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This file contains materials relating to Schlesinger in China and the death of Mao.
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People's Republic of China - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (2)
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People's Republic of China - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (2)
description
This file contains materials relating to Schlesinger in China and the death of Mao.
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Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)
East Asia and Pacific Country Files
subjects
Soviet Union
Taiwan
Laos
South Dakota
Cambodia
Diego Garcia (British Indian Ocean Territory)
China
Korea (North)
Grain sales
Nuclear testing
Presidential trips
Presidential campaign, 1976
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1976-09-30
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1976
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1975-07-01
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1975
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The original documents are located in Box 15, folder "People's Republic of China - State
Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (2)" of the Presidential Country Files for
East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 15 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
OF STATE
*
Department of State
EXPIS EXETS
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATE
OF
WA
CONF IDENTIAL 7574
PAGE 01 PEKING 01258 081129Z
41
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1026 W
087607
of 080845Z JUL 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4010
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
C 0 N F I D E N A t PEKING 1258
EXDIS
E, O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OREP (PERCY, CHARLES) CH
SUBJECT: SENATOR PERCY TRAVEL
REF: MOSCOW 9256
MR. BUSH HAS RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM SENATOR PERCY IN
MOSCOW INFORMING HIM DELEGATION CONSISTING OF PERCY, CHURCH,
PELL, STEVENSON, JAVITS, FINDLEY, MCCLOSKY PLUS WIVES AND
MARK PERCY AND CARLA JAVITS WILL ARRIVE IN PRC ON AUGUST 3.
IF IT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY MADE BY THE
DEPARTMENT, PLEASE PASS TO SENATORY PERCY'S OFFICE FOLLOWING
MESSAGE FROM MR. BUSH:
BEGIN MESSAGE: DELIGHTED TO GET YOUR MISSIVE FROM MOSCOW.
IT WILL BE GREAT TO SEE YOU AGAIN. WE WANT TO OFFER ANY
ASSISTANCE TO YOU WE CAN. IN THE PAST USLO HAS ASSIGNED A
CHINESE SPEAKING ESCORT OFFICER TO VISITING HIGH-LEVEL GROUPS
AND WE WOULD CERTAINLY BE HAPPY TO DO so IN YOUR CASE. I
THINK YOU WOULD FIND IT USEFUL. LET US KNOW YOUR PLEASURE.
ALL THE BEST. GEORGE BUSH. END OF MESSAGE.
BUSH
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT, CONF IWF IDEN AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
30 HR 5/14/01
TRANTMENT
or
2
STATE
WH
EXEM
Department of State
/ AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
of
CONFIDENTIAL 5808
PAGE 01 PEKING 01476 080851Z
12
ACTION SS=25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 w
127033
0 R 080808Z AUG 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4183
INFO AMEMASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
C 0 N F I D N T I A L PEKING 1476
EXDIS
NOFORN DISSEM
E.O. 116521 XGDS-2
TAGS: PFOR CB
SUBJECT: SIHANOUKIS TRAVEL PLANS
1. AFP PEKING IS FILING STORY THIS AFTERNOON CAUGUST 8)
SAYING SIHANOUK HAS BEEN INVITED BY THE RED KHMER
AUTHORITIESTO RETURCUTO PHNOM PENH BUT HAS NOT YET
GIVEN A POSITIVE REPLY. THIEUNN PRASITH FROM THE
CAMBODIAN
EMBASSY IN PEKING CIN CHARGE OF RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR) IS SAID TO HAVE VISITED
PYONGYANG ON JULY 18 TO CONVEY THE INVITATION OF THE
PHNOM PENH AUTHORITIES FOR SIHANOUK, MONIQUE ANB
PEN NOUTH AND HIS WIFE TO RETURN TO CAMBODIA AT ANY
TIME CONVENIENT AFTER AUGUST 1. SARIN CHAAK REPORTEDLY
ACCOMPANIED PRASITH ON HIS VISIT. ACCORDING TO THE STORY,
EXEMS
SIHANOUK PLANS TO GO TO TIENTSIN AROUND AUGUST 20 FOR A
BRIEF MEDICAL CHECKUP AND THEN RETURN TO PEKING TO DECIDE
WHETHER TO ACCEPT THE INVITATION. IF SIHANOUK DOES RETURN
TO PHNOM PENH, HE WILL DO so FOR A SHORT VISIT IN THE FIRST
PART OF SEPTEMBER.
2, BEGIN XGDS-2, NOFORN DISSEM. AFP CORRESPONDENT
E.O. DECLASSIFIED 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
BERALO FORD LIBRUPT
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES 709/27/02
CONFIDENTIAL
BY
HR, NARA, DATE 2/5/03
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
9.66 FORM DS-1652
40
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 PEKING 01476 080851Z
TOLD USLO OFFICER THAT SOURCE OF STORY IS A CAMBODIAN
CLOSE TO SIHANOUK WHO WAS IN ON THE DISCUSSION IN
PYONGYANG. SOURCE RETURNED BRIEFLY TO PEKING. SOURCE
ALSO SAID--BUT AFP IS NOT FILING--THAT IN FACT STHANOUK
IS VERY FRIGHTENED. SINCE THE INVITATION DID NOT INCLUDE
MEMBERS OF HIS ENTOURAGE OTHER THAN PEN NOUTH,
SIHANOUK FEARS THE KHMER ROUGE MAY ARREST HIM ON
ARRIVAL IN PHNOM PENH. THIS IS THT SECOND OR THIRD
INVITATION STHANOUK HAS RECEIVED FROM THE KHMER ROUGE,
HE NO LONGER CAN USE HIS SICK MOTHER AS AN EXCUSE FOR
NOT RETURNING AND KNOWS THAT THE BIG MOMENT OF DECISION
HAS COME. SIHANOUK, REPORTEDLY, DOES NOT PLAN TO
DECIDE UNTIL AFTER HE CAN TALK THE SITUATION OVER WITH
CHOU EN-LAI IN PEKING AND PERHAPS RECEIVE SOME CHINESE
GUARANTEE FOR HIS SAFETY.
3. AFR'S SOURCE FURTHER SAID THAT WHEN THE
INVITATION ARRIVED, SIHANOUK TOOK A POLL OF HIS CABINET
TO SEE HOW MANY OF HIS FOLLOWERS WANTED TO RETURN TO
CAMBODIA. NOT ONE VOTED FOR RETURN. SIHANOUK
HIMSELF IS SAID TO BELIEVE THAT THE REGIME IN PHNOM
PENH IS "FASCIST" AND IS NOW HOPING THEIR EXCESSES
WILL CAUSE THEM TO FALL FROM POWER. THE SIHANOUKISTS
OPENLY REFER TO THE KHMER ROUGE AS THE "ENEMY".
SIHANOUK IS ALSO SAID TO BE UNHAPPY BECAUSE KHIEU
SAMPHAN HAS BROKEN THE PACT AGREED TO EARLIER IN
PEKING WHICH CALLED FOR KHIEU SAMPHAN TO RUN INTERNAL
AFFAIRS ONLY, LEAVING FOREIGN RELATIONS TO SIHANOUK.
4. APP CORRESPONDENT SAID THE RECENT RUMORS THAT
SIHANOUK PLANNED TO RETURN TO CAMBODIA STEMMED FROM
STATEMENTS BY THE CAMBODIAN AMBASSADOR IN
PEKING TO TWO OTHER DIPLOMATS ON JULY 19. APPARENTLY,
THE KHMER ROUGE CHE SAYS THE AMBASSADOR AND REST
OF THE CAMBODIAN EMBASSY STAFF HERE ARE KHMER ROUGE)
ASSUMED SIHANOUK WOULD ACCEPT THE INVITATION THEY HAD
TENDERED EARLIER.
5. BOTH THE INFORMATION IN PARAS 2 AND 3 NOT FILED BY AFP AND THESE
SOURCES ARE VERY SENSITIVE. PLEASE PROTECT. END XGDS-2, NOFORN
DISSEM.
FORD
RUSH
CONFIDENTIAL
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
RM
DS-1652.
66
OF
3
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONFIDENTIAL 5433
PAGE 01 PEKING 01556 160252Z
63
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
089059
0 160241Z AUG 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4249
G 0 N a D E N I A t PEKING 1556
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OREP (PERCY, CHARLES H)
SUBJECT: SENATOR PERCY'S VIEWS ON THE SUMMIT AGENDA
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS ALSO TO SCOTT COHEN OR NADINE JACOBSEN
IN SENATOR PERCY'S OFFICE
EXPIR
REF: PEKING 1540
1. SENATOR PERCY, IN THE COURSE OF DICTATING HIS RECOLLECTION
ON HIS AUGUST 6 LUNCHEON CONVERSATION WITH VICE PREMIER TENG
HSIAO-PING, ALSO RECORDED THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL VIEWS ABOUT THE
AGENDA FOR PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO CHINA. IN THE TRANSCRIPT THIS
NOTE FOLLOWS TENGIS STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE AGENDA WILL
BE UP TO THE PRESIDENT (REFTEL).
2. BEGIN TEXT. I GAINED THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE CHINESE FEEL
THERE IS (UNDERLINE IS) A SUBSTANTIVE AGENDA THAT CAN BE MADE UP.
THEY'RE GOING TO BE EXTREMELY DESIROUS OF QUESTIONING THE PRESIDENT
ABOUT THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, ABOUT NATO FORCE LEVELS IN
EUROPE, PARTICULARLY UNITED STATES FORCES THERE. THEY'RE GOING
EXETS
TO BE CONCERNED AND WILL ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT GREECE, TURKEY AND
PORTUGAL. THEY FEEL THAT THE SUBJECT OF FORMOSA, WHICH MAY OR
MAY NOT COME UP, CERTAINLY SHOULD BE NO BARRIER WHATSOEVER TO THE
SUCCESS OF THIS CON-
FERENCE. THEY FEEL, AS A MATTER OF FACT, THAT
EVEN IF THE CONFERENCE IS NOT SUBSTANTIVE AND IF IT DOES NOT DEAL
WITH PRESSING ISSUES AND IF NO COMMUNIQUE IS EVEN ISSUED THAT WILL
&
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE HR5/14/01 AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM DS-1652
or and
Department of State
AMERICA ORLING
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 PEKING 01556 160252Z
SHOW CONCRETE PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN SOLVED, THE VERY FACT THAT THE
CONFERENCE IS HELD AT ALL WILL BF OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE
TO THE. OBVIOUSLY WHO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE WILL BE
MEETING WITH AND THE FORMAT AND AGENDA SHOULD BE WELL ESTAB-
LISHED IN ADVANCE. END TEXT.
BUSH
FORD & LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
DS-1652
4
DEPAR
Department of State
MEDICAL UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES 09
CONFIDENTIAL 9152
PAGE 01 PEKING 01615 01 OF 03 2209432
11
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
028234
P 220900Z AUG 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4300
e 0 N F I D E N SECTION 1 OF 3 PEKING 1615
EXDIS
S
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OREP CANDERSON, JOHN) PFOR US CH
SUBJECT: CODEL ANDERSON DISCUSSION WITH CHIAO KUAN-HUA
REF: PEKING 1616
FOLLOWING IS TEXT SUBSTANTIVE PORTION CODEL ANDERSON
(LED TEMPORARILY BY SENATOR BYRD) DISCUSSION WITH
PRC FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA ON AUGUST 21.
BYRD: YOU HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY HEARD THE STATEMENT AND MAY EVEN HAVE
SAID IT, THAT THE WORLD IS IN TURMOIL. THE UNITED STATES! ACTIONS
ARE MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE FOR PEACE. OUR ACTIONS ARE GEARED
TOWARD PREVENTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HEGEMONY AND THE DOMINATION
OF ONE COUNTRY BY ANOTHER IN THE ASIAN AREA. WHAT DO YOU UNDER-
STAND ABOUT THAT ROLE?
CHIAO: WE HAVE COMMON GROUND IN OPPOSING HEGEMONY. IT IS AN
IMPORTANT PORTION OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. OF COURSE, THE
UNITED STATES HAS RECENTLY TAKEN BENEFICIAL MEASURE IN THE LIGHT
EXEMS
OF UNITED STATES CONDITIONS. YOU CANNOT SAY THAT WE DON'T UNDER-
STAND, ON MANY QUESTIONS, WE DON'T HOLD THE SAME VIEWS. FOR
EXAMPLE, ON SOME QUESTIONS YOU MUST ADOPT A MORE POWERFUL POLICY,
BUT THIS IS ONLY OUR VIEW.
BYRD: IN WHAT RESPECT SHOULD WE HAVE A MORE POWERFUL POLICY?
WOULD YOU CARE TO BE MORE SPECIFIC?
BEARD R. FORD
LIBRARYS
CONFIDENTIAL Hn 5/14/01
100
WITHO
8
OFF
THE
EXECUTIVE
SE
CRETARY
GRETARY
;
BEATS
0-0xm
Department of State
of STATE AMERICA UNITED the
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 PEKING 01615 01 OF 03 220943Z
CHIAO: IF I AM TO BE SPECIFIC, THERE ARE MANY QUESTIONS ON WHICH
WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE UNITED STATES ACTIONS. WE KNOW WHICH
COUNTRY WANTS TO ESTABLISH HEGEMONY. ON QUESTIONS OF FOOD GRAIN,
DOES THE UNITED STATES INTEND TO HELP THAT POWER?
BYRD: MANY OF US REGRET THE 1972 DEAL, BUT THAT WAS NOT AN ACT
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, WHICH DID NOT EVEN KNOW HOW MUCH
GRAIN PRIVATE DEALERS HAD SOLD, THE DEALERS THEMSELVES DID NOT
KNOW THE TOTAL. IN OTHER WORDS, THE RIGHT HAND DID NOT KNOW WHAT
THE LEFT HAND WAS DOING AND MUCH MORE WAS SOLD THAN OUR GOVERN=
MENT WOULD HAVE APPROVED. PRICES HELD UP AND WE STILL FEEL IT.
NOW THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS MONITORING THE SALES AND
REQUIRES THE DEALERS TO REPORT THEIR CONTRACTS. SECRETARY BUTZ
HAS PLACED A LID ON CONTRACTS UNTIL WE CAN SEE WHAT OUR CROPS ARE2
DON'T THING WE WILL FALL INTO THIS BOX AGAIN WITH OUR EYES OPEN,
CHIAO AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL, THIS NOT ONLY INVOLVES THE PEOPLE
OF THE UNITED STATES, BUT ALSO AFFECTS THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL
MARKET. MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES HAVE SUFFERED GREAT LOSSES.
FROM THE RISING PRICE. I WOULD APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED OF YOUR
VIEWS.
BYRD: FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES,
THE UNITED STATES MUST FIRST TAKE CARE OF THE AMERICAN MARKET
THEN SELL TO ITS OLD CUSTOMERS, AND IF ANY IF LEFT WE WILL SELL IT
TO THE USSR,
A MOMENT AGO YOU SAID THAT YOU UNDERSTOOD THE NECESSITY FOR
FORCEFUL us ACTION TO PREVENT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET HEGEMONY
IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD SUCH AS OUR ACTION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
TO ESTABLISH A BASE IN DIEGO GARCIA TO KEEP THE USSR FROM MOVING
IN. IS THIS CORRECT.
CHAIO: THIS HAS A BEARING ON ALL THESE QUESTIONS. OF COURSE,
I'M RELUCTANT TO CRITICIZE YOU AT THE OUTSET OF OUR TALKS,
BYRD. I DON'T THINK YOU HAVE BEEN SPECEFIC ABOUT WHAT MORE
POWERFUL ACT BY THE UNITED STATES YOU MEANT, WOULD YOU ENLIGHTEN
THE DELEGATION?
R.
BERALD
FORD
LIBRARA
CONFIDENTIAL
NOO WITH COUT THE AUTHHORRIZAATCON OFF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
THANTMENT
or
GPATS
EXC
Department of State
I UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
of
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 PEKING 01615 01 OF 03 2209432
CHIAO: LET US GO TO ANOTHER SUBJECT. THIS HAS BEEN TAKEN UP HERE
WITH MR. BUSH. I HAVE EXPLAINED DIEGO GARCIA TO OUR AMERICAN
FRIENDS AS WELL AS THE QUESTION OF EUROPE, ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS,
I PRESUME THAT YOU KNOW WE HAVE ALREADY STATED OUR VIEWS.
BYRD: WE KNOW THAT YOU DO NOT APPROVE FOREIGN BASES, BUT IN
PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES YOU WOULD NOT DISAPPROVE THE US BASE IN
DIEGO GARCIA.
CHIAO: THIS IS VERY SPECIFIC, WE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH
SENATOR JACKSON AG GREAT LENGTH. I WILL REPEAT AGAIN WHAT I SAID,
FIRST, WE DON'T APPROVE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY BASES ON THE
SOIL OF ANY COUNTRY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE REALISTIC AND MUST
TAKE A REALISTIC VIEW IN THIS CASE. IN THE LAST TEN YEARS THE
SOVIET EXPANSION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN HAS FAR SURPASSED THE UNITED
STATES THERE. IT HAS ESTABLISHED DISGUISED BASES AND DOES IT
QUIETLY, WHEREAS THE UNITED STATES MUST DO EVERYTHING IN PUBLIC.
IN MY VIEW, THE UNITED STATES HAS LAGGED BEHIND THE USSR IN THE
LAST TEN YEARS. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE USSR MAIN-
TAINS A LARGE NUMBER OF COVERT BASES IN THE IINDIAN OCEAN, IT WOULD
NOT BE FAIR TO EXCLUDE THE UNITED STATES. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS
E ШКОШ
&
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
NNCOTTIRO BBEE REPRODUCED WITHHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
of
EXC
STATE
Department of State
/ AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
of
CONFIDENTIAL 9249
PAGE 01 PEKING 01615 02 OF 03 221030Z
12
ACTION SS=25
Ш
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
028642
P 220900Z AUG 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4301
C 0 N F I D E N T I L SECTION 2 OF 3 PEKING 1615
EXDIS
S
VIEW WITH YOU AND WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD, IF
MILITARY BASES ARE TO BE DISMANTLED, IT SHOULD BE ALL BASES,
IT IS UNFAIR FOR ONE SIDE TO DISMANTLE AND NOT THE OTHER,
PEARSON: I WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO YOUR STATEMENT ON THE WHEAT
QUESTION, YOU MAY KNOW ALREADY THAT I COME FROM KANSAS, A LARGE
PRODUCER OF WHEAT. THE UNITED STATES GENIOUS IS IN AGRICULTURE
AND OUR CAPACITY TO PRODUCE LIVESTOCK. GRAIN HAS DONE A GREAT
DEAL TO FEED THE HUNGRY PEOPLES OF THE WORLD. WE HAVE GREAT
RESPECT FOR YOUR TRADE POLICY AND FOR YOUR EMPHASIS ON SELF-
SUFFICIENCY, WE, HOWEVER, RELY ON TRADE. OUR POLICY IS OUTGOING
AND WE NEED TRADE TO MAINTAIN OUR CAPACITY TO PRODUCE GRAIN, WE
EXPORT NOT FOR DOLLARS ALONE, BUT TO FEED HUNGRY PEOPLE. NO NATION
HAS DONE MORE TO FEED THE HUNGRY PEOPLE OF THE WORLD. WE WANT TO
DO MORE IN CREATING A STOCK FOR A WORLD FOOD RESERVE, WHICH WE HOPE
YOU WILL SUPPORT. BOTH YOU AND WE HAVE POINTS OF DISPUTE WITH
INDIA, BUT WE THINK MORE OF THE HUNGRY PEOPLE OF INDIA THAN OF
ITS GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES. WE WERE PROUD TO SELL GRAIN TO THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 1973 AND 1974, WE HOPE WE CAN SELL
MORE AND FEED FOR STOCK, AND AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY, NOT ONLY FOR
THE COMMERCE, BUT TO FORM A GOOD WORKING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, I AM AFRAID I HAVE MADE A SPEECH.
CHIAO: YOU'RE TOO POLITE.
NUNN: MR. FOREIGN MINISTER, WE ARE ALL CONCERNED WITH THE SITUATION
IN KOREA. A GREAT MAJORITY IN BOTH THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES SUPPORTS THE POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO UPHOLD
OUR COMMITMENT TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. WHAT CHANCE OF PROGRESS
TOWARD PEACE IS THERE? WHAT CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE CAN THE UNITED
R.
STATES PLAY IN SEEKING PEACE AND STABILITY?
GERAL
FORD
AUTHORIZATION
OF
THE
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
on
STATE
Department of State
of STATE AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 PEKING 01615 02 OF 03 2210302
BYRD: AND MIGHT I ADD, WHAT CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE CAN YOUR COUNTRY
PLAY IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND STABILITY?
CHIAO: SINCE YOU ASK ME, IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT IF I WERE NOT
CANDID. IN OUR VIEW, IN ORDER TO PROMOTE PEACE IT IS NECESSARY.
THAT THE UN COMMAND BE DISSOLVED AND ALL FOREIGN TROOPS WITHDRAWN
TO GIVE THE KOREAN PEOPLE A CHANCE TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES.
WHAT IS THE ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES? IF THE UNITED STATES WOULD
ACT AS I SUGGESTED, IT WOULD BE A GREAT MOVE FOR PEACE AND
STABILITY. CHINA WAS DIFFERENT. IN 1958 THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S
VOLUNTEERS WITHDREW AND NORTH KOREA HAS ONLY ITS OWN TROOPS.
CHINA HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED A PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND
THIS IS THE ROLE WE SHOULD PLAY.
S
NUNN: I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF THE USSR IN
SOUTH EAST ASIA SINCE THE UNITED STATES IS NO LONGER THERE,
YOU KNOW MORE THATN WE DO ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON IN INDOCHINA,
PARTICULARLY CAMBODIA. WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THE SOVIET PRESENCE
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA? WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AMONG VIETNAM,
CAMBODIA, BURMA, THAILAND AND MALAYSIA? WHAT ARE THE CHANCES FOR
PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE FUTURE?
CHIAOI I AGREE ON THIS POINT. OUR NORTHERN FRIENDS ARE TRYING
BY HOOK OR CROOK TO INSERT THEMSELVES IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD
WHEN THE US LEAVES, WHETHER THEY WILL SUCCEED OR NOT IS ANOTHER
QUESTION, HOWEVER. WE DON'T QUITE BELIEVE IN THE VACUUM THEORY,
WHICH IS A WORD IN YOUR POLITICAL LANGUAGE. THAT IS THAT WHEN
ONE BIG POWER WITHDRAWS ANOTHER BIG POWER MUST FILL THE VACUUM.
WHAT ABOUT THE PEOPLE OF THE REGION? AS YOU SAID, SOUTHEAST
S
ASIA AND THE INDOCHINESE PEOPLE AS WE KNOW THEM ARE BRAVE PEOPLE
WITH VERY HIGH SELF-RESPECT. NOW THAT THE INDOCHINA WAR, IN WHICH
THE US INVOLVED ITSELF, HAS ENDED, WE HOPE YOU WILL IMPROVE RELA-
TIONS WITH THESE COUNTRIES. IT WOULD BE A BENEFICIAL THING TO DO.
IT IS A PITY THAT YOU HAVE NOT MADE A DECISION. NORTH VIETNAM
AND SOUTH VIETNAM HAVE APPLIED FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE UNITED STATES HAS VETOED IT, WHAT IS THE REASON? I DON'T
SEE ANY REASON AT ALL. THIS ACT CAN ONLY MAINTAIN THE HOSTILITY
OF THE INDOCHINESE.
BYRD: MR. MINISTER, YOU INDICATED THAT THE USSR WILL TRY BY HOOK
OR BY CROOK TO MOVE INTO AN AREA. WHAT ABOUT THAILAND, IF NORTH
VIETNAM WITH THE HELP OF THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD ATTEMPT TO TAKE
OVER THE AREA?
CHIAO: I DON'T QUITE BELIEVE THAT. RECENTLY WE HAVE HAD USEFUL
CONTACTS WITH OUR THAI FRIENDS. POLITICAL LOGIS IS NOT so SIMPLE
R.
MNOTT TRO BBEE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SEALO
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
or
DETA
STATE
Department of State
STATE LINE AMERICA
TELEGRAM
of
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 PEKING 01615 02 OF 03 2210302
AS SAYING THE US IS OUT AND, THEREFORE, THE USSR IS IN, THE
PEOPLE THERE WILL FILL THE VACUUM.
DERWINSKI: A MAJOR PROBLEM OF THE LAST 30 YEARS HAS BEEN THE
SOVIET CONTROL OVER THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. WILL THE
RECENT HELSINKI CONFERENCE HELP THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
OR WAS THE CONFERENCE A DIPLOMATIC VICTORY FOR THE USSR?
CHIAO: OUR VIEWS ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE ARE KNOWN
TO ALL OUR FRIENDS. NOW THIS HAS COME TO A CULMINATION IN HELSINKI.
YOUR PRESIDENT AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE SAID THAT THE UNITED
STATES MADE NO FUNDAMENTAL COMMITMENTS. OUR VIEW IS MORE THOROUGH.
WE SAY THAT THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IS A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER AND
NOT WORTH PAYING ATTENTION TO. IT HAS MADE NO CHANGE IN THE
STATUS QUO IN EUROPE. IF PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT IT MEANS 2 NEW ERA
OF DETENTE AND THEY BELIEVE SOVIET PROPAGANDA, THEN IT WAS A
GREAT DEFEAT.
DERWINSKI: WHAT IF MARSHAL TITO SHOULD LEAVE THE SCENE? WHAT
IS YOUR VIEW OF WHAT MIGHT BE SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA
IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES?
CHIAOI I CAN ONLY GIVE YOU OUR ASSESSMENT ACCORDING TO OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET
UNION, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WILL USE ALL KINDS OF PRESSURE TO CONTROL
YUGOSLAVIA. BUT IT WILL NOT BE EASY GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE
YUGOSLAV PEOPLE AND OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES
IN PARTICULAR, IF THE USSR EXERCISES DIRECT CONTROL IT IS ONE
THING; IF THE CONTROL IS INDIRECT IT IS ANOTHER.
SLACK: WHAT SHOULD BE THE GENERAL STANCE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, AND PARTICULARLY
IN ASIA?
CHIAO: THIS QUESTION WAS ANSWERED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AND
WE HAVE COMMON GROUND ON THIS POINT. THAT IS, WE OPPOSE ANY
EFFORT TO ESTABLISH HEGEMONY IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGION.
THE US HAS RELATIONS WITH MANY ASIAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY WITH
JAPAN, WE HOPE THESE GOOD RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE AND IT IS
IMPORTANT THAT IT BE AN EQUAL PARTNERSHIP.
PEARSON: YOU TALK ABOUT COMMON GROUND, WE SHARE ONE ENVIRONMENT
AND THE NECESSITY THAT THERE SHALL NEVER BE ANOTHER NUCLEAR WAR IN
THIS WORLD. MAYBE WE, AS THE ONLY COUNTRY WHICH HAS EVER DROPPED
A NUCLEAR WEAPON, ARE TOO SENSITIVE. WHILE WE APPLAUD YOUR
TECHNICAL EFFORTS IN DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR WEAPON, WE WORRY ABOUT
THE CONSEQUENCES, I WOULD ASK WHEN DO YOU SEE A TIME WHEN YOU
MIGHT ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT AND ASSOCIATE YOURSELVES WITH THE
R,
GERAL
FORD
THE
LIBRARY
or
STATE
Department of State
of / UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 PEKING 01615 02 OF 03 2210302
VIEWS OF MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, TO WHOM YOU HAVE OFFERED
LEADERSHIP? DO YOU THINK THE ENVIRONMENT AND WORLD SAFETY WOULD
LEAD YOU TO JOIN IN THE PERMANENT NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY?
CHIAO: WE WILL NEVER ENTER INTO THE TREATY AND I WILL TELL YOU OUR
REASON. I'M ONLY STATING HISTORICAL FACT ABOUT THE POSITION THAT
THE UNITED STATES TOOK IN 1963, THE USSR WAS MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE
TO BIND CHINA HAND AND FOOT TO MAKE IT EASIER TO BULLY CHINA, IT
IS NOT FAIR EVEN IN LOGIC, WHY SHOULD THE THREE POWERS WHICH HAD
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE us, THE USSR OR THE UK, BE ALLOWED TO DEVELOP
MORE AND OTHERS NOT TO, IT IS UNFAIR TO THE OTHERS LIKE CHINA.
WE VERY MUCH HOPE THAT SOME DAY THERE WILL BE NO NEED FOR NUCLEAR
TESTS, BUT HIS WILL ONLY COME WHEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
MAKE AN AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENT AN AGREEMENT FOR THE COMPLETE,
THOROUGH DESTRUCTION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I HOPE YOU UNDER-
STAND OUR POSITION. AS FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, CHINA
WILL NOT PROLIFERATE. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE
MOUNTAINS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT WANT TO FORBID THEM TO OTHERS.
IT IS UNFAIR TO DO THAT. IN RECENT DAYS INDIA HAS DEVELOPED A
NUCLEAR WEAPON BUT WE DON'T TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. WHEN IT WAS
DEVELOPED WE DIDN'T UTTER A WORD, BUT WE STRONGLY OPPOSE THE USE
OF A "NUCLEAR DETONATING FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSE" TO BLACKMAIL WEAK
S
R.
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
N8T 8 BE REPROBUCEB WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OFF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF
STATE
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
WT
CONFIDENTIAL 6587
PAGE 01 PEKING 01643 261157Z
46
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
078396
0 261110Z AUG 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4325
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG IMMEDIATE
EXPIS EXETS EXPIN
C 0 N D N T I PEKING 1643
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR OEXC CH US
SUBJECT: US-PRC EXCHANGES
REF: A. STATE 200904 (NOTAL) B. PEKING 1642
1. TWO EVENTS, FIRST THE CHINESE TURNDOWN OF A VISA FOR CONGEN HONG
KONG OFFICER BOCK TO ACCOMPANY THE SOLID STATE PHYSICS DELEGATION
SPONSORED BY THE CSC, AND NOW THE CHINESE MOVE REPORTED
IN REF A TO EXCLUDE THE MAYOR OF SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO FROM THE US
MAYORS DELEGATION SPONSORED BY THE NCUSCR, APPEAR TO US TO OFFER
A MOST TIMELY OPPORTUNITY FOR A SHOW OF SOLIDARITY IN RESISTING
CHINESE INTERFERENCE IN OUR -- - THE DEPARTMENT'S AND THE US PRIVATE
COMMITTEES' INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE FACILITAT=
ED EXCHANGE PROGRAM. THE OPPORTUNITY WILL BE PARTICULARLY TIMELY
IF, AS WE EXPECT, THE CHINESE PROVE UNRESPONSIVE TO USLO'S DEMARCHE,
NOW SCHEDULED FOR THURSDAY, CONCERNING THE USG'S TRAVEL PROBLEMS
WITH THE PRC.
2. BEFORE THE RECEIPT OF REF A, WE HAD UNDER CONSDERATION URGING
THE DEPARTMENT TO TRY ITS BEST TO PERSUADE THE CSC TO POSTPONE THE
VISIT OF THE SOLID STATE PHYSICS DELEGATION IF THE CHINESE MAINTAIN
THEIR REFUSAL OF A VISA FOR BOCK. WE REALIZED THE FEASIBILITY
MIGHT BE SLIGHT, JUST AS WE REALIZE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE US PRI-
VATE COMMITTEES, IN TOTAL CONTRAST TO THEIR PRC COUNTERPARTS,
HAS AT TIMES BEEN A MAJOR SOFT SPOT IN THE AMERICAN SIDE'S ABILITY
TO CONDUCT THE FACILITATED EXCHANGES WITH THE CHINESE UTEANY#REAL
BERALD R. FORD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUN IDENTUAU ORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
HR5/14/01
LIBRARK
OF
STATE
Department of State
OF STATE AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 PEKING 01643 261157Z
BASIS OF EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT. BUT, WE WERE GOING TO ARGUE,
AND WE DO NOW, THAT IT IS IN NEITHER THE SHORT NOR THE LONG TERM
INTEREST OF THE US, AS WE TRY TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS OF INSTIT-
UTIONALIZING THE US-PRC RELATIONSHIP, TO GIVE CHINESE OFFICIALS
AT ALL LEVELS THE IMPRESSION THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE'S INTERNAL
CONTRADICITIONS MAKE IT SAFE TO TAKE LIGHTLY USG DEMARCHES SUCH AS
THE SYSTEMATIC ONE NOW IN THE OFFING.
4. WHATEVER THE CSC'S ATTITUDE MAY HAVE BEEN BEFORE TOWARD THE
EVENTUALITY OF A CONTINUED CHINESE TURNFOMFWBF BOCKZF#WE WOULD HOPE
THE CHINESE STANCE ON THE PUERTO RICAN MAYOR, ALBEIT AFFECTING ITS
SISTER COMMITTEE, WOULD LEAVE THE CSC IN NO DOUBT THAT THIS IS THE
TIME IF EVER THERE WAS ONE FOR THE THREE OF US--THE TWO COMMITTEES
AND THE USG--TO STAND TOGETHER.
5. THOUGH WE DO NOT THINK THE PRC'S ACTION TOWARD THE MAYORS
GROUP WILL COME UP IN THE THURSDAY MEETING WITH LIN PING, WE
WILL WANT TO BE PREPARED WITH TALKING POINTS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE
HAVING THESE, AS WELL AS ANY OTHER REVISED GUIDANCE FOR THIS MEET-
ING, BY COB AUGUST 27 OUR TIME. BUSH
NOTE BY OC/T: # AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW
EXPIR
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITH CONF IDEAUT ORIZATION = THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
6
OF
STATE
WH
Department of State
of / AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONF IDENTIAL 9039
EXPIS EXPIR
PAGE 01 PEKING 01773 170729Z
21
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 SSO-00 1026 W
000415
R 170547Z SEP 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4427
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
€ A ₦ F 1 D E N T I A PEKING 1773
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PINT CH
SUBJECT: CHOU EN-LAI'S HEALTH
1. ACCORDING TO ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR GAVRILESCU--
REPORTED TO US BY HIS DCM DOROBANTU- PREMIER CHOU
EN-LAI'S HEALTH HAS DETERIORATED QUITE NOTICEABLY OVER
THE SUMMER. GAVRILESCU, WHO HAS PROBABLY SEEN MORE OF
CHOU THAN ANY OTHER AMBASSADOR IN PEKING, NOTED THE
DECLINE IN CHOUIS APPEARANCE FROM THE TIME HE SAW HIM
IN MAY TO HIS RECENT MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 7, DOROBANTU
RELATED THE STORY TO us IN A GRAVE TONE AND ILLUSTRATED
EXTENT OF CHOU'S DECLINE BY MOVING HIS HAND FROM A
RELATIVELY HIGH TO A VERY LOW POSITION.
2. COMMENT: WE DOUBT ROMANIANS WOULD EXAGGERATE
DECLINE IN CHOU'S HEALTH. GAVRILESCU'S IMPRESSION
TENDS TO CONFIRM THAT CHOU IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY
FEEBLE.
THAYER
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
State Dept Review
FORD is LIBRARY 07V839
TD 9/27/02
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR , NARA, DATE 2/5/03
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHO HOTHE DEWTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
7
/
OF
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONF IDENTIAL 9802
PAGE 01 PEKING 01800 220315Z
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EXE
060112
0 R 220300Z SEP 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4449
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
€ 0 N F T D E N T I PEKING 1800
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CH
SUBJECT: TENG HSIAO-PING ON SECRETARY'S VISIT
1. UK EMBASSY HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO BRIEF US
FULLY ON FORMER PM HEATH'S MEETINGS WITH MAO AND
TENG.
2. HOWEVER, UK EMBASSY DCM FENN, WHO WAS PRESENT
AT MEETING WITH VICE PREMIER, HAS CONFIRMED BY PHONE
PRESS REPORTS THAT TENG DID TELL HEATH THAT SECRETARY
DEFINITELY COMING IN OCTOBER. FENN STATES THAT TENG,
DESPITE CONFUSION AMONG PRESS, DID NOT/NOT SAY WHEN
IN OCTOBER.
3. DCM ALSO TELLS US TENG SAID CHOU WAS TOO ILL TO
SEE HEATH.
4. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE FOR REPLY TO PRESS
INQUIRIES HERE ABOUT SECRETARY'S VISIT. THAYER
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
State Dept Review
FORD is LIBRARY 070879
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TO 9/27/02
BY
HR, NARA, DATE 2/5/03
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
AH
8
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONFIDENTIAL 0132
PAGE 01 PEKING 01808 221008Z
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ACTION SS=25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 1026 w
062780
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FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4456
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
c N I D E N T I PEKING 1808
EXDIS
E.O. 116521 XGDS-1
TAGS: PINR PGOV CH
SUBJECT: HEATH SEPT 21 MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN
REF: PEKING 1800
1. BRITISH EMBASSY DCM FENN, WHILE NOT AT LIBERTY TO
EXEM EXPIN
DIVULGE CONTENT OF ONE-HOUR HEATH-MAO DISCUSSION, HAS
PASSED US HEATH AND AMBASSADOR YOUDE'S IMPRESSION
OF MAD'S HEALTH.
2. THEY FOUND MAO FRAIL AND HIS SPEECH IMPEDED BUT
"VERY MUCH ON THE BALL." FENN SAID, AND "EXTREMELY
LUCID". FENN SAID IT WOULD BE WHOLLY WRONG, AT LEAST
ON BASIS OF THAT HOUR'S MEETING, TO CALL MAO SENILE,
THAYER
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12058, SEC. 3.5
State Dept Review
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD9/27/02
BY
HR NARA, DATE 2/5/03
FORD is LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHUENORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
9
OF
STATE
WH
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONFIDENTIAL 8703
PAGE 01 PEKING 01819 01 OF 02 250621Z
21/62
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 1026 W
113620
R 2404382 SEP 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4466
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
ONFIDENTIA SECTION 1 OF 2 PEKING 1819
EXDIS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
CORRECTEDCOPY (TEXT)
MR # 10-042
state dept lts 5/6/10
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
EXE
By dal NARA, Date 6/24/10
TAGS: PFOR CH UK
SUBJECT: TENG-HEATH CONVERSATION SEPT 20
REF: PEKING 1813 (NOTAL), 1808 (NOTAL): STATE 226534
SUMMARY: IN NEARLY THREE-HOUR MEETING SEPT 20 WITH
FORMER BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HEATH, VICE PREMIER TENG LAID
HEAVY STRESS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND SOVIET THREAT. TENG
TOLD HEATH HE WOULD PROBE US ATTITUDE ON THIS DURING
DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT IN OCTOBER. TENG DISPLAYED
SATISFACTION WITH SINO-US RELATIONS, FINDING THEM
"NORMAL, CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES, " REITERATED
THREE CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION AND, WHILE RESERVING
ON ULTIMATE MEANS OF LIBERATION OF TAIWAN, INDICATED
CHINESE WOULD BE PATIENT. TENG DISCOUNTED POSSIBILITY
OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WITH TAIWAN. TENG DID NOT
ARGUE WITH HEATH'S ASSUMPTION THAT PRC IS MORE
CONCERNED NOW THAN LAST YEAR OVER SOVIET INFLUENCE
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. HE SHOWED CONFIDENCE IN LONG-
TERM OUTCOME IN SEA, BUT DESCRIBED CONTINUING SOVIET
AIM AS BEING TO COUNTER US POWER IN WESTERN PACIFIC/
GERALD
BRARY
INDIAN OCEAN AREA. TENG REITERATED AVERSION TO FOREIGN
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONE IDEN
FORM
DS-1652
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
EXES
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 PEKING 01819 01 OF 02 2506212
DEBT, CONFIRMED INTENTION DEVELOP OIL EXPORTS AND SAID
MOVEMENT TO CONCLUDE SINO-JAPANESE PEACE TREATY
DEPENDS ON JAPANESE. TENG DID NOT DISCUSS PRC INTERNAL
POLITICAL MATTERS BUT HE STRESSED MECHANIZATION OF
AGRICULTURE AS PRIORITY TARGET, SAID PRC WOULD NOT BE
BUYING GRAIN. END SUMMARY
1. UK EMBASSY DCM FENN HAS SUMMARIZED FOR US CONTENT
OF FORMER UK PRIME MINISTER HEATHIS NEARLY THREE-HOUR
MEETING SEPTEMBER 20 WITH VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING.
IN DOING SO, HE ASKED US TO PROTECT SOURCE CAREFULLY,
EMPHASIZING HIS EMBASSY'S DELICATE POSITION IN HANDLING
HEATHIS "PRIVATE" MEETING, NOTWITHSTANDING HEATH'S
SUBSEQUENT COMMENTS TO PRESS.
2. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND US COMMITMENT. (A) TENG,
NOT SURPRISINGLY IN LIGHT OF HEATH'S OWN PREDELICTIONS,
LAID HEAVY STRESS ON CHINESE CONCERN WITH EUROPEAN
SECURITY AND US CONSTANCY. HEATH OPENED SUBSTANTIVE
EXCHANGE BY WELCOMING CHINESE APPOINTMENT OF EC
ENVOY. HE REFERRED TO HELSINKI AGREEMENT AS ONE-
SIDED. THIS SPURRED TENG TO STRONG DENUNCIATION OF
CSCE, CHARACTERIZING IT AS COVERING SOVIET EXPAN-
SIONIST AIMS, ETC., BUT TENG NOTED APPROVINGLY THAT
OTHERS ALSO (INCLUDING HEATH) WERE MAKING "COOL-
HEADED" JUDGMENTS ON HELSINKI. IN THIS CONTEXT,
TENG TOLD HEATH HE INTENDED TO ASK DR. KISSINGER,
WHO WOULD BE VISITING CHINA IN OCTOBER, THE "TRUE
ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES" TOWARD EUROPEAN
SECURITY AND THE SOVIETS.
(B) TENG THEN VOLUNTEERED TO HEATH THAT PRC
ATTACHES MORE IMPORTNACE TO US ATTITUDE TOWARD
EUROPE (IMPLYING, BUT NOT STATING OUTRIGHT, MORE
IMPORTANT THAN US ATTITUDE TOWARD OTHER AREAS
(INCLUDING CHINA)). HEATH ASSURED TENG THAT US
ANXIOUS FOR A STRONG EUROPE BUT FOUND IT DISCON-
CERTING NOW THAT EC-9 WERE SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE.
IT IS TAKING USG A LITTLE TIME, HEATH SAID, TO GET
R.FORD LIBIRTY
USED TO THIS PHENOMENON. TENG COMMENTED THAT MOST
AMERICANS, HE FELT, KNOW "IN THEIR HEARTS" THE
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DS-1652
OF
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 PEKING 01819 01 OF 02 250621Z
TRUTH ABOUT SOVIET UNION. THE US DEFEAT IN INDO-CHINA,
TENG TOLD HEATH, COULD BE GOOD FOR THE UNITED STATES
IF THE US DRAWS CORRECT CONCLUSION THAT IT COULD NOT
BE EVERYWHERE AT ONCE, THAT THIS IS BEYOND US POWER,
TENG SAID US SHOULD FOCUS ENERGIES ON EUROPE AND FOR
THIS A RELATIONSHIP OF REAL EQUALITY (PRESUMABLY
BETWEEN EUROPE AND US) IS ESSENTIAL.
3. SINO-US RELATIONS.
(A) RELATIONS "NORMAL". TENG WENT ON TO SAY,
STIMULATED BY HEATH, THAT SINO-US RELATIONS ARE NOW
"NORMAL, CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES. TENG EX-
PLAINED THAT GIVEN CERTAIN FACTORS, MAINLY TAIWAN,
RELATIONS WITH THE US ARE AS MUST BE EXPECTED. BOTH
SIDES, TENG SAID, ARE WORKING TO MAKE THE SHANGHAI
COMMUNIQUE EFFECTIVE AND TO SEEK THE DEVELOPMENT OF
RELATIONS IN THAT SPIRIT: BUT THE PRCESS WOULD TAKE
TIME. HEATH ASKED IF TENG EXPECTED PROGRESS DURING
DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT. TENG REPLIED: "YOU WON'T BE
SURPRISED TO HEAR THAT THIS DEPENDS ON THE UNITED
STATES.
(B) TAIWANS IN RETURNING TO SINO-US RELATIONS
AT LATER STAGE IN CONVERSATION, TENG REITERATED FOR
HEATH THREE CHINESE CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION
CTREATY, TROOPS, RELATIONS). IN RESPONSE TO HEATH'S
QUESTION, TENG DISCOUNTED SOVIET THREAT RELATING TO
TATWAN, NOTING THAT, AFTER ALL, PEOPLE IN TAIWAN ARE
CHINESE. AS TO WEHTHER OR NOT REUNIFICATION WOULD
BE BY PEACEFUL MEANS, TENG REPLIED THAT ANY SETTLEMENT
WAS ENTIRELY A DOMESTIC MATTER AND THE METHOD THUS
ONLY AN INTERNAL AFFAIR. TENG SAID HE HOPED THAT
RESOLUTION "COULD BE PEACEFUL" AND THAT "CHINA WOULD
WORK HARD FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OVER A RELATIVELY
LONG PERIOD." PATIENCE, TENG CONCLUDED, IS A CHINESE
CHARACTERISTIC.
4, PROSPECTS FOR WAR AND PEACE. TENG TOLD HEATH
FLATLY THAT "WAR IS INEVITABLE" (BUT, HE REMARKED
R.FORD LIBRANA
LATER, WORLD WAR WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE NUCLEAR).
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT NAAHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
OF
UNITED
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONF IDENTIAL
PAGE 04 PEKING 01819 01 OF 02 250621Z
HE JUSTIFIED THIS STATEMENT BY CITING WEAPONS BUILD UP,
STATING THAT EXPANSION OF SOVIET ARMS BESPEAKS SOVIET
INTENTIONS. HE ADDED THAT "RESPONSIBLITY (FOR WAR
OR PEACE) LIES ON THE SUPERPOWERS." HEATH AGREED WITH
MUCH OF THIS, NOTING THAT SOVIET OBJECTIVES REMAIN
UNCHANGED, ALTHOUGH USSR NOW EMPLOYING PRINCIPALLY
POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY MEANS. WAR DANGER
LIES MAINLY IN MISCALCULATION RATHER THAN BY DESIGN,
HEATH TOLD TENG, ADDING AS EXAMPLE THAT POST-TITO
SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA CONTAINS SUCH RISKS.
(COMMENT: TENG INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH THIS POINT,
WE UNDERSTAND, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE, CONTRARY TO
SOME LOCAL CORRESPONDENTS1 INFERENCE THAT YUGOSLAVIA
WAS DISCUSSED IN ANY DETAIL.)
LERAT GERALD R.FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE
VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
FORM
DS-1652
/ or STATE
10
Department of State
of STATE UNITED MAKE AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 2311
PAGE 01 PEKING 01900 090028Z
64
ACTION EA-06
INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00
EUR-08 PRS-01 1040
IN
040366
R 980920Z OCT 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4527
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
e 0 N F on D E N T I A PEKING 1900
LIMDIS
E.O. DECLASSIFIED State Dept
12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES Review TD 9/27/02
E.O. 116521HSGDS TAGS PINT CH
BY
HR I NARA, DATE 2/5/03
SUBJECT: CHOU EN-LAI'S HEALTH
REF: HONG KONG 11917 (NOTAL)
1. SOVIET AMBASSADOR TITSTIKOV TOLD ME OCTOBER 6 THAT
CHOU EN-LAI WAS OPERATED ON SOMETIME BETWEEN SEPT 20
AND SEPT 23. TOLSTIKOV APPEARED TOTALLY CONFIDENT OF
HIS INFORMATION BUT HE COULD NOT, OR WOULD NOT, ADD
ANYTHING ABOUT THE NATURE OR OUTCOME OF THE OPERATION.
2. YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTRY NUMBER TWO LAZAR MOSJOV.-
VISITING THE PRC AS PART OF BIJEDIC'S ENTOURAGE--TOLD ME
THE NEXT DAY THAT HE BELIEVED CHOU HAD HAD A VERY SERIOUS
OPERATION AND THAT HIS CONDITION WAS FATAL. WHEN I
PRESSED HIM ON THIS, HE ADMITTED THAT THE CHINESE HAD
NO" TOLD HIM THIS ALTHOUGH THEY HAD SAID CHOU WAS IN THE
HOSPITAL AND REQUIRED SERIOUS MEDICAL ATTENTION.
3. LOCAL PRESS SOURCES TELL US JAPANESE CORRESPON-
DENT'S STORY (PERHAPS THE SOURCE OF THE BELGRADE
REPORT CITED REFTEL) THAT BIJEDIC HAD MET WITH CHOU
FORD is LIBRARY 077979
CONFIDENTIAL
to
OF etate
Department of State
UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONF IDEN TIAL
PAGE 02 PEKING 01900 0900287
WAS ERRONEOUS. AS OF MID=AFTERNOON $ OF OCTOBER 8,
BIJEDIC HAD NOT SEEN EITHER CHOU OR MAO ALTHOUGH THE
YUGOSLAVS ARE CONFIDENT THAT A MEETING WITH MAO
WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE BIJEDIC LEAVES CHINA.
BUSH
FORD is LIBRARY DIVUED
CONFIDENTIAL
11
ARTMENT
or
DES
STATE
Department of State
of AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
WH
CONFIDENTIAL
1155
PAGE 01 PEKING 01165 280938Z
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ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
041918
0 280919Z JUN 76
EXPIR
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5859
DECLASSIFIED
INFO AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL HONG KONG IMMEDIATE
AUTHORITY state dept 5/4/06
BAY dal NARA, DATE 11/14/13
C 0 N I D E N T I A PEKING 1165
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS-4
TAGS: PINS, CVIS, LA, CH, US
SUBJECT: LAO DIPLOMAT A POTENTIAL DEFECTOR
PURPOSE THIS MESSAGE IS TO FLAG LIKELIHOOD THAT LAO DIPLOMAT
HERE WILL SHORTLY BE ASKING USLO FOR SOME FORM OF ASSISTANCE
IN GETTING HIMSELF AND FAMILY TO U.S.
1. IN RECENT CONTACTS WITH USLO OFFICERS, LAO EMBASSY
COJNSELOR YONG SAYSANA HAS POINTEDLY COMBINED EXPRESSIONS
OF (1) DISSATISFACTION WITH HIS SITUATION HERE AND (2) INTEREST
IN A PRIVATE AWAY-FROM-OFFICE MEETING. HE HAS ALSO REFERRED
TO HIS COLLEGE TRAINING IN THE U.S. CAT NORTHFIELD COLLEGE IN
MINNESOTA) AND HIS SERVICE IN NEW YORK AT THE LAO MISSION TO
THE UN. THOUGH HE HAS NOT SAID so OUTRIGHT, IT SEEMS
PROBABLE SAYSANA WOULD EXPECT TO USE PRIVATE MEETING TO
REQUEST THAT USG IN SOME WAY ASSIST HIM--AND HIS WIFE AND
TWO CHILDREN WHO ARE WITH HIM. HERE--IN GOING TO THE UNITED
STATES. SAYSANA ARRIVED IN PEKING IN AUGUST 1975; HE HAS NOT
MENTIONED THAT HE EXPECTS TO BE TRANSFERRED ANY TIME SOON.
2. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS AT A USLO RECEPTION JUNE 24
(CONVERSATIONS THAT WERE OBSERVED THOUGH PROBABLY NOT OVER-
HEARD BY VARIOUS WESTERN AND THIRD WORLD DIPLOMATS),
SAYSANA ASKED FOR AND OBTAINED HOME ADDRESS AND PHONE
NUMBER OF USLO POLCOUNS AND THEN, WHILE TAKING LEAVE OF
FORD a LIBRARY OERALD
GONF IDENTIAL
6
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
on
BEATH
Department of State
OF STATE AMERICA SELINO
TELEGRAM
CONF IDENTIAL
PAGE 02 PEKING 01155 280938Z
DEPUTY CHIEF, SAID HE WOULD PHONE DC NEXT WEEK ABOUT GETTING
TOGETHER. ON MORNING JUNE 28 SAYSANA, IDENTIFYING HIMSELF
ONLY AS " A FRIEND", PHONED DC AT OFFICE AND ASKED IF HE COULD
VISIT HIM AT HIS APARTMENT THAT AFTERNOON. DC, WHO IS LEAVING
POST SHORTLY ON TRANSFER, EXPLAINED DIFFICULTY OF ARRANGING A
MEETING ON EITHER THE 28TH OR 29TH AND SUGGESTED PHONING
HIMSELF OR POLCOUNS AT OFFICE ON THE 30TH. WE EXPECT SAYSANA WILL
FOLLOW UP ON THE 30TH WITH ANOTHER CALL TO DC. WE EXPECT AT THAT
TIME TO ARRANGE A DISCREET MEETING TO FIND OUT PRECISELY WHAT
SAYSANA HAS ON HIS MIND.
3. WE ARE OF COURSE FAMILIAR WITH DEPARTMENT'S JANUARY 4, 1972
EXCES EXCES
STATEMENT OF POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING REQUESTS FOR
ASYLUM AND WITH 2 FAM PROVISIONS. IF THERE IS ANY OTHER
GUIDANCE WE SHOULD HAVE BEFORE MEETING WITH SAYSANA, REQUEST
THIS BY OUR 008 JUNE 30.
GATES
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CH US
SUBJECT: VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING BETWEEN SENATOR
SCOTT AND FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA
REF: PEKING 1278
TIME: 4:00 P.M. TO 6:00 P.M., MONDAY, JULY 12, 1976
PLACE: NUMBER THREE GUEST HOUSE, PEKING
PARTICIPANTS:
1. CHINESE:
CHIAO KUAN-HUA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SHIH YEN-HUA, INTERPRETER
CHOU PEI-YUAN, VICE-PRESIDENT, CHINESE POEPLEIS INSTITUTE OF
FOREGIN AFFAIRS (CPIFA)
TANG WEN-SHENG, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, AMERICAN AND OCEANIC AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT, FOREGIN MINISTRY
MA CHIA-CHUN, DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL, CPIFA
CHAO CHI-HUA, DEPUTY DIVISION CHIEF, AMERICAN AND OCEANIC AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN MINISTRY
FAN KUO-HSIANG, DEPUTY DIVISION CHIEF, CPIFA
CHENG WAN-CHEN, STAFF, CPIFA
2 NOTETAKERS
R.
2. AMERICAN:
GERALD
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SENATOR SCOTT
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MRS. SCOTT
AMBASSADOR GATES, CHIEF, USLO
ROBERT BARNETT, DIRECTOR, ASIA SOCIETY
RICHARD QUICK, ADMINISTRATIVE ASST TO SEN. SCOTT
TERENCE SHEA, DEPT. OF STATE
CHARLES w. FREEMAN, JR., DEPT. OF STATE
DONALD KEYSER, USLO (NOTETAKER)
RECORD OF CONVERSATION:
CHIAO KUAN-HUA: IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE TO SEE YOU AGAIN. IT HAS
ALREADY BEEN FOUR YEARS SINCE OUR LAST MEETING.
SENATOR SCOTT: IT HAS BEEN TOO LONG. BUT I HAVE BEEN so BUSY.
AND WE HAVE HAD so MANY CRISES.
CHIAO: THAT IS ONE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRESENT-DAY WORLD.
SCOTT: THE LIFE OF A POLITICIAN IS ALWAYS COMPLICATED. MAY I SAY
THAT THE CHIEF OF USLO, AMBASSADOR GATES, IS A LONG-TIME PERSONAL
FRIEND OF MINE. HE IS FROM MY STATE, MY CITY, AND MY NEIGHBORHOOD
IN PHILADELPHIA. AT ONE TIME HE WAS ALSO MY CAMPAIGN MANAGER.
CHIAO: THAT IS VERY GOOD. HE MUST HAVE GIVEN YOU GOOD ADVICE.
SCOTT: I ALSO BRING GREETINGS FROM SEN. MANSFIELD. IT IS NO SECRET,
I BELIEVE, THAT HE LOOKS FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN THE AUTUMN -- IF
THE ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE WORKED OUT.
CHIAO: IS HE IN GOOD HEALTH?
SCOTT: YES, AND HTS WIFE IS ALSO WELL. WE ARE BOTH RETIRING IN
ORDER TO HAVE MORE TIME TO SEPND WITH OUR FAMILIES.
CHIAO: YOU AND SEN. MANSFIELD HAVE BEEN VETERAN SOLDIERS IN AM-
FRICAN POLITICS.
SCOTT: YES, WE HAVE SERVED FOR 1/6 OF THE LIFE OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC. FOR 34 YEARS EACH.
MANY MEMBERS OF MY PARTY HAVE NOT VISITED THE ASIAN CONTINENT
REFORE. THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL AND FRIENDLY.
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AND WE THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
CHIAO: YES, THE CHINESE AND AMERICAN PEOPLES HAVE MANY POINTS IN
COMMON. (THE INTERPRETER HAD RENDERED SEN. SCOTT'S REMARKS AS
"THE CHINESE PEOPLE ARE CHARACTERISTICALLY VERY HELPFUL AND
FRTENDLY.")
SCOTT: PRESIDENT FORD HAS ASKED ME TO EXTEND HIS PERSONAL GOOD
WISHES TO YOU. HE HAS VERY PLEASANT RECOLLECTIONS OF HIS VISIT.
CHIAO: YES, THE FIRST TIME HE CAME AS A CONGRESSMAN AND THE
SECOND TIME AS PRESIDENT. LAST YEAR HE HAD A VERY GOOD CONVERSATION
WITH CHAIRMAN MAO, PLEASE CONVEY MY GREETINGS TO HIM.
CHIAO: THERE IS AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN GOING ON NOW IN THE UNITED
STATES. WF ARE OUTSIDERS AND DO NOT UNDERSTAND EVERYTHING. WHAT
ARE THE ELECTION PROSPECTS IN YOUR VIEW?
SCOTT: I CAN ONLY EXPRESS A PERSONAL OPINION, AND WE ARE ALL
SUBJECT TO ERROR. AMONG THE REPUBLICANS, THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY
TO BE NOMINATED. IT IS NOT CERTAIN, BUT IT IS MORE LIKELY THAN
HIS OPPONENT. I'VE BEEN WRITING POSTCARDS TO DELEGATES FROM PEKING
ASKING THEM TO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT. 1130 DELEGATES ARE NEEDED
TO NOMINATE AT KANSAS CITY. MY PERSONAL EXPECTATION IS THAT THE
PRESIDENT WILL REACH 1108. REGAN WILL HAVE ABOUT 1085, POSSIBLY
1090. SUCH IS THE PHILOSOPHY OF DELEGATES THAT THERE IS A TENDENCY
WHEN ONE CANDIDATE IS WITHIN 20 VOTES FOR DELEGATES TO HURRY TO BE
WITH THE WINNER. FORD NEEDS ONE STATE, AND REGAN NEEDS TWO OR MORE
STATES TO BE THE NOMINEE. I WILL BE CHAIRMAN OF THE THIRD LARGEST
STATE DELEGATION. THERE WILL BE CERTAIN CONTROVERSIES OVER FEATURES
OF THE PLATFORM. WE DO NOT EXPECT WIDE VARIATIONS WITH REGARD TO
ASTA. AMONG THE DEMOCRATS, CARTER TO THE GREAT SURPRISE OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE HAS GOT THE NOMINATION. HE IS UNKNOWN TO THE REP-
UBLICANS AND TO THE MAJORITY OF THE DEMOCRATS -- WHO ARE NOW OBLIGED
TO SUPPORT HIM. THE TEMPERAMENT OF CARTER IS THAT OF AN EMOTIONAL
MAN, AN EVANGELIST, AND THIS HAS STRUCK A RESPONSIVE NOTE WITH A
LARGE NUMBER OF AMERICANS. IN THE POLLS CARTER IS AHEAD OF THE
PRESIDENT BY A WIDE MARGIN. BUT 3 MONTHS AGO THE PRESIDENT WAS SIM-
TLARLY AHEAD OF CARTER. CARTER HAS NO EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
HE IS TAKING ADVICE FROM BRZEZINSKI AND VANCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
GOVERNON CARTER HAS BEEN ABLE TO SECURE THE NOMINATION WITHOUT
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MAKING POSITIVE STATEMENTS. FROM NOW ON HE MUST MAKE FIRMER STATE-
MENTS AND WILL THUS BE SUBJECT TO ATTACK FROM PRESIDENT FORD AND HIS
SUPPORTERS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME. I THINK THAT
THE MARGIN IS LESS THAN THE POLLS WOULD INDICATE. BUT AS OF
TODAY THEY STILL FAVOR CARTER. BUT IT CAN CHANGE -- AND I HOPE IT
WILL. THERE WAS AN EVEN GREATER CHANGE IN REPUBLICAN SENTIMENT IN
1968. NIXON WAS AHEAD OF SEN. HUMPHREY BY 15 PCNT IN THE POLLS,
BUT IN THE ELECTION NIXON WON BY ONLY 1 PCNT. THE ELECTORATE IS
SUBJECT TO RAPID CHANGES. WE ARE HOPEFUL OF OVERCOMING THE
MOMENTARY LEAD OF CARTER.
CHIAO: THANK YOU FOR YOUR EXPLANATION OF THE SITUATION.
THIS IS YOUR INTERNAL AFFAIR.
SCOTT: AS ALWAYS, I'M VERY CANDID WITH YOU. I'M CERTAINLY HELPING
THE PRESIDENT. WE BELIEVE HIS PERSONALITY WILL GAIN ADDED
SUPPORT FOR HIM.
CHIAO: THERE IS STILL SOME TIME. THERE MAY BE SOME CHANGES.
YOUR ELECTION IS ALWAYS TROUBLESOME FOR FOREIGNERS TO OBSERVE.
THERE ISNIT MUCH INFORMATION. WHEN AMBASSADOR GATES ASKED ME,
I SAID I FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO ANSWER.
FKMB. GATES: I REMEMBER.
SCOTT: THIS WEEK I SAT NEXT TO PRINCE PHILIP AT A WHITE HOUSE
DINNER. HE ASKED ME
BO EXPLAIN TO HIM OUR ELECTORAL SYSTEM.
I
FEAR HE STILL DOES NOT UNDERSTAND.
CHIAO: FRANKLY, WE DON'T UNDERSTAND YOUR ELECTORAL PROCESS EITHER.
SCOTT: THEY (I.E. ELECTIONS) DO CREATE A SITUATION WHICH INTERFERES
WITH USUAL PROGRESS. SIX MONTHS OUT OF EVERY THREE OR THREE AND
s HALF YEARS MAKES PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN POLICY DUE TO CRITICISM FROM
ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER.
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CHIAO: I THINK THAT THIS TIME WE HAVE NOTED THAT FOREIGN POLICY IS
ONE OF THE THEMES OF THE CAMPAIGN.
SCOTT: YES, BUT FOLLOWING THE ELECTION THERE GENERALLY IS A BROAD
CONTINUITY NOTWITHSTANDING SOME OF THE EXAGGERATIONS IN CAMPAIGN
RHETORIC. DURING THIS ELECTION YEAR, THE GOOD WILL TOWARDS PEOPLE
OF YOUR COUNTRY REMAINS SO, EVEN MORE so. THERE IS CURIOSITY AND
INTEREST ABOUT CHINA. MY MAIL IS FULL OF REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION
ON HOW TO VISIT YOUR COUNTRY. THERE ARE NOT DEBATES ON CHINA POLICY
AS WITH OTHERS.
CHIAO: THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS OF
THE TWO PEOPLES. WHATEVER CHANGES THERE ARE IN THE US INTERNAL
SITUATION, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE ARE IN THE
INTERESTS OF THE TWO PEOPLES.
SCOTT: I AGREE. WHETHER FORD OR CARTER WINS, THE SHANGHAI COM-
MUNIQUE PRINCIPLES WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS IMPORTANT GUIDELINES ONCE
WE HAVE PASSED THROUGH THE TURBULENT WATERS OF THE CAMPAIGN.
CERTAINLY THERE IS A WISH TOWARDS NORMALIZATION; A RECOGNITION THAT
SOME DELAYS AND SOME DISAPPOINTMENTS ON BOTH SIDES HAVE OCCURRED
EXTSTS. THE PRINCIPLES HAVE THE ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR PEOPLE. WE
HAVE HEARD NO CAMPAIGN TO ABROGATE OR WITHDRAW FROM THE AGREEMENTS
IN PRINCIPLE.
MY PARTY WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF YOUR
DISTINGUISHED AND FAMOUS LEADER MR. CHU TEH.
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CHIAO: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. WE ALSO THANK YOUR PRESIDENT FOR HIS
CONDOLENCE MESSAGE. YOUR CHIEF OF USLO ALSO TOOK PART IN THE
FUNERAL ACTIVITIES.
SCOTT: WE ASKED TO SUBMIT A WREATH ON BEHALF OF THE DELEGATION,
BUT WE LEARNED THAT IT WAS TOO LATE AND NOT THE TIME TO DO IT.
COULD YOU COMMENT ON THE IMPACT OF THE LOSS OF GENERAL CHU TEH
ON THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENTAL LEADERSHIP AND DUTIES.
THERE IS ALWAYS AN IMPACT IN OUR COUNTRY WHEN A MAN AS GREAT AS
GENERAL CHU TEH DIES.
CHIAO: MARSHAL CHU TEHIS DEATH WAS A GREAT LOSS TO OUR COUNTRY
AND PEOPLE. BUT OUR STATE ADMINISTRATION IS PERSONALLY DECIDED BY
CHAIRMAN MAO AND WE HAVE CONSTANTLY CARRIED OUT THIS LINE BOTH AT
HOME AND IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. WE MUST TURN GRIEF INTO STRENGTH.
THE CHINESE PEOPLE WILL MOVE FIRMLY TO CARRY OUT THESE POLICIES.
SCOTT: HIS LIFE WAS AN EXAMPLE FOR YOU.
CHIAO: YES. WE MUST LEARN FROM HIS MANY FINE QUALITIES. HE FIRMLY
CARRIED OUT CHAIRMAN MAO'S LINE. THE CHINESE PEOPLE SHOULD FOLLOW
HIS EXAMPLE. BUT CHINA'S SOCIAL SYSTEM IS DIFFERENT FROM YOURS.
IN THE NATURAL COURSE OF THINGS SOME LEADERS DIE -- THIS WON'T AFFECT
FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC POLICY. IT WONIT AFFECT THE IMPLEMENTATION.
SCOTT: THIS IS SUBSTANTIALLY WHAT I'VE SAID ABOUT OUR SITUATION
IN JANUARY. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DON'T LIKE SHARP CHANGES. WHATEVER
THE RHETORIC, THERE IS A TENDENCY TO STAY WITHIN BROADLY ESTABLISHED
POSITIONS.
OUR CONGRESSIONAL VISITORS HAVE ALWAYS RETURNED WITH GOOD REPORTS OF
HIGHLY AMICABLE MEETINGS AND RELATIONSHIPS. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP COULD BE HELPED BY REMOVAL OF AS MANY MINOR
OBSTACLES -- TECHNICALITIES -- AS POSSIBLE. so MANY AMERICANS WANT
TO VISIT CHINA. WHEN I ANNOUNCED MY VISIT, MY MAIL WAS CROWDED WITH
LETTERS FROM CONSTITUENTS WHO HAD LEARNED ABOUT CHINA FROM FRIENDS,
FROM DOCTORS, FROM PROFESSORS WHO HAD VISITED CHINA.
CHIAD: THEIR DESIRE TO COME AND SEE CHINA IS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE,
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I BELIEVE THAT AFTER NORMALIZATION SUCH EXCHANGES WILL BE MUCH MORE
CONVENIENT.
SCOTT: NOT ALL REQUESTS CAN BE FULFILLED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PHIL-
ADELPHIA ZOO WANTED A COUPLE OF PANDAS. AMBASSADOR GATES HAS
GIVEN HIS SUPPORT TO THE PHILADELPHIA ZOO. HE UNDERSTANDS WHAT
T MEAN. WE OWE YOU A MUSK OX I BELIEVE.
CHIAO: WITH RESPECT TO NORMALIZATION LAST YEAR WHEN YOUR PRESIDENT
AND SECRETARY OF STATE VISITED WE STATED OUR POSITION MANY TIMES.
YOU ARE QUITE CLEAR.
SCOTT: YES, WE ARE QUITE ANXIOUS TO MAKE PROGRESS, WE HAVE EVEN
MADE SOME SYMBOLIC MOVES IN THESE TIMES. WE HAVE REMOVED A MINOR
PRESENCE FROM QUEMOY AND MATSU. WE ARE SEEKING TO REMOVE ANY INST-
ANCE WHICH COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS. NO MATTER WHO IS PRESIDENT, WE
HAVE A PUBLIC OPINION PROBLEM. FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE PAST IS
THE PAST. WE ARE PREPARING THE MINDS OF THE PEOPLE FOR NORMAL-
TZATION.
CHIAO: YES, WE HAVE DISCUSSED THESE PROBLEMS MANY TIMES WITH RESPON-
SIBLE OFFICIALS MM YOUR GOVERNMENT. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAIR-
URE TO NORMALIZE DOES NOT LIE WITH THE CHINESE SIDE -- IT LIES WITH
US SIDE. WE MUST MAKE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN RIGHT AND
WRONG. THE US SIDE SHOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR FAILURE TO NOR-
MALIZE RELATIONS so FAR. WE HAVE STATED THIS MANY TIMES. TO PUT IT
FVEN MORE EXPLICITLY, THERE ARE THREE POINTS TO BE ACHIEVED: (1)
WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM TAIWAN: (2) ABROGATION OF THE DEFENSE TRE-
ATV; AND (3) SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN. THIS IS
OUR CONSISTENT POSITION. WE ASSUME OUR AMERICAN FRIENDS ARE
QUITE CLEAR.
SCOTT: YES, THERE EXISTS AN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE AGREEMENT
S
OF 1954. IT WILL BE WISE FROM THE US SIDE TO ENSURE THAT AMERICAN
PUBLIC OPINION WILL NOT REGARD AS ABANDONMENT THE ABROGATION OF THE
FARLIER TREATY. THERE IS MOREWILL IN THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
THAN AWARENESS INPUBLIC OPINION THAT AT SOME POINT THERE MUST BE
SOLUTIONS NOT BASED ON THE 1954 UNDERTAKINGS.
GERALD FORD LIBRARI
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BARNETT: YES, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WILL HAVE TO BELIEVE THAT AB-
ROGATION OF THE 1954 TREATY IS NOT AN ACT OF BETRAYAL BUT A
CONSTRUCTIVE MOVE FOR PEACE.
CHIAO: TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM EVEN MORE CONCRETELY LET US TRACE
BACK. AT LIBERATION IN 1949 AND AFTERWARDS IN 1950, AMERICAN SEC-
RETARY OF STATE ACHESON DECLARED TO THE WORLD THAT TAIWAN IS THE
INTERNAL AFFAIR OF CHINA AND THAT THE US WOULD NOT INTERFERE. LATER
ON YOU CONCLUDED THE TREATY. WE UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION, BUT
AT THE OUTSET WE REGARDED YOUR POSITION AS ILLEGAL. IN 1955
THE TWO SIDES BEGAN TALKS ON THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN. THESE LASTED
UNTIL (1971 SUPPLIED BY TANG WEN-SHENG). OUR POSITION HAS BEEN CON-
SISTENT. NO FOREIGN COUNTRY HAS A RIGHT TO INTERFERE IN THE AFF-
AIRS OF CHINA AND ONE OF ITS PROVINCES. THIS HISTORY STARTED IN
1949.
SCOTT: YOU WERE HERE WHEN YOUR ESTEEMED PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI GAVE
THE SAME HISTORICAL OUTLINE. WE UNDERSTAND YOUR VIEWS ENTIRELY.
OUR PROBLEM IS THE INTERNAL PROBLEM OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION.
THE MORE EVIDENCE WE HAVE TO ASSURE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT THERE IS
BUT ONE CHINA -- AND THAT THIS CAN BE WORKED OUT WITHOUT MILITARY
ACTION ON EITHER SIDE -- THEN IT BECOMES EASIER TO EXPLAIN TO THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT A SOLUTION IS UNLIKELY TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY
MILITARY ACTION. AND THEY ARE LESS LIKELY TO OPPOSE THE POLICY.
T SPEAK FOR MYSELF, NOT THE PRESIDENT. IT IS A PROBLEM, WITHOUT
WISHING TO INTRUDE IN YOUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE NEED IS FOR US
TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOLUTION IS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.
=
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CHIAO: IN PRINCIPLE THIS IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY. ON THE ONE HAND
vou RECOGNIZE THAT THER IS ONLY 1 CHINA AND THAT TAIWAN IS A
PART OF CHINA. ON THE OTHER HAND YOU ASK CHINA TO DO THIS AND
THAT. ISNIT THAT AN INTERFERENCE IN CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.
SCOTT: I WAS TALKING ALONG DIFFERENT LINES -- HOW TO MOLD PUBLIC OPIN
TON.
WHEN I RETURN MY FIRST SPEECH WILL BE TO THE OVERSEAS PRESS
CLUB. HOW TO MOLD PUBLIC OPINION IS THE IMPORTANT THING, AND
HOW SOLUTIONS ARE FOUND -- THEY MUST BE PEACEFUL. THE U.S.
DOESN'T SEEK TO INTERFERE IN CHINA'S DOMESTIC SITUATION,
CONDITIONING OF PUBLIC OPINION (IN THE U.S.) CAN HELP US CHANGE THE
SITUATION EXISTING SINCE 1954. I BELIEVE THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH
THE U.S. POSITION IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. BUT THIS IS
ARGUABLE ON THE CHINESE SIDE: THE WORDING IS A LITTLE DIFFERENT ON
YOUR SIDE.
CHIAO: I SEE THAT MR. FREEMAN IS SMILING. ON THE ISSUE OF TAIWAN IN T
HE
SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, IT is STATED THAT "ALL CHINESE ON BOTH SIDES
OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE CHINA."
WE THINK YOUR PRESENT ATTITUDE DOES NOT CONFORM TO YOUR ORIGINAL
ATTITUDE OF RECOGNIZING ONLY ONE CHINA. YOU WANT us TO DO THIS OR
THAT WITH REGARD ro TAIWAN. THIS DOES NOT CONFORM.
SCOTT: WE HAVE NO RIGHT TO SAY "DO THIS OR THAT." BUT IT WOULD BE
HELPFUL FOR OUR SIDE TO PUT THINGS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A PEACEFUL
SOLUTION.
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CHIAO: THIS IS AN OLD PROBLEM. WE CAN REITERATE CHINA'S CONSISTENT
POSITION AND ITS CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION. THE U.S. SIDE SHOULD
BE HELD REPSONSIBLE FOR THE FAILURE TO REALIZE NORMALIZATION.
IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS DIFFICULTIES WE WON'T PRESS YOU, BUT
IT IS AN ISSUE OF RIGHT AND WRONG. CAN WE SHIFT TO ANOTHER SUBJECT?
SCOTT: PERHAPS YOU HAVE READ ARTICLES BY MR. BARNETT ON VARIOUS
FORMULAS FOR EVOLUTION. (TANG WEN-SHENG NODS AFFIRMATIVELY: OTHERS DO
NOT SEEM FAMILIAR WITH ARTICLES.) WE WILL BE GLAD TO DISCUSS ANY
SUBJECT. MR. BARNETT HAS WRITTEN FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAGAZINE.
ALSO FOR WORLDVIEW. I THINK WE CAN MAKE THESE AVAILABLE TO YOU.
THESE ARE THE VIEWS OF A PRIVATE CITIZEN, OF COURSE. BUT MR. BENNETT
TS ALSO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASIA SOCIETY.
CHIAO: IS MR. BARNETT FROM BROOKINGS?
BARNETT: NO, THAT IS MY BROTHER AT BROOKINGS.
CHIAO: ARE YOUR VIEWS THE SAME?
BARNETT: MY VIEWS ARE SIMILAR TO HIS IN MANY RESPECTS.
CHTAO: WE WILL BE INTERESTED IN READING THEM. (CHIAO FIRST MISUNDER-
STANDS AND THINKS THAT THERE IS A LARGE GAP BETWEEN THE VIEWS OF THE
BARNETT BROTHERS. TANG WEN-SHENG CLARIFIES, SAYING "I WAS JUST
SAVING THAT A CONSIDERABLE GAP STILL EXISTS BETWEEN US" -- I.E.
CHINA AND THE U.S.)
SCOTT: THAT MAY BE so, BUT HE WAS BORN IN SHANGHAI AND YOU WERE BORN
TN
BROOKLYN.
CHIAO: NEVERTHELESS THERE IS STILL A DISTANCE.
WHAT ABOUT EUROPE AND THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS?
SCOTT: THAT IS A LARGE PACKAGE. IF I CAN VENTURE SOME VIEWS AND
REACTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT IS STILL TO A STRON
G
AMERICAN PRESENCE AND COMMITMENT TO EUROPE. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT NATO.
SEN. HUMPHREY AND I RECENTLY VISITED SEVERAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND
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ASSURED THEM THAT THIS IS SO. SEN. HUMPHREY AND I BELONG TO DIFFERENT
so WE ARE BIPARTISAN. WE DO NOT FAVOR A WEAKENING OF OUR
PRESENCE IN BERLIN OR ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE. WE ARE VERY
INTERESTED IN THE RECENT MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES.
WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS? DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE MEETING
WAS USEFUL OR COUNTERPRODUCTIVE? YOU KNOW THAT MY VIEWS AND THE
VIEWS OF SENATOR MANSFIELD ARE DIFFERENT IN SOME RESPECTS; ONE OF
THEM IS ON MAINTAINING OUR POSITION IN EUROPE. I BELIEVE IN
KEEPING A SUBSTANTIAL TROOP COMMITMENT. SENATOR MANSFIELD CALLED
FOR A 10 PCT REDUCTION. HIS PROPOSAL WAS DEFEATED BY A VOTE OF 53-39.
HIS VIEWS ARE IN THE MINORITY AND HE HAS NOW DROPPED HIS PROPOSAL.
WITH REGARD TO ITALY, WE HAVE TO WAIT FOR THE COMPOSITION OF THE
NEW GOVERNMENT. WE ARE UNABLE TO DECIDE OUR POLICY UNTIL THE
GOVERNMENT IS CONSTITUTED. UNLESS IT IS EVIDENT THAT THEY ARE
ACTING ON THE ORDERS OF ANOTHER POWER, THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE IN
OUR POLICY. GENERALLY, WE FAVOR STRENGTH IN EUROPE. THIS WILL
LIKELY NOT BE AN ISSUE. PRESIDENT FORD, GOVERNOR REAGAN, AND
GOVERNOR CARTER ALL AGREE ON THIS.
CHIAO: MY IMPRESS FROM THE LAST TIME sen. MANSFIELD AND I MET AND TAL
KED
WAS THAT HE ALFO FAVORED WITHDRAWAL OF FAMILY DEPENDENTS AND
LOGISTICAL PERSONNEL.
SCOTT: YES, PLUS 100,000 SOLDIERS, BUT HE HAS LOST ON THIS QUESTION,
THERE HAS BEEN ONE VERY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT. CONGRESS HAS CHANGED I
TS
ATTITUDE ABOUR ARBITRARILY CHANGING THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR
A STRONG BUDGET FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. AMBASSADOR GATES REMEMBERS
THAT DURING THE 19508 AND 19603 THE CONGRESS USED TO CUT THE
PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED DEFENSE BUDGET BY 5 PCT OR EVEN 10, PCT. PRIOR TO
THIS YEAR THERE WERE CUTS OF $4-7 BILLION. BUT THIS YEAR 99.4 PCT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST WAS APPROVED. THE CONGRESS HAS DECIDED
THAT THE PRESIDENT KNOWS BEST ABOUT NATIONAL DEFENSE AND IT FAVORS
A STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE.
CHIAO: WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION MANY TIMES IN THE PAST WITH AM
FRICAN
FRIENDS. WE FAVOR A TRULY EQUAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND
THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. BOTH SIDES HAVE A NEED. BUT THE NATURE OF
THE ARRANGEMENT IS YOUR AFFAIR.
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
om STATE
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES. OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 PEKING 01284 03 OF 04 140608Z
SCOTT: WOULD YOU CARE TO COMMENT ON THE MEETING OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNIST PARTIES? HOW DOES IT IMPACT ON ASIA? WAS IT A GOOD THING OR
NOT? HOW DO YOU VIEW THE INCREASING
INDEPENDENCE OF SOME COUNTRIES?
CHIAO: WE HAVE ALWAYS HAD A FEELING ON THIS ISSUE -- THAT YOU ARE TOO
NERVOUS ON THE ITALY SITUATION. AT LEAST THE MEETING OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNIST PARTIES HAS PROVED THAT. I SHOULD NOT REGARD THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF ITALY AS A REVISIONIST PARTY, AS A FIFTH COLUMN FOR THE
SOVIET UNION. THE MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES HAS PROVED TH
TS,
T CAN'T SEE ANY GREATER USE OF IMPACT OF THE MEETING. THE BATON
OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS LESS AND LESS EFFECTIVE.
SCOTT: YES, MR. BREZHNEV SEEMED LESS INVOLVED IN WRITING THE MEETING'
S
COMMUNIQUE. THIS IS MY PRIVATE CITIZEN'S VIEW.
CHTAO: WE THINK THAT ALTHOUGH THE CONFERENCE HAS HELD, THERE WILL BE
NO
NEW EFFECT ON THE SOVIET EXPANSION POLICY. THIS IS THE BIGGEST
PROBLEM CONCERNING EUROPE.
SCOTT: WE ARE ANXIOUS TO KEEP TALKS GOING -- BUT CONCERNED THAT THERE
BE AN EQUALITY OF RESULT.
BERALD R. FORD
CONF IDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF
Department of State
AMERICA ORLING
TELEGRAM
STATES or
CONFIDENTIAL 2103
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CHIAO: IT IS TRULY A PROBLEM -- AS TO HOW TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET
UNTON.
LAST YEAR AT ABOUT THIS TIME, AT THE END OF JULY AND IN EARLY
AUGUST, THE RUEOPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE WAS HELD. AT THAT TIME
WE REGARDED THE CONFERENCE A REFLECTION OF MUNICH THINKING. OUR
VIEW WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION ACHIEVED FROM THE EUROPEAN SECURITY
CONFERENCE A RECOGNITION OF ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN EASTERN
EUROPE. I'M NOT CLEAR ON WHAT YOU GOT. PEOPLE CAN SEE IT MORE CLEARLY
ONE YEAR LATER.
SCOTT: THERE WAS SOME FEELING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS MORE ANXIOUS
THAN
THE U.S. FOR THE CONFERENCE. THERE IS NOW GROWING CRITICISM
IN THE U.S. THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS PAID NO ATTENTION TO HUMAN
RIGHTS. WHICH WAS AN ISSUE IN THE CONFERENCE.
WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO ASEAN'S FORMULA AS A MEANS OF IMPROVING
COMMUNICATION? HOW DOES THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA REGARD ASEAN?
IS IT USEFUL IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASIA?
BARNETT:WHAT ABOUT THE ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY, WHICH IS
THF. BASIC ASEAN PRINCIPLE?
SCOTT: YOU HAVE PUT IT MUCH RETTER THAN I STATED IT.
CHIAO: THERE IS A GENERAL TREND FOR THE FIVE ASEAN COUNTRIES TO
FSTABLISH A ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY. OUR POSITION IS TO
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ERALD FORD LIBRARY
or and
EXP-0
Department of State
AMERICA CELINA
TELEGRAM
STATES or
CONFIDENTIAL 2103
PAGE 01 PEKING 01284 04 OF 04 140617Z
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e A N F $ D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 PERING 1284
EXDIS
CHIAO: IT IS TRULY A PROBLEM -- AS TO HOW TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET
UNTON.
LAST YEAR AT ABOUT THIS TIME, AT THE END OF JULY AND IN EARLY
AUGUST, THE RUEOPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE WAS HELD. AT THAT TIME
WE REGARDED THE CONFERENCE A REFLECTION OF MUNICH THINKING. OUR
VIEW WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION ACHIEVED FROM THE EUROPEAN SECURITY
CONFERENCE A RECOGNITION OF ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN EASTERN
EUROPE. I'M NOT CLEAR ON WHAT YOU GOT. PEOPLE CAN SEE IT MORE CLEARLY
ONE YEAR LATER.
SCOTT: THERE WAS SOME FEELING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS MORE ANXIOUS
THAN
THE U.S. FOR THE CONFERENCE. THERE IS NOW GROWING CRITICISM
IN THE U.S. THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS PAID NO ATTENTION TO HUMAN
RIGHTS. WHICH WAS AN ISSUE IN THE CONFERENCE.
WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO ASEAN'S FORMULA AS A MEANS OF IMPROVING
COMMUNICATION? HOW DOES THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA REGARD ASEAN?
IS IT USEFUL IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASIA?
BARNETT:WHAT ABOUT THE ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY, WHICH IS
THE BASIC ASEAN PRINCIPLE?
SCOTT: YOU HAVE PUT IT MUCH RETTER THAN I STATED IT.
CHIAO: THERE IS à GENERAL TREND FOR THE FIVE ASEAN COUNTRIES TO
FSTABLISH A ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY. OUR POSITION IS TO
CONFIDENTIAL
LIBRANA
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THEDAUTHORIZATION or THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TRANTMENT
of
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES of
CONF IDENTIAL
PAGE 03 PEKING 01284 04 OF 04 1406172
SCOTT: WELL, I'VE DONE MY DUTY (E.E. TO BARNETT). IF I HADN'T MENTIONED
THE CONFERENCE I WOULD HAVE LOST A FRIEND.
I'D LIKE TO ADD THAT WE WOULD WELCOME CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT IN
TRADE RELATIONS.
CHIAD: THIS IS A GOOD DESIRE, BUT I'M NOT TOO CLEAR ON CONCRETE
PROBLEMS.
SCOTT: NEITHER AM I.
CHIAOS OUR FOREIGN TRADE MINISTRY FRIENDS POSSIBLY ARE BETTER
ACQUAINTED WITH THE CONCRETE SITUATION.
SCOTT: MAY I ASK WHETHER IT IS PROPER TO LET ANY OF OUR GUESTS ASK
QUESTIONS?
CHIAO: YES, PLEASE.
BARNETT: I'D LIKE TO ASK ONE QUESTION REGARDING MEMBERSHIP OF ASEAN.
THERE ARE THOSE FAVORING TAKING IN VIETNAM. OTHERS WOULD LIKE
TO DELAY. HOW DOES CHINA FEEL ABOUT THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE ASEAN
ZONE TO INCLUDE VIETNAM.
CHIAO: THIS IS A PROBLEM BETWEEN ASEAN AND THE 3 INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES.
IF THEY AGREE WE HAVE NO OBJECTION.
AMB. GATES: I HAVE NO QUESTIONS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER VERY GRACIOUSLY
RECEIVED ME WHEN I ARRIVED. IF WE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS AFTERWARDS
WE WILL DISCUSS THEM THEN.
SCOTT: THE AMBASSADOR OBSERVED OUR 200TH BIRTHDAY RECENTLY WITH MANY
DECORATIONS. HE IS A DESCENDANT OF THOSE WHO FOUGHT IN THE
REVOLUTION. WE ARE REVOLUTIONARIES TOO.
CHIAO: ACTUALLY, IN HISTORY THE U.S. IS AMONG THE EARLIEST NATIONS WHO
WAGED A STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE.
FORD
is
SCOTT: THE OLDEST WRITTEN CONSTITUTION IS OURS.
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT IDEN TIAL ORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
of
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES of
CONFIDENTIAL
EXEMS EXPIS
PAGE 04 PEKING 01284 04 OF 04 140617Z
CHIAO WHAT ABOUT YOU, MR. FREEMAN? PLEASE USE CHINESE.
FREEMAN: I'M NOW INVOLVED IN INTERNAL QUESTIONS so TEMPORARILY I WILL
NOT SPEAK.
CHIAO: WHEN YOU WERE IN SHANGHAI, MR. FREEMAN, YOU ASKED FOR 24 VOLUMES
OF CHINESE HISTORY AND THE COLLECTED WORKS OF LU HSUN FOR THE DEPART-
MENT OF STATE. DID YOU RECEIVE THEM?
FREEMAN: YES, THEY ARE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE LIBRARY. I OFTEN
GO THERE TO READ THEM.
SCOTT: THE ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CHANGSHA EXCAVATIONS THAT YOU GAVE
ME I DONATED TO THEPHILADEPHIA MUSEUM. THEY ARE VERY GOOD, MUCH BETTER
THAN THE JAPANESE REPRODUCTIONS.
CHIAO: I THINK WE SHOULD CONCLUDE NOW SINCE I AM INVITING YOU TO AN
INFORMAL DINNER TONIGHT. WE WILL DISCUSS WITH YOU SOME RECENT
ARCHEOLOGICAL FINDS. MR. WANG CHIU-YEH WILL DISCUSS THEM TONIGHT
WITH YOU AT DINNER.
SCOTT: I AM VERY GRATEFUL. I AM ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER
ASKING ME TO SEND A COPY OF MY ART BOOK TO PREMIER CHOU. YOU ASKED
ME AT MRS. ENGELHART'S HOME. LET ME CONCLUDE BY SAYING THAT WE ARE
VERY MUCH HONORED. SOME OF THE MEMBERS OF MY PARTY NEVER IN THEIR
WILDEST DREAMS IMAGINED THAT THEY WOULD SEE CHINA SOME DAY.
SOME OF THEM ARE NOW IMPROVING CHINA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS BY
SHOPPING.
GATES
GERALD R. FORD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHQUI THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONT IDEN IAL
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TAGS: OVIP (SCHLESINGER, JAMES) PFOR CH US TW
SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO
REF: (A) PEKING 1754, (B) PEKING 1761
1. BEGIN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. FORMER DEFENSE
SECRETARY JAMES SCHLESINGER AND "SUBSTANTIVE" MEMBERS OF HIS
PARTY (ACCOMPANYING PRESS AND USLO WERE NOT INVITED) TALKED
WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA ON THE AFTERNOONS OF
SEPTEMBER 7 AND 8 FOR A TOTAL OF FOUR HOURS. A DELEGATION MEMBER
PASSED US--IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE HIS RECOLLECTIONS OF MEETING
HIGHLIGHTS. CWE DO NOT YET HAVE MINUTES OF EITHER MEETING, WE
HAVE A TENTATIVE OFFER OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS SUBJECT TO FINAL
APPROVAL BY SCHLESINGER.) ON TAIWAN, CHIAO EXPOUNDED STANDARD,
NONBELLICOSE LINE: U.S. MUST FULFILL ALL THREE CONDITIONS FOR
NORMALIZATION, LIBERATION OF TAIWAN IS AN INTERNAL CHINESE MATTER
AND THE U.S. OWES A "DEBT" TO THE PRC REGARDING TAIRAN.
CHIAO WARNED AGAINST THE DANGER OF À MUNICH-TYPE WESTERN
SELLOUT TO THE SOVIET UNION) AFFIRMED THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN
ENDURING SING-SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT) AND ADDED A CRYPTIC--AND
NOVEL TO US--REFERENCE TO "SOME WESTERN LEADERS" WHO SEEK TO
DIVERT SOVIET AGGRESSION TOWARDS THE EAST, CHIAO REITERATED
PRINCIPLED CHINESE SUPPORT FOR NORTH KOREAN POSITION ON
REUNIFICATION AND HE APPLAUDED THE SUCCESS OF U.S. DIPLOMACY
IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AT THE CLOSE OF THE SECOND SESSION, CHIAO
ANNOUNCED THAT THE GROUP WOULD MEET DEFENSE MINISTER AND PARTY
VICE CHAIRMAN YEH CHIEH-YING ON SEPTEMBER 10, AND WOULD
HAVE A SESSION ON SEPTEMBER 11 WITH ANOTHER TOP LEADER CTHE GROUP
SPECULATES THAT THIS WILL BE PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG). END
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.
WHSR COMMENT
SCONCROFT, HYLAND, MCFARLANE, LL
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2.0N SEPTEMBER 7 SCHLESINGER PARTY HELD THE FIRST OF TWO
AFTERNOON SESSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO. THE TWO-HOUR
SESSION WAS LARGELY CONSUMED BY READING OF FORMAL PREPARED
STATEMENTS BY THE TWO SIDES. CHIAOIS REMARKS WERE STANDARD
FARE, SETTING FORTH THE CHINESE WORLDVIEW, INTRODUCING NO NEW
THEMES, AND FAILING TO MENTION EVEN IN PASSING EITHER THE
SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE OR TAIWAN.
3. THE SEPTEMBER 7 EVENING BANQUET HOSTED BY CHIAO
(ADDRESSEES WILL HAVE SEEN NONA COVERAGE) FOLLOWED THE PATTERN
SET AT THE NOON WELCOMING BANQUET. CHIAO'S RECITATION OF FAMILIAR
PRC POSITIONS IN HIS TOAST WAS LACED WITH THE USUAL METAPHORS.
SCHLESINGER ADDRESSED THE POINTS AND THE METAPHORS ONE BY ONE.
C"WE AGREE THAT THERE IS GREAT CHAOS UNDER HEAVEN, BUT WE DO NOT
CONSIDER THE SITUATION EXCELLENT.")
4. FOLLOWING A MORNING VISIT BY ALL DELEGATION MEMBERS TO HOTBED
OF RADICALISM TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY, WHERE THE GROUP HEARD THE
CANNED BRIEFING ON TSINGHUA'S ROLE IN SPEARHEADING THE ANTI-TENG
CAMPAIGN, THE DELEGATION DIVIDED INTO SUBSTANTIVE AND PRESS CON-
TINGENTS. THE LATTER TREKKED AROUND SUBURBAN COMMUNES, WHILE THE
FORMER REASSEMBLED AT THE GREAT HALL TO CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS
WITH CHIAO. AS DURING THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON, THE PARTY WAS SEATED
IN NEGOTIATING STYLE, FACING THEIR CHINESE HOSTS ACROSS A LONG TABLE,
RATHER THAN IN THE USUAL "RELAXED" MODE: SEMICIRCULAR ARRANGEMENT
OF OVERSTUFFED CHAIRS. CHIAO HAD PREPARED NOTES IN PRONT OF HIM, AND
SEEMED
TO REFER TO THEM FOR SPECIFIC LANGUAGE FROM TIME TO TIME.
HIGHLIGHTS OF THAT TWO-HOUR SESSION FOLLOW.
5. TAINAN. AFTER EMPHASIZING THAT CHINA SEES THE
INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF U.S. PRC RELATIONS AS CENTRAL, CHIAO
MOVED TO BILATERAL MATTERS AND RAISED THE TAIWAN ISSUE--#ALMOST
PERFUNCTORILY" ACCORDING TO ONE DELEGATION MEMBER.
--CHIAO DECLARED THAT THE U.S. MUST FULFILL ALL THREE COMPONENTS
OF THE JAPANESE FORMULA AS A PRECONDITION FOR NORMALIZATION.
--ME STRESSED THAT "LIBERATION" OF TAINAN IS AN INTERNAL CHINESE
MATTER, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.
--HE INDICATED THAT THE U.S. HOWES CHINA A DEBT" ON THE TAIWAN
ISSUE--HINTING THERE WAS A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT MUST
NOT "BACK AWAY" FROM THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. TO THIS
SCHLESINGER CWHO HAD MADE A PREFATORY DISCLAIMER OF ANY ABILITY
OR INTENT TO SPEAK FOR THE USG) REPLIED THAT HIS PERSONAL UNDER-
STANDING WAS THAT THE U.S. HAD COMMITTED ITSELF IN THE SHANGHAI
COMMUNIQUE TO A GRADUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES ON TAINAN "AS
TENSIONS IN THE AREA DIMINISHED" AND THAT THE U.S. HAD FULFILLED
THIS COMMITMENT. CHIAO DID NOT CHALLENGE THIS.
6. PRC-USSR RELATIONS. CHIAO PRESENTED THE STANDARD HARD LINE ON THE
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SOVIETS: THE PRC WAS PREPARED FOR WAR, WILL ADOPT A STRATEGY
OF LURING IN THE INVADERS AND "DROWNING THEM IN PEOPLE'S HAR",
AND (QUOTING MAOD FORESEES TEN THOUSAND YEARS OF IDEOLOGICAL
CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE ADDED THAT "WE MUST TRY TO IMPROVE
OUR STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS. WHEN THE INTERPRETER INCORRECTLY
RENDERED THIS AS "WE MUST IMPROVE OUR STATE-TO-STATE STATE RELATIONS, #
CHIAO CUT IN FORCEFULLY TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT. CHIAO WARNED
ABOUT THE DANGER OF A MUNICH-TYPE SELLOUT TO MOSCOW, AND ALLUDED
TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A WESTERN DUNQUERQUE. SCHLESINGER
RIPOSTED THAT THE U.S. HAS MANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE SOVIET
UNION IS WELL AWARE OF THIS, AND THE KREMLIN LEADERS ARE UNLIKELY
TO BE RASH. IN CLOSING, CHIAO REFERRED CRYPTICALLY TO #SOME
WESTERN LEADERS WHO SEEK TO TURN THE FOCUS OF SOVIET AGGRESSION
TO THE EAST. # (COMMENT) IF ACCURATELY QUOTED, THIS LINE IS NEW
TO US. OUR SOURCE INDICATED THAT THE ENTIRE U.S. SIDE TOOK THIS
AS A BARB DIRECTED AT SECRETARY KISSINGER. SCHLESINGER IMMEDIATELY
REBUTTED, DECLARING THAT HE WAS AWARE OF NO ONE IN THE WEST WHO HELD
THAT POSITION.)
7. KOREA, CHIAO PASSED LIGHTLY OVER KOREA, MERELY
REITERATING CHINESE PRINCIPLED SUPPORT FOR THE "VERY REASONABLE"
NORTH KOREAN PROPOSALS FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA.
8, MIDDLE EAST. CHIAO TOOK CREDIT FOR SUGGESTING TO UNSPECIFIED
U.S. LEADERS THAT WASHINGTON OUGHT TO ADOPT A MORE EVENHANDED
APPROACH IN THE MIDDLE EAST, MAINTAINING TIES WITH ISRAEL WHILE
SEEKING A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. WHEN CHIAO
COMMENTED APPROVINGLY ON THE SUCCESS OF THAT POLICY, SCHLESINGER
OBSERVED THAT CHINA MIGHT ADOPT THE SAME POLICY WITH SIMILAR
EFFECT. CHIAO DECLARED THAT "HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES" MADE
THAT OPTION IMPOSSIBLE FOR CHINA TO CONSIDER.
9. ADDITIONAL MEETINGS. AT THE CLOSE OF THE SEPTEMBER 8 SESSION,
CHIAO ANNOUNCED THAT A SEPTEMBER 10 MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED
WITH DEFENSE MINISTER AND PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN YEH CHIEN-YING.
SEPTEMBER 11 HAS BEEN LEFT OPEN FOR A SESSION WITH "ANOTHER
SENIOR OFFICIAL," WHO THE GROUP SPECULATES WILL BE PREMIER
HUA KUO-FENG. SINCE THE CHINESE USUALLY ORCHESTRATE OFFICIAL
VISITS 80 AS TO SAVE THE HIGHEST RANKING LEADER UNTIL THE FINAL
DAY, IT SEEMS PLAUSIBLE TO us THAT PREMIER HUA WILL INDEED MEET
WITH THE GROUP.
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SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER PARTY TALKS, PROVNICIAL GRAND TOUR CANCELLED
REF: PEKING 1776
ACTION REQUESTED: NOTIFY S OF INFO IN PARA 5.
1. WHEN NEWS OF CHAIRMAN MADIS DEATH WAS ANNOUNCED, THE SCHLESINGER
PARTY WAS OBSERVING A MARKSMANSHIP SHOW BY THE PLAIS 3RD DIVISION ON
THE OUTSKIRTS OF PEKING. DESPITE THOISUDDEN INTERRUPTION OF THE
INTERNATIONALE AND THE TEARS WELLING UP INH HE EYES OF THE
COMMANDING OFFICER, THE PROGRAM WAS CARRIED THROUGH TO COMPLETION.
IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS. THE CHINESE ANNOUNCED THE NEWS TO
THE AMERICANS INDIVIDUALLY. THE URBAN us DESK DIRECTOR TING YUAN-HUN
G,
NORMALLY FLUENT IN ENGLISH, COULD ONLY SOB OUT IN CHINESE THAT
"CHAIRMAN MAO HAS DIED." OTHER CHINESE OFFICIALS UNASHAMEDLY HEPT.
2. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT THE HOST ORGANIZATION CHINESE
PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFRAIRS (CPIFA) BOWED OUT AS EFFECTIVE
HOSTS, DEFERRING TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS PRESENT. AMERICAN
AND OCEANIAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN PING, WHO HAD
ACCOMPANIED THE PARTY TO THE PLA UNIT, EXPLAINED THAT "UNDER THE CIR-
CUNSTANCES" THE MEETINGS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED WITH DEFENSE MINISTER
YEH AND PREMIER HUA (REFTEL) HAD BEEN CANCELLED. LIN ADDED THAT THE
GROUP'S ENTIRE
PROVINCIAL TOUR WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE CANCELLED.
3. LIN, CLEARLY SPEAKING WITHOUT GUIDANCE, NOTED THAT FOREIGN
DIGNITARIES NOT ALREADY IN CHINA WOULD NOT BE INVITED TO ATTEND THE
MEMORIAL CEREMONIES AND SUGGESTED --"ON THE BASIS OF THE PRECEDENTS
ESTABLISHED FOR THE CHOU EN-LAI AND CHU TEN FUNERAL OBSERVANCES" --
THAT DR. SCHLESINGER MIGHT WISH TO REDAUN IN PEKING TO PAY LAST RESPE
*WHSR COMMENT
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4. DR. SCHLESINGER INDICATED TO THE CHINESE THAT HE WOULD FOLLOW THEI
R
JUDGMENT AS TO APPROPRIATE ACTIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, THE CPIRA HAS
ARRANGED FOR THE DELEGATION TO VISIT THE GREAT WALL ON SEPTEMBER 10.
5. ONE DELEGATION MEMBER HAS CONFIDED TO us THAT DR. SCHLESINGER WILL
PROBABLY PLACE A CALL TO SECRETARY KISSINGER IN THE MORNING CAPPROXIM
ATELY
0800 SEPTEMBER 10 LOCAL TIMED TO SOLICIT HIS ADVICE ON AN APPROPRIATE
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SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER DELEGATION PARTICIPATION IN MAO TSE-TUNG
FUNERAL OBSERVANCES
1. SUMMARY. THE SCHLESINGER PARTY WAS INVITED SEPTEMBER
10 TO REMAIN IN PEKING THROUGH SEPTEMBER 13 IN ORDER TO VIEW
THE REMAINS OF CHAIRMAN MAD TSE-TUNG LYING IN STATE ON THAT DAY,
CUSLO PARTICIPATION, SEPTEL, WILL BE ON THE SAME DATE) A CHINESE MFA
OFFICIAL TOLD DR. SCHLESINGER THAT CHAIRMAN MAD HAD PERSONALLY
INVITED HIM TO VISIT CHINA AND WAS AWARE OF SCHLESINGERIS PRESENCE
IN CHINA JUST PRIOR TO HIS DEATH. END SUMMARY.
2. DURING THE COURSE OF A VISIT SEPTEMBER 10 TO
THE GREAT WALL AND MING TOMBS SPECIALLY LAID ON BY THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY FOR DR. SCHLESINGER AND THREE MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY, MFA
AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR LIN PING EXTENDED
AN INVITATION TO THE ENTIRE DELEGATION TO REMAIN IN PEKING
THROUGH MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 13. ON THAT DATE THE DELEGATION
COULD JOIN FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS
PRESENT IN PEKING TO VIEW THE REMAINS OF CHAIRMAN MAO
TSE-TUNG LYING IN STATE AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE.
(COMMENT) IT IS INDICATIVE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY COURTESIES
EXTENDED DR. SCHLESINGER THAT HE WAS INFORMED OF THESE
ARRANGEMENTS PRIOR TO NOTIFICATION OF USLO OR OTHER DIPLOMATIC
MISSIONS IN PEKING.) LIN PING THEN MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE
DELEGATION SHOULD PLAN TO DEPART PEKING EARLY THE FOLLOWING
MORNING.
3. LIN ALSO REVEALED THAT CHAIRMAN MAO HIMSELF HAD DIRECTED
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02
GERALD
BY. HR , NARA, DATE 2/5/03
LIBRARY
0
N
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IN 1974 THAT A FORMAL INVITATION TO VISIT CHINA BE EXTENDED
TO THEN-DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER. (NEITHER DR. SCHLESINGER
NOR HIS FORMER STAFF ASSISTANT, A MEMBER OF THE CURRENT
DELEGATION, COULD RECALL HAVING RECEIVED SUCH AN INVITATION.)
IN A SENSE, LIN CONTINUED, DR. SCHLESINGER WAS CURRENTLY IN
CHINA AT THE EXPRESS WISH OF CHAIRMAN MAO. AND CHAIRMAN MAO
HAD ACCORDINGLY BEEN APPRISED OF DR. SCHLESINGER'S
PRESENCE IN CHINA SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEATH.
DEAN
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OP IMMED
MJA950NGA969
DE RUMJPG #1843 2591230
0 151200Z SEP 76 ZFF-4
FM USLO PEKING
TO USDEL SECRETARY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6378
E c R E 7 PEKING 1843
EXDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR GATES
E.0.116521 XGDS-3
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A) PROR, CH
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SCHLESINGER VISIT
REFS: A2 SECTO 27052, B) PEKING 1761, C) PEKING 1776
DD PEKING 1782, E) PEKING 1800
1. BEGIN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. THERE FOLLOWS MY
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SCHLESINGER VISIT CREF A) BASED ON
MY PRIVATE ONE-HOUR TALK WITH HIM AT USLD SEPTEMBER 14 CHE
CALLED ON ME AT HIS INITIATIVE) AND OUR EARLIER REPORTING ON HIS
ACTIVITIES IN PEKING. AFTER MAD'S DEATH THE PARAMOUNT OBJECTIVES
IN CHINESE HANDLING OF SCHLESINGER BECAME:
--TO DEMONSTRATE FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUITY. REINSTATEMENT OF
SCHLESINGER'S PROVINCIAL TRIP, INCLUDING THE EXCURSION TO THE SINO-
SOVIET FRONTIER, HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED CHINESE ADHERENCE TO
"CHAIRMAN MAO'S REVOLUTIONARY LINE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS" WITH ITS
ANTI-SOVIET TILT.
--TO REPUDIATE IMPLICITLY SPECULATION THAT MAD'S DEATH WOULD
PROVE DESTABILIZING.
REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE MAY
OTHERWISE FEEL ABOUT CHINESE HANDLING OF SCHLESINGER, THE POLICY
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARE GENERALLY POSITIVE.
EXCLUSION OF USLO FROM THE TALKS SEEMED TO ACCORD WITH SCHLESINGERIS
OWN PREFERENCE. CHINESE FAILURE TO INCLUDE USLO IN CHIAO'S
WELCOMING BANQUET IS ODD, BUT WE DO NOT YET HAVE ALL THE FACTS
THAT PERTAIN. AS FOR SCHLESINGER'S FUNERAL ROLE, WE DO NOT SHARE
VIEW OF SOME IN HIS PARTY THAT CHINESE MEANT THIS AS SNUB DIRECTED
AT USG.
2. I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE POTENTIALLY MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS--
*WHSR COMMENT
SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, MCFARLANE, LL
RECALLED
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&
FORD
E.O. DECLASSIFIED 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
GERALD
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02
LIBRARY
BY
HR, NARA, DATE 2/5/03
SECRET
COPY
BOTH SYMBOLIC AND SUBSTANTIVE--OF HIS VISIT ARE YET TO COME: HIS
EXCURSION TO THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER AND HIS PROMISED SESSIONS WITH
RANKING CHINESE LEADERS INCLUDING PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG. I SHALL
SUBMIT A FINAL ASSESSMENT AFTER SCHLESINGER'S DEPARTURE FROM
PEKING, PLANNED FOR SEPTEMBER 29. END INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY.
3. CHINESE DISPLAY EXTRAORDINARY ESTEEM FOR SCHLESINGER. FROM
CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY TRIP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE U.S. TO REINSTATEMENT
OF THE TRIP FOLLOWING MAOIS FUNERAL, THE CHINESE HAVE MISSED NO
OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY THEIR HIGH ESTEEM FOR SCHLESINGER!
--THEY CONFIRMED HIS ITINERARY PRIOR TO HIS DELEGATION'S
DEPARTURE, AN UNPRECEDENTED BREAK WITH CUSTOMARY CHINESE
NEGOTIATING PRACTICE WITH SUCH GROUPS. (SCHLESINGER'S INTER-
MEDIARIES WITH THE CHINESE HAD STRESSED THAT PRIOR APPROVAL
WAS THE SINE QUA NON OF SCHLESINGER'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE
INVITATION.)
--THEY INCLUDED ON THE ITINERARY SENSITIVE AREAS OFTEN REQUEST
BUT NEVER PREVIOUSLY GRANTED TO AMERICANS CLHASA, INING, JUHOHAOTED.
--THEY ARRANGED UNUSUALLY HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS, ALLOCATING TO
SCHLESINGER TWO AFTERNOONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO CONE
IS THE NORM) AND PLANNING, BEFORE MADIS DEATH INTERVENED,
SESSIONS, WITH DEFENSE MINISTER YEH CHIEN-YING AND PREMIER HUA
KUD-FENG.
--MEMBERS OF THE PARTY TOLD us THAT FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT OF
MAO'S DEATH, FOREIGN MINISTRY AMERICAS AND OCEANIAS DEPARTMENT
DIRECTOR LIN PING CONFIDED TO SCHLESINGER THAT CHAIRMAN MAD HAD
PERSONALLY ORDERED AN INVITATION EXTENDED TO HINBIN 1974. LIN
ADDED THAT MAO WAS INFORMED BEFORE HIS DEATH OF SCHLESINGER'S
PRESENCE IN CHINA.
--AFTER CANCELLING THE TOUR AND REMAINING MEETINGS IN PEKING
UPON WORD THAT MAD HAD DIED, THE CHINESE REVERSED THEMSELVES,
REINSTATED THE WHOLE PROVINCIAL PROGRAM AND HINTED STRONGLY
THAT SCHLESINGER ON HIS RETURN TO PEKING WOULD MEET WITH
PREMIER HUA AND EITHER DEFENSE MINISTER YEH OR POLITBURO
STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBER CHANG CHUN-CHIAO.
4. ON HIS FIRST EVENING IN PEKING SCHLESINGER ASKED THE
ACTING CHIEF FOR USLO'S ASSESSMENT OF CHINESE MOTIVES AND
EXPECTATIONS FOR HIS VISIT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RATIONALE IS SELF-
EVIDENT: THE CHINESE POSITION ON U.S. SOVIET DETENTE PARALLELS
SCHLESINGER'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND WELL-KNOWN PRIVATE VIEWS ON
THE ISSUE: THAT THESE VIEWS WOULD BE AIRED TO CHINESE AND WORLD
AUDIENCES WAS A REASONABLE
EXPECTATION, THE POTENT COMBINATION OF HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS, A NOVEL
EXCURSION TO TIBET AND TO THE SING-SOVIET PRONTIER, AND A CORRS
OF ACCOMPANYING JOURNALISTS GUARANTEED HEAVY MEDIA PLAY IN THE
U.S. AND MANY OTHER COUNTRIES. IN THIS SENSE THE CHINESE CAST
SCHLESINGER IN THE FAMILIAR ROLE (E.G. THE FRGIS STRAUSS AND
RECALLED
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FORD
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FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON) OF PRESTIGIOUS OPPOSITION STATESMAN WHO
SHARES A KEY PART OF THE CHINESE WORLDVIEW.
5. WHETHER THE CHINESE SEEK MERELY TO GAIN ATTENTION FOR THEIR
VIEWS, TO INFLUENCE AMERICAN ELECTION-YEAR POLITICS, OR TO
REGISTER SOME GENERAL DISENCHANTMENT WITH CURRENT ADMINISTRATION
FOREIGN POLICIES IS CONJECTURAL. ALL PROBABLY ENTERED INTO INITIAL
CHINESE CALCULATIONS TO SOME DEGREE. (POST-MAO CONSIDERATION
ARE NOTED IN MY SUMMARY ABOVE.)
6. THE EXCLUSION OF USLO. USLOIS ONLY FORMAL ROLE IN THE
SCHLESINGER VISIT HAS BEEN ATTENDANCE BY THE ACTING CHIEF AT
À NOON-HOUR WELCOMING BANQUET THE FIRST DAY GIVEN BY THE
NOMINAL HOSTS, CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
ACCORDING TO ONE MEMBER OF THE PARTY, THE CHINESE SAID THEY
DID NOT PLAN TO INVITE ACTING CHIEF TO CHIAO'S BANQUET THAT EVENING
OWING TO THE BANQUETIS ALLEGED "SPECIAL NATURE. WE DOUBT THAT THE
VISITORS URGED RECONSIDERATION. USLD WAS NOT INVITED TO SEND
A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS. WE DO
NOT KNOW WHEN AND HOW EITHER DECISION WAS REACHED. BUT WE
IMAGINE THAT THE CHINESE WELCOMED AND NURTURED SUPPOSITION ON
THE PART OF SCHLESINGER AND SOME MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY THAT THESE
OCCASIONS WERE LIKELY TO BE MORE CANDID AND PRODUCTIVE SANS USG
OFFICIALS.
7. THE SCHLESINGER DELEGATION AND FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS. WE
ARE DISINCLINED TO ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO SCHLESINGERIS
PLACE AMONG FOREIGNERS PAYING LAST RESPECTS TO MAO.
--NCNA LISTS THE SCHLESINGER GROUP AMONG OTHER "FOREIGN FRIENDS"
INCLUDING AN ALBANIAN METALLURGICAL GROUP, THE PAKISTAN FOREIGN
SECRETARY, A VENEZUELAN CULTURAL GROUP, AND ATHLETES FROM JAPAN,
TANZANIA, AND EGYPT.
--SCHLESINGER IS LISTED LAST BY NCNA AMONG FOREIGNERS SENDING
MEMORIAL WREATHS, BEHIND THE VENEZUELAN CULTURAL GROUP,
JAPANESE PEASANTS, AND SHIRLEY AND DAVID DUBOIS.
ON BALANCE, THE FACT THAT SCHLESINGER SHOOK HANDS WITH PREMIER
HUA, VICE CHAIRMAN WANG HUNG-WEN, ET AL. AT THE CEREMONIES
SEEMS THE PRODUCT OF AN OVERALL FUNERAL PLAN FOR DEALING WITH
DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF FOREIGNERS. USLO WAS IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS
WESTERN AND JAPANESE EMBASSIES.
8. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE CHINESE WILL RAISE THE
TAINAN ISSUE WITH SCHLESINGER. SCHLESINGER CONFIRMED TO ME THAT FOREI
GN
MINISTER CHIAO SKIMMED OVER IT IN PERFUNCTORY PASHION.
GATES
BT
RECALLED
PSN1050179
PAGE 03
OF 03
TOR:259/17:39Z
076:1512002
SEP
76
FORD
SECRET
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0
GERALD
LIBRARY
17
the
or
STATE
Department of State
OF THE AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
WN
SECRET 7498
PAGE 01
PEKING 01843 1513042
53
ACTION SS=25
TNFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 1026 W
121652
n 151200Z SEP 76 ZFF-4
FM USLO PEKING
TO USDEL SECRETARY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
TNFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6378
SECRET PEKING 1843
EXDIS
DECLASSIFIED
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR GATES
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
State Review
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
BY.
HR. NARA, DATE 2/5/03
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A) PFOR, CH
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SCHLESINGER VISIT
REFS: A) SECTO 27052, B) PEKING 1761, C) PEKING 1776
n) PEKING 1782, E) PEKING 1800
1. BEGIN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. THERE FOLLOWS MY
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SCHLESINGER VISIT (REF A) BASED ON
MY PRIVATE ONE-HOUR TALK WITH HIM AT USLO SEPTEMBER 14 CHE
CALLED ON ME AT HIS INITIATIVE) AND OUR EARLIER REPORTING ON HIS
ACTIVITIES IN PEKING. AFTER MAOIS DEATH THE PARAMOUNT OBJECTIVES
IN CHINESE HANDLING OF SCHLESINGER BECAME:
--TO DEMONSTRATE FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUITY. REINSTATEMENT OF
SCHLESINGER'S PROVINCIAL TRIP, INCLUDING THE EXCURSION TO THE SINO-
SOVIET FRONTIER, HIGHLIGHTS CONTINUED CHINESE ADHERENCE TO
"CHAIRMAN MAD'S REVOLUTIONARY LINE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS" WITH ITS FORD
ANTI-SOVIET TILT.
--TO REPUDIATE IMPLICITLY SPECULATION THAT MAO'S DEATH WOULD
GENALD LIBRARY
PROVE DESTABILIZING.
REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE MAY
OTHERWISE FEEL ABOUT CHINESE HANDLING OF SCHLESINGER, THE POLICY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
29
of
and
EXETS
Department of State
OF / AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02
PEKING 01843 1513042
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARE GENERALLY POSITIVE.
EXCLUSION OF USLO FROM THE TALKS SEEMED TO ACCORD WITH SCHLESINGER'S
OWN PREFERENCE. CHINESE FAILURE TO INCLUDE USLO IN CHIAO'S
WELCOMING BANQUET IS ODD, BUT WE DO NOT YET HAVE ALL THE FACTS
THAT PERTAIN. AS FOR SCHLESINGER'S FUNERAL ROLE, WE DO NOT SHARE
VIEW OF SOME IN HIS PARTY THAT CHINESE MEANT THIS AS SNUB DIRECTED
AT USG.
2. I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE POTENTIALLY MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS--
BOTH SYMBOLIC AND SUBSTANTIVE-- OF HIS VISIT ARE YET TO COME: HIS
EXCURSION TO THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER AND HIS PROMISED SESSIONS WITH
RANKING CHINESE LEADERS INCLUDING PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG. I SHALL
SUBMIT A FINAL ASSESSMENT AFTER SCHLESINGER'S DEPARTURE FROM
PEKING, PLANNED FOR SEPTEMBER 29. END INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY.
3. CHINESE DISPLAY EXTRAORDINARY ESTEEM FOR SCHLESINGER. FROM
CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY TRIP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE U.S. TO REINSTATEMENT
OF THE TRIP FOLLOWING MAO'S FUNERAL, THE CHINESE HAVE MISSED NO
OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY THEIR HIGH ESTEEM FOR SCHLESINGER:
--THEY CONFIRMED HIS ITINERARY PRIOR TO HIS DELEGATION'S
DEPARTURE, AN UNPRECEDENTED BREAK WITH CUSTOMARY CHINESE
NEGOTIATING PRACTICE WITH SUCH GROUPS. (SCHLESINGER'S INTER-
MEDIARIES WITH THE CHINESE HAD STRESSED THAT PRIOR APPROVAL
WAS THE SINE QUA NON OF SCHLESINGERIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE
INVITATION.)
--THEY INCLUDED ON THE ITINERARY SENSITIVE AREAS OFTEN REQUEST
BUT NEVER PREVIOUSLY GRANTED TO AMERICANS CLHASA, INING, JUHOHAOTE).
--THEY ARRANGED UNUSUALLY HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS, ALLOCATING TO
SCHLESINGER TWO AFTERNOONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO CONE
TS THE NORM) AND PLANNING, BEFORE MAO'S DEATH INTERVENED,
is
FORD
SESSIONS WITH DEFENSE MINISTER YEH CHIEN-YING AND PREMIER HUA
KUN-FENG.
GERALD
LIBRARY
**MEMBERS OF THE PARTY TOLD US THAT FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT OF
MADIS DEATH, FOREIGN MINISTRY AMERICAS AND OCEANIAS DEPARTMENT
DIRECTOR LIN PING CONFIDED TO SCHLESINGER THAT CHAIRMAN MAO HAD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
DS-1652
OF
STATE
UNITED
,
Department of State
/
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03
PEKING 01843 1513042
PERSONALLY ORDERED AN INVITATION EXTENDED TO HINBIN 1974. LIN
ADDED THAT MAO WAS INFORMED BEFORE HIS DEATH OF SCHLESINGERIS
PRESENCE IN CHINA.
EXCES
--AFTER CANCELLING THE TOUR AND REMAINING MEETINGS IN PEKING
UPON WORD THAT MAO HAD DIED, THE CHINESE REVERSED THEMSELVES,
REINSTATED THE WHOLE PROVINCIAL PROGRAM AND HINTED STRONGLY
THAT SCHLESINGER ON HIS RETURN TO PEKING WOULD MEET WITH
PREMIER HUA AND EITHER DEFENSE MINISTER YEH OR POLITBURO
STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBER CHANG CHUN-CHIAO.
so ON HIS FIRST EVENING IN PEKING SCHLESINGER ASKED THE
ACTING CHIEF FOR USLO'S ASSESSMENT OF CHINESE MOTIVES AND
EXPECTATIONS FOR HIS VISIT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RATIONALE IS SELF-
EVIDENT: THE CHINESE POSITION ON U.S. SOVIET DETENTE PARALLELS
SCHLESINGER18 PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND WELL-KNOWN PRIVATE VIEWS ON
THE ISSUE. THAT THESE VIEWS WOULD BE AIRED TO CHINESE AND WORLD
AUDIENCES WAS s REASONABLE
EXPECTATION, THE POTENT COMBINATION OF HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS, A NOVEL
EXCURSION TO TIBET AND TO THE SINO-SOVIET FRONTIER, AND A CORPS
OF ACCOMPANYING JOURNALISTS GUARANTEED HEAVY MEDIA PLAY IN THE
U.S. AND MANY OTHER COUNTRIES. IN THIS SENSE THE CHINESE CAST
SCHLESINGER IN THE FAMILIAR ROLE (E.G. THE FRG'S STRAUSS AND
FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON) OF PRESTIGIOUS OPPOSITION STATESMAN WHO
SHARES A KEY PART OF THE CHINESE WORLDVIEW.
5, WHETHER THE CHINESE SEEK MERELY TO GAIN ATTENTION FOR THEIR
VIEWS, TO INFLUENCE AMERICAN ELECTION-YEAR POLITICS, OR TO
REGISTER SOME GENERAL DISENCHANTMENT WITH CURRENT ADMINISTRATION
FOREIGN POLICIES IS CONJECTURAL. ALL PROBABLY ENTERED INTO INITIAL
CHINESE CALCULATIONS TO SOME DEGREE (POST-MAD CONSIDERATION
ARE NOTED IN MY SUMMARY ABOVE.)
6. THE EXCLUSION OF USLO. USLO'S ONLY FORMAL ROLE IN THE
SCHLESINGER VISIT HAS BEEN ATTENDANCE BY THE ACTING CHIEF AT
A NOON-HOUR WELCOMING BANQUET THE FIRST DAY GIVEN BY THE
NOMINAL HOSTS, CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
ACCORDING TO ONE MEMBER OF THE PARTY THE CHINESE SAID THEY
DID NOT PLAN TO INVITE ACTING CHIEF TO CHIAO'S BANQUET THAT EVENING
VISITORS URGED RECONSIDERATION. USLO WAS NOT INVITED TO SEND
OWING TO THE BANQUET'S ALLEGED "SPECIAL NATURE. # WE DOUBT THAT THEFORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
DS-1652
9.66
on
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
,
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 04
PEKING 01843 151304Z
A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS. WE DO
NOT KNOW WHEN AND HOW EITHER DECISION WAS REACHED. BUT WE
IMAGINE THAT THE CHINESE WELCOMED AND NURTURED SUPPOSITION ON
THE PART OF SCHLESINGER AND SOME MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY THAT THESE
OCCASIONS WERE LIKELY TO BE MORE CANDID AND PRODUCTIVE SANS USG
OFFICIALS.
7. THE SCHLESINGER DELEGATION AND FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS. WE
ARE DISINCLINED TO ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO SCHLESINGER'S
PLACE AMONG FOREIGNERS PAYING LAST RESPECTS TO MAO.
==NCNA LISTS THE SCHLESINGER GROUP AMONG OTHER "FOREIGN FRIENDS"
INCLUDING AN ALBANIAN METALLURGICAL GROUP, THE PAKISTAN FOREIGN
SECRETARY, A VENEZUELAN CULTURAL GROUP, AND ATHLETES FROM JAPAN,
TANZANIA, AND EGYPT.
--SCHLESINGER IS LISTED LAST BY NCNA AMONG FOREIGNERS SENDING
MEMORIAL WREATHS, BEHIND THE VENEZUELAN CULTURAL GROUP,
JAPANESE PEASANTS, AND SHIRLEY AND DAVID DUBOIS.
ON SALANCE, THE FACT THAT SCHLESINGER SHOOK HANDS WITH PREMIER
HUA, VICE CHAIRMAN WANG HUNG-WEN, ET AL, AT THE CEREMONIES
SEEMS THE PRODUCT OF AN OVERALL FUNERAL PLAN FOR DEALING WITH
DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF FOREIGNERS. USLO WAS IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS
WESTERN AND JAPANESE EMBASSIES.
8. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE CHINESE WILL RAISE THE
TATWAN ISSUE WITH SCHLESINGER. SCHLESINGER CONFIRMED TO ME THAT FOREI
GN
MINISTER CHIAO SKIMMED OVER IT IN PERFUNCTORY FASHION.
GATES
FORD is LIBRARY 07VN30
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION C - THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
18
on STATE
cost
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONFIDENTIAL 0230
PAGE 01
PEKING 01948 280220Z
63
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
023320
0 R 280055Z SEP 76
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6464
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
DECLASSIFIED
C N I D N T I L PEKING 1948
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 State Dept Review
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02
BY
HR I NARA, DATE 2/5/03
EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS CINCPAC/POLAD
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR OVIP CH US (SCHLESINGER, JAMES)
SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER MEETING WITH PRC DEFENSE MINISTER YEH CHIEN-
YING
1. BEGIN INTORUDCTION AND SUMMARY. FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY JAMES
SCHLESINGER AND FOUR MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION MET FOR 2-1/2
HOURS ON THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 27 WITH PRC DEFENSE MINISTER
AND PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN YEN CHIEN-YING. ACCORDING TO ORAL BRIEFING
OF USLO OFFICER BY ONE OF THE DELEGATION MEMBERS, YEHIS PRESENTATION
WAS CANDID, NONIDEOLOGICAL, AND NARROWLY FOCUSSED ON MILITARY AFF-
AIRSI HE SPOKE THROUGHOUT AS A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY MAN, NOT A PARTY
LEADER, SETTING OUT FOR DR. SCHLESINGER CHINA'S CURRENT ASSESSMENT
OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND ITS CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR MILITARY
RESPONSE TO ANY SOVIET ATTACK. YEHIS SOLE REFERENCE TO THE US WAS
A PERFUNCTORY CLOSING QUESTION ABOUT NOVEMBER ELECTION PROSPECTS
HE MADE NO MENTION OF SINO-US RELATIONS, THE SHANGHAI
COMMUNIQUE, OR TAIWAN. YEH IMPRESSED DELEGATION MEMBERS AS PHYSICA-
LLY FRAIL BUT MENTALLY SHARP. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.
2. THE SOVIET THREAT. YEH LEFT NO DOUBT THAT CHINA REGARDS THE
FORD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GERALD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
in
or
\
Department of State
of / AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
PEKING 01948 280220Z
SOVIET UNION AS ITS PRIMARY CONTEMPORARY ENEMY. WITHOUT DIRECTLY
CHALLENGING THE OFFICIAL LINE SANCTIFIED AT THE AUGUST 1973 PARTY
CONGRESS THAT MOSCOW IS "FEINTING TO THE EAST BUT ATTACKING TO THE
WEST," YEH SPOKE NOT AT ALL OF SOVIET AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS IN
WESTERN EUROPE. HE PROPOSED INSTEAD THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD
NOT DARE ATTACK CHINA OUT OF CONCERN FOR THE POLITICAL AND
STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY OF ITS REAR. A THRUST AGAINST CHINA, YEH
INTIMATED, WOULD LOOSEN THE SOVIET HOLD OVER ITS EASTERN EUROPEAN
SATELLITES AND WOULD INVITE A PUNISHING NATO COUNTERATTACK,
3. CONTINGENCIES AND CHINESE STRATEGY. IF DESPITE ALL LOGIC THE
USSR DID ATTACK, CHINA WOULD INSTANTLY ADOPT A "PEOPLE'S WAR" STR-
ATEGY. SCHLESINGER QUESTIONED THE FEASIBILITY OF PEOPLE'S WAR,
HYPOTHESIZING THAT A THRUST INTO CHINA WAS LESS LIKELY THAN, OR
EXAMPLE, A MOVE TO LOP OFF A PIECE OF CHINESE TERRITORY SUCH AS
SINKIANG. YEH ALLOWED THAT CHINESE PLANNERS HAD ENVISAGED SUCH A
POSSIBILITY, WOULD NOT TOLERATE SUCH A "NIBBLING
OPERATION" SUCH AS THE JAPANESE HAD ADOPTED IN THE 1930S, AND WOULD
IMMEDIATELY LAUNCH AN "ALL-OUT ATTACK" ON THE USSR. (Y.E.H DID NOT
AMPLIFY ON THE FORM SUCH AN ATTACK MIGHT TAKE, HE DID STRESS CHINA'S
EXEMS EXPIR
APPRECIATION OF THE NEED FOR MODERN WEAPONS AT ANOTHER POINT
IN THE CONVERSATION, HOWEVER, POINTING TO THE RECENT NUCLEAR TEST
AS EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS IN THAT AREA.)
4. SCHLESINGER NOTED THAT SOVIET TANKS WERE NUMEROUS AND FORMIDABLE,
SUGGESTED THAT "PEOPLE'S WAR" WOULD BE AN INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO A
MASSIVE SOVIET TANK PUSH ACROSS THE BORDER, AND RECOMMENDED THAT THE
CHINESE MIGHT PROFIT FROM A STUDY OF THE ISRAELI TANK CAMPAIGN DURJ
ING THE 1973 MIDDLE EAST WAR. TERMING SUCH ADVICE "FRIENDLY, YEH
RESPONDED THAT CHINA RECOGNIZED ITS WEAKNESSES AND, HAVING THESE IN
MIND, HAD ALREADY STUDIED CAREFULLY THE LESSONS OF THAT CAMPAIGN,
5. THE SCHLESINGER DELEGATION MEMBER PRIVATELY EXPRESSED TO USLO
OFFICER THE DELEGATION'S SURPRISE AT YEH'S RATHER OFFHAND ASSUMPTION
-- PRESUMABLY REFLECTING HIGH-LEVEL ESTIMATES -- THAT THE SOVIET S
LACK THE LOGISTICAL WHEREWITHAL TO SUSTAIN A PROTRACTED WAR AGAINST
CHINA, WHEN YEH SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED A SOVIET SHORTAGE OF PET-
ROLEUM AND FOOD, SCHLESINGER POINTED OUT THAT THE USSR IS CUR-
RENTLY A NET EXPORTER OF PETROLEUM AND WOULD DOUBTLESS BE "LESS
GENEROUS" IN EVENT OF WAR. YEH SEEMED GENUINELY ASTONISHED AT THIS
ASSESSMENT, SEEKING FROM SCHLESINGER SOMEWHAT LATER IN THE CONVER-
FORD
LIBRAR
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT CONFIDENTIAL THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
of
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES of
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03
PEKING 01948 2802202
SATION A REITERATION OF HNIS VIEW.
6. THE MILITIA. YEH SPOKE BRIEFLY OF THE MILITIA AS ANOTHER
INPUT TO PEOPLE'S WAR, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ONE MILLION MEMBERS
OF THE MODEL SHANGHAI MILITIA HAD ONLY ONE THOUSAND ARTILLERY
PIECES.
7. SINO-US RELATIONS. YEH MADE NO MENTION WHATSOEVER OF BILATERAL
SINO-US RELATIONS, TAIWAN (EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF JARANESE ISLAND
STRATEGY DURING WORLD WAR II), OR THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, IN FACT,
YEH'S ONLY REFERENCE TO THE US WAS A CLOSING INQUIRY IN THE
CHOU EN-LAI STYLE: MORE A FLATTERING DISPLAY OF DETAILED KNOWLEDGE
ABOUT THE VISITOR'S COUNTRY THAN A QUESTION POSED TO ELICIT USEFUL
INFORMATION. NOTING THAT THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WOULD BE HELD
INNOVEMBER 2 AND THAT CURRENT POLLS SHOWED DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE CARTE
R
AHEAD IN 30 STATES,
YEH ASKED FOR SCHLESINGER'S ASSESSMENT OF THE PROBABLE OUTCOME.
8. STYLE, HEALTH, AND ATMOSPHERICS. THE 77-YEAR-OLD YEH, WHO HAD
STOOD ERECT IN PUBLIC VIEW FOR THE ONE HALF HOUR MEMORIAL CEREMONY FO
R
MAO A WEEK EARLIER, ENTERED THE ROOM SUPPORTED BY AN ATTENDANT. BUT
DESPITE HIS EVIDENT PHYSICAL INFIRMITIES YEH CAME ACROSS AS MENTALLY
A
ACUTE. HE MADE A CURSORY GLANCE AT HIS ONE-PAGE BRIEFING
PAPER AFTER SEATING HIMSELF BUT CARRIED ON THE SUBSEQUENT DIALOGUE
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO NOTES
OR COLLEAGUES PRESENT. SURPRISINGLY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
YANG CHENG-WU OFFERED IDEOLOGICAL INTERJECTIONS RATHER THAN
SUBSTANTIVE MILITARY CLARIFICATIONS, (YEH WAS GUILTY OF ONE GLARING
BUT
INTRIGUING SLIP. MISQUOTING MAOIS DICTUM AS "DIG TUNNELS DEEP, STORE
GRAIN EVERYWHERE, AND PREPARE AGAINST WARFARE," YEH WAS HASTILY
CORRECTED
BY YANG, WHO SUPPLIED THE CORRECT THIRD PHRASE "NEVER SEEK HEGEMONY."
,
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