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The original documents are located in Box 14, folder "People's Republic of China (17)" of the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Copyright Notice The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. 5532 Ron la MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRET /SENSITIVE ACTION Oct ober 2, 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT BD FROM: WILLIAM GLEYSTEEN of SUBJECT: Current State of Play in China, Foreign Policy Implications The President may be interested in our latest assessment of the China picture before he leaves for California. We might have made it more exciting by engaging in speculation about the outcome of the present power struggle, but frankly, we think the evidence is too thin to warrant that. RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 GERALO R. FORD LIBRARY NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES BY HR NARA, DATE 5/11/01 Digitized from Box 14 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library if MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON SEGRET/SENSITIVE INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT SUBJECT: Leadership Struggle in China, Impact on Foreign Policy Summary There is no sign that the ruling Party Politburo or its elite Standing Committee has moved away from the careful balance of political forces or from the public themes of unity and continuity of policy which have been the centerpieces of PRC pronouncements for the last month. Nonetheless, a number of signs point to contention within the succession leadership over policy and power as well as to confusion and speculation among lower level officials and the populace at large. Most Chinese seem to feel the "moderates" will dominate in the end with crucial assistance from the military. There are reports of some breakdown in social order in a number of areas but nothing which would suggest that serious turmoil is about to erupt. Although the strident line on forceful liberation of Taiwan has receded into the background, increased Chinese concern about U.S. post-election attitudes towards normalization of relations, and particularly about our ties with Taiwan, are reflected in private conversations and some media commentary. Overall, however, Peking is still sending out clear signals that China is committed to continuing improvement of relations with the United States and hostility towards the Soviet Union. Unity and Continuity on the Surface, Struggle Underneath As expected, the succession leadership in China has maintained a very careful balance of "moderate" (i.e., pragmatic) and "radical" (i.e., ideologue) forces, with neither side yet able to overpower the other. SECRET/SENSITIVE DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES SW 9/26/02 BY HR $ NARA, DATE 2/3/03 SECRET/SENSITIVE 2 Considerable effort has been devoted to giving a public impression that the essentially irreconcilable factions are working in an atmosphere of unity. At the same time, domestic and foreign audiences alike are being reassured about continuity of policy in the post-Mao period. Nonetheless, there is growing evidence that behind this facade, the power struggle of the last year is continuing. This is seen both in negative signs such as the absence of any but the blandest statements emanating from the center and in positive ways such as continued sharply divergent positions taken by known mouthpieces of the different factions. Provincial leaders throughout China, lacking firm guidance from Peking, have also emphasized ideology or practicality as suits their individual taste. In the absence of an overwhelming authority like Mao to keep the struggle within bounds, we expect that it will intensify over the coming months. Uncertainty Among the People We have numerous reports, apparently reflecting the same scantiness of information available to outsiders, of restiveness among the people and speculation by peasants and officials alike about the probable shape of the future leadership and the nature of its policies. Many people seem to think there will be an extended period of struggle, but that in the end the "moderates" will win out. They attribute this to the relatively small number of "radicals" (i. e., ideologues) and to the fact that the military will play a decisive role on the side of conservatism. As for Mao's suc- cessor, most Chinese seem to agree there will either be some sort of gimmickry (e. g., leave the Chairman's post vacant and work the power relationships around it) or that the Chairmanship will go to a person who is to be given significantly less power. This mood of uncertainty may well explain why the authorities have felt constrained to issue warnings about spreading rumors and have taken stern measures against those who engage in "anti-social" activity. Foreign Policy We would anticipate that, as there may be adjustments in domestic policy, there may also be some shifting in China's international priorities. But, the indicators emerging from Peking at the moment are almost unanimous in pointing to continuity in foreign policy in general and specifically as regards hostility towards the Soviet Union and a desire to complete the normalization process and improve relations with the United States. SEGRET/SENSITIVE TAILISNIS/S 3 The Chinese haughtily rejected Soviet Party condolences on Mao's death and have responded to the relative stand-down in Soviet anti-Chinese polemics with a virtual tirade of anti-Soviet articles and reiteration of pledges to resist Soviet revisionism. Only three days after Gromyko's UN speech holding out the prospect of normalization of Sino-Soviet rela- tions, Peking's National Day editorial called for "struggle against modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique at the core. 11 This hard-line posture may reflect some firm decision by the successors. More likely, however, it has been adopted to set the issue aside and also avoid any vulnerability to charges of being soft on Soviet communism. That the hard line is not immutable has already been suggested in two intelligence reports on views of senior Chinese diplomats, one of whom related future PRC policy towards the USSR to the fate of the US-PRC normalization process. There is continuing emphasis on carrying out Chairman Mao's "revolu- tionary line in foreign affairs" which has been a code phrase to encompass the opening with the United States. Premier Hua Kuo-feng reiterated to Schlesinger that the US-PRC relationship had the imprimatur of the ulti- mate authority, emphasizing it was Mao's personal decision to improve relations with the United States. Despite the continuation of Peking's barely disguised vendetta against Secretary Kissinger because of his identification with improved US-Soviet relations, the overall thrust of Chinese policy towards the United States is reflected in the favorable treatment accorded your condolence messages and statement. The Chinese cited in full your references to Mao's role in initiating the normalization process and your commitment to complete it. While not necessarily influenced by Mao's death, the hard line on forceful liberation of Taiwan which surfaced around the time of Senator Scott's trip to China in July has not been repeated recently. But the basic posi- tion that liberation of Taiwan is an internal matter of no concern to us is unchanged, and distress over a perceived American drift towards a two- Chinas or one China-two governments position continues to be expressed with some frequency. A senior PRC diplomat in New York spoke of this recently, citing your use of the term "Mainland China" as evidence. Others, as you know, have referred to the Republican platform and to Governor Carter's statements as signs that no matter who wins in November normalization is in trouble. Peking's concern even has gone to the point that the Chinese Ambassador in Tokyo, apparently acting under instructions, asked Japanese Foreign Minister Kosaka to sound out the U.S. on our inten- tions towards normalization, particularly about the timing. 4 While there has thus been some softening of the tone of Peking's com- ments about Taiwan in the last month, there is every indication that the Chinese see the post-election period as a critical juncture in U.S. - PRC relations and are more than a little concerned about the prospects. SEGRET/SENSITIVE IC NATIONAL SECI TY COUNCIL Saturday, Oct 2 No log number assigned -- Secretariat closed (pm). Mary Ann Bypassed Sat pm Orig 1 al cy. Log # obtained Monday am. wt FORD & LIBRARY GERALD Id DOC RECD LOG NUMBER MO DA MO DA HR INITIAL ACTION o NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE 10 2 10 4 10 7605532 TO: PRES FROM: SECSTATE S/S UNCLAS LOG OUT X SCOWCROFT SECDEF LOU NO FORN NODIS HYLAND DCI X REF EYES ONLY SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION Gueystan C EXDIS DAVIS STATE EXSEC $ CODEWORD OTHER TS SENSITIVE SUBJECT Current STate of Play in Clina STatus Report u form Policy implication INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION REC ACTION REQUIRED ACTION CONCUR- COOR- INFO CY RENCE DINATE ADV CYS S'CROFT / WGH FOR MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT STAFF SECRETARY MEMO FOR PRES CONGRESSIONAL REPLY FOR ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT APPROPRIATE ACTION EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS $ MEMO TO FAR EAST/ PRC RECOMMENDATIONS INTELLIGENCE JOINT MEMO LATIN AMERICA REFER TO FOR: MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA ANY ACTION NECESSARY? NSC PLANNING CONCURRENCE PROGRAM ANALYSIS DUE DATE: SCIENTIFIC COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN DATE FROM TO STATUS SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI: DUE CY TO 10/2 Scowert X Pas for info 10/5 10/10 NSCS C SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS Discound w/Pres per Script FORD R. GERALD LIBRARY DISPATCH NOTIFY MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS NSC/S DISP INSTR M/ F'D BY SPECIAL DISPOSITION: OCT1 1976 CRT NS DY SPECIAL INDEXING: OPEN WH SA PP X CLOSE cr MA SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED NSC 76-21 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976 599-022 ) 2a 7605351 -BPA THE WHITE HOUSE St WASHINGTON to October 9, 1976 Strib MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM: MAX FRIEDERSDORF M. 6. SUBJECT: China Trip All of the Curtis group have been contacted and accepted the President's invitation to visit the People's Republic of China starting November 8, 1976. The delegation in Protocol order, which the Chinese have requested, include the following: 1. Senator and Mrs. Carl Curtis (R-Neb) (delegation chairman) 2. Senator and Mrs. Birch Bayh (D-Ind) (delegation deputy chairman) 3. Senator and Mrs. Howard Baker (R-Tenn) 4. Senator and Mrs. Ernest Hollings (D-South Car) 5. Senator and Mrs. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) 6. Senator and Mrs. Bennett Johnston (D-La) STAFF Mr. and Mrs. Robert Wolthuis (White House) State Dept. or NSC Escort Officer CC: Jack Marsh Bob Wolthuis FORD & GERALD LIBRARY 2b MEMORANDUM 5351 we NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRET ACTION September 24, 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM: WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN SUBJECT: Congressional Travel to the PRC We have received word from the PRC Liaison Office (PRCLO) that the CODEL Curtis trip is on for November, with specific dates to be deter- mined by mutual agreement. We have proposed that the delegation plan to arrive in Shanghai November 8 for a two-week stay, exiting from Canton by rail to Hong Kong. PRCLO will be in touch when Peking has responded to these suggestions. Given the likelihood of a busy Congressional travel schedule after the election, I suggest that Bud McFarlane make tentative arrangements for a plane. He could be in touch with either my office (Romberg) or Cathie DeSibour regarding further details. You will recall that we deferred decision on Max Friedersdorf's desire to arrange a House delegation to the PRC until after we had firmed up the CODEL Curtis trip. I remain opposed to asking the Chinese to accept another delegation for a number of reasons. First, the Chinese will presumably turn it down. But even if they did not, the approach would reinforce the impression that we are always beseeching the PRC for favors (leaving them with the feeling that we owe them debts for fulfilling our requests) and it would add to the growing asymmetry in the relationship. All of this increasingly complicates our efforts to negotiate with them on issues across the board. Moreover, I believe at the present stage in our relationship it would be inappropriate to make this kind of approach. Cathie DeSibour concurs in recommending against approaching the Chinese at this time on a House delegation but cautions that there will be continuing Congressional pressures for such a trip. State also concurs in recom- mending against an approach. SECRET DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 FORD is LIBRARY GERALD NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES BY HR NAMA, 5/11/01 SECRET 2 RECOMMENDATION: That you inform Friedersdorf it would be inappropriate for foreign policy reasons to raise another Congressional trip with the Chinese at this time. APPROVE DISAPPROVE B SECRET GENALD 2c DOC RECD' LOG NUMBER MO DA MO DA HR INITIAL ACTION o NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE 9 24 9 25 09 7605351 TO: PRES FROM: SECSTATE S/S UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT SCOWCROFT x SECDEF LOU NO FORN NODIS HYLAND DCI GLaySTeeN K REF c EYES ONLY EXDIS $ SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION DAVIS STATE EXSEC CODEWORD OTHER TS SENSITIVE SUBJECT Congressoral Travel to PRC in Nov 1976 INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION REC ACTION REQUIRED ACTION CONCUR- COOR- INFO CY RENCE DINATE FOR ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT STAFF SECRETARY MEMO FOR PRES CONGRESSIONAL ) REPLY FOR ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT APPROPRIATE ACTION EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS MEMO TO FAR EAST PRC RECOMMENDATIONS INTELLIGENCE JOINT MEMO LATIN AMERICA REFER TO FOR: MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA ANY ACTION NECESSARY? NSC PLANNING CONCURRENCE PROGRAM ANALYSIS DUE DATE: SCIENTIFIC COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN DATE FROM TO STATUS SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI: DUE CY TO 9/24 Sowargt X Decision 9/25 IONS 10/11 NSSK X Scrott aced DATE FROM TO STATUS SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN): DUE 10/12 Ril Fuidersda/Mem DeSibours CY TO dlt 100 9 SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS 10/12 Magreen S Apriguate Ation 10/19 10/13/76 AR NSC/Sec C Close out Approval of Typ Juliper MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS DISPATCH NOTIFY NSC/S DISP INSTR FORD LIBRARY 07V839 00715 1976 BY SPECIAL DISPOSITION: & CRT OPEN CLOSE ID: KT NS DY SPECIAL INDESING: WH SA PP PA SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED NSC 76-21 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 1976 599-022 3a NATIONAL SECURIT COUNCIL Bul - Dole wants This today. LJ This than abamb is he most can R. BERALD FORD LIGRARY 5Km Cather 36 JP Devibour MEMORANDUM 5742 THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CONFIDENTIAL ACTION October 14, 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM: WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN of SUBJECT: Senator Dole's Request for Update on China Senator Robert Dole requested that the State Department prepare a brief update of developments in China and their relevance to U.S. - PRC relations. Because of concern both over Hatch Act provisions and charges which have been levelled recently that the President has improperly used the resources of the Executive Branch to bolster his campaign, State referred the request to the White House. We have prepared the attached briefing paper (Tab A) which gives the current state of play in Peking, comments on possible implications for foreign policy - including towards the United States, and mentions the problem which public statements on U.S. China-policy have created over the last several months. The paper is written so you could volunteer it to both Senators Dole and Mondale. In the case of Dole, I also recommend providing a copy of the Qd A we prepared for the President on this subject this morning (Tab B). RECOMMENDATION: ! That you pass the paper at Tab A to Senators Dole and Mondale, and the Q & A at Tab B to Senator Dole. GERALD R. FORD LIBRA CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 NSC MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES BY HR NADA DATE 5/11/01 3c CONFIDENTIAL Recent Developments in China and Their Impact on U.S. - PRC Relations Introduction and Summary Premier (and First Vice Chairman of the Party) Hua Kuo-feng has been selected to replace Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the ruling Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. There is also strong evidence that the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarcy, in- cluding Mao's widow, have been removed from power and are probably under arrest. Premier Hua and other Chinese leaders have stressed continuity of foreign policy including the opening with the U.S. and hostility towards the Soviet Union. The harder line on Taiwan which emerged this summer, i.e. stress on forceful "liberation" and some impatience with the pace of U.S. dis- engagement from Taiwan, has receded. But the emergence of that line, which was largely a reaction to media and other public statements in the United States, was a forceful reminder of Peking's hypersensitivity to U.S. public statements on Taiwan. Developments in China Current developments in Peking reflect a leadership struggle in the wake of Mao's death. Although critically important events have already occurred, the struggle may be far from over. The Party Central Committee is currently meeting to formalize the appointment of Premier (and Party First Vice Chairman) Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman, replacing Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese people are being told that Hua's selection to that post, and also to the Chairmanship of the Party's Military Affairs Commission, is in accordance with Mao's expressed wish. Evidence suggests that prior to his nomination, unexplained events led Hua and other centrist and "moderate" forces, with backing of the Chinese military establishment, to move against the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarcy, including Mao's widow. FORD CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12058, SEC.3.5 N80 MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. QUIDELINES HR 5/11/01 CONFIDENTIAL 2 Foreign Policy Implications Ever since Mao's death, Premier Hua and other PRC officials have stressed the continuity of PRC foreign policy. In various ways they have indicated that this means a continuing desire to move towards normalization of relations with the United States and unabating hostility towards the Soviet Union. Looking beyond the immediate future and despite the harshness of Chinese polemics against Moscow, it would only be logical to expect some reduction of tension and improvement in state-to~state relations over time. As far as the U.S. is concerned, the basic strategic interests which led to the opening in 1971/72 remain valid, and it is therefore not sur- prising that improved U.S. - -PRC relations have been endorsed. So far as completion of the normalization process is concerned, the implications of recent developmentsiin Peking are less clear. The current leadership seems to have backed away from the mid- summer stress on forceful "liberation" of Taiwan and impatience with the pace of U.S. disengagement from the island. Indications are they may revert to the 1971-73 line of "patience" with U.S. efforts to dis- engage and of the preferability of peaceful "liberation" of the island, even though Peking thinks force will eventually be necessary. But there is no reason to believe that the basic Chinese position on Taiwan has changed, i.e. that it is an internal matter to be dealt with when and how they please, without interference from outsiders. The stronger Taiwan line of last summer seems clearly to have been designed at least in part to counter growing expressions of sentiment in the United States that we should only move ahead with Peking if it is not at the expense of the security and de facto autonomy of the people on Taiwan -- e.g. as reflected in both Party platforms. R. FORD GERALD CONFIDENTIAL 10-14-76 Q'stA's 3d TAB Q: Apparently the Chinese have selected Hua Kuo-feng as new Chairman of the Communist Party and have arrested all of the leading leftists. How do you see these developments affecting U.S. - .PRC relations? A: As you know, there have been no official announcements on any of these matters. But indications are that Premier Hua has been elevated to the Chairmanship of the Party and that the other events to which you refer may have taken place. Premier Hua and other Chinese officials have stressed continuity of their foreign policy, and I have seen nothing to indicate otherwise. That does not mean that any problems which existed between us formerly have been eliminated. But I believe it means that, just as we are committed to continue toward normalization, the Chinese, too, intend to follow the course of improved relations set out in the Shanghai Communique. FORD & LIBRARY WERALD 3e CONFIDENTIAL Recent Developments in China and Their Impact on U.S.-PRC Relations Introduction and Summary Premier (and First Vice Chairman of the Party) Hua Kuo-feng has been selected to replace Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the ruling Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. There is also strong evidence that the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarcy, in@ cluding Mao's widow, have been removed from power and are probably under arrest. Premier Hua and other Chinese leaders have stressed continuity of foreign policy including the opening with the U.S. and hostility towards the Soviet Union. The harder line on Taiwan which emerged this summer, i.e. stress on forceful "liberation" and some impatience with the pace of U.S. dis- engagement from Taiwan, has receded. But the emergence of that line, which was largely a reaction to media and other public statements in the United States, was a forceful reminder of Peking's hypersensitivity to U.S. public statements on Taiwan. Developments in China Current developments in Peking reflect a leadership struggle in the wake of Mao's death. Although critically important events have already occurred, the struggle may be far from over. The Party Central Committee is currently meeting to formalize the appointment of Premier (and Party First Vice Chairman) Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman, replacing Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese people are being told that Nua's selection to that post, and also to the Chairmanship of the Party's Military Affairs Commission, is in accordance with Mao's expressed wish. Evidence suggests that prior to his nomination, unexplained events led Hua and other centrist and "moderate" forces, with backing of the Chinese military establishment, to move against the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarcy, including Mao's widow. CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12950, SEC.3.5 FORD & LIBRARY 92-51-01/18 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE GUIDELINES Retyped per Gen. Scowcroft HR NAHA, DATE 5/11/01 CONFIDENTIAL 2 Foreign Policy Implications Ever since Mao's death, Premier Hua and other PRC officials have stressed the continuity of PRC foreign policy. In various ways they have indicated that this means a continuing desire to move towards normalisation of relations with the United States and unabating hostility towards the Soviet Union. Looking beyond the immediate future and despite the harshness of Chinese polemics against Moscow, it would only be logical to expect some reduction of tension and improvement in state-to-state relations over time. As far as the U.S. is concerned, the basic strategic interests which led to the opening in 1971/72 remain valid, and it is therefore not sur- prising that improved U.S. -PRC relations have been endorsed. So far as completion of the normalization process is concerned, the implications of recent developmentsism Peking are less clear. The current leadership seems to have backed away from the mid- summer stress on forceful "liberation" of Taiwan and impatience with the pace of U.S. disengagement from the island. Indications are they may revert to the 1971-73 line of "patience" with U.S. efforts to dis- engage and of the preferability of peaceful "liberation" of the island, even though Peking thinks force will eventually be necessary. But there is no reason to believe that the basic Chinese position on Thiwan has changed, i.e. that it is an internal matter to be dealt with when and how they please, without interference from outsiders. The stronger Taiwan line of last summer seems clearly to have been designed at least in part to counter growing expressions of sentiment in the United States that we should only move ahead with Peking if it is not at the expense of the security and de facto autonomy of the people on Taiwan -- e.g. as reflected in both Party platforms. FORD & LIBRARY CONFIDENTIAL 3f CONFIDENTIAL Recent Developments in China and Their Impact on U.S. PRC Relations Introduction and Summary Although no formal announcements have yet been made, it is clear that Premier (and First Vice Chairman of the Party) Hua Kuo-feng has been selected to replace Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the ruling Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. There is also strong evidence that the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarchy, including Mao's widow, have been removed from power and are probably under arrest. Premier Hua and other Chinese leaders have stressed continuity of foreign policy including the opening with the U.S. and hostility towards the Soviet Union. The harder line on Taiwan which emerged this summer, i.e. stress on forceful "liberation" and some impatience with the pace of U.S. dis- engagement from Taiwan, has receded. But the emergence of that line, which was largely a reaction to media and other public statements in the United States, was a forceful reminder of Peking's hypersensitivity to U.S. public statements on Taiwan. Developments in China Current developments in Peking reflect a leadership struggle in the wake of Mao's death. Although critically important events have already occurred, the struggle may be far from over. The Party Central Com- mittee is currently meeting to formalize the appointment of Premier (and Party First Vice Chairman) Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman, replacing Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese people are being told that Hua's selection to that post, and also to the Chairmanship of the Party's Military Affairs Commission, is in accordance with Mao's expressed wish. Evidence suggests that prior to his nomination, unexplained events led Hua and other centrist and "moderate" forces, with backing of the Chinese military establishment, to move against the four leading "leftists" in the Chinese hierarchy, including Mao's widow. No announcements.have been made about these developments, and it is possible that none will be made, but they are the subject of widespread R. FORD CONFIDENTIAL DECLARATED GERALD E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 LIBRARY NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES BY HR NARA, DATE: 5/11/01 CONFIDENTIAL 2 discussion in China and their ralidity is suggested by a number of developments including the removal of pictures of the four from Peking bookstares. Foreign Rolicy Implications Ever since Mao's death, Premier Hua and other PRC officials have stressed the continuity of PRC foreign policy. In various ways they have indicated that this means a continuing desire to move towards normalization of relations with the United States and unabating hostility towards the Soviet Union. Looking beyond the immediate future and despite the harshness of Chinese polemics against Moscow, it would only be logical to expect some reduction of tension and improvement in state-to-state relations over time. As far as the U.S. is concerned, the basic strategic interests which led to the opening in 1971/72 remain valid, and it is therefore not surprising that improved U.S. -PRC relations have been endorsed. So far as comple- tion of the normalization process is concerned, the implications of recent developments in Peking are less clear. The current leadership seems to have backed away from the mid- summer stress on forceful "liberation" of Taiwan and impatience with the pace of U.S. disengagement from the island. Indications are they may revert to the 1971-73 line of "patience" with U.S. efforts to dis- engage and of the preferability of peaceful "liberation" of the island, even though Peking thinks force will eventually be necessary. But there is no reason to believe that the basic Chinese position on Taiwan has changed, i.e. that it is an internal matter to be dealt with when and how they please, without interference from outsiders. Public Discussion of the Issues The more strident PRC line on Taiwan in mid summer may in part have been a reflection of new personalities inserted into the picture. But there is strong evidence, including direct statements by the Chinese, that it was primarily to counter growing expressions of sentiment in the United States that we should only move ahead with Peking if it is not at the expense of the security and de facto autonomy of the people on Taiwan -- & FORD e.g. as reflected in both Party platforms. GERALD LIBRARY CONFIDENTIAL The stronger Tonnion line floot seemer seerna elearly to been disigned at buttin sight CONFIDENTIAL 3 It is necessary that the Chinese understand that the statements to which they object reflect genuine American concerns But the events of the summer point up the fact that public statements sometimes do force the Chinese to react in ways which are helpful neither to Taiwan S security interests nor to our own basic strategic interests in continuing to improve relations with the PRC. GERALD R. FORD CONFIDENTIAL DOC RECD LOG NI TR 3g MO DA MO DA HR INITIAL ACTION o NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE 1410 1416 7605742 TO: PRES PROM: SECSTATE S/S UNCLAS LOG OUT SCOWCROFT + SECDEF LOU NO FORN NODIS HYLAND DCI X REF c EYES ONLY EXDIS SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION DAVIS STATE EXSEC $ CODEWORD SUBJECT Sen Onle OTHER legiest for legdate TS SENSITIVE opplenelopments en Leking re VP litate 15 Oct 76 INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION REC ACTION REQUIRED ACTION CONCUR- COOR. INFO CY RENCE DINATE ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH FOR MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT STAFF SECRETARY MEMO FOR PRES CONGRESSIONAL REPLY FOR ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT APPROPRIATE ACTION EUR/ CANADA / OCEANS MEMO TO 1 FAR EAST/PRC RECOMMENDATIONS INTELLIGENCE JOINT MEMO LATIN AMERICA REFER TO FOR: MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA ANY ACTION NECESSARY? NSC PLANNING CONCURRENCE PROGRAM ANALYSIS DUE DATE: SCIENTIFIC COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS SUB-SAH/ AFRICA UN DATE FROM Shall TO STATUS 10/14 X Ousin SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI: DUE CY TO 10/14 10/15 C SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS OBE per Scuft FOR R. 076830 LIBRARK DISPATCH NOTIFY MICROFILM a FILE ROMTS NSC/S DISP INSTR SPECIAL DISPOSITION M CRT ID: 1976 BY DY SPECIAL INDEXING: OPEN WH SA FP CLOSE PA SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED q NSC 76-21 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976 599-022 ) SHANGHAI: JOINT CO MUNIQUE 4 1. Text of Joint Communique - February 27, 1972 2. Text of News Conference held by Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State Green - February 27, 1972 3. Text of Statement by Press Secretary Ziegler - February 27, 1972 1. Text of the Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the President's Visit. February 27, 1972 President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials. President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Com- munist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and orld affairs. During the visit. extensive. earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-iai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit. President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sitcs, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest. The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after SO many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes. The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to climinate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and FORD i LIBRARY GERALD progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to Jessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or mis- understanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to TC-G nine its own attitudes for the COI on good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the cight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Victnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate with- drawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seck a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry. The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution-this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose forcign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All forcign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Victnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolu- tionary Government of the Republic of South Victnam and the clabora- tion of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the cight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korca on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation -of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent. democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United & FORD Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the GERALD ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan LISRARY Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence WIEKLY CC LATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DÖČUMENTS, PEDRUARY 75, 1972 4/5 and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination. There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovercignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should bc settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations. With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that: -progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries; -both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict; -neither should seck hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and -neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states. Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest. The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the solc legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Gov- emment firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "onc China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined." The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan FORD i LIBRARY as the tension in the area diminishes. The 1110 sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such ficks as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side un rtakes to facilitate the further develop ent of such contacts and exchanges. Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries. The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Pcking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views.on issues of common interest. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world. President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China. i FORD NOTE: The joint statement was released at Shanghai, People's Republic of China. For a news conference of Dr. Henry Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green and a statement by the White House Press Secretary on the com- GERALD LIBRARY muniqué, see the following two items. 2. Shanghai: Joint Communique what the outcome of a meeting between the President RS the leaders of the People's Republic might be. News Conference of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant During the interim visit there was some explorate: to the President for National Security thairs, and conversation of an outcome in the conventional SCHEC Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East which both sides tend to state general positions whi- they afterwards choose to interpret, each in their own W: Asian and Pacific Affairs. - February 27, 1972 It was, therefore, decided early in the meetings this occasion between the President and Prime Mini MR. ZINGLER. You have had a chance to read over the that such an approach would make no sense. It word communiqué. Dr. Kis-inger is here to discuss it with you and take your questions. What Dr. Kissinger says is on the not be worthy of the purposes that were attempted to served. record. Together with Dr. Kissinger is Assistant Secre- It was therefore decided that each side would state i' tary of State Marshall Green who, as you know, partici- pated in all the meetings with Secretary of State Rogers position on issues in a section which it would produ: when he met with the Foreign Minister, and he is here more or less independent of the other. It would not Pir also to discuss the communiqué with you and to take tend to an agreement which did not exist and whic. your questions, together with Dr. Kissinger. would have to be interpreted away in subsequent imp:- mentations. Therefore, the beginning part of the CO!. We will begin with Dr. Kissinger. muniqué represents, in effect, a statement by each sid DR. KISSINGER. Let me make a few preliminary ob- of some of its general principles. servations before we go to your questions. Let me do it On our side, they were deliberately not phrased in in two parts: the-proces. and there is obviously the com- contentious way. While in discussions some of the any muniqué produced, and secondly, what does it incan in ments made by the Chinese side were, of course, rebutter general terms. Then I believe that I will be prepared to IVC did not feel that this was the appropriate vehicle answer questions. do so, but rather to state what our positive view was. First, how was the communiqué produced? From the For that matter, the Chinese side did not relant al"! beginning of our contacts with the People's Republic of ments which we made in our section that they did China, there were some obvious general considerations of particularly agree with. In order to present these two n an cqual masis, now, this IS all 1 want to say by way of introduc- it had been decided that in the text cd by the Amer- tion. I wonder wh Marshall Green would like to add ican Government, the U.S. position would be stated first, a few words, and then nc will he glad to answer questions. and in the text to be issued by the Chinese Government, MR. GREEN. I have just a few words. First of all with the Chinese version would be stated first. regard to the P.R.C. authority with whom Dr. Kissinger I mention this only so that you will not be surprised was maintaining the discussions, it was Chiao Kuan- if the Chinese version follows a different sequence from hua-just to clarify that point. the American version. This is by agreement. Both versions I don't think I really have much to add. Our talks under are official and are being put out on the basis of this Secretary Rogers on our side, and Foreign Minister Chi agreement. Peng-fei for the People's Republic of China, extended The procedure that was followed here was that issues over, I believe, 10 hours all together of general principle were first discussed in the incetings But it was not just the talks themselves. We had fre- between the President and the Prime Minister. They were quent occasion, as you could imagine with all the fine then, after they had been explored for some time, trans- food you have eaten-occasionally waiting to have that ferred to the meetings chaired by the Secretary of State fine food to have extensive talks also, and a number of and the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of matters could be discussed in that context. China. Then, if any additional issues arose, they might be Also, it was not just that, but the Secretary did have referred back to the meeting of the President and the a chance to meet on a number of occasions with the Prime Minister. Prime Minister. Most recently, coming down on the plane, In drafting the communiqué, various sections were pro- he had an hour and a half from Peking to Hangchow. And duced by various elements of the American side. I played then today the Prime Minister called on him in his hotel the role of go-between on our side and the Vice Foreign room for about 10 minutes. Minister, whose name I despair of ever learning to pro- I would say that the talks and the counterpart meetings nounce, on the Chinese side. were characterized by candor, friendliness, and courtesy In this manner, as we put together the various para- and hospitality, as I am sure you have all SCCI:, on the part graphs that were supplied 10 us on our side by various of our Chinese hosts. There was no pulling of punches, not individuals, if nc reached a point at which agreement physically, of course. They were outspoken, no effort to seemed near or possible, we would then go back to our cover up or paper over differences, but to have it out. It is principals and to the Secretary of State. Through this good for the system. I think in so doing one has a much process, the communqué was finally achieved. better appreciation of the other person's point of view. For example, some of the sessions were quite prolonged. As far as the specifies are concerned, in the talks, T The last few nights the sessions went on until the carly really can't say much more than what already appears hours of the morning with the President. In Peking, the in the communiqué itself, although some of the points Chinese delegation had a house in the guest complex, there may raise questions. and most of the sessions took place in that house. As a Q. On page -1, in stating that the United States will paragraph was fini-hed, it would typically go back then progressively reduce its forces in military installations on to the President who was in the next house, and this went Taiwan, was that decision a result of the discussions here in on Friday night until about 5 in the morning. China? So much for the process. Lct me say something about DR. KISSINGER. No, this is a general statement of our the content. Obviously neither side would have written policy which we have enunciated on innumerable occa- this communiqué this way if it had been able to draft it sions in innumerable forums. It says that we maintain the entirely by itself. Therefore, it represented an attempt by amount of forces that is required by the general situation two countries that had been out of contact for a long and not by any abstract determination. It is a state- time to find a basis to convey first some immediate under- ment of our general policy, but not a mutual decision. standings, but beyond that, to start a process by which Q. Is there any sign now that the conditions would lead they could bring about a closer relationship over a period to a reduction of the American military force in Taiwan of time and by which they could, where interests con- shortly? verged, act in a more nearly parallel fashion and where DR. KISSINGER. I don't want to speculate on what interests differed, 10 mitigate the consequences of those will be done over a period of time, but if you speak about disagreements. "shortly," I would not expect that. Q. Why did not the United States Government re- So the communiqué sought to be seen in two aspects: affirm its treaty commitment to Taiwan, as the President first, in terms of the specific principles and conclusions it and you have done on numerous occasions? states, and secondly, in terms of the direction to which NR. KISSINGER. Lct me take this occasion to deal with it seeks to point. It is on that basis that we are presenting 11:00 particular aspect, and let me deal with it onc, and it to the American people and on which the People FRe- notalnswer it in inmunerable elliptical forms in which, public is presenting it as well. noedoubt, it will be presented. The particular issue which Mr. slow raised is, of seeing who scorca w many points on which issue. At course, an extraordinarily difficult one to discuss on the the time of the first ping pong exchange, if I understand territory of a country with which nc do not maintain the position of the People's Republic of China, it 11:15 that formal diplomatic relations and for which this particular some very low-level pcople-to-pcople exchanges would issue is a matter of profound principle. occur. Let me, therefore, state in response to this and any The formalization of exchanges encouraged by the two related question-and let me do it once and not repeat governments, the opening of trade encouraged by the two it. We stated our basic position with respect to this issue governments, the establishment of diplomatic mecha- in the President's world report in which we say that this nisms for continued contact, the joint statement of some treaty will be maintained. Nothing has changed in that general principles of international relations, the joint state- position. ment of some basic approaches to the view of the world But I would appreciate it if that would be all that I with respect to, for example, the section which includes the would be asked to say about it in these circumstances. reference to hegemony-these, I believe, are matters that But the position of the world report stands and has been most of us would have considered unthinkable at the time unaltered. of the invitation to the ping pong team. Q. Dr. Kissinger, the possibility is mentioned of the But I would put them on the basis of mutuality rather United States sending a representative to Peking from time than of any unilateral movement on the part of the to time. Is there any likelihood that this process might be People's Republic of China. reversed and Peking might send a representative to Q. Henry, is this the first time that a President of the Washington? United States has formally picked up the language of the Dr. KISSINGER. The situation of the two sides is not Five Principles of Peaceful Cocxistence? exactly equal in this respect because in Washington there DR. KISSINGER. I have to say I am simply not sure. All is a Chinese representation different from that that would I would reply, again, would be an answer in the same be sent under the hypothesis which you mention. How- terms as I did to Mr. Frankel. The question is not who ever, what we envisage is the establishment of a contact put forward the proposals. The question is: Docs it con- point, to begin with, in which the discussions about the tain principles that WC can live by and since we have said exchanges and trade that are mentioned in the preceding we are prepared to apply these principles during the next paragraphs will be formally conducted and as soon as this one on the non-use of force, and since both sides have contact point has been established, it will be announced stated this, it docs not really make a crucial difference and the visit of a U.S. representative to Peking would take who put it forward first. place as the need arises, and as particular issues of great Q. How much progress was there made in advancing importance need to be discussed. This, however, is not the ball, in response to the question asked by George to the exclusion of any other possibility. Ball on the trips, "js this necessary?" How much further Q. What do you mean by "a contact point"? did we go than in your original discussions with Premier DR. KISSINGER. For example, there existed for a while, Chou? and formally still exists, a forum in Warsaw where U.S. DR. KISSINGER. The character of the discussions in- and Chinese officials met-something of this kind. As soon evitably is entirely different when the President of the as that is established, which we expect will be in the rea- United States talks than when an assistant talks who can- sonably near future, we will announce it. not make any definitive statement. The basic objective of Q. Will that be established in the United States or this trip was to sct in motion a train of events and an Canada or some other country? evolution in the policy of our two countries which both DR. KISSINGER. I don't expect it to be in the United sides recognized would be slow at first and present many States, but 1 don't want 10 speculate beyond that. difficulties and in which a great deal depended on the Q. Can we assume that the President and Prime Minis- assessment by each side of the understanding by the other ter discussed all these differences face-to-face, specifically of what was involved in this process and of the assessment their differences over Victnam and the reduction of troops by each side of the reliability of the other in being able on Taiwan? Were these positions stated openly? to pursue this for the amount of time necessary to see it DR. KISSINGER. All differences were discussed by the prevail. President and the Prime Minister face to face, candidly In this sense it alinost had to be conducted by the heads and seriously, including those which you mentioned. of the 1110 governments and in this sense I would say that Q. Can you point to. anything in this document in in the depth and seriousness of the discussions it wont, ob- which the People's Repablic of China goes any significant viously, beyond what had been discussed in my and step beyond its position at the time of the first ping pong beyond our expectations. exchanges? Ω. Did Chairman Mao participate? DR his partices DR. KISSINGER. Let me say two things: IVc are not ap- pation go to the detailed substance of this matter or 1125 proaching this from the point of view of a scoreboard of it largely philosophical and general? WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, FECRUAR 28, 1972 479 Dr. KISSINGER. I don't believe that it would be appro- from a dialogue with the most powerful nation in the priate for me to go into detail about the content of the world and WC are conducting our discussions with the conversation with Chairman Mao. I may say, however, People's Republic entirely on the merits of that that Chairman Man and the President discussed each of relationship. the essential categories in a general way and we have The paragraph on hegemony will arise only if any coun- every reason to believe that the Prime Minister checked try should seck it, but WC had no particular country in with the Chairman at every step along the way. But it mind when it was being drafted. was not just 2 vague philosophical discussion. Q. In the paragraph referring to the reduction of forces Q. The assertion of respect for sovereignty and terri- and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the torial integrity, combined with the statement of respect area diminishes, is this an exclusive reference to Indo- for one China, could that be construed as meaning that the china is the area? United States notes the claim of the Government of the DR. KISSINGER. No. It is a reference to the general People's Republic of China, its claim to sovercignty over area. It is not a reference to any particular part of Asia. Taiwan? Q. What conditions in that arca would keep American DR. KISSINGER. Our view with respect to Taiwan has troops on Taiwan? What tensions in the area of Taiwan been exhaustively stated in that paragraph you refer to now require the presence of American troops there? and we add nothing to it. DR. KISSINGER. Wc are talking about the general state Q. Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us whether there is any of relationships in Asia and in the world. It is in reference timetable under which you are going to undertake to fa- to that that our general decisions on deployments will be cilitate the contacts and exchanges in the cultural, sports, made. and journalistic arcas? Q. Dr. Kissinger, the President said in a television DR. KISSINGER. There is no precise timetable, Walter, interview the beginning of January that he would bring but I think it is correct to say that both sides understand up the question of American prisoners of war in Victnam that this will be pursued with some dispatch. when he came to China. Can you tell us if it came up Q. Dr. Kissinger, in the light of the statement by the and what the reaction was? Government of China that the Chinese side said that the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the DR. KISSINGER. Obviously, as the communiqué makes clear the issue of Victnam was discussed and it is normalization of relations, does this timetable depend on further progress in the solution of the Taiwan question? clear that We would not discuss it without mentionim, DR. KISSINGER. No. That is independent of the other, our concern with respect to the prisoners. The position of though at what point the two would become interdepend- the People's Republic is as stated in the communiqué that cnt again, ] cannot judge. But as this is written now, my it supports the seven-point proposal made by the Provi- answer to Walter Cronkite stands on its own feet. sional Government--by the PRG, and I think it is a fair Q. Dr. Kissinger, where the communiqué states, "Both characterization of the basic positions. sides are of the view that it would be against the interests Q. Dr. Kissinger, there is a paragraph that says "In- of the peoples of the world for any major country to col- ternational disputes should be scitled on this basis, with- lude with another against other countries, or for major out resorting to the use or threat of force." Since the countries to divide "P the world into spheres of interest,": People's Republic says the difficulty with us on Taiwan is was that a result of your talks about Sino-Soviet tensions all international issue, does this incan that they have or was the Soviet Union involved in the talks? Does this agreed not to USC force or the threat of force in settling refer to how the United States views the relationship be- or solving that? tween China and the U.S. and the Soviet Union? DR. KISSINGER. The formal position of the People's DR. KISSINGER. We have said on many occasions, and Republic of China with respect to Taiwan is a matter, of I will say it again here, that as far as the United States is course, of extreme delicacy for us to discuss here at all. concerned, our relationship with the People's Republic Clearly, they do not, as they have stated in their part of China is not directed against the Soviet Union, and of the section on Taiwan, consider it an international while the People's Republic is well able to speak for it- problem in any normal sense. Clearly, the formal state- self, and my megalomania has not reached the point where ments with respect to this issue have to be drafted with I believe that ] can speak for it, I believe that it is clear the various perspectives in mind. to us that neither is the policy of the People's Republic REPORTER. Thank you, gentlemen. of China in its relations with us directed against the Soviet Union. NOTE: White House Press Secretary Ronald 1.. Gegler opened news conference at 5:50 p.m., local time, at the Industrial We are pursuing our policy with the People's Republic tion Center Banquet Hall, Shanghai, People's Upoblic of of China on the ground that a stable peace in the world For the text of the joint communique, see the preciding item is difficult to covisage if COD million people are excluded For a statement on the communiqué by the White Home Pren Securary, see the following item. WITKLY COMPITATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, FEBRUARY 28, 1972 Shanghai: Joint Communique to improve communications between the United States and the People's Republic of China will significantly con- 3. Statement by Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to the tribute to a more stable structure of peace in the world. President. February 27, 1972 The communiqué honestly reflects the differences that both sides recognize exist and states those areas where President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai have both sides found common views and have agreed to reached agreement on a joint communiqué. This com- take specific steps to further improve their relationship. muniqué reflects the position of the United States and The communiqué, in stating its general attitude, says, the People's Republic of China on various bilateral and "The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the international issues which were discussed during Presi- United States of America found it beneficial to have dent Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China. this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to The day President Nixon arrived in Peking he met present candidly to one another their views on a variety with Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The two leaders had a of issues." serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. rela- The communiqué goes on to say: "There are csen- tions and world affairs. During the President's 7-day visit tial differences between China and the United States to the People's Republic of China extensive, frank, and in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the honest discussions were held between President Nixon two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social and Premier Chou En-lai. The discussions were held on systems, should conduct their relations on the principles the normalization of relations between the United States of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other states, non-aggression against other states, non-interfer- matters of interest to both sides. ence in the internal affairs of other states, equality and The two leaders participated in over 15 hours of formal mutual benefit, and peaceful cocxistence. International talks. In addition, Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign disputes should be settled on this basis, without resort- Minister Che Pang-fci held discussions in the same spirit ing to the use or threat of force. The United States and and participated in about 15 hours of formal discussions. the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply So the communiqué reflects over 30 hours of formal these principles to their mutual relations." discussions between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The very fact of the joint com- NOTE: Press Secretary Zingler read the statement to reporters at 6:40 p.m., local time, in the Industrial Exhibition Center Danguet muniqué between the two governments is symbolic of Hall, Shanghai, People's Repablic of China. As printed above, the greater understanding produced through the facc-to- this item follows the text of the White House press release. face discussions that have been held. For the text of the joint communiqué and a prus conference of Dr. Henry Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State Marshall It is President Nixon's hope that this historic beginning Green, see the preceding two items. R. FORD GERALD LIBRATE 5 MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PRC October 20, 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: BUD McFARLANE FROM: WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN by SUBJECT: Materials on Post-1949 PRC Foreign Policy In response to your note concerning Susan Ford's interest in a paper on "Relations between the United States and other regional and world powers and China in the Post Revolutionary Period, " I have checked with a number of sources and determined that no such paper exists. The best I can do, I am afraid, is to provide a recommended bibliography on aspects of that very broad subject. This would include: John Gittings, The World and China, 1922-1972, Harper & Row, 1974 Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, Praeger, 1976 Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, Univ. of Michigan Press, 1975 Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation, Univ. of California Press, 1970 I am also assembling some public materials from State on US-PRC relations (background notes, testimony, etc.). I will send them to you when they arrive. As a supplement, I would suggest Ms. Ford may wish to look at the annual Foreign Policy messages issued during the Nixon years. Each volume contains a section on US-PRC relations. She could also refer to a volume of hearings recently issued by Congressman Lester Wolff's House International Relations Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development on the subject United States- Soviet Union-China: The Great Power Triangle. FORD 6a MH MEMORANDUM 5927 pen was NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRET INFORMATION October 27, 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT B FROM: WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN by SUBJECT: Leadership Changes in China; Implications for the U.S. Although we would caution against assuming the permanence of new arrangements in Peking, we may have enough of a pause in the turning of the kaleidoscope to try to sort out the pattern. Hua Kuo-feng may well face further contention and struggle, but he has at least greatly improved his leadership position and purged his "radical" challengers. He has done so more rapidly and decisively than expected, and we seem to be witnessing a catharsis of pent-up animosities which suggests it may be some time before another "leftist" challenge develops. Obviously the military have played a major role and will not forget that they did so. Coping with this military power and the problem of Teng Hsiao-ping are probably Hua's most delicate problems. If the new pattern develops logically, we would expect China's domestic and foreign policies to continue, without abrupt change, toward relatively practical goals, characterized by the slogan of developing China into a modern socialist society by the end of this century. This could bring a more constructive atmosphere into our relations with Peking reminiscent of the 1971-73 period. But the PRC's terms for normalization will not alter significantly, and it is quite possible that dealings with Peking will continue to be difficult because of internal distractions. The most important move for us after the election will be a quiet signal to Hua that we welcome China's affirmation of policy continuity and that we will be preparing ourselves seriously for the next move on normalization. DECLASCIMED E.O. NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, ANGELIZES BY HR 5/11/01 The following paragraphs speculate at greater length about the impact of Peking's changes. Domestic Policies 080 While we may see an effort to assure that China continues along the "socialist path according to the thought of Mao", we expect less SECRET 2 controversy over adherence to essentially pragmatic economic policies such as greater reliance on material incentives (rather than political exhortation) to boost worker output and greater emphasis on trade. Various elements will seek greater access to Western technology to hasten economic growth and bolster China's strategic position, even though there will be a continuing wariness, even among the military, about overdependence on the outside world. Political strains within China and competition for economic resources will continue. Provincial or regional requirements will compete with national requirements, and there will be competing priorities of the military and civilian sectors. And finally, there are still large numbers of people in China who are fairly "leftist" in outlook, or whose careers have depended upon beating the "capitalist" or "revisionist" dog and who may wage a limited "rear-guard" struggle. But overall, these strains may assume the more normal proportions associated with their counterparts in other countries rather than the grotesque political campaign style which has characterized disputes in China for the past quarter century. Indeed, one of the striking features of the elevation of Hua and the purging of the "left" has been not only the smoothness with which it has proceeded thus far, but also the apparent confidence the successful leaders had ahead of time in the popularity of their removal of Chiang Ching and the others. Despite the scheming and planning which must have taken place in the center, the popularity of the turn of events has been evident in the relaxed and genuinely jubilant mood of the people, both in small informal gatherings -- including with Westerners - - and in the organized mass rallies throughout China. Foreign Policies The Chinese have been at some pains to assure domestic and foreign audiences alike that Chairman Mao's foreign policy line will be adhered to. In various ways this has been shown to mean continued hostility towards the Soviet Union and commitment to improved relations with the United States. While this has generally evoked a sense of visceral satisfaction in the West, where "moderate" has been equated with "rational" and "good", and while in fact we should find Chinese actions more predict- able than if the "leftists" had won out, it is far from clear that our own bilateral problems with China will be more easily resolved or that there will not be some eventual improvement in Sino-Soviet state-to-state relations. SECRET SECRET 3 Sino-Soviet Relations - Despite the initial hostility being displayed toward the Soviets, some shift in Sino-Soviet relations may emerge over the next few months. The degree of tension prevailing between China and the Soviet Union over the last seven or eight years has been danger- ously high with unpredictable consequences for our own interests. On that basis alone, we should not be perturbed by a lowering of the level of tension and hostility. We should also accept the reality that each of the parties in a triangular relationship, such as ours with Moscow and Peking, will try to gain whatever leverage it can with each of the other two parties and there will often be little the third party can do to influence ties between the other two. In any event, recognizing the depth of hostility between the Chinese and the Soviets, we should not become SO fearful of improvement in Sino-Soviet ties that we are panicked into making unnecessary or unwise concessions to either of them in hopes of forestalling a new "alliance". Indeed, we should get the message across to the Chinese -- and Soviets that we are relaxed about it. Sino-US Relations - We may find the Chinese tending to revert to the tone which prevailed between mid-1971 and 1973. That is, there may be a willingness on Peking's part to make soothing noises about trying all peaceful means to liberate Taiwan before resorting to force and about patience over the length of time such "liberation" might take. But the basic line on Taiwan and about the conditions for full normalization of US-PRC relations has never changed, and there is no reason to think it will now. Peking will still insist that we break all official ties with Taiwan, abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty, and withdraw all military forces and installations from Taiwan. The issue of military sales to Taiwan after normalization will remain one of great delicacy and fraught with potential hazards. We have a number of ideas as to how we might proceed to test Peking's limited flexibility, and we will present these to you after the election. For the moment, I believe that we should try to avoid making statements or taking actions which could unnecessarily complicate the process. We should be prepared fairly promptly to give Hua a positive signal but we should avoid steps which could be characterized as unseemly in their haste to woo the new Chinese leadership. SECRET 6b DOC RECD LOG N° RER MO DA MO DA HR INITIAL ACTION o NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE 27 1027 11 7605927 TO: PRES FROM: SECSTATE Leed S/S UNCLAS LOG IN/ OUT SCOWCROFT X SECDEF LOU NO FORN JODIS HYLAND DCI X REF C EYES ONLY EXCHS DAVIS STATE EXSEC s SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION CODEWORD SUBJECT Charaps in Implication Info Meno OTHER kin Lenduching TS SENSITIVE for ADV CYS S'CROFT/ INTERNAL WGH ACTION ROUTING the AND CONCUR- RENCE DISTRIBUTION DINATE COOR- 65 INFO REC ACTION REQUIRED CY FOR MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT STAFF SECRETARY MEMO FOR PRES CONGRESSIONAL REPLY FOR ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT APPROPRIATE ACTION EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS MEMO TO FAR EAST/ PRC $ RECOMMENDATIONS INTELLIGENCE JOINT MEMO LATIN AMERICA REFER TO FOR: MID EAST NO. AFRICA ANY ACTION NECESSARY? NSC PLANNING CONCURRENCE PROGRAM ANALYSIS DUE DATE: SCIENTIFIC COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS! SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN DATE FROM to STATUS DUE CY TO 10/27 IX 11/4 NSC/s SUBSEQUENT Info ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN): 1/4 C SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS noted by Showroft R. GERALD DEPARTMENT DISPATCH NOTIFY MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS NSC/S DISP INSTR M/F'D BY SPECIAL DISPOSITION: CRT NOV 08 1976 NS DY SPECIAL INDEXING: OPEN << WH SA FP X CLOSE PA SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED NSC 76-21 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976 599-022

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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 14, folder \"People's Republic of China (17)\" of\nthe Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford\nPresidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\n5532\nRon\nla\nMEMORANDUM\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSECRET /SENSITIVE\nACTION\nOct ober 2, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT\nBD\nFROM:\nWILLIAM GLEYSTEEN of\nSUBJECT:\nCurrent State of Play in China, Foreign\nPolicy Implications\nThe President may be interested in our latest assessment of the China\npicture before he leaves for California.\nWe might have made it more exciting by engaging in speculation about\nthe outcome of the present power struggle, but frankly, we think the\nevidence is too thin to warrant that.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5\nGERALO R. FORD LIBRARY\nNSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES\nBY\nHR NARA, DATE 5/11/01\nDigitized from Box 14 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nif\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSEGRET/SENSITIVE\nINFORMATION\nMEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nSUBJECT:\nLeadership Struggle in China, Impact on\nForeign Policy\nSummary\nThere is no sign that the ruling Party Politburo or its elite Standing\nCommittee has moved away from the careful balance of political forces\nor from the public themes of unity and continuity of policy which have\nbeen the centerpieces of PRC pronouncements for the last month.\nNonetheless, a number of signs point to contention within the succession\nleadership over policy and power as well as to confusion and speculation\namong lower level officials and the populace at large. Most Chinese seem\nto feel the \"moderates\" will dominate in the end with crucial assistance\nfrom the military.\nThere are reports of some breakdown in social order in a number of areas\nbut nothing which would suggest that serious turmoil is about to erupt.\nAlthough the strident line on forceful liberation of Taiwan has receded into\nthe background, increased Chinese concern about U.S. post-election\nattitudes towards normalization of relations, and particularly about our\nties with Taiwan, are reflected in private conversations and some media\ncommentary. Overall, however, Peking is still sending out clear signals\nthat China is committed to continuing improvement of relations with the\nUnited States and hostility towards the Soviet Union.\nUnity and Continuity on the Surface, Struggle Underneath\nAs expected, the succession leadership in China has maintained a very\ncareful balance of \"moderate\" (i.e., pragmatic) and \"radical\" (i.e.,\nideologue) forces, with neither side yet able to overpower the other.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review\nNSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES\nSW 9/26/02\nBY\nHR $ NARA, DATE 2/3/03\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\n2\nConsiderable effort has been devoted to giving a public impression that\nthe essentially irreconcilable factions are working in an atmosphere of\nunity. At the same time, domestic and foreign audiences alike are being\nreassured about continuity of policy in the post-Mao period.\nNonetheless, there is growing evidence that behind this facade, the\npower struggle of the last year is continuing. This is seen both in\nnegative signs such as the absence of any but the blandest statements\nemanating from the center and in positive ways such as continued sharply\ndivergent positions taken by known mouthpieces of the different factions.\nProvincial leaders throughout China, lacking firm guidance from Peking,\nhave also emphasized ideology or practicality as suits their individual\ntaste. In the absence of an overwhelming authority like Mao to keep the\nstruggle within bounds, we expect that it will intensify over the coming\nmonths.\nUncertainty Among the People\nWe have numerous reports, apparently reflecting the same scantiness of\ninformation available to outsiders, of restiveness among the people and\nspeculation by peasants and officials alike about the probable shape of\nthe future leadership and the nature of its policies. Many people seem\nto think there will be an extended period of struggle, but that in the end\nthe \"moderates\" will win out. They attribute this to the relatively small\nnumber of \"radicals\" (i. e., ideologues) and to the fact that the military\nwill play a decisive role on the side of conservatism. As for Mao's suc-\ncessor, most Chinese seem to agree there will either be some sort of\ngimmickry (e. g., leave the Chairman's post vacant and work the power\nrelationships around it) or that the Chairmanship will go to a person who\nis to be given significantly less power. This mood of uncertainty may\nwell explain why the authorities have felt constrained to issue warnings\nabout spreading rumors and have taken stern measures against those\nwho engage in \"anti-social\" activity.\nForeign Policy\nWe would anticipate that, as there may be adjustments in domestic policy,\nthere may also be some shifting in China's international priorities. But,\nthe indicators emerging from Peking at the moment are almost unanimous\nin pointing to continuity in foreign policy in general and specifically as\nregards hostility towards the Soviet Union and a desire to complete the\nnormalization process and improve relations with the United States.\nSEGRET/SENSITIVE\nTAILISNIS/S\n3\nThe Chinese haughtily rejected Soviet Party condolences on Mao's death\nand have responded to the relative stand-down in Soviet anti-Chinese\npolemics with a virtual tirade of anti-Soviet articles and reiteration of\npledges to resist Soviet revisionism. Only three days after Gromyko's\nUN speech holding out the prospect of normalization of Sino-Soviet rela-\ntions, Peking's National Day editorial called for \"struggle against modern\nrevisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique at the core. 11\nThis hard-line posture may reflect some firm decision by the successors.\nMore likely, however, it has been adopted to set the issue aside and also\navoid any vulnerability to charges of being soft on Soviet communism.\nThat the hard line is not immutable has already been suggested in two\nintelligence reports on views of senior Chinese diplomats, one of whom\nrelated future PRC policy towards the USSR to the fate of the US-PRC\nnormalization process.\nThere is continuing emphasis on carrying out Chairman Mao's \"revolu-\ntionary line in foreign affairs\" which has been a code phrase to encompass\nthe opening with the United States. Premier Hua Kuo-feng reiterated to\nSchlesinger that the US-PRC relationship had the imprimatur of the ulti-\nmate authority, emphasizing it was Mao's personal decision to improve\nrelations with the United States. Despite the continuation of Peking's\nbarely disguised vendetta against Secretary Kissinger because of his\nidentification with improved US-Soviet relations, the overall thrust of\nChinese policy towards the United States is reflected in the favorable\ntreatment accorded your condolence messages and statement. The Chinese\ncited in full your references to Mao's role in initiating the normalization\nprocess and your commitment to complete it.\nWhile not necessarily influenced by Mao's death, the hard line on forceful\nliberation of Taiwan which surfaced around the time of Senator Scott's\ntrip to China in July has not been repeated recently. But the basic posi-\ntion that liberation of Taiwan is an internal matter of no concern to us is\nunchanged, and distress over a perceived American drift towards a two-\nChinas or one China-two governments position continues to be expressed\nwith some frequency. A senior PRC diplomat in New York spoke of this\nrecently, citing your use of the term \"Mainland China\" as evidence.\nOthers, as you know, have referred to the Republican platform and to\nGovernor Carter's statements as signs that no matter who wins in November\nnormalization is in trouble. Peking's concern even has gone to the point\nthat the Chinese Ambassador in Tokyo, apparently acting under instructions,\nasked Japanese Foreign Minister Kosaka to sound out the U.S. on our inten-\ntions towards normalization, particularly about the timing.\n4\nWhile there has thus been some softening of the tone of Peking's com-\nments about Taiwan in the last month, there is every indication that\nthe Chinese see the post-election period as a critical juncture in U.S. -\nPRC relations and are more than a little concerned about the prospects.\nSEGRET/SENSITIVE\nIC\nNATIONAL SECI TY COUNCIL\nSaturday, Oct 2\nNo log number assigned -- Secretariat\nclosed (pm).\nMary Ann\nBypassed Sat pm Orig\n1\nal cy. Log # obtained\nMonday am.\nwt\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nId\nDOC\nRECD\nLOG NUMBER\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\nINITIAL ACTION o\nNSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE\n10\n2\n10\n4\n10\n7605532\nTO: PRES\nFROM: SECSTATE\nS/S\nUNCLAS LOG OUT\nX\nSCOWCROFT\nSECDEF\nLOU\nNO FORN\nNODIS\nHYLAND\nDCI\nX REF\nEYES ONLY\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nGueystan\nC\nEXDIS\nDAVIS\nSTATE EXSEC\n$\nCODEWORD\nOTHER\nTS\nSENSITIVE\nSUBJECT\nCurrent STate of Play in Clina STatus Report u\nform Policy implication\nINTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION\nREC\nACTION REQUIRED\nACTION\nCONCUR-\nCOOR-\nINFO\nCY\nRENCE\nDINATE\nADV CYS S'CROFT / WGH\nFOR\nMEMO FOR SCOWCROFT\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO FOR PRES\nCONGRESSIONAL\nREPLY FOR\nECONOMIC\nDISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\nEUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS\n$\nMEMO\nTO\nFAR EAST/ PRC\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nINTELLIGENCE\nJOINT MEMO\nLATIN AMERICA\nREFER TO\nFOR:\nMID EAST/ NO. AFRICA\nANY ACTION NECESSARY?\nNSC PLANNING\nCONCURRENCE\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDUE DATE:\nSCIENTIFIC\nCOMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS\nSUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN\nDATE\nFROM\nTO\nSTATUS\nSUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:\nDUE\nCY TO\n10/2\nScowert\nX\nPas for info\n10/5\n10/10\nNSCS\nC\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\nDiscound w/Pres per Script\nFORD R. GERALD LIBRARY\nDISPATCH\nNOTIFY\nMICROFILM & FILE ROMTS\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nM/ F'D\nBY\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION:\nOCT1\n1976\nCRT\nNS\nDY\nSPECIAL INDEXING:\nOPEN\nWH SA PP\nX\nCLOSE\ncr\nMA\nSUSPENSE CY ATTACHED\nNSC 76-21\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976\n599-022\n)\n2a\n7605351\n-BPA\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nSt\nWASHINGTON\nto\nOctober 9, 1976\nStrib\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nMAX FRIEDERSDORF\nM.\n6.\nSUBJECT:\nChina Trip\nAll of the Curtis group have been contacted and accepted the\nPresident's invitation to visit the People's Republic of\nChina starting November 8, 1976.\nThe delegation in Protocol order, which the Chinese have\nrequested, include the following:\n1. Senator and Mrs. Carl Curtis (R-Neb)\n(delegation chairman)\n2. Senator and Mrs. Birch Bayh (D-Ind)\n(delegation deputy chairman)\n3. Senator and Mrs. Howard Baker (R-Tenn)\n4. Senator and Mrs. Ernest Hollings (D-South Car)\n5. Senator and Mrs. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)\n6. Senator and Mrs. Bennett Johnston (D-La)\nSTAFF\nMr. and Mrs. Robert Wolthuis (White House)\nState Dept. or NSC Escort Officer\nCC: Jack Marsh\nBob Wolthuis\nFORD & GERALD LIBRARY\n2b\nMEMORANDUM\n5351\nwe\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSECRET\nACTION\nSeptember 24, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nWILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN\nSUBJECT:\nCongressional Travel to the PRC\nWe have received word from the PRC Liaison Office (PRCLO) that the\nCODEL Curtis trip is on for November, with specific dates to be deter-\nmined by mutual agreement. We have proposed that the delegation plan\nto arrive in Shanghai November 8 for a two-week stay, exiting from\nCanton by rail to Hong Kong. PRCLO will be in touch when Peking has\nresponded to these suggestions.\nGiven the likelihood of a busy Congressional travel schedule after the\nelection, I suggest that Bud McFarlane make tentative arrangements for\na plane. He could be in touch with either my office (Romberg) or Cathie\nDeSibour regarding further details.\nYou will recall that we deferred decision on Max Friedersdorf's desire\nto arrange a House delegation to the PRC until after we had firmed up\nthe CODEL Curtis trip. I remain opposed to asking the Chinese to accept\nanother delegation for a number of reasons.\nFirst, the Chinese will presumably turn it down. But even if they did\nnot, the approach would reinforce the impression that we are always\nbeseeching the PRC for favors (leaving them with the feeling that we owe\nthem debts for fulfilling our requests) and it would add to the growing\nasymmetry in the relationship. All of this increasingly complicates our\nefforts to negotiate with them on issues across the board.\nMoreover, I believe at the present stage in our relationship it would be\ninappropriate to make this kind of approach.\nCathie DeSibour concurs in recommending against approaching the Chinese\nat this time on a House delegation but cautions that there will be continuing\nCongressional pressures for such a trip. State also concurs in recom-\nmending against an approach.\nSECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\nNSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES\nBY HR NAMA, 5/11/01\nSECRET\n2\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you inform Friedersdorf it would be inappropriate for foreign policy\nreasons to raise another Congressional trip with the Chinese at this time.\nAPPROVE\nDISAPPROVE\nB\nSECRET\nGENALD\n2c\nDOC\nRECD'\nLOG NUMBER\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\nINITIAL ACTION o\nNSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE\n9\n24\n9\n25\n09\n7605351\nTO: PRES\nFROM: SECSTATE\nS/S\nUNCLAS LOG IN/OUT\nSCOWCROFT x\nSECDEF\nLOU\nNO FORN\nNODIS\nHYLAND\nDCI\nGLaySTeeN\nK REF\nc\nEYES ONLY\nEXDIS\n$\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nDAVIS\nSTATE EXSEC\nCODEWORD\nOTHER\nTS\nSENSITIVE\nSUBJECT\nCongressoral Travel to PRC in Nov 1976\nINTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION\nREC\nACTION REQUIRED\nACTION\nCONCUR-\nCOOR-\nINFO\nCY\nRENCE\nDINATE\nFOR\nADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH\nMEMO FOR SCOWCROFT\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO FOR PRES\nCONGRESSIONAL\n)\nREPLY FOR\nECONOMIC\nDISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\nEUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS\nMEMO\nTO\nFAR EAST PRC\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nINTELLIGENCE\nJOINT MEMO\nLATIN AMERICA\nREFER TO\nFOR:\nMID EAST/ NO. AFRICA\nANY ACTION NECESSARY?\nNSC PLANNING\nCONCURRENCE\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDUE DATE:\nSCIENTIFIC\nCOMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)\nSUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN\nDATE\nFROM\nTO\nSTATUS\nSUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:\nDUE\nCY TO\n9/24\nSowargt\nX\nDecision\n9/25\nIONS\n10/11\nNSSK\nX\nScrott aced\nDATE\nFROM\nTO\nSTATUS\nSUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):\nDUE\n10/12\nRil Fuidersda/Mem\nDeSibours CY TO\ndlt 100 9\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\n10/12\nMagreen\nS\nApriguate Ation\n10/19\n10/13/76\nAR\nNSC/Sec\nC\nClose out\nApproval of Typ Juliper\nMICROFILM & FILE ROMTS\nDISPATCH\nNOTIFY\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nFORD LIBRARY 07V839\n00715 1976 BY\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION:\n&\nCRT OPEN CLOSE ID: KT\nNS\nDY\nSPECIAL INDESING:\nWH SA PP\nPA\nSUSPENSE CY ATTACHED\nNSC 76-21\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 1976\n599-022\n3a\nNATIONAL SECURIT COUNCIL\nBul\n-\nDole wants This\ntoday.\nLJ\nThis than abamb is he most can R.\nBERALD FORD LIGRARY\n5Km\nCather\n36 JP\nDevibour\nMEMORANDUM\n5742\nTHE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nACTION\nOctober 14, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nWILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN of\nSUBJECT:\nSenator Dole's Request for Update on China\nSenator Robert Dole requested that the State Department prepare a\nbrief update of developments in China and their relevance to U.S. -\nPRC relations. Because of concern both over Hatch Act provisions\nand charges which have been levelled recently that the President has\nimproperly used the resources of the Executive Branch to bolster his\ncampaign, State referred the request to the White House.\nWe have prepared the attached briefing paper (Tab A) which gives the\ncurrent state of play in Peking, comments on possible implications\nfor foreign policy - including towards the United States, and mentions\nthe problem which public statements on U.S. China-policy have created\nover the last several months.\nThe paper is written so you could volunteer it to both Senators Dole\nand Mondale. In the case of Dole, I also recommend providing a copy\nof the Qd A we prepared for the President on this subject this\nmorning (Tab B).\nRECOMMENDATION:\n!\nThat you pass the paper at Tab A to Senators Dole and Mondale, and\nthe Q & A at Tab B to Senator Dole.\nGERALD R. FORD LIBRA\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5\nNSC MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES\nBY\nHR NADA DATE 5/11/01\n3c\nCONFIDENTIAL\nRecent Developments in China and Their Impact on U.S. - PRC Relations\nIntroduction and Summary\nPremier (and First Vice Chairman of the Party) Hua Kuo-feng has\nbeen selected to replace Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the ruling\nChinese Communist Party Central Committee. There is also strong\nevidence that the four leading \"leftists\" in the Chinese hierarcy, in-\ncluding Mao's widow, have been removed from power and are probably\nunder arrest.\nPremier Hua and other Chinese leaders have stressed continuity of\nforeign policy including the opening with the U.S. and hostility towards\nthe Soviet Union.\nThe harder line on Taiwan which emerged this summer, i.e. stress on\nforceful \"liberation\" and some impatience with the pace of U.S. dis-\nengagement from Taiwan, has receded. But the emergence of that line,\nwhich was largely a reaction to media and other public statements in\nthe United States, was a forceful reminder of Peking's hypersensitivity\nto U.S. public statements on Taiwan.\nDevelopments in China\nCurrent developments in Peking reflect a leadership struggle in the\nwake of Mao's death. Although critically important events have already\noccurred, the struggle may be far from over. The Party Central\nCommittee is currently meeting to formalize the appointment of\nPremier (and Party First Vice Chairman) Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman,\nreplacing Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese people are being told that Hua's\nselection to that post, and also to the Chairmanship of the Party's\nMilitary Affairs Commission, is in accordance with Mao's expressed\nwish.\nEvidence suggests that prior to his nomination, unexplained events led\nHua and other centrist and \"moderate\" forces, with backing of the\nChinese military establishment, to move against the four leading\n\"leftists\" in the Chinese hierarcy, including Mao's widow.\nFORD\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12058, SEC.3.5\nN80 MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. QUIDELINES\nHR\n5/11/01\nCONFIDENTIAL\n2\nForeign Policy Implications\nEver since Mao's death, Premier Hua and other PRC officials have\nstressed the continuity of PRC foreign policy. In various ways they\nhave indicated that this means a continuing desire to move towards\nnormalization of relations with the United States and unabating hostility\ntowards the Soviet Union.\nLooking beyond the immediate future and despite the harshness of\nChinese polemics against Moscow, it would only be logical to expect\nsome reduction of tension and improvement in state-to~state relations\nover time.\nAs far as the U.S. is concerned, the basic strategic interests which led\nto the opening in 1971/72 remain valid, and it is therefore not sur-\nprising that improved U.S. - -PRC relations have been endorsed. So\nfar as completion of the normalization process is concerned, the\nimplications of recent developmentsiin Peking are less clear.\nThe current leadership seems to have backed away from the mid-\nsummer stress on forceful \"liberation\" of Taiwan and impatience with\nthe pace of U.S. disengagement from the island. Indications are they\nmay revert to the 1971-73 line of \"patience\" with U.S. efforts to dis-\nengage and of the preferability of peaceful \"liberation\" of the island,\neven though Peking thinks force will eventually be necessary. But there\nis no reason to believe that the basic Chinese position on Taiwan has\nchanged, i.e. that it is an internal matter to be dealt with when and\nhow they please, without interference from outsiders.\nThe stronger Taiwan line of last summer seems clearly to have been\ndesigned at least in part to counter growing expressions of sentiment\nin the United States that we should only move ahead with Peking if\nit is not at the expense of the security and de facto autonomy of the\npeople on Taiwan -- e.g. as reflected in both Party platforms.\nR.\nFORD\nGERALD\nCONFIDENTIAL\n10-14-76\nQ'stA's\n3d\nTAB\nQ: Apparently the Chinese have selected Hua Kuo-feng as new Chairman\nof the Communist Party and have arrested all of the leading leftists.\nHow do you see these developments affecting U.S. - .PRC relations?\nA:\nAs you know, there have been no official announcements on any\nof these matters. But indications are that Premier Hua has been\nelevated to the Chairmanship of the Party and that the other events\nto which you refer may have taken place.\nPremier Hua and other Chinese officials have stressed continuity\nof their foreign policy, and I have seen nothing to indicate otherwise.\nThat does not mean that any problems which existed between us formerly\nhave been eliminated. But I believe it means that, just as we are\ncommitted to continue toward normalization, the Chinese, too, intend\nto follow the course of improved relations set out in the Shanghai\nCommunique.\nFORD & LIBRARY WERALD\n3e\nCONFIDENTIAL\nRecent Developments in China and Their Impact on U.S.-PRC Relations\nIntroduction and Summary\nPremier (and First Vice Chairman of the Party) Hua Kuo-feng has\nbeen selected to replace Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the ruling\nChinese Communist Party Central Committee. There is also strong\nevidence that the four leading \"leftists\" in the Chinese hierarcy, in@\ncluding Mao's widow, have been removed from power and are probably\nunder arrest.\nPremier Hua and other Chinese leaders have stressed continuity of\nforeign policy including the opening with the U.S. and hostility towards\nthe Soviet Union.\nThe harder line on Taiwan which emerged this summer, i.e. stress on\nforceful \"liberation\" and some impatience with the pace of U.S. dis-\nengagement from Taiwan, has receded. But the emergence of that line,\nwhich was largely a reaction to media and other public statements in\nthe United States, was a forceful reminder of Peking's hypersensitivity\nto U.S. public statements on Taiwan.\nDevelopments in China\nCurrent developments in Peking reflect a leadership struggle in the\nwake of Mao's death. Although critically important events have already\noccurred, the struggle may be far from over. The Party Central\nCommittee is currently meeting to formalize the appointment of\nPremier (and Party First Vice Chairman) Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman,\nreplacing Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese people are being told that Nua's\nselection to that post, and also to the Chairmanship of the Party's\nMilitary Affairs Commission, is in accordance with Mao's expressed\nwish.\nEvidence suggests that prior to his nomination, unexplained events led\nHua and other centrist and \"moderate\" forces, with backing of the\nChinese military establishment, to move against the four leading\n\"leftists\" in the Chinese hierarcy, including Mao's widow.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12950, SEC.3.5\nFORD & LIBRARY\n92-51-01/18\nNSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE GUIDELINES\nRetyped per Gen. Scowcroft\nHR NAHA, DATE 5/11/01\nCONFIDENTIAL\n2\nForeign Policy Implications\nEver since Mao's death, Premier Hua and other PRC officials have\nstressed the continuity of PRC foreign policy. In various ways they\nhave indicated that this means a continuing desire to move towards\nnormalisation of relations with the United States and unabating hostility\ntowards the Soviet Union.\nLooking beyond the immediate future and despite the harshness of\nChinese polemics against Moscow, it would only be logical to expect\nsome reduction of tension and improvement in state-to-state relations\nover time.\nAs far as the U.S. is concerned, the basic strategic interests which led\nto the opening in 1971/72 remain valid, and it is therefore not sur-\nprising that improved U.S. -PRC relations have been endorsed. So\nfar as completion of the normalization process is concerned, the\nimplications of recent developmentsism Peking are less clear.\nThe current leadership seems to have backed away from the mid-\nsummer stress on forceful \"liberation\" of Taiwan and impatience with\nthe pace of U.S. disengagement from the island. Indications are they\nmay revert to the 1971-73 line of \"patience\" with U.S. efforts to dis-\nengage and of the preferability of peaceful \"liberation\" of the island,\neven though Peking thinks force will eventually be necessary. But there\nis no reason to believe that the basic Chinese position on Thiwan has\nchanged, i.e. that it is an internal matter to be dealt with when and\nhow they please, without interference from outsiders.\nThe stronger Taiwan line of last summer seems clearly to have been\ndesigned at least in part to counter growing expressions of sentiment\nin the United States that we should only move ahead with Peking if\nit is not at the expense of the security and de facto autonomy of the\npeople on Taiwan -- e.g. as reflected in both Party platforms.\nFORD & LIBRARY\nCONFIDENTIAL\n3f\nCONFIDENTIAL\nRecent Developments in China and Their Impact on U.S. PRC Relations\nIntroduction and Summary\nAlthough no formal announcements have yet been made, it is clear that\nPremier (and First Vice Chairman of the Party) Hua Kuo-feng has been\nselected to replace Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the ruling Chinese\nCommunist Party Central Committee. There is also strong evidence\nthat the four leading \"leftists\" in the Chinese hierarchy, including Mao's\nwidow, have been removed from power and are probably under arrest.\nPremier Hua and other Chinese leaders have stressed continuity of\nforeign policy including the opening with the U.S. and hostility towards\nthe Soviet Union.\nThe harder line on Taiwan which emerged this summer, i.e. stress on\nforceful \"liberation\" and some impatience with the pace of U.S. dis-\nengagement from Taiwan, has receded. But the emergence of that line,\nwhich was largely a reaction to media and other public statements in the\nUnited States, was a forceful reminder of Peking's hypersensitivity to\nU.S. public statements on Taiwan.\nDevelopments in China\nCurrent developments in Peking reflect a leadership struggle in the\nwake of Mao's death. Although critically important events have already\noccurred, the struggle may be far from over. The Party Central Com-\nmittee is currently meeting to formalize the appointment of Premier\n(and Party First Vice Chairman) Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman, replacing\nMao Tse-tung. The Chinese people are being told that Hua's selection\nto that post, and also to the Chairmanship of the Party's Military Affairs\nCommission, is in accordance with Mao's expressed wish.\nEvidence suggests that prior to his nomination, unexplained events led\nHua and other centrist and \"moderate\" forces, with backing of the Chinese\nmilitary establishment, to move against the four leading \"leftists\" in the\nChinese hierarchy, including Mao's widow.\nNo announcements.have been made about these developments, and it is\npossible that none will be made, but they are the subject of widespread\nR.\nFORD\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDECLARATED\nGERALD\nE.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5\nLIBRARY\nNSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES\nBY\nHR NARA, DATE: 5/11/01\nCONFIDENTIAL\n2\ndiscussion in China and their ralidity is suggested by a number of\ndevelopments including the removal of pictures of the four from Peking\nbookstares.\nForeign Rolicy Implications\nEver since Mao's death, Premier Hua and other PRC officials have\nstressed the continuity of PRC foreign policy. In various ways they\nhave indicated that this means a continuing desire to move towards\nnormalization of relations with the United States and unabating hostility\ntowards the Soviet Union.\nLooking beyond the immediate future and despite the harshness of\nChinese polemics against Moscow, it would only be logical to expect\nsome reduction of tension and improvement in state-to-state relations\nover time.\nAs far as the U.S. is concerned, the basic strategic interests which led\nto the opening in 1971/72 remain valid, and it is therefore not surprising\nthat improved U.S. -PRC relations have been endorsed. So far as comple-\ntion of the normalization process is concerned, the implications of recent\ndevelopments in Peking are less clear.\nThe current leadership seems to have backed away from the mid-\nsummer stress on forceful \"liberation\" of Taiwan and impatience with\nthe pace of U.S. disengagement from the island. Indications are they\nmay revert to the 1971-73 line of \"patience\" with U.S. efforts to dis-\nengage and of the preferability of peaceful \"liberation\" of the island,\neven though Peking thinks force will eventually be necessary. But there\nis no reason to believe that the basic Chinese position on Taiwan has\nchanged, i.e. that it is an internal matter to be dealt with when and how\nthey please, without interference from outsiders.\nPublic Discussion of the Issues\nThe more strident PRC line on Taiwan in mid summer may in part have\nbeen a reflection of new personalities inserted into the picture. But\nthere is strong evidence, including direct statements by the Chinese,\nthat it was primarily to counter growing expressions of sentiment in the\nUnited States that we should only move ahead with Peking if it is not at\nthe expense of the security and de facto autonomy of the people on Taiwan --\n&\nFORD\ne.g. as reflected in both Party platforms.\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nCONFIDENTIAL\nThe stronger Tonnion line floot\nseemer seerna elearly to been\ndisigned at buttin sight\nCONFIDENTIAL\n3\nIt is necessary that the Chinese understand that the statements to which\nthey object reflect genuine American concerns But the events of the\nsummer point up the fact that public statements sometimes do force the\nChinese to react in ways which are helpful neither to Taiwan S security\ninterests nor to our own basic strategic interests in continuing to improve\nrelations with the PRC.\nGERALD R. FORD\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDOC\nRECD\nLOG NI TR\n3g\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\nINITIAL ACTION o\nNSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE\n1410\n1416\n7605742\nTO: PRES\nPROM: SECSTATE\nS/S\nUNCLAS LOG OUT\nSCOWCROFT +\nSECDEF\nLOU\nNO FORN\nNODIS\nHYLAND\nDCI\nX REF\nc\nEYES ONLY\nEXDIS\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nDAVIS\nSTATE EXSEC\n$\nCODEWORD\nSUBJECT Sen Onle OTHER legiest for legdate TS SENSITIVE\nopplenelopments en Leking re VP\nlitate 15 Oct 76\nINTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION\nREC\nACTION REQUIRED\nACTION\nCONCUR-\nCOOR.\nINFO\nCY\nRENCE\nDINATE\nADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH\nFOR\nMEMO FOR SCOWCROFT\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO FOR PRES\nCONGRESSIONAL\nREPLY FOR\nECONOMIC\nDISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\nEUR/ CANADA / OCEANS\nMEMO\nTO\n1\nFAR EAST/PRC\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nINTELLIGENCE\nJOINT MEMO\nLATIN AMERICA\nREFER TO\nFOR:\nMID EAST/ NO. AFRICA\nANY ACTION NECESSARY?\nNSC PLANNING\nCONCURRENCE\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDUE DATE:\nSCIENTIFIC\nCOMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS\nSUB-SAH/ AFRICA UN\nDATE\nFROM\nShall\nTO\nSTATUS\n10/14\nX\nOusin SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:\nDUE\nCY TO\n10/14\n10/15\nC\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\nOBE per Scuft\nFOR R. 076830 LIBRARK\nDISPATCH\nNOTIFY\nMICROFILM a FILE ROMTS\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION\nM CRT ID: 1976 BY\nDY\nSPECIAL INDEXING:\nOPEN\nWH SA FP\nCLOSE\nPA\nSUSPENSE CY ATTACHED q\nNSC 76-21\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976\n599-022\n)\nSHANGHAI: JOINT CO MUNIQUE\n4\n1. Text of Joint Communique - February 27, 1972\n2. Text of News Conference held by Dr. Kissinger and\nAssistant Secretary of State Green - February 27, 1972\n3. Text of Statement by Press Secretary Ziegler - February 27, 1972\n1. Text of the Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the President's\nVisit. February 27, 1972\nPresident Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the\nPeople's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of\nthe People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972.\nAccompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State\nWilliam Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other\nAmerican officials.\nPresident Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Com-\nmunist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and\nfrank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and orld affairs.\nDuring the visit. extensive. earnest and frank discussions were held\nbetween President Nixon and Premier Chou En-iai on the normalization\nof relations between the United States of America and the People's\nRepublic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In\naddition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi\nPeng-fei held talks in the same spirit.\nPresident Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural,\nindustrial and agricultural sitcs, and they also toured Hangchow and\nShanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed\nsimilar places of interest.\nThe leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States\nof America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after SO many\nyears without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a\nvariety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which\nimportant changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded\ntheir respective positions and attitudes.\nThe U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires\nefforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to climinate the basic causes\nof conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just,\nbecause it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nprogress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The\nUnited States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the\npeoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United\nStates believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving\ncommunication between countries that have different ideologies so as to\nJessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or mis-\nunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and\nbe willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate\njudge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be\nprepared to TC-G nine its own attitudes for the COI on good. The\nUnited States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to\ndetermine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary\nobjective has been a negotiated solution; the cight-point proposal put\nforward by the Republic of Victnam and the United States on January 27,\n1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence\nof a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate with-\ndrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of\nself-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will\nmaintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the\nUnited States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seck a\nrelaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean\npeninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly\nrelations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds.\nConsistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of\nDecember 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the\nceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military\nforces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire\nline in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the\npeoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military\nthreat, and without having the area become the subject of great power\nrivalry.\nThe Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is\nresistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the\npeople want revolution-this has become the irresistible trend of history.\nAll nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the\nsmall and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be\na superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind.\nThe Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the\noppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the\npeople of all countries have the right to choose their social systems\naccording to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence,\nsovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose\nforcign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All forcign troops\nshould be withdrawn to their own countries.\nThe Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Victnam,\nLaos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and\nits firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolu-\ntionary Government of the Republic of South Victnam and the clabora-\ntion of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and\nto the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese\nPeoples. It firmly supports the cight-point program for the peaceful\nunification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic\nPeople's Republic of Korca on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the\nabolition of the \"U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation\n-of Korea.\" It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of\nJapanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to\nbuild an independent. democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly\nmaintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United\n&\nFORD\nNations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw\nall their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the\nGERALD\nceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan\nLISRARY\nGovernment and people in their struggle to preserve their independence\nWIEKLY CC LATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DÖČUMENTS, PEDRUARY 75, 1972\n4/5\nand sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle\nfor the right of self-determination.\nThere are essential differences between China and the United States\nin their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed\nthat countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their\nrelations on the principles of respect for the sovercignty and territorial\nintegrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference\nin the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and\npeaceful coexistence. International disputes should bc settled on this basis,\nwithout resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the\nPeople's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their\nmutual relations.\nWith these principles of international relations in mind the two sides\nstated that:\n-progress toward the normalization of relations between China and\nthe United States is in the interests of all countries;\n-both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;\n-neither should seck hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each\nis opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to\nestablish such hegemony; and\n-neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to\nenter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at\nother states.\nBoth sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the\npeoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against\nother countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres\nof interest.\nThe two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between\nChina and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position:\nThe Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization\nof relations between China and the United States; the Government of\nthe People's Republic of China is the solc legal government of China;\nTaiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the\nmotherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which\nno other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and\nmilitary installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Gov-\nemment firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of \"onc\nChina, one Taiwan,\" \"one China, two governments,\" \"two Chinas,\" and\n\"independent Taiwan\" or advocate that \"the status of Taiwan remains\nto be determined.\"\nThe U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all\nChinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one\nChina and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government\ndoes not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful\nsettlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this\nprospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of\nall U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime,\nit will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan\nFORD i LIBRARY\nas the tension in the area diminishes.\nThe 1110 sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding\nbetween the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such\nficks as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which\npeople-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial.\nEach side un rtakes to facilitate the further develop ent of such contacts\nand exchanges.\nBoth sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual\nbenefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on\nequality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two\ncountries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade\nbetween their two countries.\nThe two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various\nchannels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Pcking\nfrom time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization\nof relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views.on\nissues of common interest.\nThe two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this\nvisit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two\ncountries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the\ntwo countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American\npeoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the\nworld.\nPresident Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their\nappreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government\nand people of the People's Republic of China.\ni\nFORD\nNOTE: The joint statement was released at Shanghai, People's Republic of China.\nFor a news conference of Dr. Henry Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State\nMarshall Green and a statement by the White House Press Secretary on the com-\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nmuniqué, see the following two items.\n2. Shanghai: Joint Communique\nwhat the outcome of a meeting between the President RS\nthe leaders of the People's Republic might be.\nNews Conference of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant\nDuring the interim visit there was some explorate:\nto the President for National Security thairs, and\nconversation of an outcome in the conventional SCHEC\nMarshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East\nwhich both sides tend to state general positions whi-\nthey afterwards choose to interpret, each in their own W:\nAsian and Pacific Affairs. - February 27, 1972\nIt was, therefore, decided early in the meetings\nthis occasion between the President and Prime Mini\nMR. ZINGLER. You have had a chance to read over the\nthat such an approach would make no sense. It word\ncommuniqué. Dr. Kis-inger is here to discuss it with you\nand take your questions. What Dr. Kissinger says is on the\nnot be worthy of the purposes that were attempted to\nserved.\nrecord. Together with Dr. Kissinger is Assistant Secre-\nIt was therefore decided that each side would state i'\ntary of State Marshall Green who, as you know, partici-\npated in all the meetings with Secretary of State Rogers\nposition on issues in a section which it would produ:\nwhen he met with the Foreign Minister, and he is here\nmore or less independent of the other. It would not Pir\nalso to discuss the communiqué with you and to take\ntend to an agreement which did not exist and whic.\nyour questions, together with Dr. Kissinger.\nwould have to be interpreted away in subsequent imp:-\nmentations. Therefore, the beginning part of the CO!.\nWe will begin with Dr. Kissinger.\nmuniqué represents, in effect, a statement by each sid\nDR. KISSINGER. Let me make a few preliminary ob-\nof some of its general principles.\nservations before we go to your questions. Let me do it\nOn our side, they were deliberately not phrased in\nin two parts: the-proces. and there is obviously the com-\ncontentious way. While in discussions some of the any\nmuniqué produced, and secondly, what does it incan in\nments made by the Chinese side were, of course, rebutter\ngeneral terms. Then I believe that I will be prepared to\nIVC did not feel that this was the appropriate vehicle\nanswer questions.\ndo so, but rather to state what our positive view was.\nFirst, how was the communiqué produced? From the\nFor that matter, the Chinese side did not relant al\"!\nbeginning of our contacts with the People's Republic of\nments which we made in our section that they did\nChina, there were some obvious general considerations of\nparticularly agree with.\nIn order to present these two n an cqual masis,\nnow, this IS all 1 want to say by way of introduc-\nit had been decided that in the text cd by the Amer-\ntion. I wonder wh Marshall Green would like to add\nican Government, the U.S. position would be stated first,\na few words, and then nc will he glad to answer questions.\nand in the text to be issued by the Chinese Government,\nMR. GREEN. I have just a few words. First of all with\nthe Chinese version would be stated first.\nregard to the P.R.C. authority with whom Dr. Kissinger\nI mention this only so that you will not be surprised\nwas maintaining the discussions, it was Chiao Kuan-\nif the Chinese version follows a different sequence from\nhua-just to clarify that point.\nthe American version. This is by agreement. Both versions\nI don't think I really have much to add. Our talks under\nare official and are being put out on the basis of this\nSecretary Rogers on our side, and Foreign Minister Chi\nagreement.\nPeng-fei for the People's Republic of China, extended\nThe procedure that was followed here was that issues\nover, I believe, 10 hours all together\nof general principle were first discussed in the incetings\nBut it was not just the talks themselves. We had fre-\nbetween the President and the Prime Minister. They were\nquent occasion, as you could imagine with all the fine\nthen, after they had been explored for some time, trans-\nfood you have eaten-occasionally waiting to have that\nferred to the meetings chaired by the Secretary of State\nfine food to have extensive talks also, and a number of\nand the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of\nmatters could be discussed in that context.\nChina. Then, if any additional issues arose, they might be\nAlso, it was not just that, but the Secretary did have\nreferred back to the meeting of the President and the\na chance to meet on a number of occasions with the\nPrime Minister.\nPrime Minister. Most recently, coming down on the plane,\nIn drafting the communiqué, various sections were pro-\nhe had an hour and a half from Peking to Hangchow. And\nduced by various elements of the American side. I played\nthen today the Prime Minister called on him in his hotel\nthe role of go-between on our side and the Vice Foreign\nroom for about 10 minutes.\nMinister, whose name I despair of ever learning to pro-\nI would say that the talks and the counterpart meetings\nnounce, on the Chinese side.\nwere characterized by candor, friendliness, and courtesy\nIn this manner, as we put together the various para-\nand hospitality, as I am sure you have all SCCI:, on the part\ngraphs that were supplied 10 us on our side by various\nof our Chinese hosts. There was no pulling of punches, not\nindividuals, if nc reached a point at which agreement\nphysically, of course. They were outspoken, no effort to\nseemed near or possible, we would then go back to our\ncover up or paper over differences, but to have it out. It is\nprincipals and to the Secretary of State. Through this\ngood for the system. I think in so doing one has a much\nprocess, the communqué was finally achieved.\nbetter appreciation of the other person's point of view.\nFor example, some of the sessions were quite prolonged.\nAs far as the specifies are concerned, in the talks, T\nThe last few nights the sessions went on until the carly\nreally can't say much more than what already appears\nhours of the morning with the President. In Peking, the\nin the communiqué itself, although some of the points\nChinese delegation had a house in the guest complex,\nthere may raise questions.\nand most of the sessions took place in that house. As a\nQ. On page -1, in stating that the United States will\nparagraph was fini-hed, it would typically go back then\nprogressively reduce its forces in military installations on\nto the President who was in the next house, and this went\nTaiwan, was that decision a result of the discussions here in\non Friday night until about 5 in the morning.\nChina?\nSo much for the process. Lct me say something about\nDR. KISSINGER. No, this is a general statement of our\nthe content. Obviously neither side would have written\npolicy which we have enunciated on innumerable occa-\nthis communiqué this way if it had been able to draft it\nsions in innumerable forums. It says that we maintain the\nentirely by itself. Therefore, it represented an attempt by\namount of forces that is required by the general situation\ntwo countries that had been out of contact for a long\nand not by any abstract determination. It is a state-\ntime to find a basis to convey first some immediate under-\nment of our general policy, but not a mutual decision.\nstandings, but beyond that, to start a process by which\nQ. Is there any sign now that the conditions would lead\nthey could bring about a closer relationship over a period\nto a reduction of the American military force in Taiwan\nof time and by which they could, where interests con-\nshortly?\nverged, act in a more nearly parallel fashion and where\nDR. KISSINGER. I don't want to speculate on what\ninterests differed, 10 mitigate the consequences of those\nwill be done over a period of time, but if you speak about\ndisagreements.\n\"shortly,\" I would not expect that.\nQ. Why did not the United States Government re-\nSo the communiqué sought to be seen in two aspects:\naffirm its treaty commitment to Taiwan, as the President\nfirst, in terms of the specific principles and conclusions it\nand you have done on numerous occasions?\nstates, and secondly, in terms of the direction to which\nNR. KISSINGER. Lct me take this occasion to deal with\nit seeks to point. It is on that basis that we are presenting\n11:00 particular aspect, and let me deal with it onc, and\nit to the American people and on which the People FRe-\nnotalnswer it in inmunerable elliptical forms in which,\npublic is presenting it as well.\nnoedoubt, it will be presented.\nThe particular issue which Mr.\nslow\nraised\nis,\nof\nseeing who scorca w many points on which issue. At\ncourse, an extraordinarily difficult one to discuss on the\nthe time of the first ping pong exchange, if I understand\nterritory of a country with which nc do not maintain\nthe position of the People's Republic of China, it 11:15 that\nformal diplomatic relations and for which this particular\nsome very low-level pcople-to-pcople exchanges would\nissue is a matter of profound principle.\noccur.\nLet me, therefore, state in response to this and any\nThe formalization of exchanges encouraged by the two\nrelated question-and let me do it once and not repeat\ngovernments, the opening of trade encouraged by the two\nit. We stated our basic position with respect to this issue\ngovernments, the establishment of diplomatic mecha-\nin the President's world report in which we say that this\nnisms for continued contact, the joint statement of some\ntreaty will be maintained. Nothing has changed in that\ngeneral principles of international relations, the joint state-\nposition.\nment of some basic approaches to the view of the world\nBut I would appreciate it if that would be all that I\nwith respect to, for example, the section which includes the\nwould be asked to say about it in these circumstances.\nreference to hegemony-these, I believe, are matters that\nBut the position of the world report stands and has been\nmost of us would have considered unthinkable at the time\nunaltered.\nof the invitation to the ping pong team.\nQ. Dr. Kissinger, the possibility is mentioned of the\nBut I would put them on the basis of mutuality rather\nUnited States sending a representative to Peking from time\nthan of any unilateral movement on the part of the\nto time. Is there any likelihood that this process might be\nPeople's Republic of China.\nreversed and Peking might send a representative to\nQ. Henry, is this the first time that a President of the\nWashington?\nUnited States has formally picked up the language of the\nDr. KISSINGER. The situation of the two sides is not\nFive Principles of Peaceful Cocxistence?\nexactly equal in this respect because in Washington there\nDR. KISSINGER. I have to say I am simply not sure. All\nis a Chinese representation different from that that would\nI would reply, again, would be an answer in the same\nbe sent under the hypothesis which you mention. How-\nterms as I did to Mr. Frankel. The question is not who\never, what we envisage is the establishment of a contact\nput forward the proposals. The question is: Docs it con-\npoint, to begin with, in which the discussions about the\ntain principles that WC can live by and since we have said\nexchanges and trade that are mentioned in the preceding\nwe are prepared to apply these principles during the next\nparagraphs will be formally conducted and as soon as this\none on the non-use of force, and since both sides have\ncontact point has been established, it will be announced\nstated this, it docs not really make a crucial difference\nand the visit of a U.S. representative to Peking would take\nwho put it forward first.\nplace as the need arises, and as particular issues of great\nQ. How much progress was there made in advancing\nimportance need to be discussed. This, however, is not\nthe ball, in response to the question asked by George\nto the exclusion of any other possibility.\nBall on the trips, \"js this necessary?\" How much further\nQ. What do you mean by \"a contact point\"?\ndid we go than in your original discussions with Premier\nDR. KISSINGER. For example, there existed for a while,\nChou?\nand formally still exists, a forum in Warsaw where U.S.\nDR. KISSINGER. The character of the discussions in-\nand Chinese officials met-something of this kind. As soon\nevitably is entirely different when the President of the\nas that is established, which we expect will be in the rea-\nUnited States talks than when an assistant talks who can-\nsonably near future, we will announce it.\nnot make any definitive statement. The basic objective of\nQ. Will that be established in the United States or\nthis trip was to sct in motion a train of events and an\nCanada or some other country?\nevolution in the policy of our two countries which both\nDR. KISSINGER. I don't expect it to be in the United\nsides recognized would be slow at first and present many\nStates, but 1 don't want 10 speculate beyond that.\ndifficulties and in which a great deal depended on the\nQ. Can we assume that the President and Prime Minis-\nassessment by each side of the understanding by the other\nter discussed all these differences face-to-face, specifically\nof what was involved in this process and of the assessment\ntheir differences over Victnam and the reduction of troops\nby each side of the reliability of the other in being able\non Taiwan? Were these positions stated openly?\nto pursue this for the amount of time necessary to see it\nDR. KISSINGER. All differences were discussed by the\nprevail.\nPresident and the Prime Minister face to face, candidly\nIn this sense it alinost had to be conducted by the heads\nand seriously, including those which you mentioned.\nof the 1110 governments and in this sense I would say that\nQ. Can you point to. anything in this document in\nin the depth and seriousness of the discussions it wont, ob-\nwhich the People's Repablic of China goes any significant\nviously, beyond what had been discussed in my and\nstep beyond its position at the time of the first ping pong\nbeyond our expectations.\nexchanges?\nΩ. Did Chairman Mao participate? DR his partices\nDR. KISSINGER. Let me say two things: IVc are not ap-\npation go to the detailed substance of this matter or 1125\nproaching this from the point of view of a scoreboard of\nit largely philosophical and general?\nWEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, FECRUAR 28, 1972\n479\nDr. KISSINGER. I don't believe that it would be appro-\nfrom a dialogue with the most powerful nation in the\npriate for me to go into detail about the content of the\nworld and WC are conducting our discussions with the\nconversation with Chairman Mao. I may say, however,\nPeople's Republic entirely on the merits of that\nthat Chairman Man and the President discussed each of\nrelationship.\nthe essential categories in a general way and we have\nThe paragraph on hegemony will arise only if any coun-\nevery reason to believe that the Prime Minister checked\ntry should seck it, but WC had no particular country in\nwith the Chairman at every step along the way. But it\nmind when it was being drafted.\nwas not just 2 vague philosophical discussion.\nQ. In the paragraph referring to the reduction of forces\nQ. The assertion of respect for sovereignty and terri-\nand military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the\ntorial integrity, combined with the statement of respect\narea diminishes, is this an exclusive reference to Indo-\nfor one China, could that be construed as meaning that the\nchina is the area?\nUnited States notes the claim of the Government of the\nDR. KISSINGER. No. It is a reference to the general\nPeople's Republic of China, its claim to sovercignty over\narea. It is not a reference to any particular part of Asia.\nTaiwan?\nQ. What conditions in that arca would keep American\nDR. KISSINGER. Our view with respect to Taiwan has\ntroops on Taiwan? What tensions in the area of Taiwan\nbeen exhaustively stated in that paragraph you refer to\nnow require the presence of American troops there?\nand we add nothing to it.\nDR. KISSINGER. Wc are talking about the general state\nQ. Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us whether there is any\nof relationships in Asia and in the world. It is in reference\ntimetable under which you are going to undertake to fa-\nto that that our general decisions on deployments will be\ncilitate the contacts and exchanges in the cultural, sports,\nmade.\nand journalistic arcas?\nQ. Dr. Kissinger, the President said in a television\nDR. KISSINGER. There is no precise timetable, Walter,\ninterview the beginning of January that he would bring\nbut I think it is correct to say that both sides understand\nup the question of American prisoners of war in Victnam\nthat this will be pursued with some dispatch.\nwhen he came to China. Can you tell us if it came up\nQ. Dr. Kissinger, in the light of the statement by the\nand what the reaction was?\nGovernment of China that the Chinese side said that the\nTaiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the\nDR. KISSINGER. Obviously, as the communiqué makes\nclear the issue of Victnam was discussed and it is\nnormalization of relations, does this timetable depend on\nfurther progress in the solution of the Taiwan question?\nclear that We would not discuss it without mentionim,\nDR. KISSINGER. No. That is independent of the other,\nour concern with respect to the prisoners. The position of\nthough at what point the two would become interdepend-\nthe People's Republic is as stated in the communiqué that\ncnt again, ] cannot judge. But as this is written now, my\nit supports the seven-point proposal made by the Provi-\nanswer to Walter Cronkite stands on its own feet.\nsional Government--by the PRG, and I think it is a fair\nQ. Dr. Kissinger, where the communiqué states, \"Both\ncharacterization of the basic positions.\nsides are of the view that it would be against the interests\nQ. Dr. Kissinger, there is a paragraph that says \"In-\nof the peoples of the world for any major country to col-\nternational disputes should be scitled on this basis, with-\nlude with another against other countries, or for major\nout resorting to the use or threat of force.\" Since the\ncountries to divide \"P the world into spheres of interest,\":\nPeople's Republic says the difficulty with us on Taiwan is\nwas that a result of your talks about Sino-Soviet tensions\nall international issue, does this incan that they have\nor was the Soviet Union involved in the talks? Does this\nagreed not to USC force or the threat of force in settling\nrefer to how the United States views the relationship be-\nor solving that?\ntween China and the U.S. and the Soviet Union?\nDR. KISSINGER. The formal position of the People's\nDR. KISSINGER. We have said on many occasions, and\nRepublic of China with respect to Taiwan is a matter, of\nI will say it again here, that as far as the United States is\ncourse, of extreme delicacy for us to discuss here at all.\nconcerned, our relationship with the People's Republic\nClearly, they do not, as they have stated in their part\nof China is not directed against the Soviet Union, and\nof the section on Taiwan, consider it an international\nwhile the People's Republic is well able to speak for it-\nproblem in any normal sense. Clearly, the formal state-\nself, and my megalomania has not reached the point where\nments with respect to this issue have to be drafted with\nI believe that ] can speak for it, I believe that it is clear\nthe various perspectives in mind.\nto us that neither is the policy of the People's Republic\nREPORTER. Thank you, gentlemen.\nof China in its relations with us directed against the\nSoviet Union.\nNOTE: White House Press Secretary Ronald 1.. Gegler opened\nnews conference at 5:50 p.m., local time, at the Industrial\nWe are pursuing our policy with the People's Republic\ntion Center Banquet Hall, Shanghai, People's Upoblic of\nof China on the ground that a stable peace in the world\nFor the text of the joint communique, see the preciding item\nis difficult to covisage if COD million people are excluded\nFor a statement on the communiqué by the White Home Pren\nSecurary, see the following item.\nWITKLY COMPITATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, FEBRUARY 28, 1972\nShanghai: Joint Communique\nto improve communications between the United States\nand the People's Republic of China will significantly con-\n3. Statement by Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to the\ntribute to a more stable structure of peace in the world.\nPresident. February 27, 1972\nThe communiqué honestly reflects the differences that\nboth sides recognize exist and states those areas where\nPresident Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai have\nboth sides found common views and have agreed to\nreached agreement on a joint communiqué. This com-\ntake specific steps to further improve their relationship.\nmuniqué reflects the position of the United States and\nThe communiqué, in stating its general attitude, says,\nthe People's Republic of China on various bilateral and\n\"The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the\ninternational issues which were discussed during Presi-\nUnited States of America found it beneficial to have\ndent Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China.\nthis opportunity, after so many years without contact, to\nThe day President Nixon arrived in Peking he met\npresent candidly to one another their views on a variety\nwith Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The two leaders had a\nof issues.\"\nserious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. rela-\nThe communiqué goes on to say: \"There are csen-\ntions and world affairs. During the President's 7-day visit\ntial differences between China and the United States\nto the People's Republic of China extensive, frank, and\nin their social systems and foreign policies. However, the\nhonest discussions were held between President Nixon\ntwo sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social\nand Premier Chou En-lai. The discussions were held on\nsystems, should conduct their relations on the principles\nthe normalization of relations between the United States\nof respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all\nand the People's Republic of China, as well as on other\nstates, non-aggression against other states, non-interfer-\nmatters of interest to both sides.\nence in the internal affairs of other states, equality and\nThe two leaders participated in over 15 hours of formal\nmutual benefit, and peaceful cocxistence. International\ntalks. In addition, Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign\ndisputes should be settled on this basis, without resort-\nMinister Che Pang-fci held discussions in the same spirit\ning to the use or threat of force. The United States and\nand participated in about 15 hours of formal discussions.\nthe People's Republic of China are prepared to apply\nSo the communiqué reflects over 30 hours of formal\nthese principles to their mutual relations.\"\ndiscussions between the United States and the People's\nRepublic of China. The very fact of the joint com-\nNOTE: Press Secretary Zingler read the statement to reporters at\n6:40 p.m., local time, in the Industrial Exhibition Center Danguet\nmuniqué between the two governments is symbolic of\nHall, Shanghai, People's Repablic of China. As printed above,\nthe greater understanding produced through the facc-to-\nthis item follows the text of the White House press release.\nface discussions that have been held.\nFor the text of the joint communiqué and a prus conference of\nDr. Henry Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State Marshall\nIt is President Nixon's hope that this historic beginning\nGreen, see the preceding two items.\nR.\nFORD\nGERALD\nLIBRATE\n5\nMEMORANDUM\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nPRC\nOctober 20, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nBUD McFARLANE\nFROM:\nWILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN\nby\nSUBJECT:\nMaterials on Post-1949 PRC Foreign\nPolicy\nIn response to your note concerning Susan Ford's interest in a paper on\n\"Relations between the United States and other regional and world powers\nand China in the Post Revolutionary Period, \" I have checked with a\nnumber of sources and determined that no such paper exists. The best\nI can do, I am afraid, is to provide a recommended bibliography on\naspects of that very broad subject. This would include:\nJohn Gittings, The World and China, 1922-1972, Harper & Row,\n1974\nJay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, Praeger, 1976\nAllen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, Univ. of\nMichigan Press, 1975\nPeter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's\nSupport for Wars of National Liberation, Univ. of\nCalifornia Press, 1970\nI am also assembling some public materials from State on US-PRC\nrelations (background notes, testimony, etc.). I will send them to you\nwhen they arrive. As a supplement, I would suggest Ms. Ford may wish\nto look at the annual Foreign Policy messages issued during the Nixon\nyears. Each volume contains a section on US-PRC relations. She could\nalso refer to a volume of hearings recently issued by Congressman\nLester Wolff's House International Relations Subcommittee on Future\nForeign Policy Research and Development on the subject United States-\nSoviet Union-China: The Great Power Triangle.\nFORD\n6a\nMH\nMEMORANDUM\n5927\npen\nwas\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSECRET\nINFORMATION\nOctober 27, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nB\nFROM:\nWILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN by\nSUBJECT:\nLeadership Changes in China; Implications\nfor the U.S.\nAlthough we would caution against assuming the permanence of new\narrangements in Peking, we may have enough of a pause in the turning\nof the kaleidoscope to try to sort out the pattern.\nHua Kuo-feng may well face further contention and struggle, but he has\nat least greatly improved his leadership position and purged his \"radical\"\nchallengers. He has done so more rapidly and decisively than expected,\nand we seem to be witnessing a catharsis of pent-up animosities which\nsuggests it may be some time before another \"leftist\" challenge develops.\nObviously the military have played a major role and will not forget that\nthey did so. Coping with this military power and the problem of Teng\nHsiao-ping are probably Hua's most delicate problems. If the new pattern\ndevelops logically, we would expect China's domestic and foreign policies\nto continue, without abrupt change, toward relatively practical goals,\ncharacterized by the slogan of developing China into a modern socialist\nsociety by the end of this century. This could bring a more constructive\natmosphere into our relations with Peking reminiscent of the 1971-73\nperiod. But the PRC's terms for normalization will not alter significantly,\nand it is quite possible that dealings with Peking will continue to be difficult\nbecause of internal distractions. The most important move for us after the\nelection will be a quiet signal to Hua that we welcome China's affirmation\nof policy continuity and that we will be preparing ourselves seriously for\nthe next move on normalization.\nDECLASCIMED\nE.O.\nNSC MEMO, 11/24/98, ANGELIZES\nBY HR 5/11/01\nThe following paragraphs speculate at greater length about the impact of\nPeking's changes.\nDomestic Policies\n080\nWhile we may see an effort to assure that China continues along the\n\"socialist path according to the thought of Mao\", we expect less\nSECRET\n2\ncontroversy over adherence to essentially pragmatic economic policies\nsuch as greater reliance on material incentives (rather than political\nexhortation) to boost worker output and greater emphasis on trade.\nVarious elements will seek greater access to Western technology to\nhasten economic growth and bolster China's strategic position, even\nthough there will be a continuing wariness, even among the military,\nabout overdependence on the outside world.\nPolitical strains within China and competition for economic resources\nwill continue. Provincial or regional requirements will compete with\nnational requirements, and there will be competing priorities of the\nmilitary and civilian sectors. And finally, there are still large numbers\nof people in China who are fairly \"leftist\" in outlook, or whose careers\nhave depended upon beating the \"capitalist\" or \"revisionist\" dog and who\nmay wage a limited \"rear-guard\" struggle.\nBut overall, these strains may assume the more normal proportions\nassociated with their counterparts in other countries rather than the\ngrotesque political campaign style which has characterized disputes in\nChina for the past quarter century. Indeed, one of the striking features\nof the elevation of Hua and the purging of the \"left\" has been not only the\nsmoothness with which it has proceeded thus far, but also the apparent\nconfidence the successful leaders had ahead of time in the popularity of\ntheir removal of Chiang Ching and the others. Despite the scheming\nand planning which must have taken place in the center, the popularity of\nthe turn of events has been evident in the relaxed and genuinely jubilant\nmood of the people, both in small informal gatherings -- including with\nWesterners - - and in the organized mass rallies throughout China.\nForeign Policies\nThe Chinese have been at some pains to assure domestic and foreign\naudiences alike that Chairman Mao's foreign policy line will be adhered\nto. In various ways this has been shown to mean continued hostility\ntowards the Soviet Union and commitment to improved relations with\nthe United States. While this has generally evoked a sense of visceral\nsatisfaction in the West, where \"moderate\" has been equated with \"rational\"\nand \"good\", and while in fact we should find Chinese actions more predict-\nable than if the \"leftists\" had won out, it is far from clear that our own\nbilateral problems with China will be more easily resolved or that there\nwill not be some eventual improvement in Sino-Soviet state-to-state\nrelations.\nSECRET\nSECRET\n3\nSino-Soviet Relations - Despite the initial hostility being displayed\ntoward the Soviets, some shift in Sino-Soviet relations may emerge over\nthe next few months. The degree of tension prevailing between China\nand the Soviet Union over the last seven or eight years has been danger-\nously high with unpredictable consequences for our own interests. On\nthat basis alone, we should not be perturbed by a lowering of the level\nof tension and hostility. We should also accept the reality that each of\nthe parties in a triangular relationship, such as ours with Moscow and\nPeking, will try to gain whatever leverage it can with each of the other\ntwo parties and there will often be little the third party can do to influence\nties between the other two. In any event, recognizing the depth of\nhostility between the Chinese and the Soviets, we should not become SO\nfearful of improvement in Sino-Soviet ties that we are panicked into\nmaking unnecessary or unwise concessions to either of them in hopes\nof forestalling a new \"alliance\". Indeed, we should get the message\nacross to the Chinese -- and Soviets that we are relaxed about it.\nSino-US Relations - We may find the Chinese tending to revert to the\ntone which prevailed between mid-1971 and 1973. That is, there may be\na willingness on Peking's part to make soothing noises about trying all\npeaceful means to liberate Taiwan before resorting to force and about\npatience over the length of time such \"liberation\" might take. But the\nbasic line on Taiwan and about the conditions for full normalization of\nUS-PRC relations has never changed, and there is no reason to think it\nwill now. Peking will still insist that we break all official ties with\nTaiwan, abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty, and withdraw all military\nforces and installations from Taiwan. The issue of military sales to\nTaiwan after normalization will remain one of great delicacy and fraught\nwith potential hazards.\nWe have a number of ideas as to how we might proceed to test Peking's\nlimited flexibility, and we will present these to you after the election.\nFor the moment, I believe that we should try to avoid making statements\nor taking actions which could unnecessarily complicate the process.\nWe should be prepared fairly promptly to give Hua a positive signal but\nwe should avoid steps which could be characterized as unseemly in their\nhaste to woo the new Chinese leadership.\nSECRET\n6b\nDOC\nRECD\nLOG N° RER\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\nINITIAL ACTION o\nNSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE\n27\n1027\n11\n7605927\nTO: PRES\nFROM: SECSTATE\nLeed\nS/S\nUNCLAS LOG IN/ OUT\nSCOWCROFT X\nSECDEF\nLOU\nNO FORN\nJODIS\nHYLAND\nDCI\nX REF\nC\nEYES ONLY\nEXCHS\nDAVIS\nSTATE\nEXSEC\ns\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nCODEWORD\nSUBJECT\nCharaps in Implication\nInfo Meno OTHER kin Lenduching TS SENSITIVE\nfor ADV CYS S'CROFT/ INTERNAL WGH ACTION ROUTING the AND CONCUR- RENCE DISTRIBUTION DINATE COOR- 65 INFO\nREC\nACTION REQUIRED\nCY\nFOR\nMEMO FOR SCOWCROFT\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO FOR PRES\nCONGRESSIONAL\nREPLY FOR\nECONOMIC\nDISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\nEUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS\nMEMO\nTO\nFAR EAST/ PRC\n$\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nINTELLIGENCE\nJOINT MEMO\nLATIN AMERICA\nREFER TO\nFOR:\nMID EAST NO. AFRICA\nANY ACTION NECESSARY?\nNSC PLANNING\nCONCURRENCE\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDUE DATE:\nSCIENTIFIC\nCOMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS!\nSUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN\nDATE\nFROM\nto\nSTATUS\nDUE\nCY TO\n10/27\nIX\n11/4\nNSC/s\nSUBSEQUENT Info ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):\n1/4\nC\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\nnoted by Showroft\nR.\nGERALD DEPARTMENT\nDISPATCH\nNOTIFY\nMICROFILM & FILE ROMTS\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nM/F'D\nBY\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION:\nCRT NOV 08 1976 NS\nDY\nSPECIAL INDEXING:\nOPEN <<\nWH SA FP\nX\nCLOSE\nPA\nSUSPENSE CY ATTACHED\nNSC 76-21\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976\n599-022"
}