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    "title": "State Department Paper Regarding the Lessons of Vietnam",
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        "Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)",
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            "day": 9,
            "logicalDate": "1975-05-09",
            "month": 5,
            "year": 1975
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    "seq": 9,
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    "type": "document",
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    "ocrText": "Digitized from Box 20 of the NSA. Presidential Country Files: East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\n7509592\n9a\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\n3173\nWashington, D.C. 20520\nMay 9, 1975\nCONF IDENTIAL\nMEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nSubject: Lessons of Viet-Nam\nAttached is a paper on \"Lessons of Viet-Nam\"\nwhich you requested.\nBrond Unclul\nfor\nGeorge S. Springsteen\nExecutive Secretary\nFORD\nAttachment:\n&\nAs stated\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nCONFIDENTIAL\nGDS KBH2/10/00\nDigitized from Box 20 of the NSA. Presidential Country Files: East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\n9b\nFORD\n&\nCONFIDENTIAL\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nThe Lessons of Viet-Nam\nTo draw meaningful lessons from our Viet-Nam experience\nit is essential to bear in mind the climate of the times\nduring which fateful decisions were taken. In 1954 it was\nwidely accepted that we faced a monolithic communist bloc\nbent on expansion through military means. Indochina was\nseen, with considerable logic in that context, as a primary\nlocus for that expansion and there was a remarkably broad\nconsensus in this country that the United States should\ncombat it. In the early 1960's, America was imbued with an\nactivist, outward-looking spirit, one reflection of which\nwas the notion that American resources and American ex-\npertise could solve any problem anywhere. It was only in\nthe late 60's, when our participation in what was perceived\nto be an unjust and unwinnable war became objectionable to\nbroad segments of the American people, that our policies\noutstripped the national consensus and support for them\nbegan to wane.\nHaving been badly burned in Viet-Nam, the American\npeople now appear to have quite different, and more limited,\nvisions of our proper role in the world and our ability to\ninfluence events. In a sense, a control mechanism has\nevolved within our society which is likely to prevent for\nthe foreseeable future any repetition of a Viet-Nam style\ninvolvement. The danger may therefore be not that we will\nignore the lessons of Viet-Nam, but that we will be tempted\nto apply them too broadly, in East Asia and around the\nworld. Nonetheless, although not all of them are uni-\nversally applicable, the lessons of Viet-Nam are clear,\nand numerous:\nThe Nature of Commitments\n--- We must keep commitments to individual countries\ntailored to our degree of interest. This is not to say\nthat the independence and well-being of small countries\nare of no consequence or concern for the United States--\nonly that such considerations are relatively more con-\nsequential in areas where our interests are more directly\nat issue. Related to this, resources devoted to carrying\nout our commitments should be proportionate to the in-\ntrinsic importance of the commitment itself, or of the\ninterest it reflects.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDigitized from Box 20 of the NSA. Presidential Country Files: East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 2 -\n-- It follows, therefore, that we should commit our-\nselves only selectively to undertakings likely to involve\nthe expenditure of lives or of massive resources. (Im-\nportant note: having made commitments, we cannot be\nselectively reliable in fulfilling them.)\n--- Recognizing that constancy in our commitments is\nimportant, we should nevertheless avoid confusing constancy\nwith inertia. When circumstances change dramatically, or\na commitment clearly becomes unsustainable, we should\ndraw the right conclusions and change our policy accordingly.\n1968 was probably a better time to try for a comprehensive\npolitical settlement in Viet-Nam than was 1972. 1973\nwas a better time to press the GVN for further realistic\npolitical negotiations--particularly since we were in that\nyear deprived by the Congress of the ability to enforce\n&\nFORD\nthe Paris Agreement--than was 1974 or 1975.\nThe Nature of Allies\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\n-- Foremost among the criteria we might henceforth\nemploy in making judgments about our commitments is the\nindigenous strength and will of our prospective ally--its\nability to help itself. Although the Vietnamese government\nwe supported was far more humane than its adversary, it\nwas, in the final analysis, unable to mobilize effectively\nthe support of its people in the face of an implacable, dis-\nciplined enemy. Without such support, ultimate defeat was\nprobably inevitable. On our desire to stem North Vietnamese\ncommunist expansion, we underestimated this critical factor.\n-- In effect, we allowed saving South Viet-Nam to\nbecome more important to us than it was for the South\nVietnamese themselves. In the future, we should gauge\nour support to our allies' efforts, and their successes.\nIf they cannot do the job, we will be unable to do it for\nthem.\n-- We should be fully aware of the fragility of govern-\nments which rest, to a significant degree, on the support\nof the military. This was not the chief cause of South\nViet-Nam's downfall--indeed the GVN retained a considerable\naura of legitimacy within Viet-Nam--but the inflexibility\nand narrowness of judgment of an increasingly isolated\nleadership in the face of unyielding North Vietnamese\npressure played a role in the nation's ultimate collapse.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDigitized from Box 20 of the NSA. Presidential Country Files: East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nCONF + DENTIAL\n- 3 -\n---- We consistently allowed the GVN to utilize massive\nU.S. support as a substitute for solutions to its own in-\nternal political problems. We were never willing to\nforce the GVN to face up to this fact.\nThe Nature of Adversaries\n-- There are probably few prospective opponents any-\nwhere in the world who will prove to have the determination\nand single-mindedness of Hanoi. Nevertheless, we consistently\nunderestimated the tenacity and sense of purpose of Hanoi,\nand overestimated our ability to break its will. We\napplied our strength without an adequate assessment of\nour opponent and thus neither achieved success nor deterred\nhis pursuit of his objectives.\n-- Nor should we underestimate the ability of revolu-\ntionary movements to develop broad and deep-seated popular\nsupport in loosely structured, unmodern societies. Most\nsuch societies have relatively recent memories of colonial-\nism, or continue to experience various degrees of external.\nexploitation, and are as such susceptible to revolutionary\nappeals to nationalistic instincts. In Viet-Nam, we were\nnever able to escape being the inheritors of the French\ncolonization.\nGERALD LIBRARY ? FORD\n-- Negotiated settlements of continuing conflicts\nhave no intrinsic life of their own. With communist\nadversaries such agreements must be backed by strength and\nthe will to use it. When an agreement no longer serves\ntheir interest, they will ignore it if it is not enforce-\nable. Since Hanoi's goal remained unchanged after\nJanuary 1973, it followed that the Paris Agreement could\nnot be successful without our readiness to force compli-\nance or to continue high levels of military support to\nthe GVN. (This does not mean that all agreements with all\ncommunist states are inherently unworkable--obviously in\nareas where there is a confluence of sustained interests,\nagreements can be reached which communist states will\nmaintain.)\nLimitations on Our Ability to Influence Events\n-- Clearly, Viet-Nam demonstrated that the effective-\nness of modern military technology is severely limited in\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDigitized from Box 20 of the NSA. Presidential Country Files: East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nR.\nFORD\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 4 -\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nunconventional conflicts. Neither massive firepower, nor\ningenious gimmickry, can insure success. Their selective\nuse, on a piece-meal basis, adds to their ineffectiveness.\n-- In addition, if we ever again undertake a direct\nmilitary involvement in such a conflict, we should guard\nagainst shifting from a supportive to a primary role, as\nwe did in Viet-Nam beginning in 1965.\n-- Moreover, we should avoid situations such as\ndeveloped in Viet-Nam in which the indigenous defending\nforces became second-class citizens in their own country;\nas our own military role grew, ARVN's declined, a situa-\ntion which was not reversed until we began Vietnamization\nand the withdrawal of our forces.\n-- We should recognize that large expeditionary forces,\nby their very nature, will not adapt to the conditions of\nan unconventional conflict. Instead, the tendency will be\nto transform an unconventional war to a conventional one,\nwhile fundamental political aspects of the conflict are\nprogressively ignored.\n-- We should admit our own imperfect understanding of\nthe political dynamics of foreign (particularly Asian)\nsocieties. In Viet-Nam we persistently looked at political\nconditions, and made our judgments, from what was basically\na Western perspective.\n-- Since our ability to understand the politics of\ncountries such as Viet-Nam is limited, it follows that our\nattempts to manipulate political forces may well fail.\nWe should not assume, as we did in 1963, that we know what\nis best for a country and proceed, as in the overthrow of\nDiem, to percipitate a situation with unknown and possibly\ndisastrous consequences, Nor should we take the opposite\ntack--allying ourselves too rigidly with a leadership whose\ndiminishing mandate we may not be able to perceive.\nInternational Aspects of Bilateral Commitments\n-- We should more realistically assess our ability to\nmaintain international support for difficult undertakings,\nrecognizing at the outset that we may be operating alone,\nthat other governments--because of limited resources,\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDigitized from Box 20 of the NSA. Presidential Country Files: East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 5 -\nGERALD R FORD LIBRARY\ndiffering political perceptions or divergent national\ninterests--will not support our efforts in any meaning-\nful way. Through strenuous efforts we elicited some\ntangible support from a few of our friends for our\npolicies in Viet-Nam but this was not sustained.\n-- Moreover, we should bear in mind the possibility\nof undertakings such as Viet-Nam actively damaging our\nrelations with other allies.\n--- We should not expect, in the event of another\nsituation like Viet-Nam, that the major communist powers\nwill help pull our chestnuts out of the fire. At best,\nour bilateral relationships with the PRC and the Soviet\nUnion may encourage a passive response from them--whether\nthings are going well for us (as in 1972), or badly\n(as in 1975).\n-- We should expect that the major communist powers\nwill support local subversion and wars of liberation,\nparticularly if they perceive no adverse effect on their\nrelations with us or on their direct interests.\nThe Management of Commitments\n-- If we were ever to become involved again in an\neffort of the magnitude of Viet-Nam, we could make things\nsomewhat easier for ourselves by improving the ways we\nattempt to manage our involvement. It can be argued that,\nin addition to having very little control over what South\nViet-Nam did, we were never in firm control of our own\nresources, whether military, economic or political. A\ndiffusion of responsibility and control compounded our\ndifficulties.\n-- We should guard against biased intelligence and\nanalysis to support policy goals, as happened in Viet-\nNam particularly during the height of our involvement.\nRelated to this, we should be wary of \"advocacy reporting\"\nfrom our missions and within the bureaucracy at home. A\nparticularly virulent form of \"localitis\" affected many\ncapable and dedicated individuals working in or on Viet-\nNam. They were intensely committed, to a worthy goal,\nbut personal commitment sometimes blurred judgment.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDigitized from Box 20 of the NSA. Presidential Country Files: East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 6 -\n-- We should devise more effective ways of bridging\nthe gap between the expert level and the decision-making\nlevel of the government. Cogent judgment was often ob-\nscured as information and recommendations proceeded upward\nthrough the system, because of the pressures for success.\n-- We should insure that the political and military\naspects of our commitments, and the resources we devote to\neach, are kept in proper balance. Military considerations\nwill become dominant in policy if that balance is skewed\nand, as in Viet-Nam, we may lose sight of the fundamental\nnature of the conflict and our goals in it.\n-- We should try to insure that we do not become\nlocked-in to \"firefighting\" management techniques. We\nmust improve our ability to anticipate events in any\nsituation of major American involvement, rather than\nfinding ourselves--as we so often did in Viet-Nam--coping\nwith crises after they had arisen.\nDomestic Considerations\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\n-- We should recognize that no amount of cajolery\ncan create public support for a foreign undertaking where\nnone already exists. (Thus, our commitments must be re-\nlated to perceived national interests.) An Administration,\nby active leadership, can only energize latent support.\n-- Having become involved in a difficult foreign\nproject, we should not attempt to mislead public opinion\nor the Congress as to its duration or the level of sacrifice\nit will require. We should not profess to see lights at\nthe end of tunnels. We should not employ short-term ra-\ntionales, out of short-term expediency, when in fact much\nremains to be done.\n-- We should never assume that inconsistencies in our\npolicies, or foul-ups in their implementation, will go un-\nnoticed by the fourth estate. We will have to live with\nthe fact that mistakes will be exposed (as well as, un-\nfortunately, the fact that any course of action, right\nor wrong, will be second-guessed).\n-- We should insure that Congress is on board not\nonly at the outset of foreign commitments, but at every\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDigitized from Box 20 of the NSA. Presidential Country Files: East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 7 -\nstage at which any escalation of our commitment or involve-\nment is contemplated. In the absence of Congressional\nsupport, clearly, commitment beyond a certain level is\nimpossible.\n-- Consistent with the requirements of military\nsecurity, our basic policy decisions should be publicly\nstated and defended.\nFORD LIBRARY & GERALD\nCONFIDENTIAL"
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