAFT (TARGET) AND THEN BREAKS OFF THE
INTERCEPT AND RETURNS TO HIS BASE. THIS IS DONE IN TWO DUAL
SORTIES AND FIVE SOLO SORTIES.
2. EXCEPT FOR NIGHT TRAINING INTERCEPT, ALL AIR-TO-
AIR TRAINING SORTIES USE GUN CAMERA FILM AND ALL ATTACKS ARE
BASED UPON THE USE OF [THE INTERCEPTOR'S] GUNS [NO MISSILES].
:1
WOULD NEVER TRUST A STUDENT TO DO so BECAUSE THE STUDENT MIGHT
DOWN THE TOW PLANE. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE APVO PRACTICES
HIGH ANGLE GUN ATTACKS AT UP TO 90 DEGREES ANGLE-OFF, BUT NO
GREATER THAN 90 DEGREES.
3. BECAUSE OF THE INEXPERIENCE OF THE STUDENTS, AND
THE POSSIBILITY OF THIS CAUSING DANGEROUS SITUATIONS DURING
FLIGHT TRAINING, ALL FLIGHT METHODS AND TECHNIQUES ARE WORKED
OUT IN ADVANCE. INSTRUCTOR PILOTS HAVE NO FREEDOM OF CHOICE
IN WHAT MANEUVERS ARE PERFORMED AND AN INSTRUCTOR WILL GET
INTO TROUBLE IF HE PERFORMS MANEUVERS OTHER THAN THOSE PREPLANNED.
5
WHILE THE STUDENT AND INSTRUCTOR CANNOT REVERSE ROLES (TARGET
4
3
AND ATTACKER), TWO INSTRUCTORS CAN GO OUT TO PRACTICE AGAINST
2
1
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EACH OTHER. EVEN THEN HOWEVER, THE INSTRUCTORS CANNOT DO
WHATEVER MANEUVERS THEY DESIRE. IF THEY DO THEY HAVE TO BE
VERY CAREFUL THAT THEY DO NOT "GET CAUGHT". WHEN ASKED IF
THEY TALK ON THE RADIO WHEN THEY ARE DOING UNAUTHORIZED
MANEUVERS,
ANSWERED WITH EMPHATIC "NO."
4. SOME STUDENTS DO NOT COMPLETE THE COURSE OF INSTRUCTION
BECAUSE OF "SIE" (SELF INDUCED ELIMINATION). FOR SOME, THIS
OCCURS BECAUSE OF APPREHENSION (E.G., SEEING A CRASH AND NEVER
GETTING OVER IT). SOME DROP OUT FOR MEDICAL REASONS. THE
MAIN REASON, HOWEVER, IS THAT AFTER 2 YEARS OF TRAINING, THE
STUDENT COMES TO FEEL THE BURDEN OF THE TIME INVOLVED WITH
MILITARY SERVICE, AND HE MAKES A DECISION TO GO BACK TO A
FACTORY OR SOME OTHER TYPE OF WORK.
THIS (APVO
25X1
TRAINING REGIMEN) IS A BURDEN.
5.
HAS NEVER PARTICIPATED IN, NOR HEARD OF, DISSIMILAR AIR
25X1
COMBAT TRAINING (I.E., MIG-25 AGAINST MIG-17, ETC).
THE PF
FICIENCY OF THE GRADUATE OF THE (SALSK?) APVO SCHOOL IS POOR.
DOES NOT FEEL THAT HE WOULD WANT TO GO INTO COMBAT
WITH A RECENT GRADUATE AND STATED THAT HE WOULD NEED ANOTHER
YEAR TO TEACH AND OBSERVE THE GRADUATE. (AIR FORCE COMMENT:
RET
siffestion)
(dissom controls)
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-7-3
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PU_EA_P-7-8-7-3
5X1
SOVIET PVO (AIR DEFENSE) UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING PROGRAM.
HE HAS ONLY 30 OPERATIONAL
HOURS IN THE MIG-25P AND WAS STILL IN THE COMBAT READINESS
COURSE AT THE TIME OF HIS DEFECTION.)
:1
5
4
3
2
1
SECRET
(classification)
(dissem controls)
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13
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013769
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re Soviet Air Force
CREATION DATE
11/04/1976
VOLUME
3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Sanitizal 9/21/05
9/28/10
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-8-2
13
DEC ASSIRED vv! nortiens exampled
E.O.
MR # 09-141; #21
C/A utr 9/28/10
B
dal NARA, Date 12/14/10
DIA review(s) completed.
APVO FIGHTER TACTICS AND CHARACTERISTICS
25X1
25X1
25X1
THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING
CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0445 76.
:1
1. FOLLOWING IS
DESCRIPTION OF COMBAT TACTICS
EMPLOYED BY VARIOUS SOVIET APVO FIGHTERS AND
COMMENTS ON
25X1
THE CAPABILITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIGHTERS:
5
A) THE MIG-25 AND SU-15 WILL BE USED AS HIGH-TO-MEDIUM
5
4
4
3
ALTITUDE INTERCEPTORS AND ARMED WITH MISSILES. THE MIG-17
3
2
2
1
WILL BE USED AS A LOW-TO-MEDIUM ALTITUDE INTERCEPTOR AND WILL
1
SECRET
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(classification)
GENALO a FORD LIGRART
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5X1
RELY UPON GUN ARMAMENT.
B) GROUND CONTROL INTERCEPT STATIONS WILL VECTOR A MIG-25
TO A HEAD-ON ATTACK REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE TARGET HAS AN
ALL-ASPECT MISSILE CAPABILITY.
IN SUCH AN ATTACK, THE
MIG-25 PILOT WOULD USE THE TECHNIQUE OF DELAYING THE OPERATION
OF HIS AI RADAR UNTIL IN MISSILE LAUNCH RANGES. HE WOULD THEN TURN ON THE
RADAR, ACHIEVE LOCK-ON, AND LAUNCH HIS IR MISSILE FOLLOWED BY HIS RADAR MISSILE.
C) IN ALL CASES, THE MIG-25 WILL ATTEMPT TO ATTACK ITS
TARGET FROM AN ALTITUDE LOWER THAN THE TARGET so THAT THE MIG-25'S
RADAR WILL HAVE A GOOD "LOOK-UP" ANGLE AND NOT BE AFFECTED
BY GROUND CLUTTER. IF THE MIG-25 ATTACKS FROM AS LOW AS 500-
1,000 METERS (M) ABOVE GROUND LEVEL, THE PILOT WILL SELECT
THE LOW ALTITUDE (OR 25 KILOMETER) POSITION ON HIS RADAR CONTROL
PANEL. THE SU-15 PILOTS DO NOT TRAIN FOR LOW-ALTITUDE INTERCEPTS
EVEN THOUGH THE SU-15 HAS THE SAME 50 METER MINIMUM EMPLOYMENT
ALTITUDE FOR ITS IR MISSILE AS DOES THE MIG-25.
D) THE MIG-17 HAS A "GUNS ONLY CAPABILITY" AND THAT IS
25X1
HOW UNITS WITH MIG-17'S PRACTICE ALL OF THEIR INTERCEPTS.
5
4
STATED THAT HE KNEW OF NO MIG-17'S WITH AN AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE
3
2
CAPABILITY. THE MIG-17 IS GAINING INCREASED EMPHASIS AS A LOW
DAD
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GERALD
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25X1
ALTITUDE "ATTACK FIGHTER" IN FRONTAL AVIATION (VVS) BECAUSE OF
ITS PERFORMANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.
E) THE MIG-27 (SIC, MIG-25?) AND SU-15 CAN ONLY INTERROGATE
SOVIET IFF. THEY HAVE NO CAPABILITY TO INTERROGATE FREE WORLD
IFF SETS. THE SU-15 HAS AN INTERLOCK CIRCUIT ON ITS RADAR WHICH
PREVENTS LOCK-ON TO AN AIRCRAFT WHICH HAS A SOVIET IFF UNLESS
THE SU-15 IFF INTERROGATOR IS SWITCHED OFF.
F) THE SU-15/MIG-23/MIG-25 PRODUCE A NOTICEABLE STREAK
OR PLUME OF FUEL WHEN DISENGAGING AFTERBURNER. THERE IS NO
PLUME WHEN ENGAGING AFTERBURNER.
:1
5
4
3
2
1
ECRET
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(dissem con
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-8-2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013770
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re Soviet Air Force
CREATION DATE
11/10/1976
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Samitizale 9/21/05
9/28/10
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-9-1
DECLASSIRED
E.O. 12058 (as ements) SEC 33
MR# 09-141-122
CIA C/A ltr 9/28/10
By dal NARA, Date 12/14/10
UBJECT
APVO USE OF MIG-15 UTILITY TRAINER AIRCRAFT
25X1
25X1
THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING
CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0462 76.
:1
1.
TWO TO THREE DUAL-COCKPIT MIG-15 TRAINERS
ARE ASSIGNED TO EVERY COMBAT INTERCEPTOR REGIMENT IN THE SOVIET
AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE FORCE. HE REVEALED THAT THESE ARE USED
FOR WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE AND TO CONDUCT INSTRUMENT FLYING PRACTICE 5
4
("UNDER HOOD" FLIGHTS). HE ALSO SAID THAT HIS OWN REGIMENT AT
3
FORD
2
DIA review(s) completed
A.
SECRET
USAF review(s) completed
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(classification)
GERALD
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25X1
SOKOLOVKA, ALTHOUGH EQUIPPED WITH MIG-25P AND MIG-25 TRAINERS,
RETAINED TWO TO THREE MIG-15UT (TRAINER) AIRCRAFT FOR WEATHER
RECONNAISSANCE AND "UNDER HOOD" FLIGHTS.
:1
5
4
3
2
1
SECRET
(classification)
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15
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013771
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re Soviet Air Force
CREATION DATE
11/10/1976
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Samilized 9/21/05
9/28/10
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PU_EA_F-7-8-10-9
DECLA
E.O. 12000
MI 09-141-123
CIA its 9/28/10
By dae ARA, Date 12/14/10
:1
SOVIET PVO STRANY OPERATIONS AND OPTIONS
25X1
25X1
THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND THE MISSILE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND IS BEING CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0469 76.
1. CENTRAL CONTROL OF THE PVO STRANY (AIR DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY/
STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSE) IS, BY POLICY, VESTED IN A CENTRAL COMMAND POST
X1
IN MOSCOW. ALL REQUESTS FOR COORDINATION OF PVO WEAPONS UNITS (FIGHTER/
5
5
4
SAM/AAA) MUST GO TO THIS CENTRAL COMMAND POST FOR A FINAL DECISION;
4
3
3
2
HOWEVER,
THIS WAS ALL THEORY, AND THAT IF THEY
2
a
FORD
1
USAF review(s) completed
DIA review(s) completed,
SECRET
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25X1
(FIELD COMMANDS) ACTUALLY HAD TO WAIT FOR THE CENTRAL COMMAND POST
TO MAKE A DECISION AND RESPOND, THEY MAY AS WELL GIVE UP
PART
OF THE COUNTRY. REALISTICALLY, THE CORPS IS CLOSER TO THE SITUATION
AND IS BETTER ABLE TO MAKE THE NECESSARY COMBAT DECISIONS. BASED ON
VARIABLES SUCH AS AIR TRAFFIC, ALERT STATUS, AND WEAPONS RESOURCES
AVAILABLE IN EACH SITUATION.
2. SHOULD THE CORPS CONTROL BE DESTROYED, DIRECT WEAPONS
RESPONSIBILITY WOULD REVERT TO THE REGIMENT LEVEL. (AIR FORCE/MIA
1
COMMENT:
REFERRED TO THE AAA REGIMENT AS BEING SEPARATE FROM
THE INTERCEPTOR AND SAM REGIMENTS.) REGIMENTAL WEAPONS CONTROL WOULD
BE EXERCISED IN THAT REGIMENT'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. COORDINATION
BETWEEN WEAPONS TYPES WOULD BE HANDLED BY THE INDIVIDUAL REGIMENTS
IN DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THEMSELVES. THE REQUIREMENT FOR
SENIOR CONTROL, IN THOSE AREAS WHERE CLOSE COORDINATION IS NECESSARY
BETWEEN WEAPON TYPES, IS SOLVED BY DELEGATION OF THIS AUTHORITY TO
THE REGIMENT (INTERCEPTOR OR SAM) WITH THE GREATER AREA OF RESPON-
SIBILITY.
SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT, IF THE FIGHTER AVIATION
HAS A SMALL ROLE, THEN IT BECOMES SUBORDINATE TO THE SAM REGIMENT.
IF THE INTERCEPTOR REGIMENT HAS A LARGER SECTOR, IT HAS BETTER
5
4
TECHNOLOGY AND THE BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCESSFULLY CARRYING OUT THE
3
2
1
1
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25X1
MISSION, THEREFORE THEY REVERSE THE COMMAND. THE CORPS PREDETER-
MINES THESE FACTORS AS A CONTINGENCY PLAN MADE KNOWN BEFOREHAND
TO RESPONSIBLE PARTICIPANTS IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. SUCH A SIT
UATION IS REQUIRED SINCE THERE IS NO ALTERNATE COMMAND POST FOR
THE 23RD PVO CORPS, THE COMMAND
INTERCEPTOR REGIMENT.
25X1
@
3.
THERE ARE NO INSTANCES OF COLLOCATION
OF SAM AND INTERCEPTOR REGIMENTS, HENCE, CURRENTLY A COMMUNICATION
LINK BETWEEN THEM IS REQUIRED.
25X1
REFERRED TO THIS AS AN "RF"
(RADIO COMMUNICATIONS) LINK.
AIR FORCE/MIA COMMENTS:
25X1
A. IN PARAGRAPH TWO,
SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO CORPS
CONTROL BEING DESTROYED AND CITED NO OTHER REASONS FOR LOSS OF CORPS
CONTROL (E.G., COMMUNICATIONS JAMMING).
(1)
B.
THE AAA REGIMENT IN PARAGRAPH
TWO, COLLECTOR BELIEVES THAT HE PROBABLY HAS LITTLE ADDITIONAL DATA
ON IT.
(3)
3
C. SINCE
THERE IS CURRENTLY A COMMUNI-
CATIONS LINK BETWEEN UNITS (PARA 3), COLLECTOR BELIEVES THAT IT IS
PROBABLY IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF CONTINGENCY
5
4
REQUIREMENTS.
3
2
1
SECRET
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Page 4 of 4 pages
Entire page redacted.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013772
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re Soviet Air Force
CREATION DATE
11/30/1976
VOLUME
5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Saintizal 9/21/05
9/28/10
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PO_EA_P-7-8-11-8
16
DECLASS Dw pertions exempted
E.O.12 (team: SEC S.S
09-141; #24
C/A ltr 9/28/10
By dal NARA, Date 12/14/10
:1
SOVIET PVO GROUND CONTROLLED INTERCEPT OPERATIONS AND PERSONNEL.
25X1
25X1
THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING
CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0470 76.
L. GCI COMMAND AND CONTROL IN SOVIET FIGHTER TACTICS IS A FUNDA-
MENTAL PART OF BOTH PVO AND FRONTAL AVIATION
OPERATIONS. IN PVO UNDER-
GRADUATE PILOT TRAINING, ALL INTERCEPTS ARE CONDUCTED UNDER GCI
5
CONTROL. IN THE PVO COMBAT TRAINING COURSES, NON-GCI CONTROLLED
4
3
INTERCEPTS ARE NOT PRACTICED. ONLY UNITS WITH A LOW-ALTITUDE
GERALD a FORD 3 5 4 LIBRARY
2
2
INTERCEPT MISSION, SUCH AS THOSE EQUIPPED WITH MIG-17'S ACTUALLY
1
1
SECRET
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completed
DIA review(s) completed
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PU_EA_P-1-8-11-8
PRACTICE IN A NON-GCI ENVIRONMENT. IN OTHER OPERATIONAL UNITS,
25X1
SECTOR RESPONSIBILITY IN A NON-GCI CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT IS
DISCUSSED BUT NOT PRACTICED.
2. A GCI SITE IS COLOCATED WITH THE REGIMENT COMMAND POST
(RCP) IN EACH REGIMENT. EACH RCP HAS THE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
NECESSARY TO CONTROL ITS ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT.
MIG-25
25X1
REGIMENT, THE CONTROLLER CADRE WAS COMPOSED OF EIGHT CONTROLLERS:
FOUR NAVIGATORS, THREE FORMER PILOTS (NO LONGER ON FLYING STATUS),
AND ONE "SH.B.U. " (EXPANSION NOT GIVEN) OFFICER THE 10TH "TAPONS
Controller. NAVIGATORS ATTENDED FOUR-FIVE MONTH CONTROLLED TRAINING "RIE
AT THE 148TH CENTER FOR COMBAT APPLICATIONS (CCA). FORMER PILOTS
ALSO RECEIVED TRAINING AT VIS 148TH CCA. SH.B.U. PERSONNEL ARE
CONSIDERED THE ELITE OF THE GCI FORCE. THEY ARE COMMISSIONED
OFFICERS WHO WERE GRADUATED WITH A FOUR-YEAR ENGINEERING DEGREE FROM
THE SH.B.U. SCHOOL AT STAVROPOL. SH.B.U. PERSONNEL ARE RATED AS
"NAVIGATOR-ENGINEERS." THE SH.B.U. SCHOOL AT STAVROPOL OPENED
APPROXIMATELY FIVE YEARS AGO.
3. PVO PILOTS WERE INCESSANTLY WARNED NOT TO TAKE ANY FLIGHT
ACTIONS (DURING GCI) WITHOUT CONTROLLER APPROVAL. THE PILOTS WERE
5
5
4
4
INSTRUCTED IN THE COMBAT GONTROL SECTIONS TO STRICTLY ADHERE TO THE
3
3
2
2
COMMANDS OF THE CONTROLLER. IN REGIMENTAL PREFLIGHT BRIEFINGS, THE
1
1
.
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intered
Heation)
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25X1
PILOTS HAD DIRECT INTERFACE WITH THE CONTROLLERS AND DISCUSSED
FLIGHT PLANS - INCLUDING WORK AREAS, VECTORING METHODS, TIMES AND
CALL SIGNS. THE CONTROLLERS AND ALL OTHER FLIGHT ASSOCIATED
PERSONNEL WERE ALSO PRESENT DURING THE POSTFLIGHT DEBRIEFING WHILE
THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER OR HIS DEPUTY EVALUATED THE DAY'S FLIGHT
ACTIVITY. THE CONTROLLERS AND THE PILOTS WERE CRITICIZED IF AN
INTERCEPT EXERCISE WAS NOT PROPERLY EXECUTED. ULTIMATELY, THE
FLIGHT RECORDERS WERE REVIEWED TO DETERMINE WHO WAS AT FAULT
AND, GENERALLY, THE PILOTS BORE THE BRUNT OF ANY BLAME.
25X1
(1)
:1
RELATIONS BETWEEN PILOTS AND CONTROLLERS WERE
GENERALLY GOOD BUT MOST WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED CLOSE FRIENDS.
(1)
:1
DID NOT PERSONALLY KNOW ANY OF THE CONTROLLERS AT SOKOLOVKA
(MIG-25 BASE) BUT DID KNOW SOME AT SAL'SK.
4. PILOTS ARE UNDER RCP AND GCI CONTROLLER COMMAND FROM THE
TIME THE PILOT BOARDS HIS AIRCRAFT.
IN THE
25X1
MIG-25, ALL INTERCEPT ACTIVITIES ARE CONTROLLED VIA DATA-LINK
(PRIMARY SYSTEM ON THE MIG-25) OR BY VOICE GCI CONTROL. WHEN
OPERATING VIA DATA-LINK, THE PILOT IS LITTLE MORE THAN A PASSENGER
FROM THE TIME HE RAISES HIS GEAR AFTER TAKEOFF UNTIL 50 METERS
5
5
4
4
ALTITUDE ON RECOVERY. HIS ONLY PURPOSE FOR BEING IN THE AIRCRAFT
3
3
2
2
IS TO PULL THE TRIGGER, BREAK AWAY, LOWER THE GEAR, AND OCCASIONALLY
1
1
SECRET
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(classi/ication)
(dissem controls)
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25X1
PUSH A BUTTON. FIRING INSTRUCTIONS WERE ALSO RECEIVED FROM THE
RCP - INCLUDING THE SPECIFIC TYPE OF ORDNANCE TO BE EXPENDED.
:1
ONLY ONE INSTANCE WHERE A PILOT WOULD BE ALLOWED
TO FIRE OF HIS OWN VOLITION: IF THE RCP INFORMS HIM THAT AN
UNIDENTIFIED TARGET IS CLOSING IN ON HIM, HE MAY FIRE IF HE
DETERMINES THAT THE TARGET IS AN ENEMY AIRCRAFT.
5. COMMAND FUNCTION AT THE RCP IS EXERCISED BY THE "SENIOR
RATED OFFICER OF THE COMMAND POST". CONTROLLERS FUNCTION ONLY
AS, CONTROLLERS. IN TRAINING, SUCH AS AT SA'LSK, STUDENT CONTROLLERS
CONTROLLED STUDENT PILOTS UNTIL THE FINAL STAGES AND THEN INSTRUCTOR
CONTROLLERS TOOK OVER.
25X1
6. TO ILLUSTRATE THE DEGREE OF CONTROL THAT THE RCP AND GCI
CONTROLLERS MAINTAIN OVER THE PILOTS,
RELATED THE FOLLOWING
HEARSAY INFORMATION: IN 1972 OR 1973, A MIG-21 PILOT RAMMED A
PHANTOM F-4 FLYING OUT TO TURKEY NEAR THE SOUTHERN COAST OF THE
BLACK SEA. THE MIG-21 PILOT WAS KILLED, THE F-4 PILOTS EJECTED.
:1
THE F - 4 WAS A TRAINER (PROBABLY BECAUSE OF ITS TWO
SEATS) THE MIG-21 HAD TAKEN OFF WITHOUT MISSILES AND WAS COMMANDED
TO VECTOR FOR A MISSILE PASS AT THE TARGET. THE PILOT NEVER RECEIVED
5
5
4
4
ANY COMMAND TO FIRE HIS CANNONS AND RAMMED THE F-4, MAYBE ACCIDENTLY.
3
3
2
2
(NFI)
1
1
$ SECRET
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(classification)
(dissem -
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-11-8
25X1
AIR FORCE COMMENT: VALIDITY OF THE HEARSAY INFORMATION IS
DOUBTFUL AS THE INFORMATION CANNOT BE CONFIRMED AT PRESENT.
:1
&
GERALD
RALD
5
GEL
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
.
SECRET
(classification)
(disi
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17
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013773
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re Soviet Air Force
CREATION DATE
11/30/1976
VOLUME
3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan — MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Sanitizel 9/21/05
9/28/10
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-12-7
DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exampted
E.O. 12058 (as amended) SEC 3.8
MR # 09-141
CIA etr 9/28/10
By dal NARA, Date 12/14/10
APVO REGIMENTAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
25X1
25X1
25X1
THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING
CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0474 76.
1. THE APVO REGIMENTAL MAINTENANCE SECTION COMMANDER TYPICALLY IS
A NONRATED LT. COLONEL WHO IS SUBORDINATE TO THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER.
HIS ENTIRE CAREER PROBABLY WILL HAVE BEEN IN MAINTENANCE AND HE WILL
5
PROBABLY POSSESS AN ENGINEERING DEGREE WITH A SPECIALTY IN AVIONICS,
5
4
4
3
ARMAMENT, ETC.
HE WILL HAVE PROGRESSED UP THROUGH THE RANKS IN
3
2
DIA review(s) completed.
USAF review(s) completed
2
1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-12-7
GERAID a FORD VIBRARY
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PO_EA_P-7-8-12-7
5X1
THE PVO.. HE IS GENERALLY UNDER
PRESSURE FROM THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER
TO HAVE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT READY.
2. THERE ARE TWO MAIN DIVISIONS IN THE MAINTENANCE SECTION:
THE ENGINEERING SECTIONS AND THE TECHNICAL EXPLOITATION BRANCH (TEB).
THE FIRST DIVISION IS SUBDIVIDED INTO SIX SECTIONS, EACH COMMANDED
BY A NONRATED MAJOR. THE SECTIONS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ROUTINE AIR-
CRAFT MAINTENANCE. THE SECTIONS ARE: ENGINE, WEAPONS/ARMAMENT,
AUTOPILOT (SAU), RADIO NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, RADAR EQUIPMENT, AND
AVIATION EQUIPMENT (GENERAL). AT THE REGIMENTAL LEVEL THESE SECTIONS
PRIMARILY SERVE A QUALITY CONTROL FUNCTION; THE "WORKING-BEE"
SPECIALISTS ARE MAINLY IN THE SQUADRON. THE SECOND DIVISION IS
SUBDIVIDED INTO THE SAME SECTIONS AS THE ENGINEERING SECTIONS AND
IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PHASE MAINTENANCE OF THE AIRCRAFT.
3. THERE IS A PRELIMINARY PREPARATION OF THE AIRCRAFT PRIOR 'JV. A FRIGHT. IN
ADDITION, BY REGULATION, THERE ARE TWO "SERVICING DAYS" PER MONTH.
FINALLY, A PHASE OR "SERIES" INSPECTION OF PARTICULAR COMPONENTS
OF AIRC AFT IS CONDUCTED WHEN DUE. THERE ARE TIME LIMITS BETWEEN MAINT-
ENANCE TASKS. DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF AIRCRAFT AND SYSTEM, MAINT -
ENANCE WORK IS DONE, FOR EXAMPLE, EVERY 50 HOURS. THERE ARE ALSO
5
5
4
24-HOUR, 100-HOUR, AND 200-HOUR JOBS. EACH TIMESPAN HAS ITS OWN
4
3
3
2
PARTICULAR CHECKLIST, AND ALL TECHNICAL WORK IS DONE AT THE
GERALD
2
1
1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-12-7
LIBRARY
(classification)
(dissen
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25X1
TECHNICAL EXPLOITATION SECTION (TECH). ENGINES ARE CHANGED APPROX-
IMATELY EVERY 200 TO 250 HOURS. OLD ENGINES ARE SENT TO À FACTORY
IN THE MOSCOW AREA AND ARE OVERHAULED.
:1
4.
THE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM DESCRIBED IS
ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS FOR FRONTAL AVIATION UNITS, BECAUSE PVO
INHERITED THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FROM THE SCVIET AIR FORCE (VVS).
AIR FORCE COMMENT: OTHER SOURCES HAVE INDICATED THAT REGIMENTAL
MAINTENANCE SECTION COMMANDERS ALSO POSSESS COLLEGE EDUCATIONS
FROM A MILITARY TECHNICAL SCHOOL (SUCH AS THE FOUR-YEAR DAUGAVPILS
AVIATION TECHNICAL SCHOOL, WHICH PARALLELS THE HIGHER AVIATION
SCHOOL SYSTEM FOR PILOTS).
:1
5
5
4
4
3
2
GERAL R. FORD 3 2 1
1
. SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-12-7
AMOUNT
(classification)
(diss.,
18
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013774
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re Soviet Air Force
CREATION DATE
12/01/1976
VOLUME
5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400274
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
7
FOLDER TITLE
Japan - MIG-25 Incident (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/05/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Sanitiza 9/21/05
9/28/10
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-13-6
18
DECLASSIF at/ portions DEC 8.3
E.O. 12
and
09-141 #26
CIA Its 9/28/10
By dal NARA, Date 12/14/10
:1
COMPOSITION OF AN APVO SQUADRON
25X1
25X1
THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND IS BEING
CIRCULATED IN DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AS IR 1 517 0473 76.
1. A TYPICAL APVO SQUADRON HAS 13 AIRCRAFT (12 FIGHTERS AND ONE
TRAINER) AND 16 PILOTS ASSIGNED. THREE SQUADRONS COMPOSE A REGIMENT.
SQUADRONS ARE DESIGNATED 1ST, 2ND OR 3RD AVIATION SQUADRON. THERE ARE N
5
EXCLUSIVE DESIGNATORS IN AN OPERATIONAL PVO SQUADRON AND NO NICKNAMES,5
4
4
3
CRESTS, OR PATCHES. THE SQUADRON'S ORGANIZATION IS COMPOSED OF
3
2
USAF review(s) completed,
2
1
DIA review(s) completed
1
SECRET
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LIBRARY
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5X1
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE UNITS.
25X1
20 TO A LIMITED EXTENT, THE OPERATIONS OF A PVO SQUADRON ARE
SIMILAR TO THOSE OF A REGIMENT. THE SQUADRON COMMANDER IS TYPICALLY
A LT. COLONEL INSTRUCTOR PILOT PILOT 1ST CLASS.
INCOMING
COMMANDER (OF THE MIG-25 UNIT) WAS A MAJOR WHO HAD RECENTLY GRADUATED
FROM SENIOR COMMANDER UPGRADE TRAINING. THE COMMANDER-DESIGNATE ASSUMES
COMMENSURATE RANK (WITH THE OLD COMP AMDER) COM UD. COURCE TM NOT
SURE WHETHER OR NOT ALL COMMANDERS HAD TO BE GRADUATES OF SENIOR
COMMANDER UPGRADE TRAINING.
:1
3. (IN
MIG-25 REGIMENT) THE SQUADRON COMMANDER HAD FIVE
DEPUTIES - EACH WITH THE RANK OF MAJOR. THE DEPUTY FOR POLITICAL AFFAII
MAINTAINED SQUADRON PARTY AFFAIRS AND ALSO WORKED WITH THE COMMUNIST
YOUTH LEAGUE. THE DEPUTY FOR FLIGHT TRAINING AND THE DEPUTY SQUADRON
COMMANDER WERE PILOTS. THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND THE ENGINEER (SQUADRON
MAINTENANCE OFFICER) WERE NONFLYING DEPUTIES. THERE WAS NO WEAPONS/
TACTICS OFFICER AT THE SQUADRON LEVEL.
4. EACH PVO SQUADRON IS SUBDIVIDED INTO THREE FLIGHTS - FOUR
PILOTS TO A FLIGHT. THE FLIGHT COMMANDER IS AN INSTRUCTOR PILOT BUT
NOT NECESSARILY A PILOT 1ST CLASS. THE FLIGHT COMMANDER HOLDS THE RANK
5
5
4
4
OF CAPTAIN AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRAINING THE PILOTS ASSIGNED TO
3
3
2
2
HIS FLIGHT. THE THREE PILOTS ASSIGNED MAY BE OF ANY CLASS, ANY RANK
1
1
FOR
SECRET
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(classi Hontion)
(dissem controls)
GERALD
LIBRARY
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-PC_EA_P-7-8-13-6
25X1
BELOW CAPTAIN, AND GENERALLY VARY IN EXPERIENCE LEVEL. EACH PILOT
IS TERMED A CREW COMMANDER (REFER TO THE PILOT CREW CHIEF RELATION-
SHIP DISCUSSED BELOW).
5. ONE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IS ASSIGNED FOR EACH PILOT POSITION IN
A FLIGHT (THREE FLIGHTS X FOUR PILOTS - 12 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT PER
SQUADRON). FOR READINESS (ALERT) PURPOSES, EACH PILOT IS ASSIGNED A
SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT. ON A DAILY BASIS, HE MAY FLY ANY OF THE ASSIGNED
AIRCRAFT. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO DEFINITE SCHEDULE, SIDE NUMBERS
(DEBRIEFER'S NOTE: TAIL NUMBERS IN U.S. TERMINOLOGY) CHANGE PERIODICALLY
(ONE MONTH TO SIX MONTH INTERVALS).
6. IN ADDITION TO BEING SUBORDINATE TO THE SQUADRON COMMANDER,
THE PVO SQUADRON MAINTENANCE OFFICER (ENGINEER) IS ALSO SUBORDINATE TO
THE REGIMENTAL MAINTENANCE OFFICER. HE IS NONRATED, HOLDS THE RANK OF
MAJOR, AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED
TO HIS SQUADRON.
7. THE SQUADRON MAINTENANCE SECTION IS COMPOSED OF SIX "SUBUNITS."
THE SUBUNITS SPECIALIZE IN ENGINE, WEAPONS/ARMAMENT, AUTOPILOT (SAU),
RADIO NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, RADAR EQUIPMENT, AND AVIATION EQUIPMENT
5
(GENERAL) SERVICES. THE MAJORITY OF ROUTINE MAINTENANCE IS ACCOMP-
5
1
4
3
LISHED AT SQUADRON LEVEL.
3
2
2
L
8. IN A SOVIET FIGHTER UNIT, EACH CREW CHIEF IS AN OFFICER WITH
1
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5X1
A FOUR-YEAR ENGINEERING DEGREE AND HOLDS A RANK OF SENIOR LIEUTENANT
OR LESS. HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTENANCE OF ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT AND
REPORTS TO THE PILOT TO WHOM THE AIRCRAFT IS ASSIGNED (FOR READINESS
PURPOSES). THE PILOT RATES THE CREW CHIEF, APPROVES LEAVE, ETC.
SHOULD THE AIRCRAFT GO TO "TECH" (REGIMENTAL MAINTENANCE) FOR PERIODIC
MAINTENANCE, THE CREW CHIEF ACCOMPANIES THE AIRCRAFT TO ASSIST IN
SOME OF THE WORK AND INSPECTIONS. TWO ENLISTED MEN ASSIST THE CREW
CHIEF IN ROUTINE MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS. PILOTS ARE TERMED CREW
COMMANDERS BECAUSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTS BETWEEN A PILOT
AND CREW CHIEF - THAT OF THE PILOT BEING THE CREW CHIEF'S REPORTING
OFFICIAL AND IN LINE OF COMMAND.
9. ALTHOUGH A CREW CHIEF IS AN OFFICER AND MAY BE OF RANK
25X1
EQUIVALENT TO THE PILOT (HIS CREW COMMANDER/REPORTING OFFICIAL)
ASSIGNED TO AN AIRCRAFT, HE DOES NOT ENJOY THE SAME PRESTIGE.
:1
CREW CHIEFS ARE TREATED POORLY IN TERMS OF RANK,
PROMOTIONS, AND OTHER OPPORTUNITIES - AND, DO NOT ENJOY AUTHORITY
COMMENSURATE TO RESPONSIBILITY. THE CREW CHIEFS DO NOT TAKE PRIDE IN
(1)
THEIR WORK BUT DO INSURE THAT MAINTENANCE IS PERFORMED CORRECTLY.
PILOTS TRUST THE CREW CHIEFS TO THE
5
5
4
4
POINT THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT AND FLY THE AIRCRAFT BASED ON THE CREW
3
3
2
CHIEF'S VERBAL ASSURANCE THAT THE AIRCRAFT IS OPERATIONALLY READY-
2
1
1
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(disse
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25X1
WITHOUT A PREFLIGHT CHECK. NONETHELESS, THE PILOTS PERFORM THE
PREFLIGHT CHECKS BY THE REGULATIONS. IF A MALFUNCTION RESULTING
IN AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT OCCURRED WHICH COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO A
CREW CHIEF ERROR, THE CREW CHIEF WOULD FACE STRICT DISCIPLINARY
ACTION - POSSIBLY INTERNMENT.
:1
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