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People's Republic of China (14)
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1553807
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People's Republic of China (14)
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Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)
East Asia and Pacific Country Files
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The original documents are located in Box 14, folder "People's Republic of China (14)" of
the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 14 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
1a
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012794
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
....
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
Jay Taylor
RECEIVER'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
CREATION DATE
07/01/1976
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400145
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
14
FOLDER TITLE
People's Republic of China (14)
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/07/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
HJR
REDACTED
9/18/08
MEMORANDUM
3835
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE
INFORMATION
July 1, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
PRC
FROM:
JAY TAYLOR
SUBJECT:
Chinese Activity in Taiwan Strait Area
Since late April there has been unusual PRC military activity at the
southern end of the Taiwan Strait. Several PRC naval vessels, including
landing ships, one missile frigate, two oilers, one water carrier, and
at least ten small landing craft, moved through the Taiwan Strait earlier
in June. Two submarines also apparently moved into the same area at
the end of June. A second missile frigate moved up to the area from the
south. Most of these ships appear to have remained in the Swatow-Amoy
region.
two regiments of MIG-19s and some additional IL-28s
have also recently 'moved into the southern part of Fukien Province.
indicate widespread rumors in Fukien
Province of special war preparations.
reported
that the situation is tense, that militia is being mobilized, that citizens
have been told not to go out at night, and that cadre have been instructed
to return from leave. One
explained the preparations
as due to a report that Premier Chiang Chang-kuo had held a war council
in Taipei to map out plans for military action against the mainland.
Another said he had heard there would be an attack on Quemoy.
OCIand DIA believe that the increased activity is in preparation for a
joint exercise involving coastal defense or is involved with inter-coastal
shipment of military and other supplies. Sporadic rail interruptions in
DECL ASSIFIED E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6
WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DIAlts 12/19/07, state liv 3/6/08; CIAlia 9118108
MR 08-19, #16; NSAetr1213107
BY dal NABA DATE 3/6/09
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
much of China since the beginning of the year may have forced the
Chinese to use landing craft for transportation, a practice they have
employed in the past.
The Chinese Nationalists are concerned that the operations may presage
a Chinese attempt to take control of the Pratas Islands, a Nationalist
controlled reef about 386 kilometers southwest of Taiwan.
Comment
There was a PRC naval exercise at the upper end of the Taiwan Strait
last year. Over the past year and a half, Peking also has been asserting
its right of transit in the Strait and may now be extending this to the air
space -- at least within 15 miles off the coast. An exercise could have
sparked the rumors which are now being reported by travellers and
letter writers. I do not recall, however, that last year there was a
similar number of such reports.
One concern is that Taiwan may be attempting to play up the prospect
of a PRC military move.
The possibility of PRC military action against either the off-shore
islands or Pratas would seem to be remote. Such a contingency in the
immediate future is conceiveable only in light of the tense and uncertain
political situation in Peking, which presumably raises the possibility
of irrational decisions.
Thus at this point the recent PRC operations in the Fukien area appear
to be non-threatening but a reflection of China's increasing assertion of
its transit rights in the Strait. The possibility of the death of Chairman
Mao and a desire to warn off the ROC from any adventures might also
be behind the recent military activity.
LIBRARY GERALD FORD
SECRET/SENSITIVE
if
SECRET
SHALLOW TAIWAN STRAIT WOULD COMPLICATE MILITARY OPERATIONS
108
114°
120°
126
MONGOLIA
NORTH
KOREA
SEA 0F JAPAN of
*
PEKING
SOUTH
36
KOREA
}
YELLOW SEA
-36°
50
30°
Shanghai
HANGCHOU BAY
Yangtze River
SEA
CHINA
30°
EAST
Fuchou
Matsu
Chilung
AIPEI
:
24.
Hsiamen (Amoy)
Chinmen
(Quemoy)
TAIWAN
126
Penghu
Shantou
Islands
swatow
Kaohsiung
24°
Major beaches
PEOPLES REPUBLIC
OF CHINA
NORTH
UNCLASSIFIED
VIETNAM
SOUTH CHINA SEA
in
GULF OF
TONKIN
0
100
200 Nautical
Miles
HAINAN
0
200 Kilometers
108°
FOB
18°
114°
CI-CH-3-6/74
LIBRARY
FIGURE 1
DECLASSIFIED
GERALD
SECRET AUTHORITY DIA BAC Period 8/7/03
BY
NLF, DATE 6/9/05
SECRET
CAPABILITIES OF OPPOSING
FORCES IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT (U)
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
JUL
DIAIAPPR 173-75
20 NOVEMBER 1975
SECRET
/C
DOC
RECD
LOG NU' R
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
7
/
72
16
7603835
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSTATE Bains
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
SCOWCROFT /
SECDEF
LOU
NO FORM
NODIS
HYLAND
DCI
x REF
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
DAVIS
STATE EXSEC
$
CODEWORD
OTHER
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT Shen Cutinity ea ite
Jaiwan that Gen
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
CONCUR-
COOR-
INFO
CY
RENCE
DINATE
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH
FOR
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS
MEMO
TO
FAR EAST/ PRC
X
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
N
JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
DATE
FROM
STATUS
DUE
7/1
Sinf
CY TO
CIX
hxo SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:
7/9
- 1/2
"S"
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
noted by Scoweroff
FORD is LIBRARY 076835
DISPATCH
NOTIFY
MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS
NSC/S DISP INSTR
JUL1 4 1976
BY
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
IF
OPEN CRT ID: Mn
NS DY
SPECIAL INDEXING:
WH SA FP
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED X
CLOSE MIK PA
NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022
)
IE president HAS SEEN
2a
MEMORANDUM
4047
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
July 19, 1976
SECRET - GDS
MAY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
The Passing of Chu Te and China's Domestic
Politics
The death of Chu Te, the 90-year old Chairman of the Standing Committee
of the National Peoples Congress, has further reduced the ranks of the
old guard. Chu Te, as the founder of the Peoples Liberation Army, was
the only Chinese leader after the death of Chou En-lai whose historical
role and prestige approached that of Mao. Although his formal role in
the regime was only ceremonial, Chu probably represented an independent
voice in the Politburo during critical decisions. Chu, for example,
reportedly supported the moderate policies of Chou En-lai and Teng
Hsiao-p'ing. Two poems by Chu, published in March, implicitly criticized
the campaign against Teng and the resultant disunity in the Party.
The Central Leadership Organs
Chu's death brings to four the number of vacancies in the Politburo
Standing Committee (out of a membership of nine) and probably enhances
the strength of the two Shanghai leftist leaders in the Standing Committee,
Chang Ch'ung-ch'iao and Wang Hung-wen. The only remaining moderate
in the Standing Committee is the aging and ailing Defense Minister Yeh
Chien-ying. Premier Hua Kuo-feng, who is now Senior Vice Chairman
of the Party, is presumably a Standing Committee member, although he
has not been identified as such.
It is unlikely that the regime will in the near future be able to fill the
vacant positions in the Politburo and the Standing Committee or to name
a replacement for Teng Hsiao-p'ing as PLA Chief of Staff. The empty
slots in the central leadership indicate the continuing standoff between the
contending factions. It is problematical whether the Standing Committee
itself is still functioning or whether an ad hoc group within the Politburo
may currently be the ultimate decision-making body.
SECRET - GDS
WR 5/10/01
SECRET
2
The Left
In any event, the leftists, with Mao's support, appear to have the political
initiative. They should obtain further leeway with the passing of Chu Te.
In addition to the Standing Committee and Party headquarters, leftist
political strength resides in the central media, the students, the militia,
the PLA political department, and the industrial heart of China --
Shanghai.
There are still many constraints on the leftists, however. Most importantly,
they seem to have little support among provincial leaders, military
commanders, or the government bureaucracy. The leftists also would
be unlikely to control a meeting of the Central Committee as presently
composed.
Thus, the leftists, a disparate group apparently led by Chang Ch'ung-ch'iao,
are probably anxious to exploit the advantage they currently enjoy at the
center before Mao dies. They must move on two fronts -- seeking where
possible to weaken their opposition and at the same time broaden their
own support. The July 1 joint editorial marking the Chinese Communist
Party anniversary, while relatively constrained, indicated the regime's
preoccupation with the domestic political struggle, and clearly suggested
the need for the removal of at least a small group of Teng and Chou
supporters.
The left is most probably concerned about gaining allies among the
military. The role of people like Chien Hsia-lien, the Commander of
the Peking Military Region, will be critical. The alignment of military
commanders, however, remains the murkiest element of the obscure
Peking domestic scene. Most military commanders are probably biding
their time until the Chairman dies.
The role of Premier Hua Kuo-feng, and several others in the leadership
who are apparently not factional partisans but essentially Mao loyalists,
will al so be vital to the course of the power struggle. Hua's control over
the Public Security organs has obvious implications. In line with Mao's
proclivities, Hua will presumably seek to protect the left. But, like Mao,
the thrust of Hua's leadership may be to retain a dynamic balance between
the left and the right. If so, Hua will probably not wish to see the left
consolidate or expand its position at the Party center in the wake of the
death of Chu Te.
FORD
SECRET
SECRET
3
The Prospect
The political structure in the PRC is probably more fragile today than
it has ever been -- including during the Cultural Revolution. Mao's
presence remains the key, but it is now a lingering presence and the
old Chairman presumably cannot assert a dynamic role. Yet, so long
as he lives, he retains the aura of political authority and the leadership
stalemate is likely to continue. Realignments that will determine the
shape of the post-Mao regime, however, may already be taking shape.
SECRET
2b -Rth hot
MEMORANDUM
7-19 //4047
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET GDS
1
ANALYSIS
July 13, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES
X
Job supped
SUBJECT:
Memorandum to the President on China's Domestic Scene
Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from you to the President discussing
the implications of the death of Chu Te and assessing the current
domestic political scene in China.
We are doing another memorandum on the foreign policy implications of
the current political struggle and will forward this to you shortly.
RECOMMENDA TION:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab A to the President.
SECRET GDS
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
HR 5/10/01
2c
4047 Rewrite
INFORMATION
SECRET - GDS
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
The Passing of Chu Te and China's Domestic
Politics
The death of Chu Te, the 90-year old Chairman of the Standing Committee
of the National Peoples Congress, has further reduced the ranks of the
old guard. Chu Te, as the founder of the Peoples Liberation Army, was
the only Chinese leader after the death of Chou En-lai whose historical
role and prestige approached that of Mao. Although his formal role in
the regime was only ceremonial, Chu probably represented an independent
voice in the Politburo during critical decisions. Chu, for example,
reportedly supported the moderate policies of Chou En-lai and Teng
Hsiao-p'ing. Two poems by Chu, published in March, implicitly criticized
the campaign against Teng and the resultant disunity in the Party.
The Central Leadership Organs
Chu's death brings to four the number of vanancies in the Politburo
Standing Committee (out of a membership of nine) and probably enhances
the strength of the two Shanghai leftist leaders in the Standing Committee,
Chang Ch'ung-ch'iao and Wang Hung-wen. The only remaining moderate
in the Standing Committee is the aging and ailing Defense Minister Yeh
Chien-ying. Premier Hua Kuo-feng, who is now Senior Vice Chairman
of the Party, is presumably a Standing Committee member, although he
has not been identified as such.
It is unlikely that the regime will in the near future be able to fill the
vacant positions in the Politburo and the Standing Committee or to name
a replacement for Teng Hsiao-p'ing as PLA Chief of Staff. The empty
slots in the central leadership indicate the continuing standoff between the
contending factions. It is problematical whether the Standing Committee
itself is still functioning or whether an ad hoc group within the Politburo
may currently be the ultimate decision-making body.
SECRET - GDS
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
HR5/10101
SECRET
2
The Left
In any event, the leftists, with Mao's support, appear to have the political
initiative. They should obtain further leeway with the passing of Chu Te.
In addition to the Standing Committee and Party headquarters, leftist
political strength resides in the central media, the students, the militia,
the PLA political department, and the industrial heart of China --
Shanghai.
There are still many constraints on the leftists, however. Most importantly,
they seem to have little support among provincial leaders, military
commanders, or the government bureaucracy. The leftists also would
be unlikely to control a meeting of the Central Committee as presently
composed.
Thus, the leftists, a disparate group apparently led by Chang Ch'ung-ch'iao,
are probably anxious to exploit the advantage they currently enjoy at the
center before Mao dies. They must move on two fronts -- seeking where
possible to weaken their opposition and at the same time broaden their
own support. The July 1 joint editorial marking the Chinese Communist
Party anniversary, while relatively constrained, indicated the regime's
preoccupation with the domestic political struggle, and clearly suggested
the need for the removal of at least a small group of Teng and Chou
supporters.
The left ;is mbst probably concerned about gaining allies among the
military. The role of people like Chien Hsia-lien, the Commander of
the Peking Military Region, will be critical. The alignment of military
commanders, however, remains the murkiest element of the obscure
Peking domestic scene. Most military commanders are probably biding
their time until the Chairman dies.
The role of Premier Hua Kuo-feng, and several others in the leadership
who are apparently not factional partisans but essentially Mao loyalists,
will al so be vital to the course of the power struggle. Hua's control over
the Public Security organs has obvious implications. In line with Mao's
proclivities, Hua will presumably seek to protect the left. But, like Mao,
the thrust of Hua's leadership may be to retain a dynamic balance between
the left and the right. If so, Hua will probably not wish to see the left
consolidate or expand its position at the Party center in the wake of the
death of Chu Te.
SECRET
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
SECRET
3
The Prospect
The political structure in the PRC is probably more fragile today than
it has ever been -- including during the Cultural Revolution. Mao's
presence remains the key, but it is now a lingering presence and the
old Chairman presumably cannot assert a dynamic role. Yet, so long
as he lives, he retains the aura of political authority and the leadership
stalemate is likely to continue. Realignments that will determine the
shape of the post-Mao regime, however, may already be taking shape.
SECRET
Rewrtn: Gen S/1ds/7-17-76
2d
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET GDS
ANALYSIS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
The Passing of Chu Te and China's Domestic Politics
furthy reduced the runks
of the old guard
The death of Chu Te, the 90 year old Chairman of the Standing Committee
of the National Peoples Congress, has provided inc sed maneuverability
to the Chinese leadership Chu Te, as the founder of the Peoples
Liberation Army, was the only Chinese leader after the death of Chou En-lai
whose historical role and prestige approached that of Mao. Although Chru his
formal
bad only a ceremonial role in the regime, be probably represented an
independent voice in the Politburo during critical decisions. Chu, for
example, reportedly supported the moderate policies of Chou En-lai and
Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Two poems by Chu, published in March, implicitly
criticized the campaign against Teng and the resultant disunity in the
Party.
The Central Leadership Organs
was only Chur
Country mumbership of nine)
Chu's death brings to four the number of vacancies in the Politburo
Standing Committee and probably enhances the strength of the two Shanghai
leftist leaders in the Standing Committee, Chang Ch'ung-ch'iao and
Wang Hung-wen. The only remaining moderate in the Standing Committee
is the aging and ailing Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying. Premier Hua
Kuo-feng, who is now Senior Vice Chairman of the Party, is presumably
a Standing Committee member, although he has not been identified as such.
It is unlikely that the regime will in the near future be able to fill the
vacant positions in the Politburo and the Standing Committee or to name
a replacement for Teng Hsiao-p'ing position as PLA Chief of Staff.
The empty slots in the central leadership indicate the continuing standoff
between the contending factions. It is problematical whether the Standing
Committee itself is still functioning or whether an ad hoc group within
the Politburo may currently be the ultimate decision-making body.
R.
FORD
GERALD
SECRET GDS
LIBRARY
HR 5/10/01
SECRET
2
The Left
In any event, the leftists, with Mao's support, appear to have the
political initiative. at the center. They should obtain further leeway
with the passing of Chu Te. In addition to the Standing Committee and
Party headquarters, leftist political strength resides in the central media,
the students, the militia, the PLA political department, and the industrial
heart of China Shanghai.
There and still undry construmtion
homener.
Many weaknesses, however, still constrain the leftists, Most importantly,
they seem to have little support among provincial leaders, military
commanders, or the government bureaucracy. The leftists also would
be unlikely to control a meeting of the Central Committee as presently
composed.
Thus, the leftists, a disparate group apparently led by Chang Ch'ung-ch'iao,
are probably anxious to exploit the advantage they currently enjoy at the
center before Mao dies. They must move on two fronts -- seeking where
possible to weaken their opposition and at the same time broaden their
own support. The July 1 joint editorial marking the Chinese Communist
Party anniversary, while relatively constrained, indicated the regime's
preoccupation with the domestic political struggle, and clearly suggested
the need for the removal of at least a small group of Teng and Chou
supporters.
The left is most probably concerned about gaining allies among the
military. The role of people like Chien Hsia-lien, the Commander of
the Peking Military Region, will be critical. The alignment of military
commanders, however, remains the murkiest element of the obscure
Peking domestic scene. Most military commanders are probably biding
their time until the Chairman dies.
The role of Premier Hua Kuo-feng, and several others in the leadership
who are apparently not factional partisans but essentially Mao loyalists,
will also be vital to the course of the power struggle. Hua's control over
the Public Security organs has obvious implications. In line with Mao's
proclivities, Hua will presumably seek to protect the left. But like Mao,
the thrust of Hua's leadership may be to retain a dynamic balance between
the left and the right. If so, Hua will probably not wish to see the left
consolidate or expand its position at the Party center in the wake of the
death of Chu Te.
R.
SECRET
GERALD
FORD
LIBRARY
SECRET
3
The Prospect
The political structure in the PRC is probably more fragile today than
it has ever been -- including during the Cultural Revolution. Mao's
presence remains the key, but it is now a lingering presence and the
old chairman presumably cannot assert a dynamic role. Yet so long
as he lives, even if in a coma, he should remain the core of political
authority and the leadership stalemate is likely to continue. Realignments
may, however, already be at work that will determine the shape of the
post-Mao regime,
homever, may retains already the certaining anro shape,
SECRET
LIGNARY GERALD R. FOR
DOC
RECD
LOG NUMBER
2e
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
7137
13
18
7604047
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSTATE
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/ OUT
SCOWCROFT X
SECDEF
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
HYLAND
DCI
X REF
C
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
DAVIS
STATE EXSE Barnes
CODEWORD
OTHER
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT Implications on PRC domeste Politics
by death of CHU TE
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
CONCUR-
COOR-
INFO
CY
RENCE
DINATE
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH
FOR
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT.
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS
MEMO
TO
FAR EAST/ PRC
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
DATE
FROM
TO
STATUS
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:
DUE
7/13
Script
+
7-19
Pres
Pres Info for info
(7/16) CY TO
CP
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
7-20
NBC's
J
Nordby Pres
BETHLO FORD
DISPATCH
NOTIFY
MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS
NSC/S DISP INSTR
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
M/F IVL 23 BY 1976
OPEN CRT ID: Apc
NS
DY
SPECIAL INDEXING:
WH SA FP
CLOSE
PA
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED
NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022
3
amt
4217
MEMORANDUM
with
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET GDS
INFORMATION
July 22, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES
SUBJECT:
Chinese Continue to Promulgate Line on Taiwan
(Begin Unclassified)
Leslie Gelb of the New York Times called Jay Taylor July 22 to say
that the PRCLO had invited him and several of his colleagues to dinner
a few days ago. Counselor Hsieh Chi-mei asked Gelb to select the
guests. During the dinner, Hsieh and the other Chinese present constantly
returned to the subject of Taiwan. The Chinese emphasized categorically
that Taiwan could not be liberated by peaceful means and that only military
force could achieve this objective. The Kuomintang regime was too
oppressive for the people to overthrow it. In discussing this point, Hsieh
referred several times to Mao's quote that "power grows out of the barrel
of a gun. "
Gelb said that he asked Hsieh what lay behind their taking this position.
The Chinese replied that this position had always been PRC policy, and
he denied that their restatement of it related to any current development.
Gelb said he asked Hsieh whether he recognized that promulgation of such
a hard line in the United States would make normalization very difficult.
Hsieh simply said this was our problem.
The Chinese had said that the discussion should be off the record. Later,
Gelb called and asked Hsieh if he could write an article on the subject.
Hsieh said he should not quote or cite any Chinese official or any Chinese
source for the statements on the Taiwan question. Gelb's editor said
that he could not print this story by simply citing "diplomatic sources."
When Gelb went back to Hsieh, the latter refused to permit any more
direct sourcing.
Gelb asked Taylor what he made of this behavior. Jay said that the
stated position was always implicit in the Chinese attitude on the
liberation of Taiwan. The Chinese did not usually so categorically rule
out the peaceful alternative, however. Jay suggested to Gelb that the
SECRET GDS
HR 5/10/01
GERAL R. FORD
LIBRARY
1
SECRET
2
editorials in the New York Times and other U.S. papers advocating
self-determination for Taiwan may have in part stimulated the PRCLO
lecture on the subject.
(End Unclassified)
Comment
(Begin Secret)
The PRCLO approach to the newsmen is clearly a follow-up to the
heated discussion between Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Senator Scott. It
confirms that Chang's position is the considered and official line, which
the regime appears determined to convey to American Congressmen
and newsmen and presumably ultimately the American public. So far,
however, we have not seen any reaffirmation of the hard line in Chinese
media. We are currently preparing an analysis for you of the significance
of this affair.
(End Secret)
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022
4a AH MH
MEMORANDUM
4343
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
ANALYSIS
July 29, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES
SUBJECT:
Toughening of Peking's Position on Taiwan
Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from you to the President
containing an analysis of Peking's toughened line on the "liberation
of Taiwan."
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.
Not President forwardes to
the
OBE
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR
,
NARA, DATE 5/10/01
4b
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ANALYSIS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Toughening of Peking's Position on Taiwan
Introduction and Summary
The PRC appears to have toughened its line on the "liberation" of
Taiwan. The result is to complicate the possibility of finding a mutually
acceptable formula on the Taiwan issue that would meet our political
needs.
The new line reflects the influence of the left faction as well as reaction
to resurgent interest in the United States and in Japan in a "two-China"
or "one-China, one-Taiwan" arrangement. Peking's less flexible
political position on the method of "liberating" Taiwan, together with
recent extensive PRC military exercises in the Taiwan Strait area,
suggests ascendancy of a view among Chinese leaders that the PRC
cannot let the Taiwan issue lie on the shelf. They apparently believe
that they must underscore the military option as a matter of principle,
as a pressure tactic against the U.S., and as a preparation for future
contingencies. While all evidence indicates that the Chinese wish to
continue the current level of detente with us on the basis of our common
concerns with Soviet expansionism, the new posture on Taiwan not only
complicates advancement to full normalization but could conceivably
lead to future problems in our relations. The Chinese, however, have
so far retained basic flexibility on the Taiwan issue by not making the
new line public, and by giving no indication of a change in their basic
policy toward the U.S.
Background
In a July conversation with Senator Scott in Peking, Vice Premier and
Politburo Standing Committee member Chang Ch'un-ch'iao made the
toughest statements on Taiwan by any PRC leader since normalization
began. Scott indicated to Chang the importance of conditioning the
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
SECRET/SENSITIVE
NPC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
SW 9/26/02
HR NARA, DATE 2/3/03
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
American people on the question of Taiwan, and he underscored our
desire for a peaceful settlement. Chang replied that there was "very
little possibility of a peaceful settlement" and that "it is more reliable
to settle this question through war. " Chang said that Taiwan is "a noose
around the neck of the United States" and that if we did not take it off
"the PLA will cut it off. 11
Senator Scott's dogged pursuit of this delicate question may in part have
accounted for Chang's intemperate language. Ambassador Gates, however,
believes that Chang knew just what he was saying, and that he probably
had whatever prior clearance he needed within the leadership for his
statements. Gates' view gained credence when, about ten days after the
Scott-Chang talks, the PRC Liaison Office (PRCLO) in Washington con-
veyed the same point, but even more inflexibly than Chang, to a group
of prominent U.S. newsmen. The PRCLO invited Leslie Gelb and several
other journalists to dinner, and the Chinese spent most of the evening
categorically asserting that peaceful liberation of Taiwan was out of the
question and that military force would have to resolve the issue. The
PRC officials, however, insisted that the journalists could not directly
or indirectly cite Chinese sources in reporting this stated position on
Taiwan.
Previous Policy
On the crucial question of a "peaceful settlement" of the Taiwan issue,
the U.S. and Chinese positions differ in the Shanghai Communique the
U.S. asserting its interest in such a settlement and the Chinese reaffirming
that the liberation of Taiwan is an internal matter. None of the top
Chinese leaders -- including Chou, Mao and Teng -- has ever lifted
the threat that the Taiwan problem would ultimately need resolution by
military means. While their formulations have varied, they have referred
to the military liberation of Taiwan as probably inevitable.
Nevertheless, the degree to which the Chinese publicly have been willing
to admit the theoretical possibility of a peaceful solution has changed over
time. For example, several important and considered statements in
early 1973 publicly affirmed the alternative of "peaceful liberation. 11
This more flexible posture seemed to come from Chou En-lai and the
moderate group around him. So far as we know, Defense Minister Yeh Ching-
ying, in a meeting with a group of overseas Chinese during the summer or
early fall of 1973, was the last to use the phrase. In mid-1973 the left
faction, of which Chang Ch'un-ch'iao is the presumed head began to criticize
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
certain aspects of Chou's foreign policy, while accepting the basic geo-
political rationale of detente with the United States. After the Tenth
Party Congress in September 1973, the phrase "peaceful liberation"
disappeared.
During the anti-Confucius, anti-Lin Piao Campaign in 1974 there was
criticism in Chinese media of Lin's alleged efforts to negotiate with
the Nationalists during the civil war. By implication, such efforts today
would also be out of the question.
It is apparent that there have been differences within the Peking leadership
on the following issues regarding Taiwan:
The possibilities of a peaceful settlement with the Taipei regime.
-- The dangers of allowing the Taiwan issue to remain on the shelf.
The best strategy for obtaining fundamental concessions from the
United States on the Taiwan question.
The wisdom of beginning to enhance the PRC's capability to employ
the military option.
The weight of progress on the Taiwan issue relative to the geo-
political benefits vis-a-vis the Soviets of PRC detente with the United
States.
Elements Behind the New Line
The new, tougher language on the liberation of Taiwan is consistent
with the more militant adherence of the left to ideological principle. It
also fits in with the left's inclination to underscore China's long-term
adversary relationship with the United States. Thus in part it reflects
the increased influence of the left faction, particularly that of Chang
Ch'un-ch'iao. The left is currently concerned with improving its
influence among the military, and conceivably some Chinese military
leaders would approve a bellicose posture towards Taiwan, and one
that emphasized enhancing China's military capabilities in the Taiwan
Strait.
In any event, the Taiwan question, involving as it does ideology, national-
ism and security, is a likely issue to become entangled in the domestic
TAILISNTS/1S
4
power struggle. The moderate group was probably vulnerable to
charges that over the past several years it had been too soft on Taiwan.
Chairman Mao's current input on decisions is problematical but pre-
sumably it is continuing to slip away. As on domestic issues, access
and influence over Mao by the leftist group including Madam Mao
(Chiang Ching) may have allowed new scope to the militants on Taiwan
policy.
The Chinese statements must also be seen in the context of recent
developments that seem to point in the direction of a hardening of U.S.
and Japanese positions toward consolidation of the Taiwan status quo.
These developments include:
The jelling of American editorial opinion in the most prestigious
and influential papers behind the need to preserve the rights of the
Taiwanese while normalizing relations with the PRC.
Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa's comments highlighting
Japan's "satisfaction" at the current state of U.S. - PRC-Taiwan relations,
and indicating Japan's concern at any change in the status quo.
Our positions on the question of Canada's restriction of the ROC's
participation in the Olympic Games.
Military Activity in the Taiwan Strait Area
The new political line on Taiwan has emerged at the time of large-
scale PRC military exercises in the coastal area in the southern region
of the Taiwan Strait. Ships from both the East and South Sea Fleet
have taken part, and for the first time in years PRC aircraft have extended
their operations several miles into the airspace over the Strait. The
exercise has involved armies from two military regions, and amphibious
and airborne operations against PRC coastal islands.
In his conversation with Senator Scott, Chang indicated that the current
exercises in the Strait were intended for their effect on both the United
States and Taiwan. Chang declared, "At present we're still making
preparations. This is no military secret. In recent days in Fukien we
have conducted small-scale military exercises. Taiwan is very nervous. "
Chang was apparently referring to this activity when later in the con-
versation he said "I want to show you that our civil war has not stopped. 11
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
5
The decision to underscore and enhance the military option in this
fashion is very likely supported not only by the left but also by some
military elements. A Central Committee directive of last summer on
modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) called for the
build-up of a military capability for the "liberation of Taiwan. 11 The
directive gave a five year time frame for achieving this capability.
Conclusions
It is impossible at the moment to sort out and define the precise intention
behind Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's comments to Scott and the concurrent military
exercises in the Strait. But in any event, the result is to narrow the
already limited ambiguity of the Chinese position on the question of their
use of force in resolving the Taiwan issue. If and when the new Chinese
line becomes known in the United States, the explicitness of the threat to
Taiwan will make considerably more difficult the development of a form-
ulation on the issue that would meet U.S. political needs, both international
and domestic.
Peking, however, has still been careful to keep open the possibility of
an accommodation with the U.S. on the question of Taiwan. No Chinese
public statement has yet affirmed the categorical rejection of a peaceful
settlement. The July 1 joint editorial on the 55th anniversary of the
Chinese Communist Party, for example, did not even include the usual
shibboleth "We are determined to liberate Taiwan. " There is no indication
that the current Chinese regime is preparedto see a worsening of relations
with the United States because of a lack of progress on the Taiwan issue.
The leftists and possibly some elements in the military may be arguing
that international developments have reduced the geopolitical advantage
for China of detente with the United States. But from all appearances,
the entire spectrum of the Chinese leadership, including the left, still
believesthat continued relaxation of tensions with the United States is
desirable in terms of power politics. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao himself, in his
remarks to Scott,indicated this was the case. In an earlier meeting with
Ambassador Gates, Premier Hua Kuo-feng suggested no change in China's
policy toward the U.S.
Nevertheless, while the more militant line on Taiwan may be largely
reactive and tactical, it is not clear where it will lead or what will be
its effect on basic U.S. China relations. The toughened language,
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
6
together with Peking's demonstration of force in the Taiwan Strait
and its efforts to enhance its long-term military capability in the area,
raise worrisome questions. The Chinese posture suggests that if over
the next year or two the U.S. does not complete normalization and does
not sever its ties to Taiwan, the tone of U.S. - PRC relations could
become more acrimonious.
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)
WH
MEMORANDUM
4366
up
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
July 30, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES
SUBJECT:
Visitors to China
State has informed us of several potential visits to China.
Ambassador Gates has invited Arthur Burns to come to Peking as a
personal visitor. Burns will be traveling to East Asia to attend a World
Bank and IMF meeting in early October, and intends to visit Peking at
that time.
Frank Zarb, of the Federal Energy Administration, is also toying with
the idea of a visit to Peking when he makes a swing through major oil
consuming and producing countries in East Asia in late September/early
October. According to one of his office staff members, Zarb mentioned
the idea of a China trip to you. Bill Gleysteen explained to the FEA
staffer that he doubted the PRC would give Zarb a visa for an official
visit, and the Chinese would shy away from extensive discussion with
an unofficial visitor. Bill also emphasized that Secretary Kissinger and
perhaps the President would have to address the policy connotations.
It was understood that Zarb would not proceed further unless he talked
/Twe
directly to you or the Secretary.
Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger's visit to China is now
scheduled for September. The Chinese have apparently already included
Sinkiang and Tibet on his schedule. These two provinces are major
areas of Chinese security concern. State understands Schlesinger has
requested an itinerary that would not include these areas.
R.
FORD
GERALD
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