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People's Republic of China (5)
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1553798
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People's Republic of China (5)
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Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)
East Asia and Pacific Country Files
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Europe
Cambodia
Iraq
Pakistan
Soviet Union
China
Korea (North)
Iran
Vietnam
Canada
Arab-Israeli relations
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1975-05-31
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1975
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The original documents are located in Box 13, folder "People's Republic of China (5)" of
the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 13 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
la
MEMORANDUM
1582-X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET
March 13, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
RICHARD H. SOLOMON
SUBJECT:
A Reply to George Bush
George Bush sent you a backchannel message yesterday (Tab B)
calling your attention to a discussion he had with Zambian Foreign
Minister Mwanga, who called at USLO on March 11. Ambassador
Bush notes that Mwanga will be visiting Washington with Zambia's
President Kaunda in the middle of next month.
Ambassador Bush requests that the President, Secretary, or
yourself mention to Foreign Minister Mwanga how much George
Bush appreciated his coming to call on him at USLO.
I have checked with Hal Horan, who is aware of the communication,
and he indicates that he feels that the "thank you" would be most
appropriately done by the Secretary. He plans to work something
into Dr. Kissinger's talking points for his meetings with President
Kaunda and his Foreign Minister.
I have prepared, at Tab A, a brief note of reply from you to
Ambassador Bush.
Recommendation:
That you approve the cable to Ambassador Bush at Tab A.
Approve B Disapprove
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
LISRARY GERALD R. FORD
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
SECRET XGDS (5b(3))
BY
HR
NARA, DATE 5/9/01
FORD i LIBRARY
I
IC
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
Sit Room has LABA
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
Id
Retyped - 3/17/75
Gen. Scowcroft/feb
ACTION
SECRET
1582-X
VIA VOYAGER CHANNEL
TO:
AMBASSADOR GEORGE BUSH
USLO PEKING
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
1. I appreciated your message of March 12, in which you reported
the Zambian Foreign Minister's call on you at USLO.
2. We will see that the Secretary thanks Mr. Mwanga for his
thoughffulness in dropping by to see you.
3. We will be sending out Jim Lilley's replacement by the end of
this month. I will notify Huang Chen in advance as we did in Jim's
case.
4. Warm regards.
E.O. 3.5
DECLASSIFIED 12958, SEC. State Dept Review
NSC TD 9/21/02
MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY:
HR TNARA, DATE 2/3/03
GERALD, LIGHTAR R FORD
SECRET
LIBRARY FORD
GERALD
&
243
SECRET
*******S COPY
If
OP IMMED
WTE074
no WTE
DE NTE30 #0074 0710214
D 1202107 MAR 75
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
FM USLO PEKING
SECRE SENSITIVE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS
PEKING 074
TO:
BRENT SCONCROFT
FROM:
GEORGE BUSH
THROUGH CHEROKEE CHANNELS WF ARE REPORTING TODAY ON A
VISIT THAT FORMIN MWANGA OF ZAMBIA AND I HAD AT USLD RESIDENCE
MARCH 11.
MWANGA WILL BE VISITING THE STATES WHEN ZAMBIAIS CHIEF OF
STATE KUANDA VISITS PRES. FORD.
I WOULD APPRECIATE IT VERY MUCH IF THE SECRETARY OR YOU
OR THE PRESIDENT COULD MENTION TO MWANGA HOW MUCH T APPRECIATED
HIS COMING TO CALL ON ME AT USLO. THISTS RATHER UNPRECEDENTED
AND THE VISIT WITH ITS REFERENCE TO CHOU EN LAT WAS VERY PRO-
DUCTIVE. I THINK 4 PERSONAL MENTION LIKE THIS WILL BE DEPPLY
APPRECIATED BY NWANGA, WILL SHOW HIGH LEVEL HOME FRONT INTEREST
IN HIS COURTERY, AHO ATLL RESULT IN MORE PRODUCTIVE VISITS IN
FUTURE. I KNW MHANGA NELL AT UN. HE IS AN ARTICULATE OPPONENT
AND A FRIEND. MANY THANKS.
WARM PEGARDS.
BT
SEALO R. FORD
DECLARATION
LISERA
E.O. 12953, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. QUIDELINES
BY
HR NARA, DATE 5/9/01
WHSR COMMENT
SCOWCRDFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN
NOT SENT TO HAK
RECALLED
PSN:021403
PAGE 91
OF 01
TOR:71/03:177
UTG#128210Z MAR 75
SECRET
COPY
0
2a
MEMORANDUM
1829-X
*ftyped
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TABA
ACTION
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
March 25, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER 8
SUBJECT:
Message from You to George Bush
In accordance with Brent Scowcroft's instructions, I have drafted the
attached message from you to Bush (Tab A) in return for Bush's
report (Tab B) about Prince Sihanouk's desire to get in touch with
us.
This approach has been coordinated with Phil Habib, who is preparing
an implementing message to John Dean
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the attached message for Bush (Tab A).
Approve
Disapprove
Revision
approved
State
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY - XGDS
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
DECLARATION
E.O. 185 $00.3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY.
HR , NARA, DATE 5/9/01
2c
VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
March 25, 1975
FOR:
GEORGE BUSH
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
Please arrange to call on Prince Sihanouk in conjunction
with the matter you described in Peking 077.
You should inform the Prince that we will do what we can
to arrange the release for transmittal to him of these materials.
You should also tell the Prince that if he has any message
for Washington, you would be glad to transmit it.
Like yourself, we are uncertain whether Sihanouk is
motivated by a desire to preserve Khmer cultural records at a
time when he fears a destructive battle or whether he wishes to
establish a contact. Whichever it is, we wish to appear responsive
and see where it leads us.
Warm regards.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
R.
BERALD
YORD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY
HR , NARA, DATE 5/9/01
2e
546
T
0
P
SECRET
*******S COPY
OP IMMED
WET077
00 MTE
DE TXT32 0077 0841033
0 251334Z MAR 75
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
FM USLD PEKING
9 P s E e R E TYSENSITIVE VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS
i
FORD
PEKING 777
RE: PEKING 276
GERALD
LIBRARY
TO:
SECRETARY KISSINGER EYES ONLY
FROM: GEORGE BUSH
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRINCE SIHANOUK
1. FRENCH AMBASSADOR ANRNAUD CALLED ON ME TODAY IN PART TO
INTRODUCE HINSELF BUT ALSO IN PART FOR THE MORE SUBSTANTIVE
PURPOSE OF TURNING OVER TO ME FOR DELIVERY TO WASHINGTON A MESSAGE
TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRINCE SIHANOUK. THE MESSAGE ESSENTIALLY WAS
AN APPEAL BY SINANOUK TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ASSTSTANCE IN GETTING
LONG VOL TO RELEASE FOR TRANSMITTAL TO STHANOUK THE FILMS AND CULTURAL
RECORDS ABOUT CAMBOOIA WHICH THE PRINCE HAD MADE BEFORE THE
1972 COUP ) STILL REMAI 1. PHNOE PENH, SO THAT THESE
MATERIALS SILL se PRESERVED FOR POSTERITY. IN MAKING THIS APPEAL,
SIHAVOUK RECALLED THE HELP WHICH PRESIDENT NIXON HAD PROVIDED IN
ARRANGING FOR THE TRAVEL OF SIHANOUK'S MOTHER OUT OF PHNOM
PENH SD SHE COULD JOIN HIM IN PEKING.
2. ARMAUD TOLD ME THAT SIHA SIHANOUK'S OUK'S MESSAGE HAS BROUGHT TO
HIM By SIHANOUKIS CHEF DU CABINET, PHENG PENG CHEN, WHO ALSO
BROUGHT ALONG SOME SAMPLES OF SIHANOUK'S PHONOGRAHP RECORDS FOR
TRANSMITTAL TO THE PRESIDENT AS EXAMPLES OF THE PRINCE'S
CULTURAL CONTRIBUTTONS. AFTER PASSING ON THESE MATERIALS, PHENG
THE TALKED TO CHARLES MALO, THE FRENCH DCM AND AN EXPERIENCED
CANGODIA HAND, AND TOLD HALD THAT THE MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT
MIGHT HAVE TXO PURPOSES: 1) PRESERVATION OF THE FILMS ANDC CULTURAL
RECORDS JUST AS SIHANOUK HAD SAID, AND 2) POSSIBLY OPENING UP A
QUIET CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS.
3. ARMAND FURTHER VOLUNTEERED THAT SIHANOUK HAD "PUT A WEAPON
IN YOUR (E.E. THE U. S.) HANDS, H SUGGESTING THAT SIHANOUK WOULD
1
LOOK RIDICULOUS IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD IF HE APPEARED TO BE
WHSR COMMENT
DECLASSIFIED
HAK, SCONCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
RECALLED
BY
HR NARA, DATE 5/9/01
PSN:238277
PAGE 01
TOR:084/15:01Z
DTG:251030Z MAR 75
TOP
SECRET
S
COPY
TOP SECRET *******S COPY
WORRYING ABOUT HIS FILMS AT A TIME WHEN so MUCH HUMAN SUFFERING
HAS TAKING PLACE.
4. WE IN USLO OF COURSE on NOT KNOW QUITE WHAT TO MAKE OF ALL
THIS, BUT IT DOES APPEAR THAT SIHANOUK MAY IN FACT BE TRYING
TO OPE UP A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS, THE MESSAGE AND THE
RECORDS ILL BE FOR ARDED TO YOU IN THE POUCH LEAVING PEKING
MARCH 28.
5. WARM REGARDS.
BT
GERALD R. FORD ABOUT
RECALLED
PSN:938277
PAGE 02
OF 12
TOR:084/15:012 . UTG:251030Z MAR 75
SECRET
COPY
3a
2797
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
April 29, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
RICHARD H. SOLOMON ruts
K
SUBJECT:
An Evaluation of Kim Il-song's
Visit to Peking
Kim Il-song's week-long visit to the PRC ended on April 26 with the
publication of a Sino-North Korean joint communique. The visit,
which by all outward appearances was a successful demonstration of
PRC-DPRK friendship, seemed to shift Kim from a rather militant
initial posture to a united front position on diplomatic efforts to achieve
the reunification of Korea by "independent and peaceful means."
One senses that Kim's visit may have traded off PRC unwillingness to
support Pyongyang in more aggressive tactics to reunify the Peninsula
in return for greater Chinese military and economic aid, and more
vigorous diplomatic backing -- as at the UNGA this coming fall. The
communique emphasized that "completely identical views were reached
on all the questions discussed" between the Chinese and North Korean
leaders. Our sense is, however, that the dangers of the North Koreans
seeking to take advantage of the psychological momentum created by the
Communist successes in Indochina has not been ended by the Peking
visit. Indeed, one can make an argument -- which we sketch below --
that the dangers of some limited provocative action by the North Koreans
against the South may have increased, despite clear indications of Chinese
aloofness from some of Kim Il-song's more militant public rhetoric.
The joint communique seems intended to highlight Kim Il-song's rela-
tionship with Mao. It notes that the two leaders had "a most significant
meeting." Chou En-lai's position is downplayed. The document notes
that Kim merely had a conversation with the Premier "in an atmosphere of
cordiality and friendship." The Shanghai radical leader Yao Wen-yuan,
out of the public eye since mid-1974, was notable for being the third
=
FORD
ranking participant in the talks.
GERAL
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE XGDS
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDEL INTS TD 9/26/02
BY,
HR NARA, DATE 2/3/03
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
2
The two delegations taking part in the talks had significant military
representation on both sides, suggesting that security matters and
military aid were major topics on the agenda. The North Korean
Chief of Staff, it should be noted, was the only other Korean to par-
ticipate in the Mao-Kim meeting. Representatives of the North Korean
army and air force took part in the general discussions, with roughly
equivalent military representation on the Chinese side. The fact that
PRC Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying did not participate in the talks
(although he did preside over a public rally) suggests some Chinese
interest in downplaying the military dimension of the visit. One recent
CAS report indicates, moreover, that Chairman Mao responded to
Kim's interest in adopting more aggressive military tactics to achieve
Korean reunification with "extreme reserve.¹ It may be that the
communique's expression of "the Chinese people's
trust in Comrade
Kim Il-song" is a backhanded way of saying that the PRC trusts that the
North Korean leader will not violate assurances that he will not resort
to provocative military action.
The communique does not carry a direct North Korean statement on
the issue of reunifying the Peninsula. Rather, it expresses China's
"resolute support" for North Korean policies designed to achieve the
"independent and peaceful" reunification of Korea based on various
proposals put forward by Kim Il-song in the past. The Chinese condemn
the Pak Government, which it says is supported and instigated by "U.S.
imperialism, " for perpetuating the division of Korea, undermining the
North-South talks, and heightening the suppression of people in the South.
The Chinese also express their support for the Korean position on dis-
solution of the United Nations Command and the withdrawal of American
armed forces from the South. No time limit is given for the U.S. troop
withdrawal, however. The PRC statement also "condemns U.S.
imperialism" for pursuing a policy of "two Koreas. If
The document pulls its punches on the Soviet factor in world affairs.
Instead of mentioning the USSR by name, or by the usual Chinese
epithet of "social-imperialism, 11 the communique quotes "both sides" as
noting that contradictions in the world "between imperialisms" are
sharpening. The document then reasserts the standard Chinese line
about the inevitability and danger of a new world war.
The rest of the rather lengthy communique has passages in which the
Chinese and North Koreans congratulate each other on their respective
domestic poilitical and economic successes, express support for the
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
3
recent developments in Indochina (in which notably visible reference
is given to Prince Sihanouk, with no mention of his various Cambodian
allies) and for various other "Third World" struggles in the Middle
East, Africa and Latin America.
Comment: It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from the pub-
lished speech material and other documentation from the Kim visit,
or the limited CAS reporting we have received, about the precise inten-
tions of the North Korean leader in making his first visit to Peking since
1961. We assume, at a minimum, that he was testing China's position
on a range of international issues in the wake of developments in Indo-
china. We find it difficult to believe that mere questions of economic
assistance, or even military aid, were sufficient to precipitate the trip.
The one notable feature of the communique and speeches published in
connection with the visit was the strong Chinese adherence to the theme
of the reunification of Korea by "independent and peaceful" means. The
North Koreans did not directly articulate this theme themselves,
suggesting that they were looking for new alternatives -- and that the
Chinese wish to hold them to their present course. We think it most
likely that the Chinese would have discouraged any North Korean inclina-
tion to resort to military action. It remains uncertain, however, how
actively they would be willing to restrain Pyongyang in the context of a
crisis situation. We believe the Chinese feel quite vulnerable to North
Korean (and North Vietnamese) efforts to play the "Third World" or the
Soviets against them should they apply pressure in ways highly incon-
sistent with North Korean (or North Vietnamese) objectives. As PRC
Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua told you last fall, Peking pays close
attention to the desires of its Korean ally.
We doubt that Kim is now content to merely replay the diplomatic track
he pursued (unsuccessfully) in the UNGA last fall. We are concerned
that he will follow up his highly visible public contact with the Chinese
by adopting a combination of political pressures and limited military
action. He might seek to provoke a controlled crisis over the North-
west islands (similar in quality to theTaiwan Strait crisis of 1958) in
order to force on what he sees as a hesitant United States the difficult
choice of whether or not to back an ally subject to criticism in our media
over a marginal territorial issue. His objective would be to drive a
wedge between Washington and Seoul, and further undermine the Pak
government and the self-confidence of the South Koreans. Kim could
then hope that an increasingly rigid and repressive response by the
government in Seoul would lead to deepening political turmoil, creating
FORD
conditions where -- as he noted in his banquet speech on the first day
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
4
of his Peking visit -- "if revolution takes place in South Korea, we, as
one and the same nation, will not just look at it with folded arms but
will strongly support the South Korean people."
In view of the Kim visit and its possible implications for some new
North Korean provocation, we believe the following steps are in
order:
-- Undertake a review of our combined political and military
posture on the Peninsula, and with respect to the U.N. Command situation.
It will now be much more difficult to undertake the initiatives we sketched
for you last month which would reduce the profile of the U.N. Command
and modify the American security role on the Peninsula. You may wish
to consider a WSAG or SRG session on Korea within a few weeks time.
-- We should consider moves which will signal to the North Koreans
our continuing alert posture with regard to military provocations (as
perhaps by sending in additional aircraft or naval units, perhaps draw-
ing on assets freed up from Indochina), and relieve some of President
Pak's anxieties. At the same time, we should make certain that the
ROK and U.N. military adopt a more disciplined and reserved posture
to avoid giving the North an incident (such as a repeat of the ROK
sinking of a Northern fishing vessel near the Northwest islands two
months ago) which it could exploit.
Concurrence:
Mr. Smyser B
FOND
CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
3b
DOC
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NSC CURRESPONDENCE PROFILE
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REFERENCE:
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INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
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4a
MEMORANDUM
2894-X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT INFORMATION
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
May 1, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
RICHARD H. SOLOMON Rots
SUBJECT:
Canadian Expulsion of PRC Diplomat
May Hold Complications for the U.S.
Canadian and American newspapers on April 28 and 29 carried a story
reporting the expulsion from Canada of the press attaché of the PRC
Embassy, for "security reasons. 11 CIA and FBI reporting indicates
that the official was very likely a representative of the International
Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party, and had been
engaged for some time in funding pro-Maoist Marxist-Lenninist
splinter groups in Canada and elsewhere. (We are currently seeking
more detailed information on the extent of his activities.)
This expulsion is linked to the United States in the fact that the PRC
official had just given the sum of $77, 000 to a naturalized American of
Philippine ancestry who teaches at the University of Connecticut. The
woman, who was apprehended at the Vermont border by U.S. customs
officials, was acting as a courier for an anti-Marcos political group in
the Philippines. The customs officials confiscated the woman's money,
but she was released and at present is at her home in Storrs, Connecticut.
Legal proceedings have not yet been initiated against the woman.
While the Canadians made public the expulsion of the PRC diplomat, they
have done so in a very low-key manner, and have not publicly developed
any linkage between the Chinese official and the Philippine woman residing
in the United States. However, a cable from USLO of April 30 indicates
that the Canadians fully informed their Embassy in Peking about the
development, including its link to the Philippine-American woman. The
Canadians told the entire story to Ambassador Bush.
If the matter of the linkage between the PRC official's expulsion and the
arrest of the Philippine woman becomes public, we would face two
particular political problems: Peking might assume we were making
E.O. DECLASSIFIED 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
TD
9/26/02
FORD LIBRARY is 077839
BY
HR NARA, DATE 2/3/03
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
2
the incident public as an embarrassment to them or as a way of calling
into question the future of our relationship; and the publication would
fuel more active public debate in this country about PRC intentions
toward our allies and Chinese diplomatic activities in the United States.
(A good case can be made, of course, that there are advantages to
exposing the PRC on this type of activity.)
An additional political angle is that there could be some marginal
advantage to us in indicating to the Marcos government that we had
intercepted these funds and the evidence of PRC efforts to support
an anti-government group in the Philippines.
Thus far we have taken steps to urge the Canadians to keep the American
element in this situation quiet. We don't know how long we will be
successful in this effort. The Washington-based correspondent of the
Toronto Globe and Mail has already inquired at the State Department
about some American involvement in the expulsion of the Chinese official.
He got a "no comment" reply to his initial inquiry. We will also face a
decision about whether or not to prosecute the Philippine-American
woman, which would certainly reveal the Chinese connection in this
matter.
As there are further developments, or issues for decision in this case,
we will inform you.
4b
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5a
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012742
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
Gleysteen, Lord, and Solomon
RECEIVER'S NAME
Secretary Kissinger
TITLE
Your Tour d'Horizon with Huang Chen
CREATION DATE
05/08/1975
VOLUME
5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400136
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
13
FOLDER TITLE
People's Republic of China (5)
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/01/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
HJR
sonitized 9/9/04
3116-X
5a
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET/SENSITIVE
May 8, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
WG/M13 for
FROM:
PHILIP HABIB/WILLIAM GLEYSTEEN
WINSTON LORD WL/RIS
RICHARD H. SOLOMON PHS
SUBJECT:
Your Tour d'Horizon with Huang Chen
on Friday, May 9, 1975, at 5:00 p.m.
You requested this meeting with PRC Liaison Office Chief Huang Chen
for a general review of international developments. The Chinese inter-
preter for this session is likely to be Miss Shen Jo-yun. Mr. Chi has
returned to Peking. We mention this in part because Miss Shen's
English is not up to Mr. Chi's standard, and hence some of the more
eliptical ways of discussing the delicate issues which will be covered in
this session may not get through to her. In addition, we have always
wondered about Miss Shen's particularly close association with Mao's
wife, Chiang Ch'ing. She (Shen) has not presented herself as open and
flexible on political issues, or as sympathetic to the American connection,
as Mr. Chi.
The following memorandum has been put together with two purposes in
mind. Primarily it is to brief you for your meeting with Huang. However,
we also use the tabbed sections on the various topics for discussion to
review developments since your November, 1974 visit to Peking, inasmuch
as you indicated an interest in covering a wide range of topics with Huang.
We are concerned about the length of the memo, but feel it is the best
way to bring you up to date for your tour d'horizon.
The Objectives of the Meeting
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 15
with PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)
MR 04-71, #5. CIA ltr 9/9/04
del Date 3/20/06
This will be your first major substantive discussion with a PRC official
since your last trip to Peking in November, 1974. In the interim,
developments in Indochina and elsewhere have radically transformed
the political context within which both we and the Chinese are operating.
(We review changes in this context in some detail below.) We see four
primary purposes to be served by the meeting:
FORD
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
E.O. DECLASSIFIED 12058, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TD 9/26/02
BY
HR NARA, DATE 2/3/03
2
-- Global: To project firmness and purposefulness regarding
the Administration's foreign policy; a sense of determination to persist
in efforts to influence world events in order to attain the primary goals of
our foreign policy -- despite the developments in Indochina and our
domestic political mood. In this regard, you should outline the state
of play and our objectives in various key areas, including: the Soviet factor
in world affairs; the President's trip to Europe and our relations with
NATO and Japan; prospects for the Middle East and Persian Gulf, etc.
Asia: To caution the Chinese about the threat to our shared
interests if recent developments in Indochina heighten tensions in other
parts of Asia. You should, in particular, indicate concern about possible
developments in Korea in the wake of Kim Il-song's visit to Peking. At
the same time, you should mention the problems we both now face in
stabilizing the region so that the Soviets are impeded in their efforts to
seek greater access to Southeast and Northeast Asia. In effect, you
should imply possible linkage between Chinese cooperation on third-
country issues and further progress in our bilateral relations.
Bilateral: To further position ourselves for the dialogue in
coming months on normalization. Bilateral relations should not comprise
a major element in this particular discussion. However, you should
obliquely indicate to Huang that the domestic political forces which have
been mobilized in the wake of the collapse of the American position in
Indochina will not be helpful to the evolution of U. PRC relations. At
the same time, you should state that we continue to adhere to the normali-
zation process, and perhaps make some low-key reference to the question
of the timing of the President's visit to Peking. You may also wish to
indicate an interest in sustaining a visible political relationship over the
coming months, as by raising the question of the timing of a Congressional
visit to the PRC in the next four months (as was agreed to in principle last
November), or by responding to Huang's request that his wife have an
opportunity to call on the First Lady.
You should assume that the Chinese are somewhat confused, and
perhaps actively disturbed, by apparently contradictory statements on
China policy made recently by the President, yourself, and Secretary
Schlesinger -- particularly Mr. Ford's statement in his press conference
of May 6 that he intends to "reaffirm our commitments to Taiwan. " You
should not initiate a defensive comment on these apparently contradictory
statements, but wait to see whether Huang raises any questions about
them. If he does not, at the end of the session you might conclude by
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
stating that our commitment to normalization is unchanged, and that
particular attention should be paid to the President's speech to the
Congress of April 10, and your press conference of April 29, as
authoritative expressions of our constant position.
Chinese views: To seek to draw Huang Chen out on PRC
perceptions of recent developments and their immediate intentions in
the Asian region and elsewhere. In preparing for this discussion he
will have received some new substantive guidance from Peking. Con-
ceivably you will be able to gain some insight from him regarding
Chinese perspectives on recent developments -- rather than just con-
ducting the kind of monologue that has characterized most of your
sessions with Huang.
The Altered Political Context
The rapid erosion of the American presence in Indochina and other de-
velopments (e.g., southern NATO and the Middle East) has substantially
altered the political climate within which we and the PRC will operate
over the coming year. For the U.S. the collapse of friendly governments
in Saigon and Phnom Penh has initiated a period of retesting our relation-
ships with other governments in Asis. Inevitably the prospect is one of
some further reduction of our ability to project American influence in
the region.
Recent developments have also substantially complicated the political
context which will affect the normalization process. Domestic critics of
normalization will assert the need to hold to all existing security rela-
tionships to prevent the further erosion of trust in our intentions and the
credibility of our commitments. Friendly foreign governments which
still look to the U.S. for security assistance will interpret our actions
over the coming months as indicators of how we are reordering our
priorities and coping with sional constraints on foreign policy.
As far as Peking's reaction to recent devents is concerned, we have re-
ceived multiple indications from diplomatic
that the
Chinese hope for a sustained, if consolidated, American role in Asia and
the world -- principally in countering the Soviets. As Foreign Minister
Ch'iao Kuan-hua (perhaps posturing somewhat for his audience) told a
group of British journalists in late April, "The Communist victory in
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
Vietnam has unloaded a burden off the back of the United States, and
now they can maybe play a more positive role in the Pacific. Certainly,
the Soviets will expand anywhere they are able. 11
For Peking, the stunningly rapid insurgent victories in Vietnam and
Cambodia have generated substantial new forces which will require the
PRC to play a more active role in the Asian region. The Chinese already
face increasingly difficult policy choices between their ideological pre-
tentions, the interests of neighboring allies, the PRC's own national
objectives, and the maneuverings of the Soviets. As was most vividly
revealed in Kim Il-song's visit to Peking, China's ideological and geo-
graphical neighbors are pressing (in the face of an uncertain American
presence in the region) to pursue their own interests in ways which cut
across Peking's foreign policy objectives. Both Pyongyang and Hanoi
have shown considerable skill in influencing Peking through a combination
of dealings with the Soviets and cultivation of China's would-be "third
world" constituency.
The Chinese are undoubtedly more concerned than ever now about the
Russians finding openings in areas on their immediate periphery. This
might come about through diplomatic maneuvering, as Hanoi, Bangkok,
and other states in the region seek greater security and political flexibility
through balanced big-power pressures. It might also come about as a
result of the development of new areas of instability -- as seems most
likely in Korea. By all evidence, Peking continues to see its interests
served by further developing its relationship with the U.S. and does not
desire to push the American presence totally out of Asia. The Chinese do,
however, seem to look toward further consolidation of our military
presence, limited perhaps to Japan, Okinawa, and Guam.
Our problem, in this regard, is how to develop a positive working rela-
tionship with the Chinese on regional issues of mutual concern (as should
be the case, in particular, in Korea). We are increasingly faced with a
situation where the Chinese expect our help in areas of high concern to
them where their ability to act is limited (as in their repeated requests
for aid to Pakistan, their diplomatic support for your negotiating efforts
in the Middle East, and -.- most generally -- their encouragement of our
efforts to counter the Soviets) while they remain aloof and generally un-
cooperative in areas central to their security (as in Indochina and
Korea).
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
5
While one can explain away this situation in terms of the complicated
game Peking must play in maneuvering between the interests of its
small peripheral neighbors and Soviet pressures, it nonetheless creates
a situation where people increasingly ask, "What are we getting out of
our relationship with the PRC? 11 In short, the Chinese must under-
stand (as perhaps they do) that the domestic political consensus which
thus far has supported normalization is changing -- and with it the
prospects for developing the kind of a relationship which would enhance
the security of both the PRC and the U.S.
Specific Areas for Discussion
At the following tabs are brief summaries of recent developments in the
specific areas we believe you should cover in the discussion. The sum-
maries are followed by suggestive talking points. We present the various
topics roughly in the order we think they should be raised. As noted
above, we believe bilateral issues should be downplayed, and left for
the end of the discussion, although some low-key clarification of the
President's May 6 press conference remarks on Taiwan is in order.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
5b
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012743
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
....
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Summary
CREATOR'S NAME
Gleysteen, Lord, and Solomon
RECEIVER'S NAME
Secretary Kissinger
TITLE
Indochina
DESCRIPTION
Attachment to memo
CREATION DATE
05/08/1975
VOLUME
3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400136
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
13
FOLDER TITLE
People's Republic of China (5)
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/01/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
HJR
REDACTED
10/19/11
C01105225
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Indochina
Indochina Background
Minister visited
Hanoi for two weeks in early March, just before the all-out North
Vietnamese offensive. We do not know what was discussed during this
visit. No public announcement was made at its conclusion which would
indicate increased Chinese military or economic aid for Hanoi. We
are reasonably certain that Peking did not encourage the North Vietnamese
to press their military campaign against the South; but at the same time
we do not think the Chinese pressured Hanoi to stay its hand. In short,
Peking probably adopted a rather passive attitude, feeling that a combination
of inaction on our part and the weakness of the Saigon government fore-
ordained a victory for Hanoi, and that the costs to them of overtly objecting
to the North Vietnamese offensive were prohibitive in terms of future
Chinese influence in Indochina and with "third world" countries.
At the same time, we have received multiple indications from diplomatic
reporting that Peking's relations with Hanoi are rather strained.
North Vietnamese officials have expressed bitterness in diplomatic contacts
about the Chinese takeover of the Paracel Islands in early 1974, and about
limited PRC military and economic assistance--which they contrast with
generous Soviet support. Peking now faces a difficult situation in Indochina.
PRC leaders are probably concerned that continuing Vietnamese expansion
into Laos and Cambodia, pressure on Thailand, and encouragement of
instability elsewhere in the region will impinge on Chinese influence and
give Moscow new openings in Southeast Asia.
Since the fall of Saigon, Peking has clearly signalled its interest in a
FORD & LIBRARY OF
stabilization of the current situation. Its message of congratulations to
the Vietnamese stressed the division between the DRV and the successful
insurgents in the south, who were said to face the difficult tasks of "carrying
through their national and democratic revolution. " This was a way of
saying that the Chinese do not want Hanoi to rapidly incorporate the south
into the DRV. As well, Peking has downplayed recent developments in
Indochina as being a defeat for the U.S.
In Cambodia, Peking was unwilling to facilitate a negotiated resolution
of the conflict, and failed to respond to your diplomatic initiatives of December
DECLASS portions exempted
E.O.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
04-70
state rev 9/26/02, CIA ltr 10/19/11
By dal CHARA, Date 2/4/12
C01105225
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
and January. The Chinese have sought to build up Sihanouk's position
in the wake of the collapse of the Lon Nol government without any apparent
success. We believe they will try to sustain a position for the Prince in
order to limit Hanoi's influence (as well as that of the Soviets) and limit the
spill-over effect into Laos and Thailand.
In discussing Indochina developments, you should stress, (a) our mutual
interest in seeing the current situation stabilized, so as to limit Soviet
opportunities in the region, (b) our desire to go beyond "Vietnam" to the
central issues in our foreign policy, yet the fact that domestic political
forces stimulated by recent developments will complicate this effort,
and (c) your interest in PRC views on recent developments.
Indochina Talking Points:
-- We recognize that developments in Vietnam and Cambodia have
complicated our foreign policy tasks, but we are determined to continue
playing a strong international role and remain confident that we can do SO.
-- We assume that we share an interest in seeing the evolution of
independent states in Indochina. What do you see as the prospects for
the Provisional Revolutionary Government in Vietnam? It is our impres-
sion that Hanoi has particularly warm feelings for Moscow at this time.
What degree of access to Vietnam do you think Hanoi will give the Russians?
-- We are concerned that Hanoi is now in the process of overthrowing
the coalition arrangement in Laos. This will raise questions in many
people's minds about the value of agreements signed with communist
governments.
FORD 2 LIBRARY OREGO
SECRET/SENSITIVE
C01105225
3
SECRET/SENSITIVE
-- We frankly were disturbed that in our efforts to see a negotiated
resolution of the situation in Cambodia you did not even give us the
courtesy of a reply to our contacts of December and January. We
believe, as you seem to, that Sihanouk should play a role in the new govern-
ment in Phnom Penh, and that Cambodia should not fall under Hanoi's
control. What do you think are the prospects for Sihanouk being any-
thing more than a figurehead?
BERALD LERARY ? FORD
5c
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Korea
Korea Background:
Kim Il-song visited Peking for a week in mid-April, the first time
he has been to China since the PRC and DPRK signed a security and
friendship treaty in 1961. While we have no hard evidence that Kim
came to China seeking support for military action against South Korea,
it seems likely that he was reviewing his options in the wake of develop-
ments in Indochina.
During the week of Kim's visit, the harshness of the North Korean
leader's public comments seemed to wane a bit, while the Chinese held
to a position of support for the "independent and peaceful" reunification
of Korea. The final communique reiterated this line, while also suggesting
PRC support for a high-gear diplomatic effort to support North Korean
objectives of gaining a U.N. General Assembly resolution in the fall
calling for the dissolution of the U.N. Command and withdrawal of U.S.
forces from South Korea. The communique characterized the DPRK as
"the sole legal sovereign state of the Korean nation. Chinese unease
about Kim's intentions was suggested, however, in the communique
phrase about "the Chinese people's high respect for and trust in Comrade
Kim Il-song" -- suggesting an effort to salve the North Korean leader's
vanity even as they expressed concern that he not violate assurances
about not doing something rash.
Since Kim's return to Pyongyang, rumors have circulated in the Peking
diplomatic corps that the North Korean leader will also visit Moscow
and various Eastern European capitals. These rumors have failed to
materialize thus far, however, generating speculation that Kim may have
found the Soviets unresponsive to his probing for new options.
The Chinese never responded to our efforts last fall to get diplomatic
motion into an effort to terminate the U.N. Command while leaving the
armistice intact. PRC leaders have indicated to you their intention to
follow Pyongyang's lead on this issue, and we do not anticipate any change
in this position in the coming months. Indeed, in view of Kim's high-
profile visit to Peking, we assume that the Chinese are now locked into
a diplomatic strategy with Pyongyang.
&
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
Review
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
TD 9/26/02
GERALD
LIBRARY
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY
HR NARA, DATE 2/3/03
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
Korea Talking Points:
-- Your friend Kim Il-song seems to be getting restless in the
wake of developments in Indochina. We appreciate China's support
for peaceful efforts to reunify Korea, but we are not so sure that Mr.
Kim is interested in peaceful approaches to this question. Is your
trust in him well founded? He has sought to present others with faits
accompli before.
-- The North Koreans should be under no illusion that if they
resort to military provocations they will meet with anything but a harsh
response from the United States.
-- We totally reject the statement in your joint communique with
Pyongyang that the U.S. has sought to "sabotage the North-South talks. "
We believe that quiet, step-by-step negotiated efforts to build confidence
between the two Koreas is the only way to achieve the "independent and
peaceful reunification of Korea. " Frankly, we are concerned about the
lack of response from the Chinese side to our efforts of last fall to make
quiet but constructive efforts to resolve the U.N. Command issue. We
remain open to any suggestions your side might have.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
-- I must frankly say that high-pressure political tactics in the
U.N. on the Korea issue will only make it much more difficult for us
to readjust our position in Korea. Such tactics are bound to heighten tension
between Seoul and Pyongyang. It looks to us as if the North Koreans are
trying to create the same combination of political and military pressures
which they saw operating in Indochina. How can they be considered the
"sole legitimate government" of Korea?
-- I would only add that if tensions in Korea rise during this fall,
or if there is a noisy debate at the U.N. with active Chinese support,
it can only complicate our bilateral dealings.
FOR
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
CINALD
5d
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
Soviet Union
Soviet Union Background:
The Chinese will have noted continued Soviet interest in detente
despite the trade setback and our own recent foreign policy
difficulties. They should also have noticed the sterner tone of
remarks by the President and yourself concerning detente in recent
statements. They know we consulted with the Russians concerning
evacuation and a possible political solution in the waning days of the
Vietnam debacle. (We did not go to the Chinese at all after their
lack of cooperation on Cambodia.)
Peking may be uneasy about the full upcoming agenda with Moscow,
particularly in contrast with our bare slate with Peking (e.g., the
Brezhnev summit, SALT II, CSCE, Middle East collaboration, etc.).
Note: Your meeting with Gromyko will be announced on Monday,
May 12. You should alert the Chinese in this meeting and explain what
will be discussed.
In the past, we have consistently used a heavy anti-Soviet tone in our
dealings with the Chinese. While you want to reassure th Ambassador
that we will be particularly firm with Moscow during this troubled
period, there may be some advantage in leaving the Chinese somewhat
uneasy about our Soviet connection.
The Russian negotiator in the Sino-Soviet border talks recently returned
home after three fruitless months in Peking. Both sides have been
cynical about the stalemate, now in its sixth year.
Soviet Talking Points:
-- The President and I have made it very clear in recent
statements that we will not allow Moscow to seek advantages as a
result of recent international events.
E.O. DECLASSIFIED 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
FORD & LIBRARY
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TD 9/26/02
BY,
HR , NARA, DATE 2/3/03
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
-- As you know, Brezhnev's trip has been delayed until
September. We are aiming to complete a SALT II agreement by then,
but are encountering the usual Soviet haggling in negotiations.
-- I am meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko during my
forthcoming European trip. This will take place in Vienna on May 19-20.
(Preview what will take place.)
-- We met informally a couple of weeks ago in London with some
of our allies as well as the Soviets on the question of exporting nuclear
materials. We will reconvene in June. The purpose is to dampen
the prospects for non-proliferation. We have assumed your govern-
ment would not be interested in such an exercise even though we do
not believe proliferation is in your interest (e.g., India, Taiwan,
South Korea).
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
be
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Europe
Europe Background:
Our relations with Europe (as well as Japan) have remained in
basically good shape, but the Chinese will be worried about the
weakening of NATO which has taken place in Portugal and Greece/
Turkey. We have announced the NATO summit meeting at the end
of this month, which will follow your visit to CENTO, OECD, and
the IEA. The President will also visit Italy and Spain. We are on
the home stretch of CSCE and are considering tabling new initiatives
in MBFR. There have been several West European visitors to Peking
lately, Belgian Prime Minister Tindeman and the EEC's Soames
being the most recent.
Europe Taling Points:
-- Our relations with Western Europe are probably better than at
any time during the past six years. There is closer consultation and
collaboration.
-- At the same time there are obviously serious problems along
the southern flank of NATO. (Explain our attitude toward Portugal and
Spain.) We are working intensively with Congress to try and relaunch
military assistance to Turkey.
-- The President's trip to Europe and the NATO summit meeting
will reaffirm our soli darity as well as give an opportunity to discuss
privately the problems on the southern flank of the alliance.
&
FORD
DECLASSIFIED Review
GERALD
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 TD 9/26/02
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
LIBRARY
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY
HR I NARA, DATE 2/3/03
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
2
-- I believe the Mansfield Resolution on withdrawing troops
from Europe is effectively dead, at least for this session of Congress.
-- The dreary CSCE exercise is in its terminal phase. The
Soviets are anxious for a summit this summer and are making some
marginal concessions. We are under no illusions about the real
significance of any documents tha t might be signed, and will guard
against any illusory sense of accomplishment over the results.
-- How are your relations going with the Europeans? What do
you sense of the European mood? As you know we favor increased
ties between the PRC and our friends in Europe.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
GREATS R. FORD 3
5f
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Middle East
Middle East Background:
Since you last saw the Chinese the step-by-step negotiating process
has broken down at least temporarily, and we have launched a reassess-
ment of our Middle East policies. Lord alerted the Chinese to the
breakdown of the shuttle at the time, but there has been no subsequent
discussion of the state of play and future prospects. The Chinese
have backed our Middle East efforts from the beginning and would want
us to continue our role so as to diminish Soviet influence. Thus they
were undoubtedly disappointed at the failure of your last mission and
may be somewhat apprehensive of greater Soviet-US cooperation in
the negotiating process.
Another interesting recent development is Iran's growing solidarity
with the Arab states, including its dumping of the Kurds in order to
patch up relations with Iraq. To the extent that this could represent
an effort to wean Iraq away from Moscow the Chinese may take some
comfort from the development.
In addition, the Soviets have been exploring contacts with Israel and
have stated their willingness to guarantee Israel within its 1967 borders.
Finally, Prince Fahd has effectively replaced the deceased King Faisal
of Saudi Arabia.
You will want to reassure the Chinese about our determination to continue
our central involvement, point out that we remain the only outside power
able to talk to both sides, and outline our ongoing strengthening of bi-
lateral ties with various states in the region.
Middle East Talking Points:
-- Explain briefly why the shuttle broke down.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept Review
E.O. 12358, SEC. 3.5 TD 9/27/02
NSC MEMO, 11/24/C
DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY.
HR , NARA, DATE 2/3/03
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
-- Outline the rationale for our reassessment, the possible
diplomatic options, and the current state of play with the various
actors.
-- As the President and I have stressed, we are determined to
continue our central role in facilitating a settlement. All the Arab
states are urging us to do so, and they continue to reflect suspicions
of Soviet intentions.
-- The President's meetings with Sadat and Rabin will help
to cap our policy review. Shortly thereafter we will decide on our
strategy.
-- We are continuing to strengthen our bilateral ties with the
Arab states. This includes efforts to help Egypt's economic situation
(e.g., Robinson's trip and working with Iran and Saudi Arabia). Sadat
has urged us to send warships through the Suez Canal on the day it
reopens. (We are the only country that he wishes to do so.)
-- Iran's improved relations with Iraq should help moderate
Soviet influence there. Iraq is playing a rather active diplomatic role now.
-- The new leadership in Saudi Arabia remains pro-American and
anti-Soviet.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
3
-- What readings of the Middle East situation do you have
from your own contacts with the Arab states, including Vice Premier
Li Hsien-nien's recent visit to Teheran?
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
5 %
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
Subcontinent
Subcontinent Background:
At the turn of the year the Chinese initiated efforts to draw the
Indians into an improved relationship. In January Peking sent a ping
pong team to Calcutta, sparking rumors that some new diplomatic
initiative might be in the offing, and at the end of February a PRC
Vice Premier, transiting the same city on his way to Nepal, remarked
to the press that "Sino-Indian relations cannot continue in the present
state for long. 11 New Delhi demonstrated considerable reserve in
responding to these signals from Peking, and with the Indian installa-
tion of Sheikh Abdullah as Chief Minister of Kashmir in February,
and the annexation of Sikkim in mid-April, the Chinese pulled back
from their forthcoming posture. The drawing back was symbolized by the
visit to Islamabad late last month of third-ranking Vice Premier Li Hsien-
nien shortly after a trip to Iran. Li attacked Indian actions in Kashmir
and Sikkim, but did not close the door to the possibility of renewed
movement toward improved relations with New Delhi at some point in
the future. Li's visit to Pakistan seems to have been largely a hand-
holding operation, as no specific agreements were announced at the
end of the visit. One CAS report indicates that Li told the Paks that it
would be best for the U.S. if it withdrew completely from Southeast
Asia and Korea.
Peking also continues to maintain diplomatic contacts with Bangladesh
officials in a low-key exploration of the issue of establishing diplomatic
relations. Until recently the Chinese have held back in establishing
a formal relationship with Dacca, while pushing the Pakistanis to make
the move first. In view of the continuing delays in diplomatic progress
between Islamabad and Dacca, however, Peking may have decided to
precede the Paks -- indeed, we have one report that President Bhutto
expressed to the Chinese his willingness to see this happen. A recent
CAS source indicates that a Bangladesh economic delegation now in
China to attend the Canton Trade Fair will discuss the recognition
question with PRC officials.
On our side, Pakistan has yet to follow up on our offer to renew arms
sales, and India has resumed its invective against the U.S.
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept Review
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 TD 9/27/02
SECRET/SENSITIVE
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY.
HR
NARA, DATE 2/3/03
,
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
2
Subcontinent Talking Points:
-- Earlier this year your ping pong players stirred up specula-
tion that there might be some improvement in China's relations with
New Delhi. Do you anticipate any progress in Sino-Indian relations?
-- I noticed that Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien recently visited
Teheran and Islamabad. Have there been any interesting develop-
ments in your relations with Iran and Pakistan?
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
5h
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012749
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Summary
CREATOR'S NAME
Gleysteen, Lord, and Habib
RECEIVER'S NAME
Secretary Kissinger
TITLE
Bilateral Relations
DESCRIPTION
Attachment to memo
CREATION DATE
05/08/1975
VOLUME
7 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400136
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
13
FOLDER TITLE
People's Republic of China (5)
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/01/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
HJR
REDACTED
10/19/11
C01105226
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
Bilateral Relations
Bilateral Relations Background:
Since the turn of the year, U.S. - PRC bilateral relations have pro-
ceeded in low-key fashion without major developments. Trade, which
reached a high point of $922 million in 1974, now shows signs of
dropping almost 50% in 1975 as a result of China's cutbacks in agri-
cultural imports. This downturn does not seem to represent any
political motivation, but rather reflects Peking's substantial balance
of payments deficit (nearly $1 billion), improved domestic agricultural
production, and certain technical problems with American grain
products. Chinese trading officials continue to indicate, however,
that imports of high technology items from the U.S. will be sustained
(an electronics industry delegation is scheduled to visit Peking in
June), and Peking appears to be moving toward a more instituti onalized
trading relationship with us by sending industry delegations of their
own to survey the American market. A textile production group visited
the U.S. in March, and the China Council for the Promotion of Inter-
national Trade is scheduled to send a delegation here in September.
Cultural exchanges continue on even keel, despite our cancellation of
the performing arts troupe tour at the end of March. Peking has not
retaliated for this development, despite some complaining by Foreign
Minister Ch'iao to the Albert/Rhodes Congressional delegation. The
Chinese recently agreed to a two month extension of the tour of their
archaeological exhibition to include San Francisco, and approved a
world affairs council delegation visit to the PRC in the fall. An
American track and field team departs for Peking later this month,
and the spring and summer visits to the U.S. of several PRC scientific
groups will be capped by the tour of their Scientific and Technical
Association -- the counterpart organization of our Committee on
Scholarly Communication with the PRC.
The one recent note of discord in the exchange program is related to
the expulsion from Canada early in May of a PRC diplomat, for
security reasons. The Chinese Press Attache in Ottawa was surveiled
by the Canadian authorities passing funds to several Canadian and
DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
FORD
SECRET/SENSITIVE
E.O. 13523 (a) amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 04-70
LIBRARY
state rev 9/27/02; CIA etr 10/19/11
By doe NARA, Date 2/6/12
C01105226
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
2
American "revolutionary" groups, including the Revolutionary Union.
This latter organization, a semi-covert Marxist-Leninist group with
Maoist pretentions, set up the U.S. - China People's Friendship
Association as a front organization. This latter group held a counter-
press conference to protest our cancellation of the performing arts
troupe tour, and shows signs of actively trying to build itself up as
a mass-based alternative to the National Committee on U.S. - China
Relations, the organization we have relied upon to facilitate cultural
exchanges with the Chinese.
Political contacts with the PRC have been at a minimal level since
January. You have seen Huang Chen only twice, and the half-dozen
meetings Phil Habib and Win Lord have held with Han Hsu included
the one positive note of informing Peking of our Taiwan air base
closings scheduled for 1975. The Chinese did approve the "add-on"
visit of Congressional leaders Albert and Rhodes. They recently
turned down another request by Senator Kennedy for a China trip.
Peking undoubtedly watched through our press the backing and forthing
on U.S. representation at the Chiang Kai-shek funeral. PRC officials
have not protested the Vice President's participation in the event.
The Chinese undoubtedly sense that in the wake of Indochina develop-
ments the Administration is cross-pressured on China policy. We
have presented conflicting signals to them in recent weeks, and may
have raised doubts in Peking about our intentions regarding normali-
zation. On the one hand the President sent a forthcoming message of
congratulations to Premier Chou in January, and mentioned his trip
to China and the intention to "accelerate" U.S. - PRC relations in his
April 10 message to Congress. During your press conference of
April 29 you pointed out the President's reaffirmation of our alliances,
yet conspicuously omitted mention of Taiwan from the list of major
treaty commitments in Asia or the governments we would consult
with in reassessing our foreign policy.
At the same time, however, Peking could see us respond to conserva-
tive pressures in constituting the Chiang funeral delegation. They read
Senator Goldwater's remark that if the Administration is considering
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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3
major changes in China policy, "it will have a helluva fight on its
hands. " They noted that the President's remarks to the ASNE editors
included the comment that he considers U.S. relations with the Re-
public of China, "a matter of very, very great importance" and that
we remain concerned about the ROC's security and stability. Most
recently, in his May 6th press conference Mr. Ford failed to mention
the re-establishment of U. - PRC contact as a major Republican
accomplishment, and he looked forward to reaffirming our commit-
ments to Taiwan. He also failed to mention his forthcoming trip to
Peking. In addition, they saw your remark to the ASNE group that,
"We shall not forget who supplied the arms which the North Vietnamese
used to make a mockery of its signature on the Paris accords"; and
they must also be pondering Secretary Schlesinger's remark of May 1
that Taiwan is defensible and that as long as we have treaty obligations
with the island we will continue to protect it.
These conflicting noises reflect the realities of our domestic political
debate, and it is undoubtedly helpful that Peking appreciates these
counter-currents. The questions. they must be asking themselves are:
will the negative pressures generated by Indochina events increase
with time or dissipate; will President Ford's future political plans
further complicate his intentions and timing regarding normalization;
and will Washington therefore be less flexible on the terms of an
agreement? We do not propose that you clarify our positions on any
of these questions in your meeting with Huang; a period of ambiguity
may be useful as developments of the next several months play them-
selves out. We do believe, however, that you should indicate the
President's continuing intention to visit Peking later this year by asking
the Chinese for their views on timing, and express interest in sustaining
a visible political relationship via another Congressional delegation visit
during the summer and by a Mme. Huang call on the First Lady (if you
think this would be appropriate within several weeks of the Indochina
defeats).
The developments in the American political context are paralleled by
conflicting trends in the PRC domestic political scene. The January
National People's Congress seemed to indicate a return to regular govern-
mental procedures, the consolidation of civilian leadership around Premier
FORD
&
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Chou En-lai, and the resolution of uncertainties about the leadership
succession with the assumption of greater responsibilities (including
heightened control over the military) by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-
p'ing and Party leader Chang Ch'un-ch'iao. The Congress passed a
relatively flexible economic program in the larger context of a
no-nonsense effort to strengthen the state bureaucracy under the
slogan of consolidating the "dictatorship of the proletariat. " Since
the Congress, however, Chou En-lai's health and political role
have remained somewhat ambiguous. The Premier has received
sixteen foreign visitors "in the hospital" for meetings that have been
more symbolic than substantive, yet most reports on his health are
positive. He has failed to appear in public in a domestic leadership
role since the Congress, yet the reports we do receive on his work
routine suggest that he remains active as a final arbiter of domestic
and foreign policies.
The most puzzling and disturbing question mark, however, relates to
Mao Tse-tung's position. The Chairman remained out of Peking from
June of last year, failed to participate directly in the January National
People's Congress or the Party Plenum which preceded it, and re-
turned to the capital only on the eve of the Kim Il-song visit. A
number of PRC press articles published since the Congress have implied
that Mao is unhappy with the economic policies approved by the NPC, and
that he has wanted to move more forcefully than other Party leaders
against the military officials who resisted the purge of Lin Piao and his
(Mao's) continuing stress on an anti-Soviet foreign policy. The Chair-
man apparently lacks sufficient control over the reconstituted organiza-
tions of political control to resist the consensus policies of the Chou/
Teng/Chang leadership.
affair. Wallposters which seem to ridicule the Chairman by historical
analogy have appeared in Canton for some weeks without being torn
down and without the writers being arrested. In short, there are signs
that the Chairman's positive is somewhat insecure. Exactly what the
implications might be of a diminution in Mao's stature for the normali-
zation process is difficult to assess at this time.
FORD
R
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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5
Talking Points on Bilateral Issues:
-- We believe our bilateral relations are generally satisfactory.
We appreciate your personal efforts to have the archaeological exhibition
extended to include San Francisco. This exhibition has been very well
received by our people, and has done the PRC real credit in this
country.
We think it is important that you are sending your China
Council for the Promotion of International Trade, and the Scientific
and Technical Association to the U.S. this fall. Hopefully their visits
will facilitate the further development of scientific and cultural
exchanges. President Ford recently sent a letter of encouragement
to our track and field team which will arrive in China later this month.
-- As you know, because of the need for additional time to
consider aspects of the SALT II agreement, we have delayed Secretary
Brezhnev's visit to Washington until September. The President
indicated in his address to Congress on April 10 that he is looking
forward to visiting China later in the year. I wonder if you have any
thoughts about timing [around the end of the year] that would suit the
convenience of the Chinese side?
FORD
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-- We believe it was important that Congressmen Albert and
Rhodes visited China. We appreciate your rapid response in agreeing
to their trip.
-- I recall that last November we agreed on one general
Congressional delegation to visit China later this year. I wonder if it
might not be useful to consider this delegation's visit for either late
June or August -- during the periods of Congressional recess? Please
let us know your thinking on timing. When you do we will propose a
delegation composed along the lines you suggested when I was in Peking.
-- We would welcome a counterpart group of Chinese officials
here at any time you feel it would be useful to have them visit the U.S.
-- [If you think it appropriate:] We have not forgotten your
interest in having Mme. Huang call on Mrs. Ford at the White House.
Mr. Solomon will be in touch with you to work out a convenient time.
-- [If the Chinese have not raised the issue:] I just want to
reaffirm our commitment to the Shanghai Communique and the normaliza-
tion of relations. I think, in particular, that if you read carefully the
authoritative
President's /April 10 address to the Congress, and my April 29 press
FORD
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
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conference, you will have no question about our continuing commitment
to the direction of our policy established by the Shanghai Communique.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
FORD & LIBRARY
5i
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