Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "7367505",
    "label": "Memorandum from Clinton E. Granger to Brent Scowcroft Regarding a Report on Vietnam",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7367505"
}

{
    "id": "7367505",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7367505",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum from Clinton E. Granger to Brent Scowcroft Regarding a Report on Vietnam",
    "description": "This memorandum provides Clinton E. Granger's views on the situation in South Vietnam and his assessment of General Fred C. Weyand's report.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7367505",
    "identifierLocal": "032400082-001",
    "collections": [
        "Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)",
        "East Asia and Pacific Country Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/5/3675/7367505/content/arcmedia/presidential-libraries/ford/gallery/032400082-001_Page_2.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/5/3675/7367505/content/arcmedia/presidential-libraries/ford/gallery/032400082-001_Page_2.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/5/3675/7367505/content/arcmedia/presidential-libraries/ford/gallery/032400082-001_Page_2.jpg",
    "imageCount": 6,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7367505",
    "naId": 7367505,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 5,
            "logicalDate": "1975-04-05",
            "month": 4,
            "year": 1975
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 2,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/5/3675/7367505/content/arcmedia/presidential-libraries/ford/gallery/032400082-001_Page_4.jpg",
    "mediaId": "142239e65807c8e4",
    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET - GDS\n- 4 -\nHe indicated that he needed additional tactical mobility, and wished\nfor additional helicopters. However, while helicopters would be\nuseful, the comment may well have been spurred by our associations\nin 1967, when I supplied helicopter airlift and gunship cover to his\n2d ARVN Divison.\nI talked about the problems created in the northern provinces by\nthe presence of families of military personnel near the tactical\npositions of the GVN forces, and asked if he had any plans to withdraw\nthe families in the more exposed positions to Saigon. He said he had\nno such plans, and that there was not really any place that they could\nwithdraw to - and that the families would stand on position with his\nsoldiers. While not very realistic, this probably indicates the mental\nattitude which will be evident when the pressure increases.\nIn response to questions on the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese\nAir Force, General Toan had no kind words, indicating that the Air\nForce was ineffective, would not press in on targets in support of\nthe ground forces in the face of enemy air defenses; dropped their\nbombs from extremely high altitude, and had even bombed General\nToan's own troops recently.\n-- Discussions on the political scene and higher headquarters were very\nlimited - General Toan did not want to discuss his views, but\nexpressed himself in a few short profane terms.\nFORD\nWe then discussed the probable scenario for future events in MR III. Our\nviews concided: expecting a major effort to isolate Tay Ninh and the 25th\nOFFICE) P. <,\nARVN Division as a prime effort, with a large secondary attack toward the\nBien Hoa-Long Binh-Saigon complex from the northeast.\nThis would probably lead to a rapidly disintegrating tactical situation through-\nout MR III, and could trigger a GVN effort to shift a division north from the\nDelta. However, one division would not have the added capability to lend\nreal stability, and the vacuum in the Delta would cause a more rapid collapse\nthere.\nSaigon will probably become a city under siege at a very early point in time -\npossibly the last week in April.\nOne event which could alter the situation in all of the remaining South Vietnamese\nforces would be the replacement of President Thieu. There is a vast bitter-\nness against Thieu for the reverses in the northern provinces. Correctly\nor not, Thieu is being blamed for the military disasters in MR I and II.\nTOP SECRET - GDS"
}