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People's Republic of China (2)
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This file contains materials relating to the President's meeting with George Bush.
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Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)
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The original documents are located in Box 13, folder "People's Republic of China (2)" of
the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
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domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
45581
1a
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Bud:
This came in last night and thought
you should see it before giving it
to
General
Scowcroft.
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
to 36104
11
4558
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
if
UNITED STATES DE RTMENT OF COMMERCE
The Assistant Secretary for Domestic
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
and International Business
Washington, D.C. 20230
SECRET
October 1, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
From:
Seth M. Bodner
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Resources and Trade Assistance
Subject:
Cotton Textile Imports from the PRC
Some time ago Ambassador Eberle asked that I contact your office
with respect to an earlier memorandum on this subject which had
been circulated by me to Anthony Jurich of CIEP and to other agencies
concerned with textile import matters (copy attached).
Imports from the PRC have continued to increase and for the 12-month
period ending August 1974 amounted to 72. 2 million square yards
equivalent, continuing the PRC as a major supplier of cotton textiles
to the U.S. The most significant development here, however, is the
movement of this trade into apparel categories which have already
experienced a significant degree of market penetration by imports.
The continued growth of this uncontrolled trade from the PRC is
undermining the structure of our agreement program in which numerous
other governments have limited their textile exports to the U.S.
They obviously do not want to sacrifice their own trade opportunities
in the U.S. market in the name of avoiding disruption of that market
if the PRC--or other countries--are to be allowed uncontrolled access.
We have heard references to this uncontrolled trade from a number of
countries in informal discussions, and it will undoubtedly affect their
view of the U.S. in the broader context of our performance under the
multilateral textile arrangement reached in Geneva last year. In my
judgment it is essential that we move now into specific discussions
with the PRC with the view to achieving a prompt stabilization of their
SECRET
HR 5/9/01
BERALD R. FORD LIBRARA
SECRET
2
trade if we are to maintain an effective textile program to protect
domestic workers and the domestic industry from excessive low
cost import competition. I fully appreciate the sensitivities of
this area and the difficulties of singling out a special area of trade
at a time when their trade with us is so heavily in our favor. But
the textile issue has been long identified internationally as a unique one,
needing special treatment. I feel strongly that maintenance of the
textile program is of considerable importance to the Administration
at this time. I would note, in this regard, that the PRC would not be
likely to find such an approach by the U.S. as surprising or unusual
as they have negotiated textile restraints with Canada.
A policy resolution of this question is needed, and I would appreciate
your thoughts on how we might best proceed to move ahead on this item.
cc: Secretary Dent
Anthony Jurich
CLASSIFIED BY SETH M. BODNER
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED IN TWO
CALENDAR YEARS AND DECLASSIFIED
ON DECEMBER 31, 1982
SECRET
FORD : GERALD LIBRARY
SECRET
AUG 1 1974
MEMORANDUM TO HONORABLE ANTHONY J. JURICH
Chairman, Special Working Group for
Textile Policy, CIEP
The White House
From:
Seth M. Bodner, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Resources and Trade Assistance
Subject:
Cotton Textile Imports from PRC
Cotton textile imports from the People's Republic of China have
taken a very significant jump during recent months. A table
is attached (Tab A) setting out these figures, but, in essence,
the trade has moved from 33.4 million square yards in Calendar 1973
to 63.5 million square yards for the 12 months ending June 1974.
(Trade for the 12 months ending June 1973 was 32.4 million square
yards.) The bulk of the trade is in cotton fabrics, Categories 9,
19, and 26, but there is a growing trade in a great many categories
including apparel, At a level of 63.5 million square yards, the
PRC becomes the seventh largest supplier of cotton textiles to
the U. S. market, and also ranks number 7 compared with countries
whose exports are subject to restraint.
I understand that this volume of imports has caused a number of
world exporting countries having agreements with the United States
to question our intentions with respect to the PRC. We must
anticipate a serious challenge to the entire agreements program if
action is not taken to restrain these imports or to establish in
some way that can be publicized an agreement in principle on the
future level of this trade. I am particularly concerned about forth-
coming negotiations with Korea, not to mention our current con-
sultations with Romania and other countries scheduled during the
next several months.
The rise in this trade has also brought the issue to public attention.
Specific questions have been raised about these imports during
R.
SECRET
DELATE
FORD
HRS/9/01
SECRET
2
the most recent public meetings of the Management-Labor Textile
Advisory Committee. I indicated at that meeting that the
Government was aware of the trade and was giving careful con-
sideration to the matter.
Attached at Tab B is an earlier memorandum of July 11, 1973,
in which a proposed scenario for discussion with the People's
Republic of China was suggested.
It is my view, in light of the new multilateral arrangement and
in light of our obligations in connection with the renegotiation of
bilaterals thereunder, that immediate steps must be taken to
open consultations with the People's Republic of China. I believe
the scenario outlined in that memorandum is still valid although
some of the specifics have been overtaken by events, e.g.,
Category 26 was not mentioned and now accounts for some 4 million
square yards of imports.
In addition, we are dealing with 64 million square yards as opposed
to 24 million, and we are also dealing with a rapidly softening
market for all domestic textile and apparel products as opposed
to the tight market conditions we were experiencing at that time.
We must come to grips with this problem as soon as possible. I
trust that all agencies will have the matter reviewed at whatever
level is appropriate so that we can make a decision to move
forward at a very early date.
Attachments
Copies to:
Secretary Dent
CITA Members:
William Barreda
CLASSIFIED BY SETH M. BODNER
Herbert N. Blackman'
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATI
Michael B. Smith
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
Barbara Steinbock
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED IN TWO
bc:
Mr. Bodner
CALENDAR YEARS AND DECLASSIFIED
Mr. Garel
ON DECEMBER 31, 1982
SBodner/rhd
SECRET
GERALD R. FORD LIBRA
BRTA-9
Id
U.S. Get al Imports of Cotton Manufact
es
from Mainland China for Selected Periods
(Equivalent Square Yards)
LISAVAY GERALD FORD
Percent
Year
Year
Change
Calendar
June
Ending
Ending
Y/E 6-30/73-
Year 1973
1974
6/30/74
6/30/73
- 6/30/74
Total Cotton
33,383,292
12,529,294
63,519,785
32,433,699
+
95.9
Fabrics (5-27)
31,181,670
12,229,884
59,732,302
30,781,394
+
94.1
f of Total
93.4
97.6
94.0
94.9
Apparel (39-63)
1,669,896
245,992
2,857,992
1,145,803
+
149.4
s of Total
5.0
2.0
4.5
3.5
j
Made-up & Misc.
531,726
53,418
929,491
506,502
+
83.5
f of Total
1.6
0.4.
1.5
1.6
Category
6
50,000
50,000
----
it
7
5,100
54,125
-
90.6
8
16,956
85,780
102,736
---
:
9
2,328,487
1,854,245
11,947,481
2,008,610
+
494.8
>
10
---
----
15,120
-------------------------
I
15
52,313
-----
114,506
----
-----
16
157,552
----
157,552
----
-------------------------
18
68,900
----
68,900
-----
19
25,654,033
7,200,170
34,643,970
26,054,526
+
33.0
21
-----
14,623
14,623
-----
-----
22
1,621,110
967,937
7,718,002
1,651,092
+
367.5
23
-----
64,089
----
---
24
76,679
3,000
103,000
15,679
+ 556.9
26
1,149,706
1,567,417
3,943,692
938,862
+ 320.1
27
5,934
536,712
833,531
8,500
+ 9706.3
31
8,352
9,041
561,317
15,764
+ 3460.8
32
44,398
111
18,652
52,658
I
64.6
36
----
----
207
-----
i
39
1,115,590
----
1,136,399
632,745
+
79.6
40
----
----
575
-----
42
45,213
---
137,171
2,821
+ 4762.5
43
-----
----
21,058
10,938
+
92.5
45
------
-----
----
6,656
----
46
1,101
14,674
15,775
8,804
+
79.2
48
-----
1,250
----
-----
49
59,704
119,340
536,707
87,069
+ 516.4
50
18,225
17,085
17,797
24,987
-
28.8
51
43,140
10,678
130,453
17,975
+ 625.8
53
----
---
---
362
----
54
-----
----
25,000
---
-----
55
-----
-----
----
8,925
i
56
----
---
---
460
---
57
----
349
349
563
-
38.0
58
----
-----
440
-----
-------------------------
60
13,614
15,588
25,045
70,666
I
64.6
62
552
---
13,303
4,397
+
202.6
63
372,757
68,278
797,245
267,854
+
197.6
64
478,976
44,266
349,315
438,086
-
20.3
Cotton imports from Mainlan China show an increase of 95. for year ending June 1974
over year ending June 1973 and 19.6% over year ending May 1974. For year ending
June 1974, Fabrics account for 94.0% of total imports compared to 94.9% for year
ending June 1973. Category 19 accounts for 54.5% of total imports for year ending
June 1974, and 58% of fabric imports for year ending June 1974. For year ending
June 1973 Category 19 was 80.3% of total imports and 84.6% of fabric imports.
Prepared by:
Implementation Divísion
Office of Textiles
July 30, 1974
GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY
le
SECRET
July 11, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT D. HORMATS
Senior Staff Member for
International Economic Affairs
National Security Council
From:
Seth M. Bodner 151
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Resources and Trade Assistance
Anthony J. Jurich and 151.
Chairman, Special Working Group for
Textile Trade Policy
The White House
Subject: Cotton Textile Imports from PRC
Recent statistics continue to show the need to take action with
respect to cotton textile imports from the People's Republic of
China. In addition to the rapid rise of cotton textile imports,
we are in a particularly sensitive situation relative to our
equity provisions with third countries, As you are well aware,
we are currently engaged in a major international effort to
secure a new multilateral multifiber agreement. One of the
charges being loveled at the developed countries, including the
United States, is that some of our actions have been discrimi-
natory. Therefore, in addition to the potential economic reasons
of the rate of increase we are now experiencing, we must reach
some understanding with the PRC before we are officially accused
of discriminating in their favor. Obviously, we also have a
domestic problem with the U.S. industry which is already aware
that significant increases are taking place.
It is our view that such discussions should take place now
before the situation becomes serious either internationally or
domestically. Information has been received that indicates the
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY Deptof Commerce memo 3/21/96
DEALO R. FORD
BY
HR
NLF, DATE 5/9/01
LIBRARA
SECRET
2
PRC views the textile sector as a major element in its export
plans which further supports our position that we reach an
understanding before the problem gets out of hand,
For the twelve months ending May, imports in Categories 18/19
(print cloth) amounted to 24 million square yards equivalent.
Total imports in all cotton textile categories amounted to
about 31 million square yards equivalent.
While the domestic market is strong, and even tight, in these
products the PRC is now by far our largest single supplier.
Imports from this uncontrolled 10w-cost supplier already ex-
ceed the level of imports permitted from all countries which
have signed bilateral agreements with the United States and
which we hope will support the United States position in the
coming stages of the multilateral textile negotiations. Some
examples are Thailand, where the aggregato limit for all cot-
ton textiles is 15 million square yards, and India, where the
limit for textiles in Categories 18/19 is 6.6 million yards,
Imports from the PRC are priced extremely low, 16 cents per
square yard for print cloth, for example. This is about the
same level as that of our lowest priced textiles, from India
and Pakistan. This is about 30 percent below domestic prices.
We are now in the process of negotiating an increase in that
yardage with India in return for its support in the Geneva
negotiations. India was-particularly helpful at a crucial
point last week, and can be expected to cooperate, provided
we go through the deal we have already begun to negotiate.
Negotiations were held with Pakistan this past week along these
same lines, and were successfully concluded. Our ability to
negotiate commitments of support in the multilateral negotiations
in return for granting increases in those categories will be
seriously undercut if, at the same time, imports from Communist
China remain uncontrolled. In addition, our relation with less
important suppliers presently under bilateral agreement with us
will also be jeopardized.
Accordingly, we recommend immediate action to continue discussions
with the PRC representatives in Washington, with a view to reaching
agreement for the restraint of textile imports of Categories 18/19
SECRET
R.
FORD
GERALD
LISEART
SECRET
3
and also with a view to negotiating a more comprehensive bi-
lateral arrangement on textiles. We have been advised that
the PRC negotiated restraints with the Canadian Government on
several occasions. The Canadians tell us that the Chinese
approached these negotiations in a businesslike manner exactly
as other countries have approached such negotiations with
Canada. The Chinese, in the view of the Canadians, are quite
familiar with international textile trade rules, and would not
ordinarily make an unusual political issue of it. Further de-
tails on the Canadian restraints, and on PRC restraints with
third countries, are attached at Tab A.
We would propose to make the following points to the Washington
representatives of the PRC:
1. Call attention to rapid rise of PRC imports and com-
pare with import limitations on the same categories under U.S.
cotton textile agreements with other countries. (Comparison
table attached at Tab B.)
C
2. Note United States equity obligations arising from
other bilaterals and from the Long-Term Arrangement, coupled
with U.S. policy on textiles which, while contemplating sub-
stantial flexibility in negotiation of restraint levels, does
not contemplate decontrol.
3. Note United States desire to avoid formal invocation
of Article 3, unilateral-restraint pursuant to the Long-Term
Arrangement and our preference to establish bilateral agrec-
ment, 1.0., an understanding pursuant to which the PRC would
limit its exports of these products to the United States.
(We are particularly concerned with Categories 18/19 but
would prefer to consider a broader bilateral comprehensive
textile arrangement.)
4. We believe that the present 24 million yards of
imports of these products is excessive and cannot be accommo-
dated without disruption in United States textile relations
with third countries. Recent monthly rates are even higher
and, if unchecked, will very shortly create serious problems
for us,
SECRET
&
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
4
5. We would like PRC concurrence to a restraint which
would be expressed publicly 50 that U.S. industry and third
countries would be aware of its existence and of the level
established. It should be done in an enforceable form
should that become necessary.
In view of the continuing substantial increases in these imports,
and the unsettling effect it will have with India, Pakistan, and
other suppliers, we recommend that this effort with the PRC be
opened as promptly as possible. For purposes of continuity, and
for your own education, we would be delighted to have you join
us in any meetings with PRC officials. In our view, the first
session should explain our problems, domestically and inter-
nationally, to be followed by a second session which would go
into more details. This would allow them time to evaluate
their own position and be prepared to discuss specifics,
Attachments
SBodner/AJurich/lit
cc: Mr. Bodner (2)
Mr. Jurich
Mr. Garel
subject
chron
Peter Flanigan
SECRET
BERALD R. FORD
if
TAB A
CANADA
Imports of most textiles and textile products into Canada from
Mainland China wore openly controlled through 1967. Since
1967, Canadian authorities have supplied the Chinese export
corporations with "indicative" lists of products and levels of
imports which would not be disruptive.
Canada also maintains quotas on imports of certain textile and
apparel products with prevailing duties being charged for im-
ports within the quota and surtax on imports in excess of
quota. These quotas relate to all low wage countries. Infor-
mally, we understand that Canada has negotiated more specific
restraints than the available public record shows.
UNITED KINGDOM
Imports of practically all textiles and appare1 from Mainland
China are subject to quotas, Most of the quotas are expressed
in value of imports,
AUSTRIA
Imports of textiles and apparel from Mainland China are subject
to an intergovernmental trade agreement effective November 1,
1972. Quotas are not established under agreement, but various
textile and apparel items were listed as "essential" product
of exchange.
DENMARK
Danish-Chinese trade agreement includes a ceiling of $1,866,200
for all textiles imported into Denmark from Mainland China.
FRANCE
France maintains quantitative restrictions on imports of textiles
and apparel from all non-OECD countries (ex Japan).
FORD i LIBRARY
2
WEST GERMANY
Germany issues licenses for imports from a number of countries,
probably including Mainland China, up to established but not
published quotas.
ITALY
Ceilings expressed in value are applicable on imports of most
textile and apparel items imported from Mainland China.
SWEDEN
Import licenses are required on imports from Eastern area
countries including Mainland China and specific quotas are es-
tablished when necessary.
BENELUX
The imports are subject to "price checking" system.
SWITZERLAND
Switzerland maintains a price surveillance system and Swiss
authorities have discretion to refuse to grant import licenses
if the margins between prices of imported and domestic products
are 10 percent for cotton fabrics, 12 percent for wool fabrics,
and 20 percent for finished articles.
FORD i GERALD LIBRARY
1g
TAB B
Categories 18/19, Print Cloth
Unrestrainted PRC 24 Million Square Yards
Restraint Levels
Countries
(million square yards)
Brazil
11.6 (Includes print cloth from Category 26)
Republic of China
1.7
Colombia 1/
1.3
India
6.6
Republic of Korea
2.9 (Includes print cloth from Category 26)
Malaysia
2.0 (Includes print cloth from Category 26)
Pakistan
17.3 (Includes print cloth from Category 26)
Poland
1,2
Romania
1.8
Spain
9.8 (Includes print cloth from Category 26)
Thailand
2.0
Yugoslavia
0.6
1/
Includes Category 19 only - Category 18 is subject to undue
concentration clause.
FORD & 076839 LIBRARY
Office of Textiles
July 11, 1973
REPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
addon4558
UNITED STATES PARTMENT OF COMMERCE
The Assistant Se tary for Domestic
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
and International Business
ih
Washington, D.C. 20230
DEC 11 1974
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
From:
Alan Polansky
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Resources and Trade Assistance
Subject
Cotton Textile Imports from the PRC
Imports from the PRC have continued to increase since Seth
Bodner's October 1, 1974 memorandum to you on this subject.
In the year ending October, imports totaled 81.3 million
square yards, compared to the year ending August 72.2
million square yards equivalent mentioned in the October 1
memorandum. Of this amount, 75.6 million square yards were
entered in the January through October period. So far this
calendar year, the PRC is the third largest major supplier
of cotton textiles to the United States, exceeded only by
India and Hong Kong, and higher than that of such traditional
suppliers as Taiwan, Japan, Pakistan, Mexico and Brazil.
Another factor has been added to those mentioned in the
October 1 Bodner memorandum, that is, the domestic industry
is now in a depressed state. Prices of cotton textiles have
declined sharply, employment is down substantially, and many
mills are on short workweeks or are closing for extended
periods of time.
The continued increase in imports of cotton textiles from the
PRC, in light of the depressed domestic market conditions and
at a rate above that of almost all of our traditional suppliers,
places the entire textile program under additional pressure.
If we are to maintain an effective textile program to protect
domestic workers and the domestic industry from excessive low
SECRET
HR 5/9/01
LIBRARY GERALD ? FORD
2
SECRET
import cost competition and to fulfill our commitments of
equity to our other bilateral partners, it is essential that
we move quickly into discussions with the PRC to stabilize
the trade.
I would appreciate hearing from you on this matter.
CLASSIFIED BY ARTHUR GAREL
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED IN TWO
CALENDAR YEARS AND DECLASSIFIED ON
DECEMBER 31, 1982
SECRET
143 3
DOC
RECD
NBR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
Bodner, m MO DA
MO
DA
HR
10
312
AN
7404558 740 4558
Solomon NITIAL ACTION o
REFERENCE:
CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
TO: PRES
FROM: KISSINGER,H.
5/5
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KISSINGER
COLBY, W
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+
SCHLESINGER, J
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SUBJECT: Connery DAVIS funds STE SEC New $ TS SENSITIVE CODEWORD
Calten INTERNAL ROUTING Infile AND DISTRIBUTION Imports from PRC
REC
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(
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CLOSE DD
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(NBC-147)
2
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEETING WITH GEORGE BUSH
CHIEF OF U.S. LIAISON OFFICE, PEKING
Tuesday, October 15, 1974
12:30 p.m. (10 minutes)
The Oval Office
From: Henry A. Kissinger
D5
I.
PURPOSE
To underline your personal interest in US relations with Peking
and the importance you attach to Ambassador Bush's assignment.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: Ambassador Bush leaves Washington
October 17 and will arrive in Peking October 21. He has
spent much of the past month getting briefed for his new
position. He met briefly with Secretary Kissinger and
attended the Secretary's dinner in New York for Vice
Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, the head of the Peking
delegationto the UN General Assembly. Ambassador Huang
Chen, the Chief of the PRC Liaison Office in Washington,
gave a dinner in his honor last night.
B. Participants: Ambassador Bush and Brent Scowcroft.
C. Press Arrangements: Press photo session. Meeting to be
announced.
III.
TALKING POINTS
1. I attach great importance to the US-PRC relationship and
to your responsibilities in Peking.
2. During your initial calls, please convey my best wishes to
Chairman Mao and Premier Chou (including my hope that
SECRET - GDS
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
HR 5/9/01
SECRET
2
Chou will recover his health). Also, please reaffirm to
them the validity of past US-PRC understandings and my
dedication to the continued normalization of relations
between our two countries. (Ambassador Bush probably
will not see Mao, and perhaps not Chou, during his initial
calls, but he can convey the messages through the Foreign
Ministry.)
3. I am confident that you will take in stride some of the
frustrations of working and living in Peking, including
the low-key nature of our public posture there.
4. You will have an opportunity to participate in the high-level
talks with the Chinese during Secretary Kissinger's upcoming
visit to Peking. Those talks will play an important part
in deciding our next steps in normalizing relations.
5. I look forward to your reports about conditions in the PRC
and the future course of US-PRC relations.
&
FORD
SECRET - GDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
4351 D
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
October 14, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
W.R. Smyser 8
SUBJECT:
The President's Meeting with George Bush
Attached is a memorandum to the President giving him talking points for
his meeting with George Bush on October 15, our new Chief of the U.S.
Liaison Office in Peking.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the attached memorandum to the President
SECRET/GDS
HR 5/9/01
R.
FORD
GERALD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEETING WITH GEORGE BUSH
CHIEF OF U.S. LIAISON OFFICE, PEKING
Tuesday, October 15, 1974
12:30 p.m. (10 minutes)
The Oval Office
From: Henry A. Kissinger
I.
PURPOSE
To underline your personal interest in US relations with Peking
and the importance you attach to Ambassador Bush's assignment.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: Ambassador Bush leaves Washington
October 17 and will arrive in Peking October 21. He has
spent much of the past month getting briefed for his new
position. He met briefly with Secretary Kissinger and
attended the Secretary's dinner in New York for Vice
Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, the head of the Peking
delegationto the UN General Assembly. Ambassador Huang
Chen, the Chief of the PRC Liaison Office in Washington,
gave a dinner in his honor last night.
B. Participants: Ambassador Bush and Brent Scowcroft.
C. Press Arrangements: Press photo session. Meeting to be
announced.
III.
TALKING POINTS
1. I attach great importance to the US-PRC relationship and
to your responsibilities in Peking.
2. During your initial calls, please convey my best wishes to
Chairman Mao and Premier Chou (including my hope that
GERALD GERALD R. FORD
SECRET - GDS
HR 5/9/01
SECRET
2
Chou will recover his health). Also, please reaffirm to
them the validity of past US-PRC understandings and my
dedication to the continued normalization of relations
between our two countries. (Ambassador Bush probably
will not see Mao, and perhaps not Chou, during his initial
calls, but he can convey the messages through the Foreign
Ministry.)
3. I am confident that you will take in stride some of the
frustrations of working and living in Peking, including
the low-key nature of our public posture there.
4. You will have an opportunity to participate in the high-level
talks with the Chinese during Secretary Kissinger's upcoming
visit to Peking. Those talks will play an important part
in deciding our next steps in normalizing relations.
5.
I look forward to your reports about conditions in the PRC
and the future course of US-PRC relations.
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
SECRET - GDS
send staffing copy.
THE WHITE HOUSE
up Zo GeA.S.
WASHINGTON
October 12, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
WARREN RUSTAND WSR
SUBJECT:
Approved Presidential Activity
Please take the necessary steps to implement the following and confirm
with Mrs. Nell Yates, ext. 2699. The appropriate briefing paper should
be submitted to Dr. David Hoopes.
Event: Meeting with George Bush
Date: Tuesday, October 15, 1974 Time: 12:30 p.m. Duration: 10 mins.
Location: The Oval Office
Purpose: Bush is departing for China on October 16 or 17
Press Coverage: White House Photographer
cc:
Mr. Hartmann
Mr. Marsh
Mr. Cheney
Dr. Hoopes
Mr. Jones
Mr. Nessen
Mr. O'Donnell
Mrs. Yates
Mrs. Davis
Mr. Theis
FORD R. GERALD LIBRARY
DOC
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INITIAL ACTION o
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MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
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OCT 18 1974
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Oct. 29, 1974
Mrs. Davis:
The attached message
has already been sent. Solomon
has copy.
eddy
MEMORANDUM
4128-X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
October 28, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
RICHARD H. SOLOMON
faks
SUBJECT:
Message to the Secretary Regarding My
Conversation with PRCLO Official
Per our conversation on Saturday, at Tab A is a suggested message to
the Secretary reporting my conversation with Chi Ch'ao-chu of the PRC
Liaison Office, in which Chi floated several "signals" regarding nor-
malization of U.S. - PRC relations.
I have tried to give as full and accurate account of this discussion as
possible, for I think it is of some importance as an indication of Chinese
concerns to move ahead on this issue. If, however, you feel the mes-
sage is too long, or that it might be properly edited in some other manner,
please feel free to do so.
Given Ambassador Bush's call on Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua
tomorrow, you may wish to repeat this message via the Voyager channel
to Peking.
Recommendation:
That you approve the message to Secretary Kissinger at Tab A.
Approve as 2nd
Disapprove
That you repeat this report to Peking for Ambassador Bush's information.
Approve
Disapprove
FORD & LIBRARY 938870
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TD 9/26/02
BY,
HR NARA, DATE 1/30/03
3d
TOP SECRET /SENSI VE
wired
7:30 pm
TOHAK # 55
10/28/74
FROM:
RICHARD H. SOLOMON
SUBJECT:
PRCLO Political Officer's Comments on
U.S. - PRC Normalization
1. Summary: At an informal family dinner on October 25, PRCLO
Interpreter and Political Officer Chi Ch'ao-chu took me aside to
emphasize a number of points regarding normalization of relations.
He initially expressed some surprise and concern about your charac-
terization of his country as "Communist China" in the James Reston
interview published in the New York Times on October 13. He also
said that he was surprised to see you imply that China needed to import
grain. He said he thought it was understood that his country did not
need the grain, but imported it for "other reasons. 11 After dinner, Chi
took me aside to a separate room for further discussion. He emphasized
four points regarding normalization of relations. The first three were
quite familiar: (1) normalization has to be on the "Japanese pattern";
(2) the U.S. should place no obstacles in the way of unification of Taiwan
with the mainland; (3) a normalization agreement cannot create a
situation of "one China, two governments" or "one China, one Taiwan."
The fourth point was an interesting indication of some anxiety in Peking
about moving ahead to complete the normalization process. Chi said that
it is hoped
the process of working out an agreement will not
become "stretched out. "
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TO 9/26/02
FORD i 938870 LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET
BY,
HR NARA, DATE 1/30/03
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
2. Seen in the context of your October 2nd dinner discussion with
Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, and your forthcoming trip to
Peking in late November, Chi's purposeful comments appear to be a
clear signal from Peking expressing interest in seriously con-
fronting the issue of a normalization agreement, despite official com-
ments about China not being in a hurry to establish formal diplomatic
relations. [In fact, the leadership in Peking is probably anxious to
conclude a basic agreement and avoid a drawn-out negotiating process
which would either get caught up in their internal situation or put them
up against the possibility of a further leadership transition in the U.S.
at the time of the 1976 Presidential election.
End Summary.
3. In return for an informal luncheon which I had hosted for PRCLO
Political Counselor Tsien Ta-yung and Interpreter/Political Officer
Chi Ch'ao-chu in April of this year, the two officers invited me and
my family, children included, to an informal dinner at the official
residence of Ambassador Huang Chen on October 25. Unexpectedly,
Chi Ch'ao-chu took the occasion of the dinner to "exchange views" that
seem to represent a clear and official -- if informally conveyed --
message of Peking's concerns about the state of U.S.-PRC normaliza-
tion on the eve of your forthcoming trip to Peking.
4. Shortly after arriving at Ambassador Huang's official residence
at 23rd and S Street, and after a brief tour of the first floor of the
FORD & 07V830 LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
building, Chi steered me to one end of the large living room while
Tsien Ta-yung and his wife entertained the rest of the family at the
other end of the room. Chi began by commenting that he had recently
accompanied Tsien to New York where they had acquainted themselves
with the contents of your October 2nd dinner discussion with Vice
Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua. Chi asked me what my impressions
of the meeting were. I replied that it was evident that we were in a
particularly delicate period of the transition process:
I observed that
while you had clearly indicated the problems we had to confront in
reaching a normalization agreement, at the same time you and the
President had affirmed on several occasions the Administration's
intention to complete the normalization process.
5. Chi then commented on your recent interview with James Reston,
published in the New York Times on October 13. He said he was sur-
prised and disturbed by your characterization of the PRC as "Communist
China. " He also said he could not agree with your comment that his
country needed to import food grains. He said he thought it was under-
stood that China did not "need" to import such grain. They did so for
"other reasons. 11 I replied that I saw no great significance in your use
"Communist China."
of the term / I commented that such things also seem to occur on their
side. I recalled for Chi that Senator Fulbright, during the recent
Congressional tour of China, had expressed concern to Vice Premier
FORD & 07V830 LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SEGRET/SENSIT E
4
Teng Hsiao-p'ing about the way PRC media continue to refer to
the United States as "U.S. imperialism."
6. I then asked Chi if he had had an opportunity to gain any of Senator
Fulbright's impressions of his trip to China. Chi commented that he
with
had not. I replied that your interview + Reston seemed to me to
emphasize the growing interdependence of the countries of the world.
I said that in contrast some of our public officials, like Senator F ulbright,
were much more isolationist in their view of world affairs. I said it was
my impression that Senator Fulbright was somewhat disturbed about
Peking's foreign policy orientation as a result of his trip to China. I said
the Senator was surprised at the way PRC leaders brushed aside the
Soviet threat to China, while warning the U.S. that the Russians were
really threatening American interests. At the same time, Fulbright
was surprised to hear leaders like Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Ch'iao Kuan-hua
comment so favorably on the American troop presence in Japan or in
had
Europe. He also/noted the efforts that China is making to build good
relations with so-called Third World countries, in the context of
continuing attacks on both "U.S. imperialism" and "Soviet social
imperialism. " I added at this point that you had commented to Ch'iao
Kuan-hua on October 2 that PRC media now seemed to be characterizing
the United States in terms more equivalent to their attacks on the Soviet
Union. I said that Fulbright, apparently drew the conclusion from his experience
that China wants the U.S. to maintain a presence abroad to counter
FORD & LIBRARY 07V839
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SEGRET/SENSHIVE
5
Soviet expansionism -- which is clearly of some benefit to China's
security -- while at the same time China attacks the U.S. as an imperialist
building
superpower and is / a coalition in the "Third World" to be used against
us. I said that while you understand the thrust of China's foreign policy,
men like Senator Fulbright, who have some Congressional influence over
the evolution of our relationship, show some concern about maintaining
our security commitments abroad, especially when they feel we are
being used.
7. At this point the conversation shifted to informal topics as we went
into the dining room for the evening meal. After dinner, Chi again
steered me away from the rest of the group, this time suggesting that
the two of us sit in a small drawing room. While he did not explicitly
say his comments were made at the direction of either Ambassador
Huang Chen or officials in Peking, the precise way he structured his
presentation, as well as the usual reticence of PRC officials to make
forthcoming comments on matters of substance unless formally instructed
to do so, leaves little doubt in my mind that this was a purposeful signal.
8. Chi resumed the discussion by saying he wanted to make some
additional comments on the topics we had been exploring before dinner,
adding that he had several points he wanted to make regarding normaliza-
tion of relations. He said that he hoped it was understood that normali-
zation had to be on the Japanese pattern. I replied that based on your
LIBRARY GERALD B. FORD
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSIT E
6
conversation with Chairman Mao last November, as well as subsequent
the
A remarks by of Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao we had no question in our
unre very chan on this cont
minds that this was the preference of his government. I reiterated your
comments to Ch'iao on October 2 that our understanding is that the
"Japanese model" involves moving our embassy from Taipei to Peking
but that we need to have some residual representation in Taiwan, either
a liaison office or a consulate.
9. Chi continued by saying that the U.S. should place no obstacles in the
way of an eventual resolution of the relationship of Taiwan to the PRC.
I queried him as to whether he saw the United States now doing anything
which constituted the creation of obstacles. He said no, there was nothing
we were doing at present that could be characterized in this way, but then
recalled the remark which Ch'iao Kuan-hua had made to Ambassador Bruce
in April regarding the Unger appointment and the ROC consulates. I
responded that we were frankly a bit surprised at the strength of Peking's
reaction to these developments, inasmuch as they had occurred in the
context of our military withdrawals from Taiwan, of which we had informed
them. I said that the largely proforma developments of the Unger appoint-
ment and the consulates had to be weighed against the substantive action
of the military withdrawal, which was carried out in the spirit of the
Shanghai Communique. characterized the situation in terms of
"feinting towards the East, while in fact moving toward the West, 11 and
suggested that it was in neither of our interests to panic Taipei into some
rash action or to create a situation of political chaos on the island. added
that some people had speculated that the strength of the
FORD : 07V839 LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
7
PRC's reaction to the Unger appointment and the consulates might
have reflected
debate within China about the policy of normalising
U.S.- PRC relations. Chi made no comment on this remark.
10. Chi continued by saying that in normalizing relations we should not
do it in a way that would lead to a "one China, two governments" solution,
or "one China, one Taiwan. " I said that we understood this point of view
very clearly.
11. Chi then made a final point which was less formally articulated
than his first three points, although it is perhaps the most important
signal of the entire exchange. /He said he hoped the process of normali-
zation "would not be stretched out. " I replied by reiterating the timetable
you had communicated to iao Kuan hua during the October dinner,
and recalled your comment that the question of timing was basically
related to whether or not "our problems are ripe for overcoming, " and
that this was a matter of
finding an acceptable way of resolving
the issue of "peaceful transition" for Taiwan. Chi said that their position
on this matter had been made clear for many years, they could not
formally commit themselves to such a solution. I replied that I was not
authorized to get into this particular area in any detail, but Lit was my
personal impression that both you and the President were quite con-
cerned about the impact on Soviet assessments of our intentions, as
is
FORD,
well as the confidence of our allies, should we normalize in such a way
GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
8
that we appeared to be just abandoning a security commitment
I
mentioned that it was in our mutual interest that Japan, for example,
not have doubts about the constancy of our defense role. I reviewed
the history of the 1949-50 period where, according to my interpretation
of events, President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson had said
Korea was not part of America's security concerns, and how this had lead
the Soviets to stimulate the North Koreans to attack the South in hopes
that this would put Russia in commanding position on the Korean peninsula
to outflank both China and Japan. I said the U.S. remained concerned
about North Korea's intentions, and if our actions regarding Taiwan
caused them to feel we would, once again, be unresponsive to renewed
pressure on South Korea, this could complicate China's security as well
as our own. For this reason, I said, we appeared to have a mutual
interest in resolving the Taiwan issue in a way which did not destabilize
areas of common concern to the security of our two countries. I added,
reiterating another of your comments to Ch'iao, that it was not in our
common interest to normalize in such a way that our relationship became
controversial in Congress or in our public political debate
in the way that "detente" with the Soviet Union is now subject to attack.
12. I sontinued that while I personally remained hopeful that full nor-
malization could be achieved, I was somewhat disturbed by a recent
change in Peking's foreign policy orientation. I said it was evident that
one reason the Shanghai Communique had been achieved was that both
FORD is 07V839 LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
9
sides, aware of their mutual concern about "hegemony," had reached
a common position on the most delicate issue of Taiwan in a spirit of
mutual accommodation. I said that over the past year we had noted
Chinese leaders repeatedly saying that the Soviet threat was not directed
at China so much as the West, and that countering the Russians was
America's problem, whereas the Chinese were not worried but were
prepared for any eventuality. I\said I did not want to get into an un-
productive debate about where the Soviet threat really was directed,
and noted that views had been thoroughly exchanged on this question.
However, I said, one implication that could be drawn from the Chinese
position was that they no longer felt the sense of common interest in
working with the United States to deal with the problem of "hegemony."
I said that if this was the case I was personally concerned that there
would not be that spirit of mutual accommodation which had made
possible the agreements which led to the Shanghai Communique. Chi
replied by saying that we did have our differences on some aspects of
the Soviet threat, but that as far as our relations are concerned he
felt it was appropriate to quote a phrase of Chairman Mao's that,
"although there are twists and turns in the road ahead, the future is
still bright."
FORD & 976839 LIBRARY
13. I responded that this was certainly my hope, and that we were well
aware of the continuity that Chairman Mao personally brought to a policy
of improving U.S.-PRC relations. I noted that he had first expressed
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
10
such an interest in 1944, but then added that one additional point of
concern for the U.S. was the question of whether there would be continuity
in the Chairman's foreign policy when his successors took the helm. I
said that some American observers were puzzled by the continuing criticism
of Lin Piao more than three years after his disappearance. Some people
speculated this was because there was debate in the PRC military about
the Chairman's policy of cooperating with the United States to oppose the
Soviet Union. I recalled the history of opposition to the Chairman's policy
toward the Soviet Union from the military dating back to the Peng Teh-
huai incident in 1959, and noted that the Chairman had explicitly told
President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger that there were some people
in China opposed to his policy of dealing with the U.S. Chi allowed as
how of course there were differences of opinion, but he emphasized that
the Chairman's policy was broadly disseminated to the party cadre and
that there would be continuity. I responded by recalling that Chairman
Mao had told you that he was prepared to wait a hundred years on the
Taiwan issue. I said that while we had no doubts about the Chairman's
word, it was likely that quite a few leaders would succeed the Chairman
before the hundred year period was up. I raised the rhetorical question
of how the Chairman's comment might be given concrete expression,
not just one that was private but which would be politically meaningful
GERALD R. FORD
when we tried to explain a normalization agreement to our Congress and
public. I reiterated to Chi that I was speaking personally and had not
been authorized to explore this issue, but that such questions were worth
thinking about,
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
11
14. Comment: Inasmuch as PRC cadre almost never get into issues
of substance unless instructed to do so, and given the precise and
focussed nature of his presentation, I can only assume that Chi was
seeking to pass you a signal on behalf of his superiors in Peking. The
of
central message / this exchange, of course, is that Peking wants to move
to a concrete discussion of a normalization agreement. In reiterating
the now familiar points about normalization on the Japanese pattern,
about not wanting the U.S. to place any obstacles in the way of reunifica-
tion with Taiwan, and by emphasizing that no normalization agreement
can include a "one China, two governments" or "one China, one
Taiwan" arrangement, Chi was emphasizing the parameters which
Peking hopes will be incorporated into an agreement.. The most
interesting of his comments, however, was the explicit statement that
he hopes the process of normalization will not be "stretched out" --
this in the context of other authoritative statements to the effect that
"China is in no hurry to normalize." In fact, of course, Mao and Chou
are in a hurry, both because of their age and the degree to which they
have committed their foreign policy to an improvement in relations
with the U.S. These factors, along with their continuing -- if more
muted -- fears of the Soviet Union, will constitute your major levers
in discussing a normalization agreement next month.
FORD & LIBRARY 076839
15. In responding to Chi's comments I sought to
with Chiad.
stay within the confines of your past official discussionsA although I did try
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
12
to provide a little more "elbow room" for negotiations by emphasizing
concern about what the U.S. can expect in the way of continuity in the
Chairman's current "America policy, " and by stressing that I did not
think the Administration would see it in the interest of either the U.S. or
of Peking to conclude a normalization agreement which would appear
to be abandoning Taiwan to its fate. We could not afford to raise doubts
about the constancy of America's purposes in security matters in
Moscow, Tokyo, or elsewhere, or by making our relationship contro-
versial in our domestic political debate.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE