Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
This file contains material relating to Nicholas Shadrin.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1525323
label
USSR - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (11)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1525323
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
USSR - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (11)
description
This file contains material relating to Nicholas Shadrin.
citationUrl
collections
Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada (Ford Administration)
Europe and Canada Country Files
subjects
Soviet Union
Angola
China
Portugal
Middle East conflicts
Human rights
Petroleum
United States-Soviet relations
Helsinki Agreement, 1975
Grain sales
Arms control
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1525323
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1976-09-30
month
9
year
1976
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1975-11-01
month
11
year
1975
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
b7d7da4056a2592e
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 21, folder "USSR - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (11)" of the NSA. Presidential Country Files for
Europe and Canada at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 21 of NSA. Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
DEPARTMENT
;
STATE
wrt
Department of State
OF / AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 4444
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 15046 241109Z
14
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 350-00 /026 W
090525
R 240632Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9084
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
C n N F D E N I A MOSCOW 15046
EXDIS
E.O. 116521 GDS
TAGS: PINT, UR
SUBJECT: TIGHTENING OF SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICY
EXCES
1. SUMMARY. A NEW, MORE RESTRICTIVE POLICY GOVERNING
EMIGRATION HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN THE UKRAINE. IF ADOPTED
ELSEWHERE, POTENTIAL EMIGRANT POOL WILL BECOME SMALLER.
END SUMMARY.
2. DISSIDENT MOSCOW JEWISH SOURCES TOLD US OF A NEW OVIR
POLICY OF REFUSING TO ACCEPT EMIGRATION APPLICATIONS
FROM INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD LEAVE PARENTS OR SIBLINGS
BEHIND ON EMIGRATING FROM THE SOVIET UNION (PREVIOUS
POLICY WAS TO REQUIRE PERMISSION FROM PARENTS NOT
EMIGRATING). OUR SOURCES SAY THAT THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC
OVIR HAS INFORMED SEVERAL KIEVAN JEWS THAT THE NEW POLICY
WAS ADOPTED EFFECTIVE SEPT 1. "PURSUANT TO MOSCOW
DIRECTIVE". THE ODESSA OVIR REPORTEDLY PUT THIS POLICY
INTO EFFECT AS OF SEPT 10, AND OVIRS IN OTHER UKRAINSAN
CITIES ARE ALSO BEGINNING TO APPLY THE NEW REGULATIONS.
3. OUR SOURCES ADD THAT THERE HAVE BEEN ISOLATED AND
UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF ADOPTION OF A SIMILAR POLICY IN
FORD
&
TASHKENT AND DUSHANBE. OUR SOURCES SAY THAT THUS FAR
THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO GET CONFIRMATION FROM THE
IN FACT BEEN CHANGED, BUT SEVERAL APPEALS FROM
GERALD
LIBRARY
ALL-UNION OVIR THAT THE EMIGRATION GROUND RULES HAVE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONF IDENTIAL
1 7/31/01
STATE
ORLINO
Department of State
TELEGRAM
% /
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
MOSCOW 15046 2411092
DECISIONS TAKEN UNDER THE NEW POLICY ARE CURRENTLY UNDER
REVIEW AT THE ALL-UNION LEVEL.
4. OUR SOURCES SAY THAT THE JEWISH DISSIDENT COMMUNITY
HAS BEEN QUITE DISTURBED BY THE REPORTS OF THE CHANGED
POLICY IN THE UKRAINE, BECAUSE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF
JEWS LIVING THERE, AND BECAUSE THE POLICY DECISION MAY
BE EXTENDED SOON THROUGHOUT THE USSR. SOURCES ALSO ADMIT
THEY HAD LONG ANTICIPATED AN INCREASE IN EMIGRATION CAND
EASING IN APPLICATION OF REGULATIONS) IN THE PERIOD BEFORE
THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. THEY CONFESSED TO BEING
SOMEWHAT SURPRISED AT THE TIMING OF THIS RESTRICTIVE
MOVE. THEY OBSERVED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE HAVE BEEN
ISOLATED CASES IN THE PAST OF OVIRS REFUSING TO GRANT
EMIGRATION PERMISSION IN CASES IN WHICH A PARENT OR
SIBLING WOULD BE LEFT BEHIND ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT
WOULD LEAD TO A BREAKUP RATHER THAN A REUNION OF A
FAMILY.
5, COMMENT: SOVIET AUTHORITIES COULD INDEED INTERPRET
THE NEW REGULATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CSCE FINAL
ACT BY ARGUING THAT IT IS WRONG TO BREAK UP ALREADY
EXISTING FAMILIES. GIVEN THAT A LARGE PERCENTAGE
OF THE JEWS EMIGRATING FROM THE SOVIET UNION HAVE
RELATIVES WHO WISH TO STAY, THE SOVIETS MIGHT WELL FEND
THIS A USEFUL TACTIC TO REDUCE EMIGRATION WHILE TRUMPETING
THEIR COMPLIANCE WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
MATLOCK
R.
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REFRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION 0 THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFEDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED of 7
TELEGRAM
ITATE
SECRET 5493
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 9653 1721077
14
ACTION SS-25
TNFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 1026 W
033008
R 1715277 JUN 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5360
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USI.O PEKING
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
SECRET MOSCOW 9653
EXDIS
F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, CH, UR
EXCES
SUBJECT: A SOVIET GESTURE TO POST-MAD CHINA?
REF: HONG KONG 6887
1. IN THE EXCELLENT FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT POST-MAO MAO
CHTNA PROVIDED BY REFTEL, HONG KONG SUGGESTS THAT SOVIET
INITIATIVE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE PRC IN THE IMMEDIATE
AFTERMATH OF MAO'S PASSING SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED (PARA 7).
FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT, IT WOULD APPEAR TO MAKE BOTH POLITICAL
AND TACTICAL SENSE FOR THE SOVIETS TO MAKE A GESTURE OF SOME
TYPE. THE SOVIETS HAVE A VARIETY OF OPTIONS LARGE AND SMALL,
BUT THEIR MOST LIKELY APPROACH WOULD BE TO CALL FOR NORMALIZA-
TION OF STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS AND A SETTLEMENT OF THE BORDER
PROBLEM.
?. IN CHINA ITSELF, WE SUSPECT THE SOVIETS WILL BE
APPEALING TO WHATEVER FUTURE LEADERSHIP MAY EMERGE
AFTER A RATHER PROLONGED SHAKING-DOWN PROCESS WHICH
FORD
WILL TAKE PLACE UNDER "MADIST" AUSPICES, AND THEREFORE
&
UNDER THE SIGN OF CONTINUING ANTI-SOVIETISM.
THF SINOLOGISTS WE TALK TO HERE ARE OF
A NUMBER OF MINDS AS TO NOW DEEP "MADISM" GOES IN THE
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
66 7/31/01
DEPARTMENT of STATE
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 09653 1721072
CHINESE BODY POLITIC, BUT THEY HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT
PERMEATES AHT LEADERSHPIP CADRE AND PROBABLY WILL FOR YEARS
TO COME. THEREFORE, THEY DO NOT EXPECT A RAPID EVOLUTION
FOR THE BETTER IN CHINESE ANTI-SOVTETISM. AND, CONSE-
QUENTLY, WHATEVER GESTURE THE SOVIETS MAKE WILL BE
DESIGNED FOR THE FARTHER RATHER THAN THE NEARER FUTURE,
WHEN PEKING MAN BEGINS TO REAWAKEN FROM THE LONG DARK
NIGHTS OF MAOISM.
3, BEYOND CHINA, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS WILL ALSO BE
WRITING A RECORD OF REASONABLENESS AND GOODWILL FOR
"WORLD PUBLIC OPINION,' FOR OTHER ASTANS, AND FOR
COMMUNISTS EVERYWHERE, I.E., IN EVERY AREA OF POLITICS
WHERE THEY ARE CURRENTLY LOCKED IN STRUGGLE FOR HEARTS
AND MINDS WITH THE "MAOISTS."
4. AND FINALLY, A STANCE OF REASONABLENESS, IN A FRAME-
WORK OF FIRMNESS IN THE RIGHT, IS PART AND PARCEL OF
THE CURRENT SOVIET LEADERSHIPIS SELF-IMAGE, WHICH IT
FINDS ADVANTAGEOUS AND SEEKS TO PROTECT TO ITS OWN
PEOPLE. THE CHINESE RE GENUINELY UNPOPULAR HERE, BUT
WAR-- ANDTENSIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TOWARD WAR-- IS EVEN
MORE UNPOPULAR. sn LONG AS MAO LIVES, THE EASY WAY TO
BAL ANCE THESE UNPOPULARITIES IS TO CAST THE "MADISTS"
TN THE VILLIAN ROLE OF LEFTISTS AND WARMONGERS, AND HUG THF
MIDDLE ROAD BETWEEN "LEFT" AND "RIGHT" IN WORLD
COMMUNISM AND "MAOTSM" AND "IMPERIALISM, IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITCIS. UNCE MAO IS GONE, HOWEVER, IT WILL BE HARDER
TO KEEP "MAOISM" ALIVE AS THE SELF-EVIDENT VALIDATION
OF SOVIET AND CPSU "STATESMANSHIP." THE SOVIETS WILL OWF
TT TO THEMSELVES TO REINFORMCE THIS IMAGE, AT LEAST
TN THE SHORT TERM, BY AN APPROPRIATE GESTURE. AND IF THE
CHINESE RESPOND, ALL THE BETTER.
STOESSEL
a
FORD
GERALD
LIBHARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF
STATE
WIt
S
Department of State
OF i AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET 6550
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 00771 01 OF 03 191723Z
43
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
041472
0 191604Z JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8845
S ECRE-T SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 0771
EXDIS
F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, AO
SUBJ: SOVIET POLICY IN ANGOLA
1. BEGIN SUMMARY. THOUGH OUR INFORMATION ON SUBJECT
IS FAR FROM COMPLETE, OUR ANALYSIS OF SOVIET POLICY
ON ANGOLA CONCLUDES THAT IN SOVIET VIEW THEIR ACTIONS
TO DATE ARE JUSTIFIED AND ON BALANCE SUCCESSFUL,
EXCEPT IN REGARD TO THEIR IMPACT ON U.S. -SOVIET
RELATIONS. WE CAN DISCERN NO STRONG U.S. LEAVERAGE
IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, HOWEVER, WHICH DOES NOT
IMPINGE ON U.S. INTERESTS AT LEAST AS MUCH AS SOVIET.
IT APPEARS TO US, THEREFORE, THAT--UNLESS PRESSURE
CAN BE BROUHT TO BEAR IN WASYS NOT APPARENT TO US
HERE-- THE BEST SOVIETS WILL BE WILLING TO DO IN
ORDER TO SHORE UP DETENTE IMAGE IN U.S. WOULD BE TO
REFRAIN FROM LARGE ADDITIONAL INCREMENTS IN SOVIET
AND CUBAN ASSISTANCE TO MPLA, TO PAY LIP SERVICE TO
IDEA OF COALITION CUNDER MPLA HEGEMONY), AND PERHAPS
TO PROMISE GRADUAL REDUCTION IN SOVIET AND CUBAN
PRESENCE IF SOUTH AFRICA WITHDRAWS. EVEN THESE
LIMITED CONCESSIONS WOULD PROBABLY. BE IMPLICITLY
CONTINGENT ON MPLA MAINTAINING MILITARY INITIATIVE.
END SUMMARY.
FORD
&
2. ALTHOUGH WE ARE MISSING SEVERAL IMPORTANT PIECES
OF THE PUZZLE, IT MAY BE USEFUL AT THIS POINT TO PUT
GERALD
LIBHARY
DOWN OUR IMPRESSIONS AS TO THE REASONS FOR MOSCOW'S
SECRET
NOI 10 BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE/AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GG 7/31/01
FORM
TEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
/
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00771 01 OF 03 191723Z
ACTIONS IN ANGOLA AND TO ADDRESS THE POSSIBILITY OF
A KREMLIN RETREAT FROM A PLLICY WHICH HAS HAD SOME
SUCCESS ON THE GROUND IN AFRICA BUT WHICH HAS
INEVITABLY RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.
3. REASONS FOR SOVIET ANGOLA POLICY. WE CAN THINK
OF EIGHT INTERTWINING CAUSES WHICH IMPELLED THE
SOVIETS TO ACT IN ANGOLA:
A. SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION. GROMYKO'S
SEPTEMBER KOMMUNIST ARTICLE, WHICH LAID OUT THE
PRINCIPLES AND FRAMEWORK OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
IN PREPARATION FOR THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS, STRESSED
THREE MAJOR FOUNDATIONS OF THAT POLICY--I.E., 1)
CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOCIALIST CAMP: 2) DETENTE WITH
THE WEST: 3) SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION. THE
SOVIETS HAVE STATED REPEATEDLY THAT THEY SEE NO
CONTRADICTION BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERA-
TION AND DETENTE. ANGOLA WOULD SEEM TO BE A CLASSIC
EXAMPLE OF THAT THESIS. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS AT
PRESENT JUSTIFY THEIR ASSISTANCE TO THE MPLA AS AID
TO A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, THE FOUNDATION OF
THEIR ANGOLA POLICY--IN THEIR EYES AS WELL AS IN
THEIR PROPAGANDA- IS IN THEIR ASSERTED RIGHT TO
ASSIST A NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT, WITH OR
WITHOUT THE WIND AT ITS SAILS.
B. SUPPORT FOR AN ALLY. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN
BACKING THE MPLA SINCE 1956. ONE OF THEIR CLEAR
AIMS IN ANGOLA IS TO DEMONSTRATE TO OTHERS THAT THE
USSR IS A RELIABLE FRIEND AND THAT IT WILL NOT LET
DOWN AN ALLY. IN THIS REGARD, IT MIGHT BE OF
POSSIBLE INTEREST TO NOTE THAT NETO WASPRESENT AT
THE 24TH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE CPSU.
C. MAINTENANCE OF REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS. IT
IS IMPORTANT FOR MOSCOW TO KEEP UP ITS REVOLUTIONARY
CREDENTIALS, NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT ASPIRES TO LEADER-
SHIP IN THE THIRD WORLD AND IN THE COMMUNIST AND
R.
"PROGRESSIVE"CAMPS, BUT FOR PURPOSES OF MAIN-
TAINING ITS OWN INTERNAL LEGITIMACY AS WELL. THE
GERALD
FORD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED V THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF E EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
THANTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED
(2)
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
EXE™ EXCES
STATE
SECRET
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 00771 01 OF 03 1917232
MESSAGE THAT THE USSR ADOPTS A "PRINCIPLED" POSITION
IN ITS SUPPORT FOR "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION"
TS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIETS BOTH INTERNALLY
AND EXTERNALLY.
D. THE CHINA FACTOR. PEKING AND MOSCOW ARE LOCKED
IN WHAT BOTH SIDESREGARD AS A "ZERO-SUM" GAME
WHEREBY WHAT IS GOOD FOR MOSCOW'S NATIONAL INTERESTS
IS THOUGH TO BE BAD FOR PEKING'S, AND VICE VERSA.
THE FACT THAT THE CHINESE WERE SUPPORTING A GROUP
OPPOSED TO THE MPLA MADE IT ALMOST A CERTAINTY THAT
MOSCOW WOULD FEEL COMPELLED TO TAKE SOME STEPS TO
BOLSTER ITS CLIENT IN ANGOLA. THE SOVIETS DESIRE TO
DIMINISH CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD AND
TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE IS NO TRUTH IN PEKING'S
ASSERTION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE A STATUS QUO POWER
BASICALLY IN OPPOSITION TO THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE
THIRD WORLD.
F. ENHANCE THE SOVIET IMAGE IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE.
THE SOVIETS SAW THE APRIL 25 COUP IN PORTUGAL AS AN
EXTRAORDINARY OPPORTUNITY TO STEP UP THEIR INFLUENCE
AND PRESTIGE IN AFRICA. IN THIS REGARD, THEY WERE
UNDOUBTEDLY ALSO ENCOURAGED BOTHE SUCCESS OF
FRELIMO IN MOZAMBIQUE AND WERE ANXIOUS TO DEMONSTRATE
THAT THE TIDE WAS MOVING IN THEIR DIRECTION IN
AFRICA. THE KREMLIN REGARDS ITS FORTUITOUS URECT
OPPOSITION TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN0433, CE IN ANGOLA
AS A MAJOR POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA TRIUMUY. THE
FACT THAT THIS HAS STRUCK A SYMPATHETIC WHORD IN
COUNTRIES AS IMPORTANT AS NIGERIA MAY WELL BE CON-
SIDERED BY THE KREMLIN AS AMPLE JUSTIFICATION IN
ITSELF FOR MOSCOW'S ANGOLA POLICY.
F. SOVIET INTERNAL IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS IN
ANGOLA. GIVEN RECENT FOREIGN POLICY REVERSES,
PARTICULARLY EGYPT BUT PORTUGAL AS WELL, MOSCOW
PROBABLY FELT THAT IT COULD NOT AFFORD ANOTHER
FORD
OBVIOUS SETBACK, PARTICULARLY IN A SITUATION WHERE
&
THE U.S. WAS SEEN TO BE THE "WINNER." THIS IS DOUBLY
THE CASE IN VIEW OF STRONG U.S. CONGRESSIONAL AND
GERALD
LIBHANY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
DS-1652
0.66
TRANTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED
MAKE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 04 MOSCOW 00771 01 OF 03 1917232
PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA. COUR
GUESS WOULD BE THAT LOCAL EXPERTS ON THE U.S. ADVISED
THAT OUR DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS WRE SUCH THAT IT WAS
UNLIKELY WE WOULD FACE UP TO A "TOUGH" SOVIET POLICY
IN ANGOLA.) WITH THE PARTY CONGRESS APPROACHING,
ANGOLA THUS OFFERED A CONCRETE FOREIGN POLICY GAIN
IN SUPPORT OF ORTHODOX IDEOLIGICAL THEMES AT AN
OPPORTUNE TIME FOR BREZHNEV.
G. COUNTERING THE U.S. WHETHER THEY ACTUALLY
BELIEVE IT OR NOT IS ANOTHER QUESTION, BUT OUR
VARIOUS CONTACTS AS WELL AS SOURCES FOR LOCAL NEWS-
MEN HAVE CONSISTENTLY ARGUED THAT, IN INCREASING
ASSISTANCE TO THE MPLA ABOVE MODEST LEVELS, THE
USSR WAS MERELY REACTING TO US. MOVES IN ANGOLA.
FURTHERMORE, THE CLAIM IS PUT FORTH THAT THE USSR
HAS NO DESIRE TO MAKE A PUBLIC ISSUE OF ANGOLA
AND THAT THE SOVIETS "CANNOT UNDERSTAND" WHY THE
AMERICANS HAVE BROUGHT ANGOLA TO THE FOREFRONT.
THE MUST RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT OF THIS THESIS
WAS AN ARTICLE IN THE JANUARY 16 NOVOYE VREMYA
DEVOTED TO ALLEGED CIA INTERFERENCE IN ANGOLA.
ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE, BASED ON AMERICAN PRESS
SOURCES, A FORTY COMMITTEE MEETING INJANUARY 1975
APPROVED A CIA PROPOSAL TO BUY FNLA AND UNITA
AGREEMENT TO TORPEDO THE THREE FACTION ACCORD ON
COALITION GOVERNMENT SIGNED IN KENYA JANUARY 5.
THE ARTICLE STATES THAT ROBERTO HAD BEEN IN THE
CIA POCKET SINCE 1961 AND THAT SAVIMBI WAS "ALSO
LINKED TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE." THESE LEADERS THERE-
FORE "CAME OUT AGAINST" THE MPLA IN FEBRUARY AND
THE TWO GROUPS THEN RECEIVED 10 MILLION DOLLARS
FROM THE CIA IN JUNE. THE CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT
EXCES
A SOVIET READER IS INTENDED TO DRAW IS THAT IT
WAS THE U.S. WHICH FIRST UPPED THE ANTE IN ANGOLA.
WHILE MANY SOVIETS WILL BE MORE THAN SKEPTICAL OF
THEIR OWN PROPAGANDA, THE FACT THAT THIS RATIONALE
HAS BEEN WIDELY CIRCULATED WITHIN THE USSR WILL
MAKE IT THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO
WITHDRAW FROM OR TONE DOWN THEIR EFFORTS IN ANGOLA
R.
UNLESS IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT THEY DERIVE CLEAR BENEFIT
GERALD
FORD
THEREBY.
SEGRET
NOT 10 BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION O' THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
DS-1652
9.66
PARTMENT
or
DER
STATE
EXP-3
Department of State
/
TELEGRAM
I
or
SECRET 5915
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 00771 02 OF 03 1917392
43
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
036781
0 191604Z JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8846
SECRE SECTION 2 OF 3 MOSCOW 0771
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
H. ECONOMIC-STRATEGIC FACTORS. GEOPOLITICS IS
STILL TAKEN SERIOUSLY IN MOSCOW AND THE SOVIETS
ARE NOT INSENSITIVE TL THE FACT THAT ANGOLA IS A
COMPARATIVELY RICH, UNDERPOPULATED COUNTRY WITH
SUBSTANTIAL NATURAL RESOURCES, INCLUDING CABINDAN
OIL, THE SOVIET NAVY WOULD PROBABLY, AT THE VERY
LEAST, FIND IT USEFUL TO HAVE ACCESS TO ANGOLAN
PORTS ON A BASIS SIMILAR TO THAT AVAILABLE IN
GUINEA. IN ANY CASE, WE DO NOT FIND CHONA'S THESIS
ON THE SOVIET GRAND STRATEGY FOR AFRICA CLUSAKA
(15) TO BE ENTIRELY IMPLAUSIBLE, EVNE THOUGH THE INITIAL
SOVIET IMPLUSE MAY FLOW MORE FROM EXPLOITING TARGETTS
OF OPPORTUNITY THAN EXECUTING A MASTER PLAN®
4. THE CUBAN FACTOR. FOR A COMBINATION OF THE
ABOVE REASONS THE POLITBURO PROBABLY FELT IT HAD
LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO TAKE ACTION IN ANGOLA TO
SUPPORT THE MPLA. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A QUICK
POWERFUL STROKE THAT WOULD TURN THE TABLES IN FAVOR
OF THEIR OWN CLIENT AND THUS PUT THE SOVIETS IN A
STRONGER BARGAINING POSITION. SINCE THE MPLA
ITSELF WAS PROBABLY IN NO POSITION TO UTILIZE THE
MASSIVE SOVIET AID ACCORDED TO IT, THE SOVIETS
FORD
DECEIDED TO MAKE USE OF A CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
R
OUR GUESS WOULD BE, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS ARE
WELL AWARE OF THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION IN
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT 10 BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
or
STATE
STATE USLINA AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00771 02 OF 03 1917392
ANGOLA AND PROBABLY SEE THE DANGER OF THE CUBANS
REMAINING FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME IN HOSTILE
TERRITORY AS AN OCCUPYING FORCE. FOR WHAT IT IS
WORTH, SEVERAL OF OUR SOVIET CONTACTS HAVE ASSERTED
STRONGLY THAT THE USSR DOES NOT DESIRE A "MILITARY
SOLUTION" IN ANGOLA, WHILE OTHERS HAVE RECENTLY
HINGTED THAT AN MPLA/UNITA COALITION MIGHT BE THE
ULTIMATE SOLUTION.
5. MOSCOWIS OBJECTIVES. THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY
HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE A MAJOR COMMITMENT TO ENSURE
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT CON-
TROLLED BY THE MPLA, ASSISTED AND SUPPORTED BY
THE USSR, WHICH WOULD DERIVE A FAVORABLE POSITION
COMPARABLE TO WHAT IT CURRENTLY ENJOYS IN GUINEA
AND SOMALIA. A "COALITIONGOVERNMENT" UNDER MPLA
HEGEMONY IS QUITE CONSISTENT WITH SUCH A SOVIET
AIM SO LONG AS THE MPLA WOULD REMAIN THE DOMINANT
FORCE. WHAT THE SOVIETS PROBALY DESIRE IS A
VICTORY IN ANGOLA WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE GRADUALLY
ENOUGH so THAT SOVIET DETENTE INTERESTS ARE NOT
AFFECTED THEREBY. IF THE SOVIETS SAW GOOD PROSPECTS
FOR SUCH A GRADUAL VICTORY THEY WOULD PROBABLY
RESIST PRESSURE FROM THE MPLA ITSELF, OR PERHAPS
FROM THE CUBANS, TO GO FRO BROKE IN ANGOLA.
6. FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA. IN THIS
REGARD, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS DID NOT ACHIEVE THE
OPTIMUM AT THE RECENT OAU CONFERENCE, THEY ARE
ALMOST CERTAINLY PLEASED WITH THEIR LONG RANGE
AFRICAN POLICY OF PATIENT SUPPORT FOR "NATIONAL
LIBERATION," AND REGARD OVERALL TENDENCIES AS MOVING
IN THEIR DIRECTION. RELATIONS WITH CERTAIN KEY
COUNTRIES SEEM TO HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED, E.G., NIGERIA,
CHANA, TANZANIA, AND MOZAMBIQUE (WHICH PREVIOUSLY LEANED
TO CHINA). NETO HIMSELF IS
GENUAINELY POPULAR WITH SEVERAL IMPORTANT AFRICAN
COUNTRIES, SUCH AS TANZANIA WHICH MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR THE
SOVIETS TO RIDE ON HIS COATTAILS TO A DEGREE. IN SOVIET EYES THE
U.S. IS PAYING THE INEVITABLE PRICE OF BEING
POPULARLY IDENTIFIED IN AFRICA (NO MATTER HOW
GERALD
R.
FORD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION O' HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LIBE
SECRET
FORM
DS.1652
or
STATE
EXP-3
CHINA
/
Department of State
TELEGRAM
of STATE
SECRET
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 00771 02 OF 03 1917392
UNJUSTLY) AS A FORMER SUPPORTER OF PORTUGUESE
COLONIALISM AND A PRESENT SUPPORTER OF WHITE
REGIMES IN THE SOUTH. FINALLY, IF THE MPLA RACKS
UP FURTHER MILITARY VICTORIES, THE SOVIETS PROBALY HOPE TO
GARNER ADDITIONAL BACKING IN AFRICA,
7. UNEXPECTED EVENTS. ESPECIALLY INLIGHT OF
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT, THE SOVIETS WERE,
HOWEVER, PROBABLY SURPRISED AT THE VEHEMENCE OF AT
LEAST SOME OF THE AFRICAN MODERATES WHO CONTINUE TO
OPPOSE SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERFERENCE IN AFRICAN
AFFAIRS. THEY WERE ALSO SEEMINGLY GENUINELY SUR-
PRISED BY THE PUBLIC REACTION IN THE UNITED STATES
AND BY THE PRIMACY WHICH THE ANGOLA SITUATION NOW
HAS IN U.S.=SOVIET RELATIONS. IN FACT, THIS DETENTE
CONNECTION HAS PROBABLY BEEN THE SINGLE MOST
IMPORTANT MISTAKE MOSCOW POLICYMAKERS HAVE MADE
REGARDING ANGOLA. WHILE IT IS STILL ONLY ONE OF
MANY FACTORS IN THEIR CALCULATIONS, IT HAS CLEARLY
BECOME AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS ONE.
8. THE U.S. ANGLE. IT THEREFORE SEEMS TO us THAT
EXCEPT FOR ITS EFFECT ON RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.
THE SOVIETS HAVE NO REASON TO FEEL DISSATISFIED
WITH THE POLICIES THEY HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING IN
ANGOLA FURTHERMORE, IT IS PERHAPS IMPORTANT TO
KEEP IN MIND THAT AT LEAST SOME KREMLIN "AMERICA
EXPERTS, " AS NOTED ABOVE, POSSIBLY SINGED ON TO
THE ORIGINAL DECISION TO STEP UP THE SOVIET EFFORT
IN ANGOLA ON THE GROUNDS THAT DOMESTIC PRESSURES
IN THE UNITED STATES PRECLUDED A TOUGH U.S. RESPONSE
TO SUCH SOVIET MOVES. IF THIS IS THE CASE, "EXPERTSZ
WILL FIND IT BUREAUCRATICALLY DIFFICULT
AT THIS STAGE TO TURN AROUND AND ARGUE THAT ANGOLA
COULD HAVE A LASTING HARMFUL EFFECT ON U.S. =SOVIET
RELATIONS. MORE IMPORTANT, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY
BELIEVE THAT, GIVEN OUR DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES, THE
VARIOUS CONCRETE LEVERS AVAILABLE TO us FOR DEALING
WITH THE KREMLIN OVER ANGOLA ARE NOT VERY IMPRESSIVE.
UNLESS WE ARE CAPABLE OF RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY ON THE GROUND,
SALT IS TOO IMPORTANT TO CONNECT WITH ANGOLA, WE HAVE
FORD
A
ERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOI TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SE RETARY
FORM
DS-1652
STATE
Department of State
/ AMERICA ORLINA mmg
TELEGRAM
or
SECRET
PAGE 04 MOSCOW 00771 02 OF 03 1917392
ALREADY RULED OUT GRAIN, MFN WAS ONLY A DISTANT
HOPE ANYWAY, AND CUTTING DOWN EXCHANGES WOULD BE
INFFFECTIVE AND PERHAPS INAPPROPRIATE. MOST
IMPORTANT OF ALL, THE TOP LEADERS IN THE KREMLIN
PROBABLY DO NOT REALLY UNDERSTAND THE POSSIBLE
LONG TERM EFFECTS WHICH ANGOLA COULD HAVE ON U.S.
VIEWS OF THE USSR.
9. THE SOVIET DILEMMA. WHILE INTERNAL PRESSURE
TO CHANGE POLICY IN ANGOLA IS THEREFORE NOT LIKELY TO BE VERY
GREAT, MOSCOW DOES NOT WANT ANGOLA TO IMPINGE ON
DETENTE, TO AFFECT U.S. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS, AND
ESPECIALLY TO INFLUENCE THE U.S. ELECTIONS. BUT
IT CANNOT AFFORD A DEFEAT OR A WITHDRAWAL UNDER
OBVIOUS PRESSURE. AT THIS STAGE THE KREMLIN
OBVIOUSLY WOULD NOT WANT TO BE CHARGED WITH "SELLING
OUT"ITS CLIENTS AND IT OULD BE TO SOME EXTENT
IN PAWN TO NETO, AS IT WAS TO HANDI FROM 1965-1975.
EX@-&
10. THE LIMITS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY. AT THE
SAME TIME, THE KREMLIN DOES NOT WANT TO GIVE THE
U.S., OR ANYONE ELSE, THE IMPRESSION THAT WASHINGTON
HAS SIGNIFICANT LEVERAGE BECAUSE OF MOSCOW'S DESIRE
TO ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS OF PROPONENTS OF DETENTE
IN THE UPCOMING U.S. ELECTIONS. GIVEN THE EXTENT
GERALD
R.
FORD
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION O' THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
DS-1652
THANTMENT or STATE
UNITED
Department of State
/
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET 5922
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 00771 03 OF 03 191745Z
43
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
036918
0 191604Z JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8847
S F C R E T
SECTION 3 OF 3 MOSCOW 0771
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
OF THEIR COMMITMENT, ANY MOVE THE SOVIETS MAKE TO
REDUCE THEIR CAND CUBA'S) PRESENCE, IF ANNOUNCED
AT ALL, WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE JUSTIFIED ON
PRACTICAL GROUNDS--I.E., THE ASSISTANCE IS NO
LONGER NEEDED--RATHER THAN ON GROUNDS OF PRINCIPLE.
IN ANY CASE, A SETTLEMENT WITHOUT QUICK AND CLEAR
SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA APPEARS MOST
UNLIKELY. BUT THE DEPARTURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS
MIGHT POSSIBLY FORM THE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION WHICH
THE SOVIETS COULD BUY SINCE IT COULD BE PORTRAYED
AS A CLEAR VICTORY -- I.E., RESOLUTE SOVIET ACTION
FORCED THE RACIST AGRESSORS OUT OF ANGOLA. IF
THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE TO WITHDRAW, SOVIET SUPPLIES
OF NEW EQUIPMENT COULD BE SCALED DOWN, AND IF THE
U.S. SUPPLY LINEK RUNS DRY, NETO WOULD BE LEFT
IN A FAVORABLE MILITARY POSTURE. SOME CUBANS COULD
ALSO BE WITHDRAWN WHILE OTHERS COULD BE LIMITED MORE
AND MORE TO SUPPORT AND ADVISORY ROLES, IN ORDER TO
AVOID CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS. AT SOME POINT,
THF CUBANS WOULD HAVE TO GO. BUT THE SOVIETS,
HAVING DEMONSTRATED CONVINCING WILLINGNESS TO COUNTER
ANY MOVES TO DISPLACE THE MPLA, COULD WITHDRAW INTO
THE BACKGROUND AND ALLOW FOR AN "AFRICAN" SOLUTION
FORD
TO THE ANGOLA PROBLEM, AT THE SAME TIME GUARANTEEING
H
MPI.A CONTROL OF AT LEAST THE CENTRAL AND CABINDAN
LIBRARY
AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, AND PERHAPS OF THE NORTH AS
BERALD
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM DC-1652
io
STATE
Department of State
STATE AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00771 03 OF 03 191745Z
EXCES EXE-M
WELL. SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD CLEARLY LEAVE THE MPLA
TN A STRONG POSITION TO EXTEND ITS POWER MILITARILY.
THTS, IN TURN, COULD CREATE STEADY PRESSURE IN AFRICA
FOR ADDTIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA REGIME.
IN OTHER WORDS, ANY NEGOTIATED OUTCOME WHICH SEEMS
FEASIBLE TO US WOULD NOT BE A HAPPY ONE FOR U.S.
POLICY. BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE CANNOT CONCEIVE
OF THE SOVIETS SETTLING FOR LESS, AT LEAST AT THIS
STAGE.
11. IN SUM, THE CURRENT SOVIET ASSESSMENT IS
PROBABLY THAT THEY HAD AMPLE REASON FOR TAKING
RESOLUTE ACTION IN ANGOLA AND ARE OPERATING FROM
A POSITION OF STRENGTH. GIVEN THE EXTENT OF THEIR
INVESTMENT, THEY CANNOT NOW AFFORD TO ACCEPT ANY
SOLUTION WHICH WOULD SEEM TO ENCOMPASS A LOSS OF
FACE. HOWEVER, FOR REASONS OF DETENTE AND THE
FUTURE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS THE SOVIETS MIGHT
BE INDUCED TO BUY SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE WHICH
FAVORED THE MPLA. WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN
FORCES (WHICH COULD BE IN OUR INTERESTS AS WELL)
IS POSSIBLY THE KEY TO REACHING SOME SORT OF SOLUTION
TO THE ANGOLAN DILEMMA.
12. DEPARTMENT PASS OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED.
STOESSEL
at
GERALD
FORD
SECRET
NOI 10 BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION or THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM ne.1659
or STATE
4
Department of State
STATES UNITED the AMERICA
TELEGRAM
or
W2H.
SECRET 8688
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 00180 0714402
EXE™ EXPIS
41
EYES ONLY
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 1026 w
003893
R 071419Z JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8455
S ECRE q MOSCOW 0180
EXDIS
E.O. 116521 GDS
TAGS: CASC, UR (SHARDIN, NICHOLAS GEORGE)
SUBJECT: DISAPPEARANCE OF US CITIZEN
REF: MOSCOW 18551
CONSULAR COUNSELOR CALLED ON MFA'S CONSULAR ADMINISTRA-
TION COUNSELOR G. BOSIKOV JANUARY 7 AT LATTER'S REQUEST.
BOSIKOV REPEATED ORALLY AND BY NON-PAPER INFO TELEPHONED
EARLIER PER REFTEL THAT AS RESULT OF INQUIRIES IT HAS
BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT (1) CITIZEN OF USA NICHOLAS GEORGE
SHADRIN BORN 1928 IN LENINGRAD HAS NOT ENTERED USSR.
(2) THERE ARE NO SOVIET OFFICIALS IN AUSTRIA BY NAMES OF
OLEG KOZLOV AND MIKHAIL KURYSHEV.
MATLOCK
FORD
R
GERALD
LABRARY
PER BUD: ScowcRoft, HYLAND,
MCFARLANE ONLY
SECRET
hb 7/31/06
NOI TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
DS-1652
9.66
or
STATE
3
Department of State
UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES or
CONFIDENTIA
6284
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 16112 1010442
11
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
072942
0 101028Z NOV 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6566
C N I 0 N 7 I A MOSCOW 16112
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, AO, UR
SUBJ: ANGOLAN RECOGNITION
REF: STATE 265503
IN ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS AND TALKING POINTS
KEYED TO LOCAL SITUATION, I ASSUME THAT DEPARTMENT DOES
NOT RPT NOT DESIRE EMBASSY TO MAKE DEMARCHE HERE ON ANGOLA,
IF, HOWEVER, APPROACH IS DESIRED, PLEASE ADVISE BY
IMMEDIATE AT WHICH LEVEL MEETING SHOULD BE SOUGHT AND
WHAT SHOULD BE MAIN THRUST OF PRESENTATION, GIVEN
PRESUMPTION PARA ONE REFTEL (WHICH WE SHARE) THAT USSR
INTENDS TO RECOGNIZE MPLA REGIME IMMEDIATELY.
MATLOCK
FORD
&
GERALD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT GONE ADENCIA ATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
32 Gh 7/31/01
Opr STATE
Department of State
WH
2
STATE UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
CONFIDENTIAL 7964
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 16100 01 OF 03 1901232
63
ACTION SS-25
TNFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 1020 W
068107
P 9813132 NOV 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHOC PRIORITY 6559
F.
E
7
SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 16100
FXDIS
F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US
SUBJECT: THE CURRENT SOVIET VIEW OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS
EXSTS
RCF: STATE 261650
% SUMMARY, THERE HAS BEEN A DISTINCT COOLING IN SOVIET MEDIA
TREATMENT OF THE U.S. IN THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, COUPLES WITH
GREATER EMPHASIS ON SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST CAMP
AND ON MOSCOWIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WORLD "PROGRESSIVE" AND
"NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE OTHER
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS, WE ATTRIBUTE THIS LARGELY TO SOVIET
DISAPPOIN MENT AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATION AND
RILATERAL SPHERES, INCLUDING MOST NOTABLY WESTERN BACKLASH
ON CSCE, EXCLUSION FROM LATEST MIDDLE EAST DISENGAGEMENT,
AND DELAY IN CONVERTING VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT INTO SALT II TREATY.
IF WE ARE INDEED IN A PRESUCCESSTON PHASE, THEN BREZHNEV'S
UPCOMING DEMISE MIGHT ALSO HAVE PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS CHANGED
PMPHASIS, BUT WE SEE NO CLEAR FVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH A SUP-
POSITION. WHAT IS EVIDENT TO US IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE UNCERTAIN
ABOUT CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S., APPREHENSIVE ABOUT
WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE THE GROWING CHORUS OF ANTI-SOVIET AND
ANTI-DETENTE SENTIMENTS BEING EXPRESSED THERE, AND WORRIED
ABOUT THE IMPACT WHICH OUR ELECTION CAMPAIGN MAY HAVE ON
SUNSOVIET RELATIONS. A SALTII AGREEMENT AND A WASHINGTON
FORD
SUMMIT WOULU, HOWEVER, BRING RELATIONS BACK TO A MORE EVEN
?
KEFL. 1s BREZHNEV IS TO MAKE THE TRIP TO WASHINGTON,
THIS WOULD IMPLY AN INTENTION TO CONTINUE HIM IN POWER FOR
GERALD
LIBHARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL-
FORM
bla 7/31/01
0r STATE
Department of State
STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 16100 01 OF 23 190123Z
SOME TAIME AFTER A MEETING, SINCE A LAME DUCK SUMMIT WOULD MAKE
LITTLE SENSE FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW. IN ANY CASE,
WE MAY WELL BE MOVING INTO A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY, WHICH MIGHT
ALSO IN THE LONG RUN TURN OUT TO BE A PERIOD
OF HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. END SUMMARY.
0. THE MEDIA. WE DETECT A PERCEPTIBLE COOLING OVER
THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS IN THE RELATIVE STRESS IN THE
SOVIET MEDIA ON THE IMPORTANCE OF DETENTE AND U.S.-
SOVIET RELATIONS. CONCOMMITANTLY, HEAVY COVERAGE OF
RECENT SOVIET EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION
WITHIN "THE SOCIALIST CAMP" HAS BEEN MARKED. IN
ADDITION. MORE EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON THE
KREMLIN'S SUPPORT FOR "NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS
AND ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCVIET CONTRIBUTION TO
SUCH MOVEMENTS, THE SOVIETS PUBLIC POSITION TOWARD
THE MIDDLE EAST HAS RECENTLY TOUGHENED AND CRITICISM
OF THE U.S. ROLE THERE, BOTH IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT,
HAS INCREASED. TREATMENT OF CHINA, ALWAYS HARD, HAS
GOTTEN HARDER. THE FIGHTING IN ANGOLA HAS OCCASIONED
INCREASINGLY FREQUENT CHARGES OF U.S. .-CHINESE COLLUSION
AS HAVE VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY CHINESE LEADERS THAT
MOSCOW IS LESS TRUSTWORTHY THAN WASHINGTON.
IMPLICIT CONTRAST HAS BEEN DRAWN BETWEEN THE
SECRETARY'S TRIP TO PEKING AS COMPARED WITH THAT OF
GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN THAT SCHMIDT'S DEFENSE
OF DETENTE AGAINST CHINESE ATTACKS WAS JUXTAPOSED AGAINST
WHAT THE LOCAL MEDIA PORTRAYED AS THE SECRETARY'S SILENCE
ON THIS SUBJECT. COVERAGE OF THE U.S. ITSELF,
TEMPORARILY BRIGHTENED BY APOLLO-SOYUZ AND THE ASTRONAUTS
TRIPS, HAS RECENTLY TENDED MORE AND MORE TO DIGGING AND JABBING
TN INNUMERABLE PETTY WAYS.
3. WHILE DETENTE WITH THE AFST RETAINS ITS THEURETICAL
PRIMACY, EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR IT IS NOW USUALLY
ACCOMPANIED BY WORRIED SORTIES AGAINST DETENTE'S
WESTERN ENEMIES OR THEIR CHINESE HELPMATES. THE
DRUMBEATING FOR "MILITARY DETENTE" AS A NEXT STEP
ON THE PROCESS, INTENDED AS A MAJOR POST-HELSINKI
R.
PROP GANDA THEME, HAS BEEN BROUGHT UP SHORT BY THE
DEPALD
Funo
UNFXPECTED BACKLASH AGAINST CSCE. TREATMENT OF CSCE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
60NF IDENTIAL
OF STATE
Department of State
of STATE UNITED Name AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE n3 MOSCOW 16100 01 OF 03 190123Z
TISELF HAS TURNED CONSISTENTLY DEFENSIVE AND SOMETIMES
SURLY. DETENTE IS NOW USUALLY PAIRED WITH THE NEED
FUR ATTENTION TO THE "WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM" AND THE
"WORLD COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' MOVEMENT."
4, THE TROUBLED GISCARD VISIT RECEIVED ONLY MODERATE
AND CORRECT MEDIA TREATMENT AND WAS FAR OVERSHADOWED
BY THE PLAY GIVEN TO HONECKER AND LE DUAN. EVEN
HUNGARIAN PREMIER LAZAR LOOKED GOOD IN GISCARD'S
WAKE. THE RECEPTION FOR LE DUAN WAS LAVISH IN ITS SYM-
BOLIZATION OF THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION TO "PROGRESSIVE"
FORCES AS WELL AS NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
FVFRYWHERE. DURING THE VISIT THE PAGES OF PRAVDA
WERE OPENED TO THE KIND OF ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENTS
RY LE DUAN THAT WE HAVE NOT SEEN IN THE SOVIET PRESS
iN SEVERAL YEARS. DETENTE EMERGED A VERY POOR SISTER
TN THE PROCESS.
5. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE NOTICEABLE
SLACKENING OF SOVIET LIP SERVICE TO THE OVERALL CONCEPT
EXPIC EXPIS
OF DETENTE. THE PEACE POLICY OF THE 24TH CONGRESS
TS STILL SINGLED OUT AS A LANDMARK. VARIOUS STATE-
MENTS BY U.S. GOVERNMENT LEADERS AND OTHER AMERICANS
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS HAVE
RECEIVED PROMINENT SPACE IN THE PAGES OF THE CENTRAL
PRFSS. DETENTE, THE KREMLIN CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN,
BUT IN A MORE TROUBLED TONE, MUST BE MADE "IRREVERSIBLF".
PERHAPS SYMBOLIC OF THE IMPORTANCE STILL ACCORDED TO
SOVIET RELATIONS IS THE RECENT ELEVATION OF
KORNIYENKU, HEAD OF THE USA DIVISION OF THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY, TO THE RANK OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER).
NOTE: NODIS CAPTION DELETED, HANDLED AS EXDIS PER
STATE 266783 11/11/75
FORU
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM DS-1652
TRANTMENT OF STATE
(2)
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL 7968
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 16100 02 OF 03 1901252
63
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 1026 W
068117
P 0813137 NOV 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6560
D
I
SECTION 2 OF 3 MOSCOW 16100
EXDIS
6. DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE U.S. IN THE PRESS HAS
EXTENDED BEYOND THE USUAL SNIPING AT THE ILLS OF
AMERICAN SOCIETY UNEMPLOYMENT, CRIME, RACIAL PROBLEMS,
FTC. -- TO INCLUDE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS REGARDING
THE INHERENT STRENGTH OF "ANTI-SOVIET" POLITICAL
FORCES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN POINTING WITH CONCERN
AT WHATTHEY SEE AS A RISING CHORUS OF UNJUSTIFIABLE
ANTI-SOVIET CRITICISM. THEY ARE WORRIED AT THE EFFECT
SUCH CRITICISM MAY HAVE ON DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS
AND DETENTE AS A WHOLE AND FEAR THAT OUR UPCOMING
ELECTION CAMPAIGN COULD LEAD TO A FURTHER EXACERBATION
OF RELATIONS. WHILE SUCH STATEMENTS ARE AT LEAST IN
PART SELF-SERVING, THEY HAVE BECOME SO FREQUENT
AND SO POINTED THAT THEY RAISE LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS
AS TO WHETHER WE MAY BE IN FOR A SWITCH IN EMPHASIS
IN SOVIET POLICY. THIS COULD CONCEIVABLY BE SEEN AS
PART UF A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY PRECEDING BREZHNEV'S
DEPARTURE FOR VALHALLA, ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE IS FAR
FROM CLEAR ON THIS.
7. OUR OWN VIEW. HOWEVER, IS THAT THE CHANGE OF EMPHASIS
DESCRIBED ABOVE HAS BEEN LARGELY DETERMINED BY CONCRETE
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE IN RECENT
a
MONTHS. THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY LINE DOES NOT
SEFM in US TO BE IN QUESTION. SUSLOV LECTURED THE
GERALD
SENATORS ON IT THIS SUMMER: GROMYKO GAVE A CLEAR
INDICATION OF THE LEADERSHIP'S INTENTION TO WRITE IT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
THEARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
of STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 16100 02 OF 03 190125Z
INTO THE RECORD OF THE 25TH CONGRESS IN HIS SEPTEMBER
KOMMUNIST ARTICLE; BREZHNEV REAFFIRMED IT AT HELSINKI AND
IN HIS TOAST TO GISCARD OCTOBER 151 AND THE MEDIA PROMOTE IT WITH
INCESSANT VIGOR. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS "GENERAL LINE" IN THIS
HIERARCHICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.
8. A LIST OF SOVIET GRIEVANCES. BUT BREZHNEV'S DISAPPOINT=
MENT AT THE WAY THINGS HAVE WORKED OUT SINCE HELSINKI SEEMS
APPARENT. HF. CLEARLY HAD A DUAL-TRACK MASTER PLAN WHICH CALLED
FOR CONCENTRATION AFTER HELSINKI ON MILITARY DETENTE IN POST-CSCF
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND, SIMULTANEOUSLY, DEVOTION
OF MORE TIME TO CEMENTING RELATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.
HIS TIMETABLE CALLED FOR RUNNING UP TO THE 25GH CONGRESS ALONG
BOTH FOREIGN POLICY TRACKS I.E., HE HOPED TO SYMBOLIZE THE
TRTUMPH OF HIS "PEACE POLICY"BY HAVING SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED
A SALT AGREEMENT AND A WASHINGTON SUMMIT, ON THE ONE HAND,
AS WELL AS AN ECPC CONFERENCE ON THE OTHER. WHATEVER SUCCESS
THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD, HOWEVER, HAS THUS FAR ONLY BEEN ALONG
ONE OF THESE TRACKS. FOR THIS THEY LARGELY BLAME THE US
AND THE WEST EUROPEANS, WHOM THEY SEE AS HAVING SABOTAGED THE
FRA OF GOOD FEELING THAT WAS TO HAVE BEEN USHERED IN AFTER
HELSINKI. A LIST OF SOVIET GRIEVANCES WOULD INCLUDE:
A. CSCE BACKLASH. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, THE
SOVIETS WERE UNEASY ABOUT THE FORD ADMINISTRATION AND
THIS UNEASINESS HAS BEEN FED AND COMPOUNDED PY THREE
MAJOR SURPRISES DURING THE PAST YEAR. THE FIRST WAS
THE TOTALLY UNEXPECTED WAVE OF CRITICISM IN THE U.S.
AGAINST THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT. THE SECOND WAS
THE FAILURE OF THE "VLADIVOSTOK SPIRIT" TO HAVE ANY
APPRECIABLE IMPACT ON THE TRADE/EMIGRATION IMPASSE.
THE THIRD HAS BEEN THE UNEXPECTED BACKLASH AGAINST CSCF TN THE
UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE AND THE CONSEQUENT BASIC
DUESTIONING OF THE VALUE OF DETENTE BY MORE AND MORE PFOPLE
WITHIN AMERICAN SOCIETY. IN ANY CASE, THIS POST-CSCE BACKLASH
HAS CLEARLY THROWN A MONKEYWRENCH INTO THE SOVIET SCENARIO
WHICH CALLED FOR A TRIUMPHAL CSCE CULMINATION LEADING UP TO AN
EQUALLY TRIUMPHAL REAFFIRMATION OF DETENTE AT THE 25TH
CONGRESS.
DERALO
R.
FORD
B. THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO DISTURBED THAT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM DS-1652
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 16100 02 OF 03 1901252
THEY HAVE BEEN FROZEN OUT OF THE LATEST PEACE AGREEMENT
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAVE COMPLAINED THAT THEY
ARE NOT BEING CUT INTO THE ACTION -- AS THEYTHINK THEY SHOULD
RE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A DETENTE RELATIONSHIP -- IN
WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE A VITAL AREA. THE DIRECT
ATTACKS BY SADAT IMPUGNING SOVIET MOTIVES AND
DISPARAGING THEIR AID WERE CLEARLY REGARDED HERE AS
A CHALLENGE. THE SOVIETS MAY WELL FEEL THAT SADAT'S
DISTRESSING BARBS COULD PERHAPS HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF
WASHINGTON HAD INFORMED THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT THAT
SUCH BLATANT ANTI-SOVIET BAITING WOULD BE UNWISE.
C. PORTUGAL. HACKLES HAVE ALSO BEEN RAISED IN THE
KREMLIN BY CONSISTENT ALLEGATIONS IN THE WEST THAT
THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN VIOLATING THE RULES OF DETENTE
BY THEIR ACTIONS IN PORTUGAL. MOSCOW'S VIEW IS THAT,
ON THE CONTRARY, IT HAS BEEN OPERATING WITHIN DETENTE
GUIDELINES AND HAS BEEN DOING LITTLE WHICH COULD BE
DESCRIBED HONESTLY AS DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN LISBONIS
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR AS IMPERILING DETENTE. POLITICAL AND
FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO A FOREIGN CP IS, IN THEIR VIEW,
PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE, AND THEY PROBABLY CONCEDE OUTRIGHT TO
no THE SAME IN RESPECT TO OUR FRIENDS, EVEN THOUGH THE
LATTER WOULD BE CONSIDERED GRIST FOR THE PROPAGANDA MILL.)
n. CHINA. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY NOW REGARD THEIR
RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND ITS EFFECT THROUGHOUT
THE COMMUNIST AND THIRD WORLD AS THEIR MOST IMPORTANT
FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEM. THEY ARE DEEPLY WORRIED THAT
we MAY be MANEUVERING TO HAVE CHINA BECOME ALMOST AN
ALLY OF THE U.S. THE SOVIETS FEEL THAT AT THE VERY
EXCES
LEAST A DETENTE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD ENSURE EQUAL TREATMENT
OF MOSCON AND PEKING. THEY ARE THEREFORE PROBABLY
DISTURBED AT THE SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT TO CHINA
FORD
AND THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING ONE.
&
F_ BILATERAL IRRITANTS. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL DIFFICULTIFS
GEHALD
LIBRARY
HAVE UNDORTFOLY CAUSED THEM INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS,
AS TESTIFIED TO BY THEIR FAILURE TO PUBLICIZE THE LONG-
TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. OUR ATTEMPTS TO USE THIS
GRAIN DEAL AS A LEVER TO EXTRACT SIGNIFICANT PRICE CON-
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED and STATES OF 2)
TELEGRAM
CONF IDEN IAL
PAGE 04 MOSCOW 16100 02 OF 03 190125Z
RESSIONS ON SOVIET OIL, ALTHOUGH UNDERSTANDABLE, WAS UNDOUBTEDLY
THE SUBJECT OF HEATED POLITBURO DISCUSSION, AND MAY HAVE
RESULTED IN SOME REAL RESENTMENT. A WHOLE RANGE OF OTHER
BILATERAL IRRITANTS -- SOMETIMES PETTY, SOMETIMES LESS SO --
CONTINUE TO TROUBLE THE SOVIETS. AMONG THEM ARE DIFFICULTIES
REGARDING VISAS, SOME OF WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE REAL
DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING. OUR FAILURE TO ALLOW A CPSU
DELEGATION TO ATTEND THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY
EXEMS EXCES
CONGRESS, FOR EXAMPLE, DESPITE PLEAS AT VERY HIGH LEVELS,
UNDOUBTEDLY GALLED THE SOVIETS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IN THIS
REGARD HAS BEEN OUR FAILURE TO MOVE AHEAD ON CONSTRUCTION
OF BOTH EMBASSY PROJECTS.
NOTE: NODIS CAPTION DELETED, HANDLED AS EXDIS PER
STATE 266783 11/11/75
GERALD R.
FORD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF (2)
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EX@-&
CONFIDENTIAL 7971
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 16100 03 OF 03 190126Z
63
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 1026 w
068122
P. 0813137 NOV 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6561
SECTION 3 OF 3 MOSCOW 16100
EXDIS
F. SALT AND MBFR. MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, THE EXPECTED
PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS,
WHICH WAS INTENDED TO MOVE DETENTE ALONG AND BRING
BREZHNEV TO WASHINGTON IN TRIUMPH, HAS NOT BEEN
FURTHCOMING. THE SOVIETS CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE
MADE LARGE CONCESSIONS AT SALT ON VERIFICATION WHICH HAVE
BEEN NEITHER MATCHED NOR EVEN SUITABLY RECOGNIZED BY
THF U.S. OWE CAN CONCEIVE OF NO SOVIET OFFICIALS
WITH ANY VOICE IN THESE MATTERS, NO MATTER HOW
GREAT HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, WHO WOULD
RECOMMEND THAT THE USSR SHOULD AGREE THAT LONG-RANGE
CRUISE MISSILES SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED STRATEGIC
WEAPONS OR THAT THE BACKFIRE BOMBER SHOULD BE WITHIN
THE VLADIVOSTOK CEILING.) IN ADDITION, THE EXPECTED
OFFER OF OPTION III IN MBFR HAS NOT TAKEN PLACE. WHILE
SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT LACK OF PROGRESS IN THESE
MATTERS ARE CLEARLY SELF-SERVING, WE SUSPECT THAT MOSCOW
IN FACT STRONGLY RESENTS BEING DRIVEN UP AGAINST ITS
OWN CONGRESS DEADLINE BY ITS U.S. NEGOTIATING PARTNER
THE OTHER SOVIET GRIEVANCES, HOWEVER, PALE IN IMPORTANCE
AS COMPARED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SECOND SAL AGREEMENT
AND A SUCCESSFUL WASHINGTON SUMMIT. ACHIEVEMENT OF BOTH THESE
OBJECTIVES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY RESTORE U.S. SOVIET
REI ATIONS TO AN FVFN KEEL.
FORD
9, THE PARTY CONGRESS. ANOTHER FACTOR EXPLAINING
&
INCREASING SOVTET PUBLIC COOLNESS TOWARD THE UNITED
STATES IS THE PARTY CONGRESS ITSELF. ON PAST
BERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
THANTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED
1)
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 16100 03 OF 03 190126Z
PERFORMANCE IT WAS PREDICTABLE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD
PAY MORE ATTENTION TO CONSOLIDATING AND GARNERING
SUPPORT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AS THEY PREPARED
FOR THE CONGRESS. (THE HOMESTRETCH OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO PROBABLY HAVE
OBLIGED THEM TO no so, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
OTHER FACTOR.) IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE CONGRESS
WE EXPECT TO SEE A NARROWING SOVIET FOCUS ON A SHRINKING
NUMBER OF HIGH PRIORITY AREAS, WITH SOVIET DECISION. MAKING
FFFICIENCY DECLINING AS THE CONGRESS APPROACHES. SUCH
A FREEZING OF THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS WILL
PROBABLY BE HEIGHTENED IF WE ARE INDEED IN A PRESUCCESSION
PERIOD, AS POSTULATED IN REFTEL.
10. THE BREZHNEV FACTOR. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED
BY AT LEAST SOME OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN REFTEL (A
FULLER EXPOSITION OF OUR VIEWS WILL FOLLOW BY SEPTEL),
OUTWARD INDICATORS HERE ARE THAT BREZHNEV REMAINS
NUMBER ONE FOR THE PRESENT. HUGE PHOTOS OF HIM HAVE
REFN MOUNTED ALL OVER MOSCOW. FOR EXAMPLE, AS PART OF THE
PREPARATION FOR THE 58TH OCTOBER AND HE CONTINUES
TO RECEIVE DAILY ECOMIUMS IN ALL MEDIA. EVEN IF HE IS SHORTLY
TO STEP DOWN FROM THE TOP SPOT, WE REMAIN CONVINCED IT
WOULD BE FOR HEALTH RATHER THAN FOR POLITICAL REASONS.
HOWEVER, HIS REMOVAL FROM THE SCENE WOULD OBVIOUSLY
COMPLICATE PLANS FOR THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT AS WELL AS FOR THE
PARTY CONGRESS ITSELF. ON NEITHER OCCASION WOULD IT BF USEFUL
FOR THE CPSU TO HAVE A LAME DUCK PRESIDING AND MAKING VITAL
DECISIONS. WE THEREFORE EXPECT THAT AT THE NEXT CPSU/CC
PLENUM, PRESUMABLY DECEMBER 1, THIS SHOULD BE A FIRM INDICATOR
OF BREZHNEVIS PLANS, OR, CONCEIVABLY, THE PLANS BEING
MADE BY OTHERS FOR BREZHNEV.
11. IN ANY CASE, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF
NUANCE (SUSLOV AND PODGORNY, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEM TO TAKE
A TOUGHER LINE THAN OTHERS TOWARD THE VALUE TO BE
DERIVED FROM DETENTE), WE HAVE THUS FAR DISCERNED NO
GERALD R. FORD
TUENTIFIABLE POLICY DIFFERENCES WITH THE POLITBURO
WHICH WOULD SIGNIFY A LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE AND THEREFORE
CONTINUE TO ASSUME THAT IF BRE7HNEV IS REPLACED FUR
HEALTH REASONS IT WILL BE BY A COLLEGIUM OF PARTY ELDERS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT
or
STATE
Department of State
of STATE UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 16100 03 OF 03 190126Z
CONSISTING OF KIRILENKO, PODGORNY, KOSYGIN AND SUSLOV,
RATHER THAN BY A YOUNDER LEADER. WE ALSO CONTINUE TO
BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE A GOOD POSSIBILITY OF
BREZHNEV MOVING INTO SOME HONORARY POSITION AS A
FACE-SAVING DEVICE WHEN THE TIME COMES FOR HIM TO STEP
DUWN FRUM OFFICE BUT THAT IF A REAL SHAKEUP IS IN STORE WE
WOULD PROBABLY HAVE HAD SOME INKLING OF IT BY THIS TIME.
TN ANY CASE, HF HAS HAD A BUSY OCTOBER, AND THE SCHEDULE SHAPING
UP FOR THE BALANCE OF THE YEAR PROMISES TO BE EQUALLY BUSY
THE CEMA MEETING, THE POLISH CONGRESS OF DECEMBER 8, THE
FIRST CUBAN CONGRESS AND POSSIBLY AN ECPC). HIS STAMINA,
THEREFORE, IS LIKELY TO RE SUBJECTED TO A SEVERE TEST.
12. FUTURE PROSPECTS. IN CONTEXT OF OVERALL US-SOVIET
RELATIONS, A FADING AWAY OF BREZHNEV AND HIS INFLUENCE WOULD
ALMUST CERTAINLY RESULT IN INCREASING CAUTION ON THE PART OF
THF SOVIET BUREAUCRACY DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD. TESTED AND
TRIED SOVIET BUREAUCRATS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WAIT TO SEE WHICH
WMV THE WIND WAS BLOWING BEFORE MAKING LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS FOR
WHICH THEY WOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE LATER. THERE WOULD ALSO
EXPIN EXPIS
PROBABLY BE A MARKED OBDURACY WITHIN THE SOVIET
RUREAUCRACY, WHICH WOULD RESIST SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS
DESIGNED TO FNHANCE THE HISTORIC IMPORTANCE OF A LAME DUCK.
13. IN FACT, WE HAVE NOTED JUST SUCH A MARGINAL, BUT STILL
PERCEPTIBLE, CHANGE IN OUR RECENT CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET
BUREAUCRACY ON A SERIES OF MATTERS - MOST MINOR - OVER THE PAST
SEVERAL WEEKS. DECISION MAKING, NORAMLLY TORRID AT BEST, SEEMS
TO BE EVEN SLOWER THAN USUAL AND IN SOME CASES WE HAVE RECEIVED
NEGATIVE REPLIES WHEN WE EXPECTED POSITIVE ONES. THESE
PHENOMENA COULD BE SATISFACTORILY EXPLAINED AWAY AS PAVING
NO SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IN AND OF THEMSELVES. ALTERNATIVELY
FOHD
THEY COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO A SLIGHT COOLING OF US-SOVIET
&
RELATIONS, TO PRE-CONGRESS RIGOR MORTIS, OR PERHAPS TO THE
FACT THAT WE ARE IN A PRE-SUCCESSION PERIOD. WHILE WE SEEM
TU BE SUMEWHAT LESS CONVINCED THAN THE DEPARTMENT THAT THE
GERALD
LIBRARY
LAST HURRAH IS IMMEDIATELY UPON US AND STRONGLY DOUBT THAT --
BARRING A COLLAPSE--THE GENERAL SECRETARY MIGHT BE STEPPING
nuwn OR MIGHT BE MOVED OUT EVEN REFORE THE CONGRESS. RREZHNEV'S
AGF AND PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKE IT PROBABLE THAT 1976, HIS
70TH YEAR, WILL BE HIS LAST IN POWER. THUS, EVEN IF THE DANCE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM
DS.1652
OF STATE
UNITED AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
of
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 MOSCOW 16100 03 OF 03 190126Z
OF SUCCESSION HAS NOT YET ACTUALLY BEGUN, ALL THE DANCERS CAN
HEAR THE MUSIC PLAYING JUST OUTSIDE THE ROOM. THIS LENDS
FVFN MORE IMPORTANCE, WE WOULD ARGUE, TO ACHIEVING A SATISFACTORY
SAI AGREEMENT AND TO ARRANGING A SUCCESSFUL WASHINGTON
SUMMIT WHILE THIS CURRENT LEADERSHIP IS IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE
THE NEXT ONE, AND THE 25TH CPSU CONGRESS MAY BE CRUCIAL IN
THTS RESPECT.
EXPIS EXCES EXATS
14. wE ARE, IN ANY CASE, CLEARLY MOVING INTO A TIME OF
TRANSITION. LIKE ALL SUCH PERIODS, IT COULD BE ONE OF
HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. THUS, ARBATOV'S METAPHOR (MOSCOW 15962)
THAT WE HAVE NOW REACHED A TIME WHEN A "WINDOW/ MAY BE
PRIEFLY OPENING IN RELATIONS -- JUST AS a WINDOW OPENS
FOR A PLANETARY PROBE AND THEN CLOSES AGAIN--MAY MAY BE ENTIRELY
APT.
MATLOCK
NOTE: NOOIS CAPTION DELETED, HANDLED AS EXDIS PER
STATE 266783 11/11/75
DEPALD R. FORD
Admuar
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CUNFIDENTIAL
FORM
DS-1652
or
STATE
WAS
UNITED
Department of State
0
TELEGRAM
I
OF
CONFIDENTIAL 0589
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 16100 01 OF 03 112036Z
65
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 1026 W
094502
P 0813132 NOV 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6559
F
E
L. SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 16100
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US
SUBJECT: THE CURRENT SOVIET VIEW OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS
REF: STATE 261650
1. SUMMARY. THERE HAS BEEN A DISTINCT COOLING IN SOVIET MEDIA
TREATMENT OF THE U.S. IN THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, COUPLES WITH
GREATER EMPHASIS ON SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST CAMP
AND ON MOSCOWIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WORLD "PROGRESSIVE" AND
"NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE OTHER
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS, WE ATTRIBUTE THIS LARGELY TO SOVIET
DISAPPOINTMENT AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATION AND
LATERAL SPHERES, INCLUDING MOST NOTABLY WESTERN BACKLASH
ON CSCE, EXCLUSION FROM LATEST MIDDLE EAST DISENGAGEMENT,
AND DELAY IN CONVERTING VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT INTO SALT II TREATY.
IF WE ARE INDEED IN A PRESUCCESSION PHASE, THEN BREZHNEV'S
UPCOMING DEMISE MIGHT ALSO HAVE PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS CHANGED
EMPHASIS, BUT WE SEE NO CLEAR EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH A SUP-
POSITION. WHAT IS EVIDENT TO US IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE UNCERTAIN
ABOUT CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S., APPREHENSIVE ABOUT
WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE THE GROWING CHORUS OF ANTI-SOVIET AND
ANTI-DETENTE SENTIMENTS BEING EXPRESSED THERE, AND WORRIED
ABOUT THE IMPACT WHICH OUR ELECTION CAMPAIGN MAY HAVE ON
U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS. A SAL II AGREEMENT AND A WASHINGTON
SUMMIT WOULD, HOWEVER, BRING RELATIONS BACK TO A MORE EVEN
FORD
KEFL. IF BREZHNEV IS TO MAKE THE TRIP TO WASHINGTON,
&
THIS WOULD IMPLY AN INTENTION TO CONTINUE HIM IN POWER FOR
GERALD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
GG 7/31/01
DS-1652
to
STATE
GREAMA
Department of State
1
TELEGRAM
EXPIS EXCES
STATES of
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 16100 01 OF 03 1120362
SOME TAIME AFTER A MEETING, SINCE A LAME DUCK SUMMIT WOULD MAKE
LITTLE SENSE FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW. IN ANY CASE,
WE MAY WELL BE MOVING INTO A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY, WHICH MIGHT
ALSO IN THE LONG RUN TURN OUT TO BE A PERIOD
OF HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. END SUMMARY.
2. THE MEDIA. WE DETECT A PERCEPTIBLE COOLING OVER
THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS IN THE RELATIVE STRESS IN THE
SOVIET MEDIA ON THE IMPORTANCE OF DETENTE AND U.S.-
SOVIET RELATIONS. CONCOMMITANTLY, HEAVY COVERAGE OF
RECENT SOVIET EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION
WITHIN "THE SOCIALIST CAMP" HAS BEEN MARKED. IN
ADDITION, MORE EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON THE
KREMLIN'S SUPPORT FOR "NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS
AND ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION TO
SUCH MOVEMENTS. THE SOVIETS' PUBLIC POSITION TOWARD
THE MIDDLE EAST HAS RECENTLY TOUGHENED AND CRITICISM
OF THE U.S. ROLE THERE, BOTH IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT,
HAS INCREASED. TREATMENT OF CHINA, ALWAYS HARD, HAS
GOTTEN HARDER. THE FIGHTING IN ANGOLA HAS OCCASIONED
INCREASINGLY FREQUENT CHARGES OF U.S. CHINESE COLLUSION
AS HAVE VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY CHINESE LEADERS THAT
MOSCOW IS LESS TRUSTWORTHY THAN WASHINGTON.
IMPLICIT CONTRAST HAS BEEN DRAWN BETWEEN THE
SECRETARY'S TRIP TO PEKING AS COMPARED WITH THAT OF
GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN THAT SCHMIDT'S DEFENSE
OF DETENTE AGAINST CHINESE ATTACKS WAS JUXTAPOSED AGAINST
WHAT THE LOCAL MEDIA PORTRAYED AS THE SECRETARY!S SILENCE
ON THIS SUBJECT. COVERAGE OF THE U.S. ITSELF,
TEMPORARILY BRIGHTENED BY APOLLO-SOYUZ AND THE ASTRONAUTS
TRIPS, HAS RECENTLY TENDED MORE AND MORE TO DIGGING AND JABBING
IN INNUMERABLE PETTY WAYS.
EXCES
3. WHILE DETENTE WITH THE WEST RETAINS ITS THEORETICAL
PRIMACY, EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR IT IS NOW USUALLY
ACCOMPANIED BY WORRIED SORTIES AGAINST DETENTE'S
WESTERN ENEMIES OR THEIR CHINESE HELPMATES. THE
DRUMBEATING FOR "MILITARY DETENTE" AS A NEXT STEP
R. FORD
IN THE PROCESS, INTENDED AS A MAJOR POST-HELSINKI
PROPAGANDA THEME, HAS BEEN BROUGHT UP SHORT BY THE
UNEXPECTED BACKLASH AGAINST CSCE. TREATMENT OF CSCE
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUTH NATION or HE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
FORM me 1050
on
STATE
UNITED
the
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONF IDENTIAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 16100 01 OF 03 112036Z
ITSELF HAS TURNED CONSISTENTLY DEFENSIVE AND SOMETIMES
SURLY. DETENTE IS NOW USUALLY PAIRED WITH THE NEED
FOR ATTENTION TO THE "WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM" AND THE
"WORLD COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' MOVEMENT."
4. THE TROUBLED GISCARD VISIT RECEIVED ONLY MODERATE
AND CORRECT MEDIA TREATMENT AND WAS FAR OVERSHADOWED
RY THE PLAY GIVEN TO HONECKER AND LE DUAN. EVEN
HUNGARIAN PREMIER LAZAR LOOKED GOOD IN GISCARD'S
WAKE. THE RECEPTION FOR LE DUAN WAS LAVISH IN ITS SYM..
BOLIZATION OF THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION TO "PROGRESSIVE"
FORCES AS WELL AS NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
EVERYWHERE. DURING THE VISIT THE PAGES OF PRAVDA
WERE OPENED TO THE KIND OF ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENTS
BY LE DUAN THAT WE HAVE NOT SEEN IN THE SOVIET PRESS
IN SEVERAL YEARS. DETENTE EMERGED A VERY POOR SISTER
IN THE PROCESS.
5. DN THE OTHER HAND, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE NOTICEABLE
SLACKENING OF SOVIET LIP SERVICE TO THE OVERALL CONCEPT
OF DETENTE. THE PEACE POLICY OF THE 24TH CONGRESS
TS STILL SINGLED OUT AS A LANDMARK. VARIOUS STATE-
MENTS BY U.S. GOVERNMENT LEADERS AND OTHER AMERICANS
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS HAVE
RECEIVED PROMINENT SPACE IN THE PAGES OF THE CENTRAL
PRESS. DETENTE, THE KREMLIN CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN,
BUT IN A MORE TROUBLED TONE, MUST BE MADE "IRREVERSIBLE",
(PERHAPS SYMBOLIC OF THE IMPORTANCE STILL ACCORDED TO
11.5. SOVIET RELATIONS IS THE RECENT ELEVATION OF
KORNIYENKO, HEAD OF THE USA DIVISION OF THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY, TO THE RANK OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER).
NOTE: NODIS CAPTION DELETED. HANDLED AS EXDIS PER
STATE 266783 11/11/75
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT ENUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EARM
OF STATE
Department of State
of STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 0596
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 16100 02 OF 03 1120322
65
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 SSO-00 /026 W
094478
P 0813132 NOV 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6560
C
0
N
La.
N
I
SECTION 2 OF 3 MOSCOW 16100
EXDIS
6. DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE U.S. IN THE PRESS HAS
EXTENDED BEYOND THE USUAL SNIPING AT THE ILLS OF
AMERICAN SOCTETY--UNEMPLOYMENT, CRIME, RACIAL PROBLEMS,
ETC. -- TO INCLUDE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS REGARDING
THE INHERENT STRENGTH OF "ANTI-SOVIET" POLITICAL
FORCES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN POINTING WITH CONCERN
AT WHATTHEY SEE AS A RISING CHORUS OF UNJUSTIFIABLE
ANTI-3OVIET CRITICISM. THEY ARE WORRIED AT THE EFFECT
SUCH CRITICISM MAY HAVE ON DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS
AND DETENTE AS A WHOLE AND FEAR THAT OUR UPCOMING
ELECTION CAMPAIGN COULD LEAD TO A FURTHER EXACERBATION
OF RELATIONS. WHILE SUCH STATEMENTS ARE AT LEAST IN
PART SELF-SERVING, THEY HAVE BECOME SO FREQUENT
AND SO POINTED THAT THEY RAISE LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS
AS TO WHETHER WE MAY BE IN FOR A SWITCH IN EMPHASIS
IN SOVIET POLICY. THIS COULD CONCEIVABLY BE SEEN AS
PART OF A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY PRECEDING BREZHNEV'S
DEPARTURE FOR VALHALLA, ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE IS FAR
EXEMS
FROM CLEAR ON THIS.
7, OUR OWN VIEW, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE CHANGE OF EMPHASIS
DESCRIBED ABOVE HAS BEEN LARGELY DETERMINED BY CONCRETE
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE IN RECENT
FORD
MONTHS. THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY LINE DOES NOT
&
SEEM TO US TO BE IN QUESTION. SUSLOV LECTURED THE
SENATORS ON IT THIS SUMMER: GROMYKO GAVE A CLEAR
QERALD
LISBARY
INDICATION OF THE LEADERSHIP'S INTENTION TO WRITE IT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHO.UT. CONFIDENTIAL THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DRM
DE-1652
of
STATE
EXP-0
ORLINA
Department of State
(
TELEGRAM
/
of
CONF
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 16100 02 OF 03 112032Z
INTO THE RECORD OF THE 25TH CONGRESS IN HIS SEPTEMBER
KOMMUNIST ARTICLE, BREZHNEV REAFFIRMED IT AT HELSINKI AND
IN HIS TOAST TO GISCARD OCTOBER 151 AND THE MEDIA PROMOTE IT WITH
INCESSANT VIGOR. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS "GENERAL LINE" IN THIS
HIFRARCHICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.
8. A LIST OF SOVIET GRIEVANCES. BUT BREZHNEV'S DISAPPOINT-
MENT AT THE WAY THINGS HAVE WORKED OUT SINCE HELSINKI SEEMS
APPARENT. HE CLEARLY HAD A DUAL-TRACK MASTER PLAN WHICH CALLED
FOR CONCENTRATION AFTER HELSINKI ON MILITARY DETENTE IN POST-CSCF
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND, SIMULTANEOUSLY, DEVOTION
OF MORE TIME TO CEMENTING RELATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.
HIS TIMETABLE CALLED FOR RUNNING UP TO THE 25GH CONGRESS ALONG
BOTH FOREIGN POLICY TRACKS--I.E., HE HOPED TO SYMBOLIZE THE
TRIUMPH OF HIS "PEACE POLICY"BY HAVING SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED
A SALT AGREEMENT AND A WASHINGTON SUMMIT, ON THE ONE HAND,
AS WELL AS AN ECPC CONFERENCE ON THE OTHER. WHATEVER SUCCESS
THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD, HOWEVER, HAS THUS FAR ONLY BEEN ALONG
ONE OF THESE TRACKS. FOR THIS THEY LARGELY BLAME THE US
AND THE WEST EUROPEANS, WHOM THEY SEE AS HAVING SABOTAGED THE
ERA OF GOOD FEELING THAT WAS TO HAVE BEEN USHERED IN AFTER
HELSINKI. A LIST OF SOVIET GRIEVANCES WOULD INCLUDE:
A. CSCE BACKLASH. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, THE
SOVIETS WERE UNEASY ABOUT THE FORD ADMINISTRATION AND
THIS UNEASINESS HAS BEEN FED AND COMPOUNDED BY THREE
MAJOR SURPRISES DURING THE PAST YEAR. THE FIRST WAS
THE TOTALLY UNEXPECTED WAVE OF CRITICISM IN THE U.S.
AGAINST THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT. THE SECOND WAS
THE FAILURE OF THE "VLADIVOSTOK SPIRIT" TO HAVE ANY
APPRECIABLE IMPACT ON THE TRADE/EMIGRATION IMPASSE.
THE THIRD HAS BEEN THE UNEXPECTED BACKLASH AGAINST CSCF IN THE
UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE AND THE CONSEQUENT BASIC
QUESTIONING OF THE VALUE OF DETENTE BY MORE AND MORE PEOPLE
WITHIN AMERICAN SOCIETY. IN ANY CASE, THIS POST-CSCE BACKLASH
HAS CLEARLY THROWN A MONKEYWRENCH INTO THE SOVIET SCENARIO
WHICH CALLED FOR A TRIUMPHAL CSCE CULMINATION LEADING UP TO AN
EQUALLY TRIUMPHAL REAFFIRMATION OF DETENTE AT THE 25TH
CONGRESS.
R.
GERAL
FORM
B, THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO DISTURBED THAT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITH TRINTUALI ORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
OF
STATE
UNITED
NAME
Department of State
/
TELEGRAM
STATES
or
CONF IDENT IAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 16100 02 OF 03 112032Z
THEY HAVE BEEN FROZEN OUT OF THE LATEST PEACE AGREEMENT
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAVE COMPLAINED THAT THEY
ARE NOT BEING CUT INTO THE ACTION -- AS THEYTHINK THEY SHOULD
RE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A DETENTE RELATIONSHIP -- IN
WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE A VITAL AREA. THE DIRECT
ATTACKS BY SADAT IMPUGNING SOVIET MOTIVES AND
DISPARAGING THEIR AID WERE CLEARLY REGARDED HERE AS
A CHALLENGE. THE SOVIETS MAY WELL FEEL THAT SADAT'S
DISTRESSING BARBS COULD PERHAPS HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF
WASHINGTON HAD INFORMED THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT THAT
SUCH BLATANT ANTI-SOVIET BAITING WOULD BE UNWISE.
C. PORTUGAL. HACKLES HAVE ALSO BEEN RAISED IN THE
KREMLIN BY CONSISTENT ALLEGATIONS IN THE WEST THAT
THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN VIOLATING THE RULES OF DETENTE
BY THEIR ACTIONS IN PORTUGAL. MOSCOWIS VIEW IS THAT,
ON THE CONTRARY, IT HAS BEEN OPERATING WITHIN DETENTE
GUIDELINES AND HAS BEEN DOING LITTLE WHICH COULD BE
DESCRIBED HONESTLY AS DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN LISBON'S
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR AS IMPERILING DETENTE. POLITICAL AND
FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO A FOREIGN CP IS, IN THEIR VIEW,
PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE, AND THEY PROBABLY CONCEDE OUTRIGHT TO
DO THE SAME IN RESPECT TO OUR FRIENDS, EVEN THOUGH THE
LATTER WOULD BE CONSIDERED GRIST FOR THE PROPAGANDA MILL.)
D. CHINA. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY NOW REGARD THEIR
RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND ITS EFFECT THROUGHOUT
THE COMMUNIST AND THIRD WORLD AS THEIR MOST IMPORTANT
FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEM. THEY ARE DEEPLY WORRIED THAT
WE MAY BE MANEUVERING TO HAVE CHINA BECOME ALMOST AN
ALLY OF THE U.S. THE SOVIETS FEEL THAT AT THE VERY
LEAST A DETENTE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD ENSURE EQUAL TREATMENT
EXCES
OF MOSCOW AND PEKING. THEY ARE THEREFORE PROBABLY
DISTURBED AT THE SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT TO CHINA
AND THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING ONE.
FORD
E. BILATERAL TRRITANTS. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL DIFFICULTIES
&
HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSED THEM INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS,
TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. OUR ATTEMPTS TO USE THIS
GERALD
LIBRARY
AS TESTIFIED TO BY THEIR FAILURE TO PUBLICIZE THE LONG-
GRAIN DEAL AS A LEVER TO EXTRACT SIGNIFICANT PRICE CON-
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
ORM
DS-1652
OR
STATE
CALINA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 MOSCOW 16100 02 OF 03 1120322
CESSIONS ON SOVIET OIL, ALTHOUGH UNDERSTANDABLE, WAS UNDOUBTEDLY
THE SUBJECT OF HEATED POLITBURO DISCUSSION, AND MAY HAVE
RESULTED IN SOME REAL RESENTMENT. A WHOLE RANGE OF OTHER
BILATERAL IRRITANTS ww SOMETIMES PETTY, SOMETIMES LESS so --
CONTINUE TO TROUBLE THE SOVIETS. AMONG THEM ARE DIFFICULTIES
REGARDING VISAS, SOME OF WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE REAL
DIFF IDULTY IN UNDERSTANDING. OUR FAILURE TO ALLOW A CPSU
DELEGATION TO ATTEND THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY
CONGRESS, FOR EXAMPLE, DESPITE PLEAS AT VERY HIGH LEVELS,
UNDOUBTEDLY GALLED THE SOVIETS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IN THIS
REGARD HAS BEEN OUR FAILURE TO MOVE AHEAD ON CONSTRUCTION
OF BOTH EMBASSY PROJECTS.
NOTE: NODIS CAPTION DELETED, HANDLED AS EXDIS PER
STATE 266783 11/11/75
GERALD
R.
FORD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THEUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EARM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXEMS
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 0601
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 16100 03 OF 03 1120077
65
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 1026 y;
094213
P 081313Z NOV 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6561
E
N
SECTION 3 OF 3 MOSCOW 16160
EXPIS
F. SALT AND MBFR. MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, THE EXPECTED
PROGRESS IN U.S. SOVIET DISARMAMENT NEGUTIATIONS,
WHICH WAS INTENDED TO MOVE DETENTE ALONG AND BRING
BREZHNEV TO WASHINGTON IN TRIUMPH, HAS NOT BEEN
FORTHLOMING. THE SOVIETS CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE
MADE LARGE CONCESSIONS AT SALT ON VERIFICATION WHICH HAVE
BEFN NEITHER MATCHED NOR EVEN SUITABLY RECOGNIZED BY
THE U.S. (WE CAN CONCEIVE OF NO SOVIET OFFICIALS
WITH ANY VOICE IN THESE MATTERS, NO MATTER HOw
GREAT HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, WHO WOULD
RECOMMEND THAT THE USSR SHOULD AGREE THAT LONG-RANGE
CRUISE MISSILES SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED STRATEGIC
WEAPONS OR THAT THE BACKFIRE BOMBER SHOULD BE WITHIN
THE VLADIVOSTOK CEILING.) IN ADDITION, THE EXPECTED
OFFER OF OPTION III IN MBFP HAS NOT TAKEN PLACE. WHILE
SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT LACK OF PROGRESS IN THESE
MATTERS ARE CLEARLY SELF-SERVING, WE SUSPECT THAT MOSCOS
IN FACT STRONGLY RESENTS BEING DRIVEN UP AGAINST ITS
OWN CONGRESS DEADLINE BY ITS U.S. NEGUTIATING PARTNER.
THF OTHER SOVIET GRIEVANCES, HOWEVER, PALE IN IMPORTANCE
AS COMPARED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SECOND SAL AGREEMENT
AND A SUCCESSFUL WASHINGTON SUMMIT. ACHIEVEMENT OF ROTH THESE
OBJECTIVES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY RESTORE U.S. SOVIET
RELATIONS TO AN EVEN KEEL.
Q, THE PARTY CONGRESS. ANOTHER FACTOR EXPLAINING
FORD
INCREASING SOVIET PUBLIC COOLNESS TOWARD THE UNITED
&
STATES IS THE PARTY CONGRESS ITSELF. ON PAST
GERALD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
DS-1652
8.66
THANTMENT OF STATE
EXPIS
Department of State
of / AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 16100 03 OF 03 1120072
PERFORMANCE IT WAS PREDICTABLE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD
PAY MORE ATTENTION TO CONSOLIDATING AND GARNERING
SUPPORT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AS THEY PREPARED
FOR THE CONGRESS. (THE HOMESTRETCH OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO PROBABLY HAVE
Opt. IGED THEM TO no SO, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
OTHER FACTOR.) IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE CONGRESS
WE EXPECT TO SEE A NARROWING SOVJET FOCUS ON A SHRINKING
NUMBER OF HIGH PRIORITY ARFAS, WITH SOVIET DECISION-MAKING
EFFICIENCY DECLINING AS THE CONGRESS APPROACHES. SUCH
A FREEZING OF THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS WILL
PROHABLY BE HEIGHTENED IF WE ARE INDEED IN A PRESUCCESSION
PERIOD, AS POSTULATED IN REFTEL.
in. THE BREZHNEV FACTOR. ALTHOUGH WE hAVE BEEN IMPRESSED
BY AT LEAST SOME OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN REFTEL (A
FULLER EXPOSITION OF OUR VIEWS WILL FOLLOW BY SEPTFL),
OUTWAND INDICATORS HERE ARE THAT BREZHNEV REMAINS
NUMBER UNE FOR THE PRESENT. HUGE PHOTOS OF HIM HAVE
BEEN MOUNTED ALL OVER MOSCOW, FOR EXAMPLE, AS PART OF THE
PREPARATION FOR THE 58TH OCTOBER AND HE CONTINUES
TO RECEIVE DAILY ENCOMIUMS IN ALL MEDIA. EVEN IF HE IS SHORTLY
TO STEP DOWN FROM THE TOP SPOT, WE REMAIN CONVINCED IT
WOULD BE FOR HEALTH RATHER THAN FOR POLITICAL REASONS.
HOWEVER, HIS REMOVAL FROM THE SCENE WOULD OBVIOUSLY
COMPLICATE PLANS FOR THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT AS WELL AS FOR THE
PARTY CONGRESS ITSELF. ON NEITHER OCCASION WOULD IT BE HSFFUL
FOR THE CPSU TO HAVE A LAME DUCK PRESIDING AND MANING VITAL
DECISIONS. WE THEREFORE EXPECT THAT AT THE NEXT CPSU/CC
PLENUM, PRESUMABLY DECEMBER 1, THE SITUATION MAY BE SOMEWHAT
CLARIFIED BY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MAIN SPEAKER AT THE
CONGRESS AND ITS AGENDA. THIS SHOULD BE A FIRM INDICATOR
EXEMS
OF BREZHNEV'S PLANS, OR, CONCEIVABLY, THE PLANS BEING
MADE BY OTHERS FOR BREZHNEV.
11. IN ANY CASE, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF
NUANCE (SUSLOV AND PODGORNY, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEM TO TAKE
SERALD
R.
A TOUGHER LINE THAN OTHERS TOWARD THE VALUE TO BE
DERIVED FROM DETENTE), WE HAVE THUS FAR DISCERNED NO
FORD
TURNTIFIABLE POLICY DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE POLITBURO
WHICH WOULD SIGNIFY A LEADERSHIP STRUGGLF AND THEREFORE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
DRM
DS-1652
ro
OF
STATE
GREINA
Department of State
/
TELEGRAM
STATES or
CONF IDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 16100 03 OF 03 112007Z
EXPIN EXPIR
PERFORMANCE IT WAS PREDICTABLE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD
PAY MORE ATTENTION TO CONSOLIDATING AND GARNERING
SUPPORT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AS THEY PREPARED
FOR THE CONGRESS. (THE HOMESTRETCH OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO PROBABLY HAVE
Ool IGED THEM TO no SO, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
OTHER FACTOR.) IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE CONGRESS
WE EXPECT TO SEE A NARROWING SOVIET FOCUS ON A SHRINKING
NUMBER OF HIGH PRIORITY AREAS, WITH SOVIET DECISION-MAKING
EFFICIENCY DECLINING AS THE CONGRESS APPROACHES. SUCH
A FREEZING OF THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS WILL
PROBABLY BE HEIGHTENED IF WE ARE INDEED IN A PRESUCCESSION
PERIOD, AS POSTULATED IN REFTEL.
10. THE BREZHNEV FACTOR. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED
BY AT LEAST SOME OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN REFTEL (A
FULLER EXPOSITION OF OUR VIEWS WILL FOLLOW BY SEPTEL),
OUTWARD INDICATORS HERE ARE THAT BREZHNEV REMAINS
NUMBER UNE FOR THE PRESENT. HUGE PHOTOS OF HIM HAVE
BEEN MOUNTED ALL OVER MOSCOW, FOR EXAMPLE, AS PART OF THE
PREPARATION FOR THE 58TH OCTOBER AND HE CONTINUES
TU RECEIVE DAILY ENCOMIUMS IN ALL MEDIA. EVEN IF HE IS SHORTLY
TO STEP DOWN FROM THE TOP SPOT, WE REMAIN CONVINCED IT
WOULD BE FOR HEALTH RATHER THAN FOR POLITICAL REASONS.
HOWEVER, HIS REMOVAL FROM THE SCENE WOULD OBVIOUSLY
COMPLICATE PLANS FOR THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT AS WELL AS FOR THE
PARTY CONGRESS ITSELF. ON NEITHER OCCASION WOULD IT BE USEFUL
FOR THE CPSU TO HAVE A LAME DUCK PRESIDING AND MAKING VITAL
DECISIONS. WE THEREFORE EXPECT THAT AT THE NEXT CPSU/CC
PLENUM, PRESUMABLY DECEMBER 1, THE SITUATION MAY BE SOMEWHAT
CLARIFIED BY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MAIN SPEAKER AT THE
CONGRESS AND ITS AGENDA. THIS SHOULD BE A FIRM INDICATOR
OF BREZHNEVIS PLANS, OR, CONCEIVABLY, THE PLANS BEING
MADE BY OTHERS FOR BREZHNEV.
11. IN ANY CASE, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF
NUANCE (SUSLOV AND PODGORNY, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEM TO TAKE
A TOUGHER LINE THAN OTHERS TOWARD THE VALUE TO BE
DERIVED FROM DETENTE), WE HAVE THUS FAR DISCERNED NO
GERALD R. FORD
IDENTIFIABLE POLICY DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE POLITBURO
WHICH WOULD SIGNIFY A LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE AND THEREFORE
THEY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
FORM DS.1652
on
&
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
)
TELEGRAM
STATE
or
CONF IDENTIAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 16100 03 OF 03 1129072
CONTINUE TO ASSUME THAT IF BREZHNEV IS REPLACED FOR
HEALTH REASONS IT WILL BE BY A COLLEGIUM OF PARTY ELDERS
CONSISTING OF KIRILENKO, PODGORNY, KOSYGIN AND SUSLOV,
RATHER THAN BY A YOUNDER LEADER. WE ALSO CONTINUE TO
RELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE & GOOD POSSIBILITY OF
BREZHNEV MOVING INTO SOME HONRDARY POSITION AS A
FACE-SAVING DEVICE WHEN THE TIME COMES FOR MIM TO STEP
DOWN FROM OFFICE BUT THAT IF A REAL SHAKEUP IS IN STORE We
WOULD PROBABLY HAVE HAD SOME INKLING OF IT BY THIS TIME.
IN ANY CASE, HE HAS HAD A BUSY OCTOBER, AND THE SCHEDULE SHAPING
UP FOR THE BALANCE OF THE YEAR PROMISES TO BE EQUALLY RUST
THE CEMA MEETING, THE POLISH CONGRESS OF DECEMBER 6, THE
FIRST CUBAN CONGRESS AND POSSIBLY AN ECPC). HIS STAMINA,
THEREFORE, IS LIKELY TO BE SUBJECTED TO A SEVERE TEST.
12, FUTURE PROSPECTS. IN THE CONTEXT OF OVERALL US-SOVIET
RELATIONS, A FADING AWAY OF BREZHNEY AND HIS INFLUENCE WOOLD
EXC
ALMOST CERTAINLY RESULT IN INCREASING CAUTION ON THE PART OF
THE SUVIET BUREAUCRACY DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD. TESTED AND
THIED SOVIET BUREAUCRATS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WAIT TO SEE WHICH
WAY THE WIND WAS BLOWING BEFORE MAKING LONG-TERN COMMITMENTS FOR
WHYCH THEY WOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE LATER. THERE WOULD AUSO
PROBABLY BE A MARKED OBDURACY WITHIN THE
SOVIET BUREAUCRACY, WHICH WOULD RESIST SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS
DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE HISTORIC IMPORTANCE OF A LAME DUCK
13, IN FACT. WE HAVE NOTED JUST SUCH A MARGINAL, BUT STYLE
PERCEPTIBLE, CHANGE IN OUR RECENT CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET
BUREAUCRACY ON A SERIES OF MATTERS - MOST MINOR 5R2 OVER THE PAST
SEVERAL neeks. DECISIONMAKING NORMALLY TORRID AT BEST, SEEMS
TO BE EVEN SLOWER THAN USUAL AND IN SOME CASES WE HAVE RECEIVED
NEGATIVE REPLIES WHEN WE EXPECTED POSITIVE ONES. THESE
EXCE
PHENOMENA COULD BE SATISFACTORILY EXPLAINED AWAY AS HAVING
FORD
NO SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IN AND OF THEMSELVES, ALTERNATIVE
&
THEY COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO 1 SLIGHT COOLING OF US-SOVIET
RELATIONS, TO PRE-CONGRESS RIGOR MORTIS, OR PERHARS TO THE
GERALD
LIBRARY
FACT THAT WE ARE IN A PRE-SUCCESSION PERIOD. WHILE WE SEEM
TO BE SOMEWHAT LESS CONVINCED THAN THE DEPARTMENT THAT THE
LAST HURRAH IS IMMEDIATELY UPON us AND STRONGLY DOUBT THAT
BARRING A COLLARSE THE GENERAL SECRETARY MIGHT BE STEPPING
DOWN OR MIGHT BE MOVED OUT EVEN BEFORE THE CONGRESS, BREZANEVIS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONF
FORM
OF STATE
UNITED
ED
)
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES of
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 MOSCOW 16100 03 OF 03 112007Z
AGF AND PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKE IT PROBABLE THAT 1976, HIS
70TH YEAR, WILL BE HIS LAST IN POWER. THUS, EVEN TF THE DANCE
or SUCCESSION HAS NOT YET ACTUALLY BEGUN, ALL THE DANCERS CAN
HEAR THE MUSIC PLAYING JUST OUTSIDE THE ROOM. THIS LENDS
EVEN MORE IMPORTANCE, WE WOULD ARGUE, TO ACHIEVING A SATISFACTORY
SAI AGREEMENT AND TO ARRANGING A SUCCESSFUL WASHINGTON
SUMMIT WHILE THIS CURRENT LEADERSHIP IS IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE
THE NEXT ONE, AND THE 25TH CPSU CONGRESS MAY BE CRUCTAL TN
THIS RESPECT.0
14, WE ARE, IN ANY CASE, CLEARLY MOVING INTO A TIME 0F
TRANSITION. LIKE ALL SUCH PERIODS, TT COULD BE ONE OF
HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. THUS, ARBATOVIS METAPHOR (MUSCOW 159521
THAT NE HAVE NOW REACHED A TIME WHEN A "WINDOW" MAY BE
BRIEFLY OPENING IN OUR RELATIONS -- JUST AS A WINDOW OPENS
FOR A PLANETARY PROBE AND THEN CLOSES AGAIN AGAIN--MAY BE ENTIRELY
APT.
MATLOCK
NOTE: NODIS CAPTION DELETED, HANDLED AS EXDIS PER
STATE 266783 11/11/75
R
FORD
GERALD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE-AUTHQRIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ORM DS.1652