Ask the Scholar
Page 4 of 9
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
Digitized from Box 20 of the NSA. Presidential Country Files: East Asia andthe Pacificat the Gerald R.Ford Presidential Library
FUND
a
CONF IDENTIAL
-4- -
own)
unconventional conflicts. Neither massive firepower, nor
ingenious gimmickry, can insure success. Their selective
use, on a piece-meal basis, adds to their ineffectiveness.
-- In addition, if we ever again undertake a direct
military involvement in such a conflict, we should guard
against *shifting from a supportive to a primary role, as
we did in Viet-Nam beginning in 1965.
-- Moreover, we should avoid situations such as
developed in Viet-Nam in which the indigenous defending
forces became second-class citizens in their own country;
as our own military role grew, ARVN's declined, a situa-
tion which was not reversed until we began Vietnamization
and the withdrawal of our forces.
-- We should recognize that large expeditionary forces,
by their very nature, will not adapt to the conditions of
an unconventional conflict. Instead, the tendency will be
to transform an unconventional war to a conventional one,
while fundamental political aspects of the conflict are
progressively ignored.
-- We should admit our own imperfect understanding of
the political dynamics of foreign (particularly Asian)
societies, In Viet-Nam we persistently looked at political
conditions, and made our judgments, from what was basically
a Western perspective.
-- Since our ability to understand the politics of
countries such as Viet-Nam is limited, it, follows that our
attempts to manipulate political forces may well fail.
We should not assume, as we did in 1963, that we know what
is best for a country and proceed, as in the overthrow of
Diem, to percipitate a situation with unknown and possibly
disastrous consequences, Nor should we take the opposite
tack--allying ourselves too rigidly with a leadership whose
diminishing mandate we may not be able to perceive.
International Aspects of Bilateral Commitments
-- We should more realistically assess our ability to
maintain international support for difficult undertakings,
recognizing at the outset that we may be operating alone,
that other governments- - -because of limited resources,
CONPIDENTIAL
Page data
- Page
- 4
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 5346a3bb2f2aeae9
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 7367501
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "7367501",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7367501",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "State Department Paper Regarding the Lessons of Vietnam",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7367501",
"identifierLocal": "032400090-001",
"collections": [
"Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)",
"East Asia and Pacific Country Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/1/3675/7367501/content/arcmedia/presidential-libraries/ford/gallery/032400090-001_Page_7.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/1/3675/7367501/content/arcmedia/presidential-libraries/ford/gallery/032400090-001_Page_7.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/1/3675/7367501/content/arcmedia/presidential-libraries/ford/gallery/032400090-001_Page_7.jpg",
"imageCount": 9,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "7367501",
"label": "State Department Paper Regarding the Lessons of Vietnam",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7367501"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "7367501",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7367501",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "State Department Paper Regarding the Lessons of Vietnam",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7367501",
"identifierLocal": "032400090-001",
"collections": [
"Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)",
"East Asia and Pacific Country Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/1/3675/7367501/content/arcmedia/presidential-libraries/ford/gallery/032400090-001_Page_7.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/1/3675/7367501/content/arcmedia/presidential-libraries/ford/gallery/032400090-001_Page_7.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/1/3675/7367501/content/arcmedia/presidential-libraries/ford/gallery/032400090-001_Page_7.jpg",
"imageCount": 9,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7367501",
"naId": 7367501,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 9,
"logicalDate": "1975-05-09",
"month": 5,
"year": 1975
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 4,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/1/3675/7367501/content/arcmedia/presidential-libraries/ford/gallery/032400090-001_Page_5.jpg",
"mediaId": "5346a3bb2f2aeae9",
"ocrText": "Digitized from Box 20 of the NSA. Presidential Country Files: East Asia andthe Pacificat the Gerald R.Ford Presidential Library\nFUND\na\nCONF IDENTIAL\n-4- -\nown)\nunconventional conflicts. Neither massive firepower, nor\ningenious gimmickry, can insure success. Their selective\nuse, on a piece-meal basis, adds to their ineffectiveness.\n-- In addition, if we ever again undertake a direct\nmilitary involvement in such a conflict, we should guard\nagainst *shifting from a supportive to a primary role, as\nwe did in Viet-Nam beginning in 1965.\n-- Moreover, we should avoid situations such as\ndeveloped in Viet-Nam in which the indigenous defending\nforces became second-class citizens in their own country;\nas our own military role grew, ARVN's declined, a situa-\ntion which was not reversed until we began Vietnamization\nand the withdrawal of our forces.\n-- We should recognize that large expeditionary forces,\nby their very nature, will not adapt to the conditions of\nan unconventional conflict. Instead, the tendency will be\nto transform an unconventional war to a conventional one,\nwhile fundamental political aspects of the conflict are\nprogressively ignored.\n-- We should admit our own imperfect understanding of\nthe political dynamics of foreign (particularly Asian)\nsocieties, In Viet-Nam we persistently looked at political\nconditions, and made our judgments, from what was basically\na Western perspective.\n-- Since our ability to understand the politics of\ncountries such as Viet-Nam is limited, it, follows that our\nattempts to manipulate political forces may well fail.\nWe should not assume, as we did in 1963, that we know what\nis best for a country and proceed, as in the overthrow of\nDiem, to percipitate a situation with unknown and possibly\ndisastrous consequences, Nor should we take the opposite\ntack--allying ourselves too rigidly with a leadership whose\ndiminishing mandate we may not be able to perceive.\nInternational Aspects of Bilateral Commitments\n-- We should more realistically assess our ability to\nmaintain international support for difficult undertakings,\nrecognizing at the outset that we may be operating alone,\nthat other governments- - -because of limited resources,\nCONPIDENTIAL"
}