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This file contains contingency plans for Chairman Mao's death.
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People's Republic of China (15)
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1553808
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People's Republic of China (15)
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This file contains contingency plans for Chairman Mao's death.
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Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)
East Asia and Pacific Country Files
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The original documents are located in Box 14, folder "People's Republic of China (15)" of
the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 14 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
per 5 outbod 9/10/76
4195 (redo)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL GDS
ACTION
August 3, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES
of
SUBJECT:
Contingency Messages on Mao Tse-tung's Death
State has sent a contingency plan (Tab C) to Secretary Kissinger for
use at the time of Mao Tse-tung's death. Based on the precedent
established in connection with Chou En-lai's death, State believes the
President should send condolence messages to Premier Hua Kuo-feng,
to Madame Mao (Chiang Ching), and to whomever is fulfilling the protocol
functions of PRC Chief of State following Chu Te's death.
We have slightly amended the suggested texts that State drafted for
the President's signature. The revised texts are at Tab A; the State
originals form part of Tab C. We have also slightly edited the State
proposed text of a separate White House statement on the Chairman's
death. The revised text is at Tab B; the State original forms part of
Tab C.
Official Delegation
It is probable but not certain that in the case of Mao's death the Chinese
will adhere to their past practice of not inviting foreign governments to
send delegations to the funeral. Should the Chinese indicate that they
are prepared to receive an official U.S. delegation, the EA Bureau
believes that Secretary Kissinger would be the most appropriate person
to head it. The Bureau also recommends that the delegation include
Senator Mansfield, Congressman Rhodes, and Ambassador Gates.
On the other hand, the Bureau believes that should it become evident
LISAARY GERALD R. FORD
that the Chief-of-State or head-of-government will head a substantial
number of other delegations, Vice President Rockefeller should head
the delegation "provided the risk of domestic political opposition to his
selection is considered manageable."
I believe that in any event you would wish to recommend to the President
that Vice President Rockefeller not lead a U.S. delegation to Chairman
Mao's funeral. As State's memorandum points out, the Vice President
CONFIDENTIAL GDS
HR 5/10/01
CONFIDENTIAL
2
attended the funeral of Chiang Kai-shek in April 1975. Many Congress-
men and others would probably oppose his attendance at Mao's funeral
for that reason. Peking would also have reservations because of the
Vice President's role at Chiang Kai-shek's funeral.
Other possibilities for head of the delegation would be: David Bruce,
the First Chief of our Liaison Office in Peking, and Ambassador Scranton.
Douglas Smith, of Robert Hartmann's office, has cleared the texts of
the condolence messages and the White House statement.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the text of the contingency messages at Tabs A and B.
APPROVE RM1055. DISAPPROVE
That you discuss with the President the question of a possible U.S.
delegation to Mao funeral indicating that you believe that we should not
consider the Vice President on this occasion, but that the Secretary of
State would be the most appropriate delegation head.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
Done
FO4D
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S
CONFIDENTIAL
To:
The Secretary
From: EA - Robert H. Miller
Contingency Plans for Mao Tse-tung's Death
In view of the increasing likelihood that Chairman
Mao Tse-tung's death may occur soon, you may wish to
review the contingency plans we have prepared for that
eventuality. Mao was 82 on December 26, 1975 and has
been in frail health for some time. The PRC announced
June 15 that Chairman Mao will no longer meet foreign
visitors, providing further evidence that his health
may be failing.
On Mao's death, we will need to move promptly on
four matters:
-- the release of appropriate statements in the
name of the President and the Secretary of State;
-- the despatch of condolence messages;
-- the selection of an official delegation if
foreign governments are invited to send representatives
to the funeral; and
-- the determination of the level of USG partici-
pation in Washington observances of Mao's death, such as
signing the condolence book at the PRC Liaison Office.
US Government Statements
The proposed texts of appropriate statements (fully
cleared at the working level) to be released by the
White House and the Department of State are at Tabs 1
and 2.
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS
HR 5/10/01
GEAL R.FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
Condolence Messages
Based on the precedent established in connection
with Chou En-lai's death, we believe the President
should send condolence messages to Premier Hua Kuo-feng,
to Madame Mao (Chiang Ching), and to whomever is ful-
filling the protocol functions of PRC Chief of State
following Chu Te's death. Suggested texts of these
messages are at Tabs 3, 4, and 5. (In Chou's case, the
President sent condolence messages to Chu Te, Mao
Tse-tung, and Madame Chou. The President also included
a brief expression of regret over Chou's death in his
letter to Teng Hsiao-p'ing following his visit to the
PRC in December 1975.)
In addition, you should send a condolence message to
PRC Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua. A proposed text is
at Tab 6.
If the Chinese adhere to the practice followed in
the case of Premier Chou, we can anticipate that these
messages will be made public by the PRC and published
in the PRC press.
Official Delegation to Mao's Funeral
This question may not arise, but we should be prepared
for it if it does. The Chinese did not invite foreign
governments to send delegations to the funerals of either
Chou En-lai or Chu Te. In both cases they announced that
this decision was "in accordance with China's customs and
reformed protocol." It is probable but not certain that
they will adhere to this practice in the case of Mao.
Should the Chinese indicate that they are prepared
to receive an official US delegation, we should bear in
mind the following considerations:
-- Regardless of formal titles, Mao has no real protocol
equivalent in this country. Officially, he is simply Chair-
man of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
People's Republic of China. As such he is Commander in Chief
of the armed forces and Chairman of the Party's Military
Commission, but he holds no formal governmental position.
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
-- Mao is still identified in the minds of some
Americans as a radical revolutionary who sent troops
to fight us in Korea, has fomented revolution around
the world, and is noted for his antagonism to our way
of life. At the same time, by meeting personally with
top US leaders, he has given his stamp of approval to
the new turn in US-PRC relations. We would wish to
remember him in this latter role without forgetting the
former.
-- The funeral would probably not provide a good
occasion for substantive talks with the Chinese on the
future of our relations.
-- In selecting the senior representative to attend
the funeral, we would wish to demonstrate the importance
we attach to the US-PRC relationship, and to Mao's
personal role in achieving the breakthrough, without
doing so in such an ostentatious fashion as to set
undesirable precedents, to unsettle US-Soviet relations,
or to arouse domestic criticism.
Delegation Head
Attendance by the President would probably be
undesirable in any perceivable circumstances.
Sending Vice President Rockefeller would symbolize
the importance we attach to US-PRC relations, but his
attendance at the funeral of Chiang Kai-shek in April 1975
would dramatize the "two Chinas" aspect of our concurrent
relations with both Peking and Taipei. On the one hand,
Ambassador Gates has strongly recommended that the Vice
President head our delegation despite the Chiang Kai-shek
precedent. On the other, there is the possibility that
a few extreme supporters of the Republic of China in this
country, including Members of Congress, could oppose the
Vice President's attendance on the grounds that we should
not treat Mao on the same level as our long-time friend
and ally Chiang Kai-shek.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 4 -
You yourself have had more contact with Chairman
Mao than any other US official. Your attendance at the
funeral would be symbolically fitting for this reason
and would demonstrate the importance we attach to our
ties with the PRC. There is the possibility, however,
that other delegations will be headed at a higher level
in a strict protocol sense.
Problems of protocol and the anomalies introduced
by the absence of full US-PRC diplomatic relations
could be reduced by sending a prominent figure outside
the Executive Branch as the President's personal repre-
sentative. Preferably, this person should have some
connection with China and, particularly, with the break-
through in US-PRC relations.
Former President Nixon's selection for this purpose
would presumably be acceptable to the Chinese but would
obviously be unacceptable to Americans.
Former Secretary of State Rogers accompanied
President Nixon to China in 1972, but the Chinese recog-
nize that he was not a principal architect of the shift
in our policy, and he did not accompany the President
to his meeting with Chairman Mao.
Other Delegation Members
While the delegation should be small, we may wish
to include several Congressional leaders to symbolize
the broad bipartisan support in this country for our
policy toward the PRC. A list of Members of Congress
who have visited the PRC is at Tab 7. To provide
appropriate balance, the best choices might be Senate
Majority Leader Mansfield and House Minority Leader
Rhodes.
The Chief of our Liaison Office in Peking should
also be designated an official member of the delegation.
One or both of our former Liaison Office Chiefs in Peking -
David Bruce and George Bush - could also be included. We
do not consider this necessary or desirable, however,
CONFIDENTIAL
GLRALD FORD VISNARY
CONFIDENTIAL
- 5 -
since their inclusion could tend to undercut the position
of Ambassador Gates in Peking. Moreover, it would not
be appropriate to include the Director of Central Intel-
ligence on a delegation of this sort.
Bureau Views
If a delegation is required, we feel that on balance
you would be the most appropriate person to head it. The
delegation might also include Senator Mansfield, Congress-
man Rhodes, and Ambassador Gates. On the other hand,
should it quickly become evident that a substantial
number of other delegations will be headed at the chief
of state or head of government level, we would favor
having Vice President Rockefeller head the delegation,
provided that the risk of domestic political opposition
to his selection is considered manageable. You could
also appropriately be a member of the delegation under
these circumstances.
Participation in Washington Observances
As in the case of Premier Chou, the PRC Liaison
Office in Washington will probably open a condolence
book for signature. You were the ranking person to sign
the book for Premier Chou, and we believe you should also
sign the book for Mao.
Other Actions
A circular telegram should be sent to field posts
with instructions on how to observe the occasion. A
draft is at Tab 8.
Attachments:
Tab 1 - Suggested White House Statement
Tab 2 - Suggested Statement by the Secretary.
Tab 3 - Suggested Message to Hua Kuo-feng
Tab 4 - Suggested Message to Madame Mao Tse-tung
Tab 5 - Suggested Message to Acting Chief of State
Tab 6 - Suggested Message to Ch'iao Kuan-hua
Tab 7 - Members of Congress who have visited PRC
Tab 8 - Draft Circular Telegram
CONFIDENTIAL
FORD LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
Suggested White House Statement on Mao's Death
The People's Republic of China announced today
the passing away of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
Chairman Mao was a giant figure in modern
Chinese history. He was a leader whose actions
profoundly affected the development of his country
and whose ideas were influential well beyond the
borders of China.
Americans will remember that it was under
Chairman Mao that China moved together with the
United States to end a generation of hostility and
to launch a new and more positive era in relations
between our two countries. We are confident that
the trend of improved relations between the People's
Republic of China and the United States, which Chairman
Mao helped create, and to which he imparted authoritative
direction, will continue.
The United States offers its condolences to
the Government and people of the People's Republic
of China.
CONFIDENTIAL
GERALD FOND
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12038, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY
HR , MARA, DATE 5/10/01
CONFIDENTIAL
Suggested Statement by the Secretary on Mao's Death
The death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung marks the
passing of one of the major figures of our time.
It was my privilege to meet with Chairman Mao
over a period of nearly four years, during which the
United States and the People's Republic of China
established a new and more positive relationship
based on the principles of the Shanghai Communique.
From these conversations, I came to know Chairman
Mao as a man of broad vision with a deep concern for
the future of his country and its place in the world.
The creation of a durable relationship between our
two countries based on mutual understanding and a
perception of common interests will stand as a lasting
tribute to Chairman Mao's foresight and boldness of
purpose.
I extend my deep sympathy to the Government and
people of the People's Republic of China on this sad
occasion.
FOAD
CONFIDENTIAL
GERALD
HR
5/10/01
CONFIDENTIAL
His Excellency
Hua Kuo-feng
Premier of the State Council
Peking
Premier:
Dear Mr. Chairmans
Please accept my personal condolences, and those
of the Government and people of the United States, on
the occasion of the passing of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
Few men in any era are destined to leave a deep
imprint on the course of development of a great
country and fewer still to achieve historic greatness.
Chairman Mao was one of these rare men. His leader-
ship has been a decisive element in the shaping of the
Chinese nation over the past several decades. He was
truly a major figure of our times.
I was privileged to meet Chairman Mao during my
visit to Peking in December 1975. Our discussion
furthered the development of US-China relations along
the lines that he had earlier envisaged. Let me
affirm now, as I did then, the determination of the
United States to complete the normalization of our
relations on the basis of the Shanghai Communique.
This would be a fitting tribute to his vision, and
of benefit to the peoples of our two countries.
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford
CONFIDENTIAL
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12058, SEC. 3.5
GERALD
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY
HR NARA, DATE 5/10/01
Madame Mao Tse-tung
Peking
People's Republic of China
Dear Madame Mao:
Mrs. Ford joins me in extending to you our
deepest sympathy on the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
Chairman Mao had a profound impact on his era.
During my visit to Peking in December 1975, I was
privileged to hold wide-ranging discussions with him.
Our talks confirmed that we shared a common belief in
the importance of strengthening the relations between
our two countries. Chairman Mao will be remembered
in this country for his leading role in restoring the
traditional ties of friendship between the American
and Chinese peoples.
Please accept my personal condolences.
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford
FUND
LIBRARY
(Contingency Message to be sent, on an optional
basis, to whomever is fulfilling the protocol
functions of PRC Chief of State)
Dear Mr.
:
On behalf of the Government and people of the
United States, I wish to extend to you my condolences
on the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
Chairman Mao was one of the remarkable men of
this age. In his life and actions, he demonstrated
the power of ideas, and under his leadership the face
of China was profoundly altered. He has left an in-
delible imprint on the history of China and of our
times.
We shall always remember Chairman Mao as a leader
who had the vision to recognize that strengthened ties
between our two countries would serve the interests of
both our peoples, and the courage to translate this
vision into practical steps that should be of long-
term benefit to the evolution of a more secure world.
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford
GERALO R.FORD
His Excellency
Ch'iao Kuan-hua
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Peking
Dear Mr. Minister:
Please accept my sincere condolences on the
passing of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
Chairman Mao was a towering figure on the world
scene. During the meetings which I was privileged to
have with him, I was deeply impressed by his wide-
ranging intellect and profound commitment to his
country. Under his leadership, China joined the United
States in shaping a new and durable relationship. We
are determined to continue on this course, which will
stand as a monument to his foresight.
Sincerely,
Henry A. Kissinger
FORD
CONGRESSIONAL VISITORS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
APRIL, 1972 -- to Present
(CODEL Leaders underlined)
April, 1972
Senator Mike Mansfield
Senator Hugh Scott
June, 1972
Rep. Hale Boggs
Rep. Gerald Ford
July, 1973
Sen. Warren Magnuson
Sen. Robert Griffin
Sen. John Sparkman
Sen. Gale Mcgee
Rep. Thomas Morgan
Rep. John McFall
Rep. William Maillard
Rep. Jerry Pettis
July, 1974
Sen. Henry Jackson
September, 1974
Sen. William Fulbright
Sen. Hiram Fong
Sen. Hubert Humphrey
Rep. Peter Frelinghuysen
Rep. Clement Zablocki
Rep. William Broomfield
Rep. Barbara Jordan
December, 1974
Senator Mike Mansfield (second visit)
B. FORD
Congressional Delegations to PRC (cont'd)
2.
March, 1975
Rep. Carl Albert
Rep. John Rhodes
August, 1975
Sen. Charles Percy
Sen. Jacob Javits
Sen. Claiborn Pell
Sen. Adlai Stevenson III
Rep. Margaret Heckler
Rep. Paul Findley
Rep. Paul McCloskey
August, 1975
Rep. John Anderson
Sen. Robert Byrd
Sen. Sam Nunn
Sen. James Pearson
Rep. John Slack
Rep. John Derwinski
December, 1975
Rep. Margaret Heckler
Rep. Patsy Mink
Rep. Gladys Spellman
Rep. Bella Abzug
Rep. Corinne Boggs
Rep. Yvonne Burke
Rep. Cardiss Collins
Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman
Rep. Patricia Schroeder
Rep. Millicent Fenwick
Rep. Helen Meyner
FORD
Congressional Delegations to the PRC (cont'd)
3.
April, 1976
Rep. Mel Price
Rep. Bob Wilson
Rep. Samuel Stratton
Rep. Richard Ichord
Rep. William Randall
Rep. William Dickinson
Rep. Lester Wolff
Rep. J. Herbert Burke
Rep. G. William Whitehurst
July, 1976
Sen. Hugh Scott
FORD is LIBRANY 07V839
CONFIDENTIAL
DRAFT CABLE
To: All Diplomatic and Consular Posts
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS:
SUBJECT: Guidance for US Involvement in Commemorative
Activities on the Death of PRC Chairman Mao Tse-tung
1. The PRC has announced the death of Chinese Communist
Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung. This message provides
guidance for participation by US officials in commemorative
activities organized by PRC missions at third-country
posts.
2. If a condolence book is opened and the US post is
either specifically invited to sign or is included in a
circular note or other general invitation, the chief of
mission, charge, or principal officer should sign for
USG. Individual US officials may also sign, at the
discretion of the chief of mission.
3. A number of posts reported that they were omitted
from general invitations to sign condolence books on
occasion of Chou En-lai's death. In those cases where
posts nevertheless persisted in efforts to sign, Department
is unaware of any Chinese rebuff. Accordingly, posts
&
FORD
GERALD
CONFIDENTIAL
HR 5/10/01
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
which do not initially receive such invitations are
authorized to use their own discretion in probing
Chinese intentions and in deciding, if situation still
ambiguous, whether or not to sign.
4. Regardless of official condolence posture, if personal
relations warrant the chief of mission may seek an
appropriate opportunity to convey his personal condolences
to his PRC counterpart.
5. Posts may also participate in other forms of observance
(we are not aware of any such official activities in case
of Chou, but cannot rule it out in Mao's case) at an
appropriate level if invited to attend. In the majority
of cases, even if such observances take place, US
representatives will probably not be invited.
6. Department would appreciate brief reports on PRC
handling of funeral observances, particularly any unusual
aspects.
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Mr. Premier:
Please accept my personal condolences, and those of the Government
and people of the United States, on the occasion of the passing of
Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
Few men in any era Fare destined & deep imprint on the
an
course of development of a great country and fewer still to achieve
historic greatness. Chairman Mao was one of these rare men. His
leadership has been a decisive element in the shaping of the Chinese
for and his works have left a deep imprint upon our
nation the past several decades ")^ He was truly a major figure
civilization.
of our times.
I was privileged to meet Chairman Mao during my visit to Peking
in December 1975. Our discussion furthered the development of U.S. -
China relations along the lines that he had earlier envisaged. Let me
affirm now, as I did then, the determination of the United States to
complete the normalization of our relations on the basis of the Shanghai
Communique. This would be a fitting tribute to his vision, and of
benefit to the peoples of our two countries.
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
His Excellency
Hua Kuo-feng
Premier of the State Council
Peking
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
CONFIDENTIAL
NSC MEMO, 11/24/93, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY
HR , NARA, DATE 5/10/01
Dear Madame Mao:
Mrs. Ford joins me in extending to you our deepest sympathy
on the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
Chairman Mao had a profound impact on his era. During my visit
to Peking in December 1975, I was privileged to hold wide-ranging
discussions with him. Our talks confirmed that we shared a common
belief in the importance of strengthening the relations between our
two countries. Chairman Mao will be remembered in this country for
his leading role in restoring the traditional ties of friendship between
the American and Chinese peoples.
Please accept my personal condolences.
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford
Madame Mao Tse-tung
Peking
People's Republic of China
8/2/76
FORD LIBRARY & CERALD
(Contingency Message to be sent, on an optional
basis, to whomever is fulfilling the protocol
functions of PRC Chief of State)
Dear Mr.
:
On behalf of the Government and people of the
United States, I wish to extend to you my condolences
on the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
Chairman Mao was one of the remarkable men of
this age. In his life and actions, he demonstrated
the power of ideas, and under his leadership the face
of China was profoundly altered. He has left an in-
delible imprint on the history of China and of our
times.
We shall always remember Chairman Mao as a leader
who had the vision to recognize that strengthened ties
between our two countries would serve the interests of
both our peoples, and the courage to translate this
vision into practical steps that should be of long-
term benefit to the evolution of a more secure world.
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
ThyLoR
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Tom;
Can we get all - of state
memo-
1
Holder
GGRALD FORD
Rec. 7/28/76 11:35 am
mm
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 28, 1976
TO:
DOUG SMITH
FROM:
JAY TAYLOR
SUBJECT: Contingency Messages on Mao Tse-tung's
Death
The attached Presidential letters and White House
statement are forwarded for your clearance.
Please call 3044 when cleared.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
FORD LIBRARY is GERALD
E.O. 12958, CES. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. BUIDELINES
BY HR ME 5/10/01
CONFIDENTIAL
Suggested White House Statement on Mao's Death
The People's Republic of China announced today the passing away of
Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
Chairman Mao was a giant figure in modern Chinese history. He
was a leader whose actions profoundly affected the development of his
country. His influence on history will extend far beyond the borders
of China.
Americans will remember that it was under Chairman Mao that
China moved together with the United States to end a generation of
hostility and to launch a new and more positive era in relations between
our two countries. We are confident that the trend of improved relations
between the People's Republic of China and the United States, which
Chairman Mao helped create, and to which he imparted authoritative
direction, will continue.
The United States offers its condolences to the Government and
people of the People's Republic of China.
8/2/26
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, SEC. 3.5
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY
HR
/ NARA, DATE 5/10/01
OR
planetype only
A
AH
MEMORANDUM
4195
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
the
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS
pain
July 20, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
Tom can we
exis
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES
have all of sate meno
area
SUBJECT:
Contingency Messages on Mao Death
Tse-tung's part of which is indided
State has sent a contingency plan (Tab C) to Secretary Kissinger for
use at the time of Mao Tse-tung's death. Based on the precedent
established in connection with Chou En-lai's death, State believes the
President should send condolence messages to Premier Hua Kuo-feng,
to Madame Mao (Chiang Ching), and to whomever is fulfilling the protocol
functions of PRC Chief of State following Chu Te's death. Suggested texts
whose
of these messages are at Tab A.
st.
ghty
The proposed text of a separate White House statement on the Chairman's
death, is at Tab B.
sthervised the.State-proposed at lext B; the State original forms of TAB C.
Official Delegation
pad
It is probable but not certain that in the case of Mao's death the Chinese
will adhere to their past practice of not inviting foreign governments to
send delegations to the funeral. Should the Chinese indicate that they
are prepared to receive an official U.S. delegation, the EA Bureau
believes that Secretary Kissinger would be the most appropriate person
to head it. The Bureau also recommends that the delegation include
the
Senator Mansfield, Congressman Rhodes, and Ambassador Gates.
On the other hand, the Bureau believes that should it become evident
that the Chief-of-State or head-of-government will head a substantial
number of other delegations, Vice President Rockefeller should head
the delegation "provided the risk of domestic political opposition to his
are
selection is considered manageable."
I believe that in any event you would wish to recommend to the President
that Vice President Rockefeller not lead a U.S. delegation to Chairman
Mao's funeral. As State's memorandum points out, the Vice President
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
HR 5/10/01
CONFIDENTIAL
2
attended the funeral of Chiang Kai-shek in April 1975. Many Congressmen
and others would probably oppose his attendance at Mao's funeral for that
reason. Peking would also have reservations because of the Vice
President's role at Chiang Kai-shek's funeral.
Other possibilities for head of the delegation would be: David Bruce,
the First Chief of our Liaison Office in Peking, and Ambassador Scranton.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the text of the contingency messages at Tabs A and B.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
That you discuss with the President the question of a possible U.S.
delegation to Mao's funeral indicating that you believe that we should not
consider the Vice President on this occasion, but that the Secretary of
State would be the most appropriate delegation head.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
CONFIDENTIAL
DOC
RECD
LOG NUMBER
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
7
20
7
22
14
7604195
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSTATE
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/ OUT
SCOWCROFT
x
SECDEF
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
HYLAND
DCI
X REF
C
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
S
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
DAVIS
STATE EXSEC
CODEWORD
OTHER Barnes
TS.
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT Contingency mags for use at time of
MAO TSE-TUNG death
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
CONCUR-
COOR-
INFO
CY
RENCE
DINATE
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH
FOR
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
(
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
(
CONGRESSIONAL
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS
MEMO
TO
(
FAR EAST/ PRC
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
(
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
1.
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
4
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
DATE
FROM
TO
STATUS
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:
DUE
CY TO
7/22
Scroft
X
Decision
7/29
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
7/26
-
TAYLOR
S
FURTHER ACTION
7/10
NSCS
C
See 7605027 for action
8/3
Scroft
+
Decision
9/10
C
See 7605027 for fund actur
DISPATCH
NOTIFY
MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS
NSC/S DISP INSTR
FORD LIBRARY is
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
SEP2 1976 BY
IF
SPECIAL INDEXING: 7605027
CRT ID:
NS
DY
OPEN
AC
WN
SA FP
*
CLOSE
CA
PA
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED
NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022
2a
MEMORANDUM
4392 (add-on)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 7, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MARSH
BD
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Hanoi's Attack on the President
There is no question that Hanoi's personal attack on the President
goes substantially beyond what we usually see. Ordinarily, Hanoi
attacks some aspect of the President's policy rather than his
personal character. The harsh tone is also inconsistent with other
more authoritative commentaries which Hanoi has disseminated
recently. For example, its reaction to the President's July 24
remarks at the MIA Convention was more measured than this
diatribe. Ordinarily the sharper attack could be expected to follow
the President's taking a tough line on the MIA problem.
The best explanation I can think of is that this commentary was
meant for internal consumption in Vietnam. It seems obvious
that the information the article uses came from some "research"
which an American commentator compiled. We believe Hanoi
regularly receives all such material, and probably jumped on this
item as a "good foreign source" on which to base an attack on the
President. Moreover, it is in the Vietnamese language and it was
a wire item. The words which Hanoi really wants us to hear are
sent in English over its international radio service.
Since there is no clear evidence that Hanoi meant to pick a fight
with us directly by publishing this item, I recommend that we not
make an issue of it now. Rather we should save it for use as a
rationale for being tough with Hanoi when critics suggest we are
not being sufficiently forthcoming to the Vietnamese.
FORD
staff done wky up
THE WHITE HOUSE
4392 2c
WASHINGTON
August 5, 1976
MEMORANDUM TO:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
JACK MARSH Jach
Brent, I would appreciate your thoughts on the attached.
Many thanks.
FORD is LIBRARY 07VU39
AUG
THE WHITE HOUSE
gd
WASHINGTON
August 3, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
RUSS ROURKE
FROM:
MILT MITLER
Russ, you may have already seen this transcript
of a diatribe against the President by Hanoi.
This was released on July 22, 1976, before the
League of Families speech. It represents an
unusually harsh attack against the President
and unlike the normal run where the President's
policies are attacked. It was also in Vietnamese
and so intended primarily for consumption within
Vietnam.
Attachment (transcript - "Ford's True Nature")
GENATO FORD
2t
MEMORANDUM
4392 (add-on)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
August 6, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES
SUBJECT:
Memorandum to Jack Marsh on Hanoi's Attack on the
President
I have prepared a memorandum for you to send to Jack Marsh (Tab A)
commenting on Hanoi's recent diatribe against the President.
5
ASIA & PACIFIC
ANNEX
22
were deeply touched at hearing Prime Minister Pol Pot saying: "The friendship and
solidarity between the Kampuchea and Vietnam revolutions, between Kampuchea and Victnam
constitute a problem of both strategy and sacred feelings. Should that friendship and
solidarity go well the revolution in our two countries would develop finely. There's
no other way".
The Vietnamese press and television delegation on visit to the Democratic Kampuchea shall
keep forever the nice and profound recollections and shall do its utmost to contribute
even a small part to keeping the two countries, as the first secretary of the Vietnam
Workers Party said: "Already bound to each other in the struggle for national liberation,
to be forever attached to each other in the national reconstruction and protection, for
the sake of the independence and prosperity of our respective country and for the
revolutionary interests of the people in southeast Asia and the world over." [sentence
as received]
VIETNAM
VNA DESCRIBES FORD AS CORRUPT, REACTIONARY POLITICIAN
Hanoi VIIA in Vietnamese to VNA Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) 1320 GMT 22 Jul 76 OW--
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[VNA document: "Ford's True Nature"]
[Text] In reality, what is Ford? Following are some features on him:
--Ford started his political career by jumping into the U.S. House of Representatives with
the assistance of the Western family, one of the wealthiest and most influential families
in Michigan and having relations with the well-to-do uppercrust families in the United States.
--Ford has the past of a reactionary. In a letter addressed to his friends in 1971, he
considered the liberals in the Democratic Party as dangerous elements with regard to the U.S.
way of life and philosophy.
--Ford assisted Nixon in selecting ultrarightist judges such as Carswell and Hairesworth to
the Supreme Court.
--He is well-known racist in the United States.
--He is an advocate of increasing the Pentagon's inherently huge national defense budget.
--He is a defender of corruption in the United States. As confirmed by sources from
Washington, Ford took large payoffs at his office in Washington from an employee of the
General Electric Co. who asked him as the House minority leader to help Thomas O. Paine,
director of the monopolist company, win the post of NASA deputy director. A few days
after Paine was appointed to hold this post, the General Electric Co. signed a contract
with NASA worth $50 million to carry out a satellite project. This contract was approved
by the Faderal Government.
--Ford has close relations with the major financial companies in the United States. On
22 January 1968, he was appointed director of the old Kent Bank and Trust Company in
Brand Rapids, a hig bank of [words indistinct] which sent him to run in the congressional
:lections, This thank possesses assets worth $500 million. In the United States, the
jarks have big intirests in all problems related to the laws concerning banks and
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
"Inance. Thus it :): not surprising that many Fuderal projects have been carried out
arough the Kent Bank.
coording to a U.S law, a state official such as a congressman and the U.S. president
re not allowed to issume functions in any private organs.
6
ASIA & PACIFIC
ANNEX
But Ford has had no trouble when he violated this law.
Robert Winter Berger, one of those specializing in seeking persons who wish to sign
contracts with the company which he represents, wrote in his book Washington Payoff"
about the bargain between him and Ford on the purchase of the title of U.S. ambassador
to France for Francis Kellog, president and main share sholder of the International
Mining Corporation in New York.
Winter Berger said to Ford: "He is ready to offer $30,000 more to the Republican
National Committee." Ford replied promptly: "All right, please tell him that he can
come and see me at any time as he pleases."
Before leaving, Winter Berger warned Ford: "Be careful, this is a hot piece of char-
coal!" Ford replied: "Don't worry, money is the name of this game."
All the aforesaid facts have exposed the true nature of Ford who is now playing a bigger
chess game in the United States.
JAPAN
KANSKO READS JCP CC REPORT ON DRAFT RESOLUTION
Tokyo JPS in English 1512 GMT 29 Jul 76 OW--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[All figures at beginning of paragraphs are as received]
[Text] Tokyo, July 30 JPS--On the first day of the 13th extraordinary congress of the
JCP (July 28), the Central Committee proposed the draft resolution; Mitsuhiro Kaneko
read the report on behalf of the Central Committee. Some points are added to the draft
resolution by consideration of the development in the subsequent situation and adoption
of the contents of discussions in the entire party. Kaneko read out the report, which
includes the added parts.
Pointing out the "importance of the aggravation of the LDP crisis resulting from the
progress of the criminal investigation into the Lockheed scandal case since the announ-
cement of the draft resolution, Kaneko said as follows:
1. The correctness of the draft resolution saying that the dangerous maneuver of the
Mik1 cabinet for hush-up of the Lockheed scandal is starting too, was endorsed again.
1. We should not belittle the danger that maneuvers for hushing-up the Lockheed scan-
dal will gain success.
1. The Liberal-Democratic Party and the Miki cabinet are attempting to divert the
criticism of the people under the new cloak of "rebirth of the LDP."
1. We should not [be too] lazy to pay attention to various political moves resulting
from the aggravated crisis of the LDP.
22
1. (Such LDP political moves) do not mean that the straight retrogression in the LDP's
rule and its rapid approach to "the alliance of conservatives and progressives", the
modernization of the LDP body, etc: are inevitable,
&
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
of
Retyped - 8/6/76
4392 (add-on)
Scowcroft/feb
MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MARSH
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Hanei's Attack on the President
There is no question that Hanoi's personal attack on the President
goes substantially beyond what we usually see. Ordinarily, Hanci
attacks some aspect of the President's policy rather than his
personal character. The harsh tone is also inconsistent with other
more authoritative commentaries which Hanoi has disseminated
recently. For example, its reaction to the President's July 24
remarks at the MIA Convention was more measured than this
diatribe. Ordinarily the sharper attack could be expected to follow
the President's taking a tough line on the MIA problem.
The best explanation I can think of is that this commentary was
meant for internal consumption in Vietnam. It seems obvious
that the information the article uses came from some "research"
which an American commentator compiled. We believe Hanoi
regularly receives all such material, and probably jumped on this
item as a "good foreign source" on which to base an attack on the
President. Moreover, it is in the Vietnamese language and it was
a wire item. The words which Hanoi really wants us to hear are
sent in English over its international radio service.
Since there is no clear evidence that Hanoi meant to pick a fight
with us directly by publishing this item, I recommend that we not
make an issue of it now. Rather we should save it for use as a
rationale for being tough with Hanoi when critics suggest we are
not being sufficiently forthcoming to the Vietnamese.
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
29
MEMORANDUM
4392
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT INFORMATION
August 2, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES
SUBJECT:
Hanoi's Attitude Toward President Ford
Jack Marsh sent you a memorandum (Tab C) July 30 transmitting a copy
of a memorandum he sent to the President the same day. The second
memorandum included the text of a July 27 Radio Hanoi commentary
criticizing the President's July 24 remarks on MIAs. We had sent Marsh
the text in the first place, and did a Presidential brief (Tab B) of it July 29.
Marsh's notification to you thus forms a round robin.
We prepared another Presidential brief August 2, the day we received it,
of Hanoi's vicious July 22 attack on the President (Tab A) which describes
him as a "corrupt
racist, If and accuses him of receiving bribes while
in public office. The Vietnamese News Agency (NVA) published the attack
in a Vietnamese language transmission from Hanoi to Saigon.
This biting attack on the President's personal probity is unusual. While
Hanoi has never hesitated to refer to U.S. officials in caustic terms, it
usually linked its acerbit to some element of U.S. policy which it did not
like. Hanoi's milder reaction in English on July 27 following the Presi-
dent's tough remarks on July 24 is also confusing. One possible explana-
tion is that the sharp personal attack in Vietnamese was meant only for
internal consumption, while the more measured criticism in English was
intended for our ears.
GERALD
2t
IV. 30 Jul 76
5
ASIA & PACIFIC
ANNEX
We were deeply touched at hearing Prime Minister Pol Pot saying: "The friendship and
solidarity between the Kampuchea and Vietnam revolutions, between Kampuchee and Victnam
constitute a problem of both strategy and sacred feelings. Should that friendship and
solidarity go well the revolution in our two countries would develop finely. There's
no other way".
The Vietnamese press and television delegation on visit to the Democratic Kampuchea shall
keep forever the nice and profound recollections and shall do its utmost to contribute
even a small part to keeping the two countries, as the first secretary of the Vietnam
Workers Party said: "Already bound to each other in the struggle for national liberation,
to be forever attached to each other in the national reconstruction and protection, for
the sake of the independence and prosperity of our respective country and for the
revolutionary interests of the people in southeast Asia and the world over." [sentence
as received]
VIETNAM
VNA DESCRIBES FORD AS CORRUPT, REACTIONARY POLITICIAN
Hanoi VNA in Vietnamese to VNA Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) 1320 GMT 22 Jul 76 OW--
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[VNA document: "Ford's True Nature"]
[Text] In reality, what 1s Ford? Following are some features on him:
--Ford started his political career by jumping into the U.S. House of Representatives with
the assistance of the Western family, one of the wealthiest and most influential families
in Michigan and having relations with the well-to-do uppercrust families in the United States.
--Ford has the past of a reactionary. In a letter addressed to his friends in 1971, he
considered the liberals in the Democratic Party as dangerous elements with regard to the U.S.
way of life and philosophy.
-Ford assisted Nixon in selecting ultrarightist judges such as Carswell and Hainesworth to
the Supreme Court.
--He is well-known racist in the United States.
--He is an advocate of increasing the Pentagon's inherently huge national defense budget.
--He is a defender of corruption in the United States. As confirmed by sources from
Fashington, Ford took large payoffs at his office in Washington from an employee of the
Jeneral Electric Co. who asked him as the House minority leader to help Thomas O. Paine,
lirector of the monopolist company. win the post of NASA deputy director. A few days
After Paine was appointed to hold this post, the General Electric Co. signed a contract
with NASA worth $50 million to carry out a satellite project. This contract was approved
by the Federal Government.
--Ford has close relations with the major financial companies in the United States. On
2 January 1968, he was appointed director of the old Kent Bank and Trust Company in
trand Rapids, a big bank of [words indistinct] which sent him to run in the congressional
lections. This tank possesses assets worth $500 million. In the United States, the
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
anks have big intirests in all problems related to the laws concerning banks and
inance. Thus it 113 not surprising that many Federal projects have been carried out
hrough the Kent Bink.
coording to a U.S law, a state official such as a congressman and the U.S. president
re not allowed to assume functions in any private organs.
IV. 30 Jul 76
6
ASIA & PACIFIC
ANNEX
But Ford has had no trouble when he violated this law.
Robert Winter Berger, one of those specializing in seeking persons who wish to sign
contracts with the company which he represents, wrote in his book "Washington Payoff"
about the bargain between him and Ford on the purchase of the title of U.S. ambassador
to France for Francis Kellog, president and main share sholder of the International
Mining Corporation in New York.
Winter Berger said to Ford: "He 1s ready to offer $30,000 more to the Republican
National Committee.' Ford replied promptly: "All right, please tell him that he can
come and see me at any time as he pleases."
Before leaving, Winter Berger warned Ford: "Be careful, this is a hot piece of char-
coal!" Ford replied: "Don't worry, money is the name of this game."
All the aforesaid facts have exposed the true nature of Ford who is now playing a bigger
chess game in the United States.
JAPAN
KANEKO READS JCP CC REPORT ON DRAFT RESOLUTION
Tokyo JPS in English 1512 GMT 29 Jul 76 OW--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[All figures at beginning of paragraphs are as received]
[Text] Tokyo, July 30 JPS--On the first day of the 13th extraordinary congress of the
JCP (July 28), the Central Committee proposed the draft resolution; Mitsuhiro Kaneko
read the report on behalf of the Central Committee. Some points are added to the draft
resolution by consideration of the development in the subsequent situation and adoption
of the contents of discussions in the entire party. Kaneko read out the report, which
includes the added parts.
Pointing out the "importance of the aggravation of the LDP crisis resulting from the
progress of the criminal investigation into the Lockheed scandal case since the announ-
cement of the draft resolution, Kaneko said as follows:
1. The correctness of the draft resolution saying that the dangerous maneuver of the
Miki cabinet for hush-up of the Lockheed scandal is starting too, was endorsed again.
1. We should not belittle the danger that maneuvers for hushing-up the Lockheed scan-
dal will gain success.
1. The Liberal-Democratic Party and the Miki cabinet are attempting to divert the
criticism of the people under the new cloak of "rebirth of the LDP."
1. We should not [be too] lazy to pay attention to various political moves resulting
from the aggravated crisis of the LDP.
1. (Such LDP political moves) do not mean that the straight retrogression in the LDP's
rule and its rapid approach to "the alliance of conservatives and progressives", the
modernization of the LDP body, etc. are inevitable.
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
2i
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012926
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
....
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Report
CREATION DATE
07/1976
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400146
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
14
FOLDER TITLE
People's Republic of China (15)
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/11/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
HJR
4392
2
21
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 30, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Please note the attached. The President may ask you about
this statement.
JACK Just MARSH
Many thanks.
GERALD R. R. FORD LIBRARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 30, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JACK Jack MARSH
I thought you would be interested in seeing what Hanoi said
concerning your remarks to the League of Families.
I have sent a copy of this to Brent for his consideration and
interpretation, should you desire.
CC: Brent Scowcroft
to FORD
HANOI COMMEN ARY ON FORD'S MIA TALK
2l
"GERALD FORD'S UNSUCCESSFUL PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACK"
(TEXT) On Sunday U.S. President Gerald Ford summoned the
representatives of 800 families of Americans registered as
Missing in Southeast Asia to the White House to hear his words
of sympathy.
While talking nineteen to the dozen, the U.S. President did not
mention a word about the reason for the deaths or Missing in
Action of hundreds of thousands of American youths in a region
half a world away from the states. He also went to lengths making
slanders against the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia with
regard to the Missing in Action problem. By so doing, Gerald Ford
probably wanted to incite the chauvinistic feelings among Americans
to buy votes in the November Presidential elections.
However, Ford's psychological blow has missed the target because
he uttered ambiguities and failed to provide any concrete evidence.
At this White House meeting, Gerald Ford also missed his mark when
he said that there is no normalization of relations between the
United States and Vietnam so long as the Missing in Action problem
has not been settled.
Ford's blackmail is too obvious to take anybody in. Everybody
in the world knows that he is eating the U.S. promise to
contribute to the healing of the wounds of war and reconstruction
in Vietnam. The question is how the United States could break its
solemn promise to contribute to healing the wounds of war and
to the rebuilding of Vietnam, which is the responsibility and
obligation and a point of honor for America.
It is certain that the compatroits of Mr. Gerald Ford, the
Vietnamese people and the world public will not let him do what
he likes.
DOC
RECD
LOG N RER
2m
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
730
8212
7604392
Barnes INITIAL ACTION o
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSTATE
10
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/ OUT
SCOWCROFT
t
SECDEF
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
HYLAND
DCI
X REF
c
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
DAVIS
STATE EXSEC
S
CODEWORD
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
SUBJECT Hanoi Commutery OTHER on he TS remains SENSITIVE
to the League of Imilie (miA)
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
CONCUR.
COOR-
INFO
CY
RENCE
DINATE
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH
FOR
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT.
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS
MEMO
TO
FAR EAST/PRC
+
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
8-9
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
DATE
FROM
TO
STATUS
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:
DUE
CY TO
8/2
Scurt
CIX
Info
8-6
Scroft
X
Sgn MEMO to Marsh
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
8-7
NSCIS
C
Socrept sgd menioto Marsh
FORD is LIBRARY BERVID
NOTIFY
MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS
NSC/S DISP INSTR
DISPATCH i) HD WB
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
M/F'D 12 1976
BY
IF
SPECIAL INDEXING:
AUG
CRT ID:
NS DY
OPEN
SA FP
CLOSE
PA
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED
NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022
7m
MEMORANDUM
76°4392
DAH
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT INFORMATION
August 2, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES
x
10
SUBJECT:
Hanoi's Attitude Toward President Ford
Jack Marsh sent you a memorandum (Tab C) July 30 transmitting a copy
of a memorandum he sent to the President the same day. The second
memorandum included the text of a July 27 Radio Hanoi commentary
criticizing the President's July 24 remarks on MIAs. We had sent Marsh
the text in the first place, and did a Presidential brief (Tab B) of it July 29.
Marsh's notification to you thus forms a round robin.
We prepared another Presidential brief August 2, the day we received it,
of Hanoi's vicious July 22 attack on the President (Tab A) which describes
him as a "corrupt racist, If and accuses him of receiving bribes while
in public office. The Vietnamese News Agency (NVA) published the attack
in a Vietnamese language transmission from Hanoi to Saigon.
This biting attack on the President's personal probity is unusual. While
Hanoi has never hesitated to refer to U.S. officials in caustic terms, it
usually linked its acerbity to some element of U.S. policy which it did not
like. Hanoi's milder reaction in English on July 27 following the Presi-
dent's tough remarks on July 24 is also confusing. One possible explana-
tion is that the sharp personal attack in Vietnamese was meant only for
internal consumption, while the more measured criticism in English was
intended for our ears.
MICROFISM DATA
DO.
GERALD LIBRARY R. FORD
ORIG)
TO
)
SUBE
GERALD
? FORD
LIBRARY
24
IV. 30 Jul 76
5
ASIA & PACIFIC
ANNEX
We were deeply touched at hearing Prime Minister Pol Pot saying: "The friendship and
solidarity between the Kampuchea and Vietnam revolutions, between Kampuchea and Vietnam
constitute a problem of both strategy and sacred feelings. Should that friendship and
solidarity go well the revolution in our two countries would develop finely. There's
no other way".
The Vietnamese press and television delegation on visit to the Democratic Kampuchea shall
keep forever the nice and profound recollections and shall do its utmost to contribute
even a small part to keeping the two countries, as the first secretary of the Vietnam
Workers Party said: "Already bound to each other in the struggle for national liberation,
to be forever attached to each other in the national reconstruction and protection, for
the sake of the independence and prosperity of our respective country and for the
revolutionary interests of the people in southeast Asia and the world over." [sentence
as received]
VIETNAM
VNA DESCRIBES FORD AS CORRUPT, REACTIONARY POLITICIAN
Hanoi VNA in Vietnamese to VNA Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) 1320 GMT 22 Jul 76 OW--
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[VNA document: "Ford's True Nature"]
[Text] In reality, what is Ford? Following are some features on him:
--Ford started his political career by jumping into the U.S. House of Representatives with
the assistance of the Western family, one of the wealthiest and most influential families
in Michigan and having relations with the well-to-do uppercrust families in the United States.
--Ford has the past of a reactionary. In a letter addressed to his friends in 1971, he
considered the liberals in the Democratic Party as dangerous elements with regard to the U.S.
way of life and philosophy.
--Ford assisted Nixon in selecting ultrarightist judges such as Carswell and Hainesworth to
the Supreme Court.
--He is well-known racist in the United States.
--He is an advocate of increasing the Pentagon's inherently huge national defense budget.
--He is a defender of corruption in the United States. As confirmed by sources from
Washington, Ford took large payoffs at his office in Washington from an employee of the
General Electric Co. who asked him as the House minority leader to help Thomas O. Paine,
director of the monopolist company, win the post of NASA deputy director. A few days
after Paine was appointed to hold this post, the General Electric Co. signed a contract
with NASA worth $50 million to carry out a satellite project. This contract was approved
by the Faderal Government.
--Ford has close relations with the major financial companies in the United States. On
is
FORD
22 January 1968, he was appointed director of the old Kent Bank and Trust Company in
Grand Rapids, a big bank of [words indistinct] which sent him to run in the congressional
elections. This Bank possesses assets worth $500 million. In the United States, the
GERALD
LIBRARY
banks have big intirests in all problems related to the laws concerning banks and
finance. Thus it It not surprising that many Federal projects have been carried out
through the Kent Bank.
According to a U.S law, a state official such as a congressman and the U.S. president
are not allowed to issume functions in any private organs.
IV. 30 Jul 76
6
ASIA & PACIFIC
ANNEX
But Ford has had no trouble when he violated this law.
Robert Winter Berger, one of those specializing in seeking persons who wish to sign
contracts with the company which he represents, wrote in his book "Washington Payoff"
about the bargain between him and Ford on the purchase of the title of U.S. ambassador
to France for Francis Kellog, president and main share sholder of the International
Mining Corporation in New York.
Winter Berger said to Ford: "He is ready to offer $30,000 more to the Republican
National Committee." Ford replied promptly: "All right, please tell him that he can
come and see me at any time as he pleases.'
Before leaving, Winter Berger warned Ford: "Be careful, this is a hot piece of char-
coal!" Ford replied: "Don't worry, money is the name of this game."
All the aforesaid facts have exposed the true nature of Ford who is now playing a bigger
chess game in the United States.
JAPAN
KANEKO READS JCP CC REPORT ON DRAFT RESOLUTION
Tokyo JPS in English 1512 GMT 29 Jul 76 OW--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[All figures at beginning of paragraphs are as received]
[Text] Tokyo, July 30 JPS--on the first day of the 13th extraordinary congress of the
JCP (July 28), the Central Committee proposed the draft resolution; Mitsuhiro Kaneko
read the report on behalf of the Central Committee. Some points are added to the draft
resolution by consideration of the development in the subsequent situation and adoption
of the contents of discussions in the entire party. Kaneko read out the report, which
includes the added parts.
Pointing out the "importance of the aggravation of the LDP crisis resulting from the
progress of the criminal investigation into the Lockheed scandal case since the announ-
cement of the draft resolution, Kaneko said as follows:
1. The correctness of the draft resolution saying that the dangerous maneuver of the
Miki cabinet for hush-up of the Lockheed scandal is starting too, was endorsed again.
1. We should not belittle the danger that maneuvers for hushing-up the Lockheed scan-
dal will gain success.
1. The Liberal-Democratic Party and the Miki cabinet are attempting to divert the
criticism of the people under the new cloak of "rebirth of the LDP."
1. We should not [be too] lazy to pay attention to various political moves resulting
from the aggravated crisis of the LDP.
1. (Such LDP political moves) do not mean that the straight retrogression in the LDP's
rule and its rapid approach to "the alliance of conservatives and progressives", the
modernization of the LDP body, etc. are inevitable.
&
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
p. FORD
/
2N
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD
MEMORANDUM FOR: Quinn
FROM:
James Fazio
SUBJECT:
President's Daily Brief
The attached items in area of interest were submitted in the
President's Daily Brief your of 7/29/16
.
Attachment
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
HR5/11/01
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD
2s
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012927
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Report
CREATION DATE
07/1976
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400146
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
14
FOLDER TITLE
People's Republic of China (15)
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/11/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
HJR
4392
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 30, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
JACK
Please note the attached. The President about
this statement.
MARSH June
Many thanks.
DEPARTMENT FORD
Agreem
2n
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 30, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JACK Jack
I thought you would be interested in seeing what Hanoi said
concerning your remarks to the League of Families.
I have sent a copy of this to Brent for his consideration and
interpretation, should you desire.
CC: Brent Scowcroft
8. 2334 GENALDY
HANOI COMMENTARY ON FORD'S MIA TALK
"GERALD FORD'S UNSUCCESSFUL PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTACK"
(TEXT) On Sunday U.S. President Gerald Ford summoned the
representatives of 800 families of Americans registered as
Missing in Southeast Asia to the White House to hear his words
of sympathy.
While talking nineteen to the dozen, the U.S. President did not
mention a word about the reason for the deaths or Missing in
Action of hundreds of thousands of American youths in a region
half a world away from the states. He also went to lengths making
slanders against the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia with
regard to the Missing in Action problem. By so doing, Gerald Ford
probably wanted to incite the chauvinistic feelings among Americans
to buy votes in the November Presidential elections.
However, Ford's psychological blow has missed the target because
he uttered ambiguities and failed to provide any concrete evidence.
At this White House meeting, Gerald Ford also missed his mark when
he said that there is no normalization of relations between the
United States and Vietnam so long as the Missing in Action problem
has not been settled.
Ford's blackmail is too obvious to take anybody in. Everybody
in the world knows that he is eating the U.S. promise to
contribute to the healing of the wounds of war and reconstruction
in Vietnam. The question is how the United States could break its
solemn promise to contribute to healing the wounds of war and
to the rebuilding of Vietnam, which is the responsibility and
obligation and a point of honor for America.
It is certain that the compatroits of Mr. Gerald Ford, the
Vietnamese people and the world public will not let him do what
he likes.
3a
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
August 25, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JACK MARSH
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
SUBJECT:
Shanghai Communique
As you requested, I am attaching a one-page summary of the major
provisions of the Shanghai Communique (Tab A).
In addition, you may find the following classified comments useful back-
ground in dealing with the Shanghai communique and "normalization":
-- Although we explicitly disagreed with the Chinese on many issues,
a crucial international factor which binds our relationship with the PRC
was expressed in the three-line anti-hegemony clause (which was expanded
in a later communique to cover the entire world, not just Asia). This
common perception has been the centerpiece of most of our discussions
in recent years.
-- The Chinese position on Taiwan in the communique was consistent
with their line since the Korean War; i.e., they will not establish full
relations with us while we maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei,
while our Mutual Security Treaty is in force, or while we have military
forces and installations on Taiwan.
-- For our part, we did not fully endorse the "one China" principle,
but we came very close to it; and the direction of our policy was clear,
including our troop drawdowns and eventual removal of our military
presence.
-- There is some real and semantic conflict between the U.S. and PRC
positions over the final settlement of the Taiwan question. The PRC
asserts that "liberation" of Taiwan is an entirely "internal" question,
quite separate and distinct from the "international" question of official
U.S. presence in Taiwan. As expressed in the Shanghai Communique,
the U.S. agrees that any settlement should be worked out by the Chinese
(on both sides) themselves, but we have also expressed our interest in
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 Review
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
SW 9/26/02
BY
HR , NARA, DATE 2/3/03
CONFIDENTIAL
2
a peaceful settlement. This U.S. position on a peaceful settlement
conflicts to some extent with the Chinese argument that once we have
settled the "international" aspects of the Taiwan question, the modali-
ties of resolving the "internal" aspects; i.e., whether or not they use
force, is strictly up to them.
CONFIDENTIAL
3b
Major Provisions of the Shanghai Communique
On the international front, each side gave its own separate statement
of its goals (e. g. the U.S. stressed just and secure peace, individual
freedoms, etc. while the PRC emphasized the need for small and weak
nations to escape the bullying of the big and strong). Each side also
gave differing positions on Indochina, Korea, Japan and South Asia.
The two sides acknowledged that there are essential differences in
their social systems and foreign policies, but they agreed on certain
principles for the conduct of international relations (non-interference
in internal affairs, non-aggression, etc. ). They specifically agreed
that neither would seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and that
each would oppose efforts by any other country to establish such
hegemony.
On the bilateral side, aside from agreeing to facilitate trade and cultural
and scientific exchanges and to hold periodic high-level discussions, the
key portions were separate statements on Taiwan. The PRC noted that
the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing normalization of
our relations and stressed its view that there is only one China, of which
Taiwan is a part. It said that the PRC Government is the sole legal
government of China, that the liberation of Taiwan is an internal ques-
tion, and that the U.S. must withdraw all military forces and installa-
tions from Taiwan. It opposed any efforts to create "one China, one
Taiwan, " "one China, two governments, " two Chinas," etc.
The United States acknowledged -- and did not challenge the view
that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China". The U.S. reaffirmed its
interest in "a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese
themselves. " With this prospect (i.e. of a peaceful settlement) in mind,
we affirmed the ultimate objective of withdrawal of all U.S. forces and
installations from Taiwan and stated that, in the meantime, as tension
in the area diminishes, we will progressively reduce those forces and
installations.
3C D
MEMORANDUM
4538
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
August 13, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
WILLIAM GLEYSTEEN
SUBJECT:
Jack Marsh's Request for a Summary of
the Shanghai Communique
Jack Marsh asked you for a one-page summary of the major provisions
of the Shanghai Communique which is attached at Tab A.
I don't know what use he intends to make of it, but on the assumption
that he might be talking with others about China, you may wish to
provide him an interpretive guide to the key provisions and, in the
case of the Taiwan question, a description of the dilemma we face. I
have incorporated these points into the memo from you to him (Tab I)
and classified it "confidential".
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I which forwards the Shanghai
Communique to Jack Marsh.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12050, SED 2.5
HSC MEMO. 11(24/50, IN GUIDELINES
HR
5/11/01
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INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022