Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1525334
label
USSR - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS (11)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1525334
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
USSR - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS (11)
citationUrl
collections
Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada (Ford Administration)
Europe and Canada Country Files
subjects
China
Soviet Union
Angola
Portugal
Helsinki Agreement, 1975
Ambassadors
Arms control
United States-Soviet relations
Petroleum
Middle East conflicts
Grain sales
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1525334
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1976-03-31
month
3
year
1976
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1975-11-01
month
11
year
1975
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
8104dc826dc8236d
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 21, folder "USSR - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS (11)" of the NSA. Presidential Country Files for
Europe and Canada at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 21 of NSA. Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
-8 NOY 752 15
CONF IDE INL
NOD57
ACTION 002025 COPY
PAGE E1 MOSCOW 16100 01 OF 03 081434Z
42
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 150-00 /001 W
063230
P #813137 MDV 75
Fn AMERGASESY MOSCOM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6559
C 0 N F I E I A SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 16160
NODIS
E.O. 116521 GDS
TAGS: PEUR, UR, us
SUBJECT: THE CURRENT SOVIET VIEW OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS
REF: STATE 261650
1. SUMMARY. THERE HAS BEEN A DISTINCT COOLING IN SOVIET MEDIA
TREATMENT OF THE U.S. IN THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, COUPLED WITH
GREATER EMPHASIS ON SQVIFT RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST CAMP
AND 04 MOSCOWIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WORLD "PROGRESSIVE" AND
"NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE OTHER
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS, WE ATTRIBUTE THIS LARGELY TO SOVIET
DISAPPOINTMENT AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATION AND
BILATERAL SPHERES, INCLUDING MOST NOTABLY WESTERN BACKLASH
ON CSCE, EXCLUSION FROM LATEST MIDDLE EAST DISERSAGEMENT,
AND DELAY IN CONVERTING VLADIVOSTOR AGREEMENT INTO SALTII THEATY.
IF WE ARE INDEED IN 4 PRESUCCESSION PHASE, THEN PREZHNEVIS
UPCORING DEMISE MIGHT ALSO HAVE PLAYED A RULE IN THIS CHANGED
EMPHASIS, BUT WE SEE NO CLEAR EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH A sup-
POSITION. WHAT IS EVIDENT TO US 15 THAT THE SOVIETS ARE UNDERTAIN
ABOUT CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S.F APPREHENSIVE ABOUT
KHAT THEY COMSIDER TO PE THE GROWING CHCRUS OF ANTI ROVIET AND
ANTI-OFTENTE SENTIMENTS PEING EXPRESSED THERE, AND MORRIED
ABOUT THE IDPACT WHICH willi ELECTION CAMPAIGN MAY HAVE ON
rume
U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS. A BAL II AGREEMENT AND & WASHINGTON
a
SUMMIT NOULD, HOWEVER, BRING RELATIONS BACK TO A MORE EVEN
KEEL. IF BREZRNEV IS TO MAKE THE THIP TU WASHINGTON,
THIS WOULD IMPLY AN INTENTION TO CONTINUE HIM IM POWER FOR
GERALD
CONE IOF 117 IAL
GG
8/1/01.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
of
CONF IDEN IAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 16103 01 OF 03 0814342
some TAIME AFTER A MEETING, SINCE A LAME DUCK SUMMIT WOULD MAKE
LITTLE SENSE FROM THE SUVIET POINT OF VIER. IN ANY CASE,
WE MAY WELL BE MOVING INTO A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY, WHICH MIGHT
ALSO IN THE LONG RUN TURN OUT TO BE A PERIOD
OF HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. END SUMMARY.
2. THE MEDIA. WE DETECT A PERCEPTIBLE COOLING OVER
THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS IN THE RELATIVE STRESS IN THE
SOVIET MEDIA ON THE INFORTANCE OF DETENTE AND U.S.-
SOVIET RELATIONS. CONCOMMITANTLY, HEAVY COVERAGE OF
RECENT SOVIET EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION
WITHIN "THE SOCIALIST CAMP" HAS BEEN MARKED. IN
ADDITION, MORE EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON THE
KREMLINIS SUPPORT FOR "NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS
AND as THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET CONTRIPUTION TO
SUCH NOVENENTS. THE SOVIETS' PUBLIC POSITION TOWARD
THE MIDDLE EAST HAS RECEPTLY TOUGHENED AND CRITICISM
OF THE U.S. HOLE THERE, BOTH IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT,
HAS INCREASED. TREATMENT TIF CHINA, ALWAYS HARD, HAS
GUTTEN HARDER. THE FIGHTING IN ANGULA HAS OCCASIONED
INCREASINGLY FREQUENT CHARGES OF U.S.-CHINESE COLLUSION
AS HAVE VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY CHINESE LEADERS THAT
MOSCOW 1S LESS TRUSTWORTHY THAN WASHINGTON.
IMPLICIT CONTRAST HAS BEEN DRAWN BETWEEN THE
SECRETARY'S TRIP TO PEKING AS COMPARED WITH THAT OF
GERMAN CHANGELLOR SCHNIDT IN THAT SCHMIDT'S DEFENSE
OF DETENTE ARAINST CHINESE ATTACKS WAS JUXTAPOSED AGAINST
WHAT THE LOCAL MEDIA PORTRAYED AS THE SECRETARY'S SILENCE
ON THIS SUBJECT. COVERAGE CF THE U.S. ITSELF,
TEMPORARILY BRIGHTENED BY APOLLO-SOYUZ AND THE ARTRUNAUTS!
TRIPS, HAS RECENTLY TENDED MORE AND MORE TO DIGGING AND JAGUING
IN INNUMERABLE PETTY WAYS.
3. WHILE DETENTE WITH THE WEST RETAINS ITS THEORETICAL
PRIMACY, EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR IT IS NOW USUALLY
FORD
ACCOMPANIED BY WORRIED SORTIES AGAINST DETENJE'S
&
WESTERN ENEMIES DR THEIR CHINESE HELPHATES. THE
DRUNSEATING FOR "MILITARY DETENTE" AS A NEXT STEP
IN The PROCESS, INTEMDED AS 4 MAJOR POST HELSINKI
GERALD
PROPAGANDA THEME, HAS BEEN BROUGHT UP SHORT BY THE
UNCXPLCTED BACKLASH AGAINST CSCE. TREATMENT OF CSCE
CONF
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF state
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 16100 01 OF 03 0814342
ITSELF HAS TURNED CONSISTENTLY DEFENSIVE AND SOMETIMES
SURLY. DETENTE IS NOW USUALLY PAIRED WITH THE NEED
FOR ATTENTION TO THE "WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM" AND THE
"WORLD COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' MOVEMENT."
4; 4 THE TROUBLED GISCARD VISIT RECEIVED ONLY MODERATE
AND CORRECT MEDIA TREATMENT AND WAS FAR OVERSHADOWED
BY THE PLAY GIVEN TO HONECKER AND LE DUAN. EVEN
HUMBARIAN PREMIER LAZAR LOOKED GOOD IN GISCARD'S
WAKE. THE RECEPTION FOR LE DUAN WAS LAVISH IN FTS SYN-
SOLIZATION OF THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION TO "PROGRESSIVE"
FORCES AS WELL AS NATIONAL LIBERATION NOVEMENTS
EVERYWHERE. DURING THE VISIT THE PAGES OF PRAVUA
WERE OPENED TW THE KIND OF ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENTS
BY LE DUAN THAT HE HAVE NOT SEEN IN ThE SOVIET PRESS
IN SEVERAL YEARS. DETEATE EMERGED A VERY POOR SISTER
IN THE PROCESS.
5. ON THI: OTHER HAND, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE NOTICEABLE
SLACKENING OF SOVIET LIP SERVICE TO THE OVERALL CONCEPT
OF DETENTE. THE PEACE POLICY OF THE 24TH CONGRESS
IS STILL SINGLED OUT AS A LANDMARK. VARIOUS STATE-
MENTS BY U.S. GOVERNMENT LEADERS AND OTHER AMERICANS
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS HAVE
RECEIVED PROMINENT SPACE IN THE PAGES OF THE CENTRAL
PRESS. DETENTE, THE KREPLIN CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN,
BUT IN A MORE TROUBLED TONE, MUST BE HADE "IRROVERSIBLE",
(PERHAPS SYMBOLIC OF THE IMPORTANCE STILL ACCORDED TO
U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS IS THE RECENT ELEVATION OF
KORNIYENKO. MEAD OF THE USA DIVISION OF THE FOREIGN
HIDISTRY, TO THE RANK OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER).
S
FORD
&
CONFIDENTIAL
GERALD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DIPARTMENT OF D STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
NODES
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 16100 02 OF 03 081514Z
45
ACTION 0005-86
INFO OCT-91 IS0-00 1002 N
063434
F 2813137 NOV 75
FM ANEMHASET MOSCOW
TO SECRETE WASHDC PRIORITY 6560
C
0
11
F
T
40
A
SECTION 2 OF 3 MOSCOW 16109
NODIS
6. DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE U.S.IN THE PRESS HAS
EXTENSED BEYOND THE USUAL SNIPING AT THE ILLS OF
AMERICAN SOCIETY UNERPLOYMENT, CRIME, RACIAL PROBLEMS,
ETC. -- TO IMELUCE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS REGARDING
Titt INHERENT STRENGTH OF "ANTI-SOVIET" POLITICAL
FORCES RITHIN THE UNITED STATES. IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN POINTING KITH CONCERN
AT WHATTHEY SLE AS A RISING CHORUS OF UNJUSTIFIABLE
ANTI-SOVIET CRITICISM. THEY ARE WORRIED AT THE EFFECT
SUCH OPITICISM MAY HAVE OK DISARBAMENT NEGOTIATIONS
AND DETENTE AS À WHOLE AND FEAM THAT OUR UPCOMING
ELECTION CAMPAIGN COULD LEAD TO A FURTHER EXACERSATION
OF RELATIONS, WHILE SUCH STATEMENTS ARE AT LEAST IN
PART SELF-SERVING, THEY HAVE BECOME SO FREQUENT
AND $0 POINTED THAT THEY RAISE LEGITIMATE RUESTIONS
AS TO WHETHER WE MAY BE IN FOR A SWITCH IN EMPHASIS
IN SOVIET PULICY. THIS COULD CONCEIVARLY BE SEEN AS
PART OF : PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY PRECEDING BREZHNEV'S
DEPARTURE FOR VALHALLA, ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE IS FAR
FROM CLEAR ON THIS.
7. OUR OKN VIEW, HONEVER, IS THAT THE CHANGE OF EMPHASIS
DESCRIBED ABOVE HAS BEEN LARGELY OFTERMINED F.Y CONCRETE
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE IN RECENT
MONTHS. THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY LINE DOES NOT
SEET. TO US TO BE IN QUESTION. SUSLOV LECTURED THE
FORD
SENATORS 011 IT THIS SUMMER BROGYKO GAVE A CLEAR
&
INDICATION OF THE LEADERSHIP'S INTENTION TO WRITE IT
GERALD
LIBRARY
GONE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
INFORMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
IDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 16100 02 OF 03 0815142
INTO THE RECORD OF THE 25TH CONGRESS 1N HIS SEPTEMBER
KOMMONIST ARTICLE; BREZHNEV REAFFIRMED IT AT HELSINRI AND
IN HIS TOAST TO GISCARD OCTOBER 15; AND THE MEDIA PROMOTE IT HITH
INCESSANT VIGOR. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS "GENERAL LINE" IN THIS
HIERAHCHICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC SUCIETY SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.
G. A LIST OF SOVIET GRIEVANCES. BUT BREZHWEV'S DISAPPOINT-
MENT AT THE WAY THINGS KLVE MORKED OUT SINCE HELSINKI SEEMS
APPARENT. HE CLEARLY HAD 4 DUAL-TRACK MASTER PLAN WHICH CALLED
FOR CONCENTRATION AFTER HELSINKI ON MILITARY DETENTE IN PUST-CSCE
EVIET RELATIONS MITH THE WEST AND, SIMULTANEOUSLY, DEVOTION
OF MORE TIME TO CEMENTING RELATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST NOVEMENT.
HIS TIMETABLE CALLED FOR RUNNING UP TO THE 256H CONGRESS ALONG
BOTH FOREIGN POLICY TRACKS--I.E., HE HOPED TO SYNSOLIZE THE
TRIUMPH OF HIS "PEACE PLICY" BY HAVING SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED
A SALT AGREEMENT AND A WASHINGTON SUMMIT, ON THE ONE HAND,
AS HELL AS All ECPC CONFERENCE ON THE OTHER. WHATEVER SUCCESS
THE SOVIETS HAVE MAD, HOPEVER, HAS THUS FAR ONLY BEEN ALONG
ONE OF THESE TRACKS. FOR THIS THEY LARGELY BLAME THE US
AND THE WEST LUROPEANS, WHOM THEY SEE AS HAVING SABOTAGED THE
ERA OF GOOD FEELING THAT WAS TO HAVE BEEN USHERED IN AFTER
HELSINKI, A LIST OF SDVIET GRIEVANCES *DOLD INCLUDE
A. CACE BACKLASH. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, THE
SOVIETS RERE UNEASY ABOUT THE FORD ADMINISTRATION AND
THIS UREASINESS HAS BEEN FED AND COMPOUNDED BY THNEE
MAJUS SURPRISES DURING THE PAST YEAR. THE FIRST WAS
THE TOTALLY UNEXPECTED WAVE OF CRITICISM IN THE UnSo
AGAINST THE VLADIVOSTUK AGREEMENT. THE SECOND AS
THE FAILURE OF THE "VLADIVOSTOK SPIRIT" TO HAVE ANY
APPRECIABLE IMPACT ON THE TRADE/EMIGRATION IMPASSE.
THE THIRD HAS BEEN THE UNEXPECTED BACKLASH AGAINST CSCE IN THE
UNITED STATES Airl) VESTERN EUROPE AND THE CONSEQUENT BASIC
DUESTIONING OF THE VALUE OF DETENTE BY MORE AND MORE PEOPLE
WITHIN AMERICAN SOCIETY. IN ANY CASE, THIS POST-CSCE HACKLASH
HAS CLEARLY THROWN A GORKEYWRENCH INTO THE SOVIET SCENARIO
WHICH CALLED FOR A TSIUMPHAL CSCE CULMINATION LEADING UP TO AN
EQUALLY TRIUMPHAL HEAPFIRMATION OF DETENTE AT THE 25TH
CONGRESS.
FORD
&
P. THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO DISTURSED THAT
GERALD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 16100 02 OF 03 0815142
THEY HAVE BEEN FROZEN OUT OF THE LATEST PEACE AGREEMENT
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAVE COMPLAINED THAT THEY
ARE NOT PEING CUT INTO THE ACTION -- AS THE THINK THEY SHOULD
BE WITHIN THE FRAHEWORK OF A DETENTE RELATIONSHIP -- IN
WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE A VITAL AREA. THE DIRECT
ATTACKS BY SADAT IMPUGNING SOVIET MUTIFVS AND
DISPARAGING THEIR AID WERE CLEARLY REGARDED HERE AS
A CHALLENGE. THE SOVIFTS MAY WELL FEEL THAT SADAT'S
DISTRUSSING BAHBS COULD PERWARS HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF
ASHINGTON HAD INFORMED THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT THAT
SUCH BLATANT ANTI-SOVIET BAITING WOULD BE UNWISE.
C. PORTUGAL, HACKLES HAVE ALSO BEEN RAISED IN THE
KREMLIM RY CONSISTENT ALLEGATIONS IN THE WEST THAT
THE SUVIETS HAVE BEEN VIOLATING THE RULE? OF DETENTE
BY THEIR ACTIONS IN PORTUGAL. MOSCORTS VIEW IS THAT,
ON THE CONTRANY, IT HAR REF OPERATING KITHIN DETENTE
GUIDELINES AND HAS BEEN DOING LITTLE KHICH COULD BE
DESCRIBED HONESTLY AS DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN LISBONIS
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR AS IMPERILLING DETENTE. POLITICAL AND
FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO A POREIGN LP IS, IN THEIR VIEW,
PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE, AND THEY PROBABLY CONCEDE OURRIGHT TO
DD THE SAME IN RESPECT TO OUR FRIENDS, EVEN THOUGH THE
LATTER WOULD BE CONSIDERED GRIST FOR THE PROPAGANDA MILL.)
D. CHINA. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY NOR REGARD THEIR
RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND ITS EFFECT THROUGHOUT
THE COMMUNIST AND THIRD WORLD AS THEIR MOST IMPORTANT
FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEM. THEY ARE DEEPLY WORRIED THAT
HE MAY BE MANEUVERING TO HAVE CHINA BECOME ALMOST AN
ALLY OF THE U.S. THE SOVIETS FEEL THAT AT THE VERY
LEAST 4 DETENTE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD ENSURE EQUAL TREATMENT
OF NOSCOW AND PEKING. THEY ARE THEREFORE PROBABLY
DISTURBED AT THE SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT TO CHINA
AND THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING ONE.
E. BILATERAL IRRITANTS. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL DIFFICULTIES
HAVE UNDORTEOLY CAUSED THEM INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS,
FORD
is TESTIFIED TO BY THEIR FAILURE TO PUBLICIZE THE LONG-
&
TEPM GRAJN AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. OUR ATTEMPTS TO USF THIS
CONFIDENTIAL
GERALD
LIBRARY
GRAIN DEAL AS A LEVER TO EXTRACT SIGNIFICANT PRICE CON-
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT or STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONE IDENTIAL
PAGE or MOSCOW 16103 02 OF 03 0815142
CESSTONS 0% SOVIET OIL, ALTHOUGH UNDERSTANDABLE, WAS UNDOURTEDLY
THE SHAJECT OF HEATED POLITBURO DISCUSSION, AND MAY 1 YE
RESULTED IN SOME REAL RESENTMENT. A WHOLE RANGE OF OTHER
BILATERAL IRRITANTS -- SOMETIMES PETTY, SOMETIMES LESS so --
CONTINUE TO TROUBLE THE SOVIETS. AMONG THEM ARE UIFFICULTIES
REGARDING VISAS, SOME OF WHICH THE SOVIETS hAVE REAL
DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING. OUR FAILURE TO ALLON A CPSU
DELEGATION TO ATTEND THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY
CONGRESS, FOR EXAMPLE, DESPITE PLEAS AT VERY HIGH LEVELS,
UNDOUNTERLY GALLED THE SOVIETS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IN THIS
REGARD HGS BEEN OUR FAILURE TO MOVE AHEAD ON CONSTRUCTION
OF BOTH EMBASSY PROJECTS.
S
FORD LIBHAR & 07VU39
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
COLEIDENTS
N00507
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 16100 03 OF 63 6815462
45
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
063629
P 0813137 MOV 75
FM AMERGASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6561
G
0
N
F
I
0
11:
H
T
H
A
L
SECTION 3 OF 3 MOSCOW 16100
NODIS
F. SALT AND MGFR. MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, THE EXPECTED
PROGRESS IN S.-SOVIET DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS,
WHICH was INTENDED TO MOVE DETENTE ALONG AND BRING
BREZHNEV TO WASHINGTON IN TRIUMPH, HAS NOT BEEN
FORTHCOLING. THE SOVIETS CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE
MADE LARGE CONCESSIONS AT SALT ON VERIFICATION WHICH HAVE
BEEN WEITHER MATCHED NOR EVEN SUITABLY RECOGNIZED BY
THE U.S. (WE CAN CONCEIVE OF NO SOVIET OFFICIALS
WITH ANY VOICE IN THESE MATTERS, NO MATTER HOK
GREAT HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, WHO WOULD
RECOMMEND THAT THE USSR SHOULD AGREE THAT LONG-RANGE
CRUISE MISSILES SHOULD NOT DE CONSIDERED STRATEGIC
WEARONS OR THAT THE BACKFIRE BOMBER SHOULD BE WITHIN
THE VLADIVOSTOK CEILING.) IN ADDITION, THE EXPECTED
OFFER OF OPTION TII IN MBER HAS NOT TAKEN PLACE. WHILE
SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT LACK OF PROGRESS I'd THESF
MATTERS ARE CLEARLY SELF-SERVING, WE SUSPECT THAT MOSCOS
IN FACT STRONGLY RESENTS BEING DRIVEN UP AGAINST ITS
OWN CONGRESS DEADLINE FY ITS U.S. NEGOTIATING PARTNER.
THE OTHER SOVIET GRIEVANCES, HOWEVER, PALL IN IMPORTANCE
AS CORPARED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SECOND SSL AGREEMENT
AND A SUCCESSFUL WASHINGTON SUMMIT. ACHIEVEMENT OF NOTH THESE
OBJECTIVES NOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY RESTORE U. S. SOVIET
RELATIONS TO AN EVEN KEEL.
FORD
9. THE PARTY CONGRESS. ANOTHER FACTOR EXPLAINING
INCREASING SOVIET PUBLIC COOLNESS TOWARD THE UNITED
LIBRARY
STATES IS THE PARTY CONGRESS ITSELF. ON PAST
CONE
INL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT or STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONF IDENT IAL
PAGE $2 MOSCOW 16100 03 OF 03 0815462
PERFORMANCE IT WAS PREDICTABLE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD
PAY MORE ITTENTION TO CONSOLIDATING AND GARNERING
SUPPORT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AS THEY PREPARED
FOR THE CONGRESS. (THE HOMESTRETCH OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO PROBABLY HAVE
PALIGED THEM TO DO so, EVEN IN THE ARGENCE OF ANY
OTHER FACTON.) IN THE PERIOD LEADING OF TO THE CONGRESS
WE EXPECT TO SEE A NARROWING SOVIET FUCUS ON A SHRINKING
NUMBER OF HIGH PRIORITY AREA5, WITH SOVIET DECISION-MAKING
EFFICIENCY DECLINING AS THE CONGRESS APPROACHES. SUCH
a FREEZING OF THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS KILL
PROBABLY BE HEIGHTENED IF WE ARE INDRED IN A PRESUCCESSION
PERIOD. AS POSTULATED IN REFTEL.
10. THE CREZHNEV FACTOR. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED
BY AT LEAST BOME OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN REFIEL CA
FULLER EXPOSITION or OUR VIEWS WILL FULLOW BY SEPTEL),
OUTWARD INDICATORS WERE ARE THAT BREZHNEV REMAINS
NUMBER ONE FOR THE PRESENT. HUGE PHOTOS OF HIM HAVE
BEEN MOUNTED ALL OVEH MJ8C06, FOR EXAMPLE, AS PART OF THE
PREPARATION FOR THE 58TH OCTOBER AND HE CONTINUES
TO RECEIVE DAILY ENCONIUMS IN ALL MEDIA. EVEN IF HE ,IS SHORTLY
TO STEP DOWN FROM THE TOP SPOT, WE NEGAIN CONVINCED IT
WOULD BE FOR HEALTH RATHER THAN FOR POLITICAL REASONS.
HOWEVER, HIS RENOVAL FRUX THE SCENE WOULD OBVIOUSLY
COMPLICATE PLANS FOR THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT AS WELL AS FOR THE
PARTY CONGRESS ITSELF. ON NEITHER OCCASION WOULD IT BE USEFUL
FOR THE CPSU TO HAVE A LAME DUCK PRESIDING AND MAKING VITAL
DECISIONS. ME THEREFORE EXPECT THAT AT THE NEXT CPSU/CC
PLENTH, PRESURABLY DECEMBER 1, THE SITUATION MSY BE SOMEWHAT
CLARIFIED BY AMOUNCEMENT OF THE MAIN SPEAKER AT THE
CONGRESS AND ITS AGENDA. THIS SHOULD BE A FIRM INDICATOR
OF GREZHNEVIS PLANS, OR, CONCEIVABLY, THE PLANS BEING
MADE BY OTHERS FOR BREZHNEV.
11. IN ANY CASE, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF
NUANCE (SUSLOV AND PODGORNY, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEM TO TAKE
A TOUGHER LIME THAN OTHERS TOWARD THE VALUE TO HE
FORD
DERIVED FROM DETENTE), NE HAVE THUS FAR DISCERNED NO
&
IDENTIFIABLE POLICY DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE POLITBURO
WHICH WOULD SIGNIFY A LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE AND THEREFORE
GERALD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WJTHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DIPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONF IDENTIAL
PAGE 33 MOSCOW 16100 03 OF B3 0815462
CONTINUE TO ASSUME THAT IF BREZHNEV IS REPLACED FOR
HEALTH REASONS IT WILL BF BY A COLLEGIUM OF PAPTY ELI 78
CONDISTING OF KIRILENRO, POOGORNY, KOSYGIN AND SUSLOV,
RATHER THAN BY A YOUNDER LEADLR. WE ALSO CONTINUE TO
BELIEVE THAT THERE HOULD BE 4 GOOD POSSIBILITY OF
BREANWFY MOVING INTO SOME HOURDARY POSITION AS p.
FACE-SAVING SAVING DEVICE WHEN THE TIME COMES FOR HIM TO STEP
DOWN FROM OFFICE BUT THAT IF A REAL SHAKEUP TS IN STORE WE
WOULD PRODABLY HAVE HAD SOME INKLING OF IT BY THIS TIME.
In ANY CASE, HE HAS BAD A BUSY OCTOBER, AND THE SCHEDULE SHAPING
UP FOR THE BALANCE of THE YEAR PROMISES TO BE EQUALLY BUSY
(THE CENA KEFTING, THE POLISH CONGRESS OF DECEMBER 8, THE
FIRST CUBAN CONGRESS AND POSSIBLY AN ECPO). HIS STAMINA,
THEREFORE, IS LIKELY TO BL SUBJECTED TO A SEVERE TEST.
12. FUTURE PROSPECTS. IN THE CONTEXT OF OVERALL US-SOVIET
RELATIONS, A FADING ANAY OF BREZHWEV AND HIS IMPLUENCE WOULD
ALMOST CERTAINLY RESULT IN INCREASING CAUTION an THE PART OF
THE SOVIET INTERAUCRACY DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD. TESTED AND
THIED SOVIET BUREAUCRATS BOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WAIT TU SEE WHICH
WAY THE WIND WAS BLOWING BEFORE MAKING LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS FOR
WHICH THEY ROULD BE HEI.D ACCOUNTABLE LATER. THERE NOULD ALSO
PROBABLY BR A MARKED ORDURACY WITHIN THE
SOVIET BURRAUCRACY, WHICH MOULD RESIST SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS
DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE HISTORIC IMPORTANCE OF A LAME DUCK.
13. IN FACT, WE HAVE NOTED JUST SUCH A MARGINAL, BUT STILL
PERCEPTIBLE, CHANGE IN OUR RECENT CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET
BUREAUCRACY ON A SERTES OF MATTERS - MOST MINOR m OVER THE PAST
SEVERAL WEEKS. DECISIONMARING, NURMALLY TORPID AT BEST, SEEMS
TO BR EVEN SLOVER THAN USUAL AND IN SOME CASES WE HAVE RECEIVED
NEGATIVE REFLIES WHEN WE EXPECTED POSITIVE ONES. THESE
PHENOMENA COULD HE SATISFACTORILY EXPLAIMED AWAY AS HAVING
NO SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE TN AND OF THEMSELVES. ALTERNATIVELY,
THEY COULD of ATTRIBUTED TO L SLIGHT COULING OF US-SOVIET
RELATIONS, TO PRE-COMGRESS RIGOR NORT15, OR PERHAPS TO THE
FACT THAT bit ARE IN 4 PRE-SUCCESSION PERIOD. WHILE ME SEEM
FORD
TO SE SOMEWAY LESS CONVINCED THAN THE DEPARTMENT THAT THE
LAST HURRAH IS INCEDIATELY UPON US AND STRONGLY DOUBT THAT
-
GENERAL
BEWARD
1444917
:
DOWN OR MICHT "E MDVED UNT EVER REFURE THE CONGRESS, STEPPING BREZHNEY'S
SECRETARY
MIGHT
PE
CONF
IDC
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONF
PAGE 04 MOSCOW 16100 03 OF 03 081546Z
AGE AND PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKE IT PROBABLE THAT 1976, HIS
76Tm YEAR, WILL BE HIS LAST IN POWER. THUS, EVEN IF IE DANCE
OF SUCCESSION HAS NOT YET ACTUALLY BEGUN, ALL THE DANCERS CAN
HEAR THE BUSIC PLAYING JUST OUTSIDE T.F. ROOM. THIS LENDS
EVEN COSE IMPORTANCE, WE HOULD ARGUE, TO ACRIEVING A SATISFACTORY
SAL AGREEMENT AND TO ARRANGING A SUCCESSFUL MASHINGTON
SUMMIT PRILL THIS CURRENT LEADERSHIP IS IN A POSITION TO IMPLUENCE
THE NEXT ONE, AND THE 25TH CPGU CONGRESS MAY BE CRUCIAL IN
THIS RESPECT.
14, WF. ARE, IN ANY CASE, CLEARLY MOVING INTO A TIME OF
TRANSITION. LINE ALL SUCH PERIODS, IT COULD EE ONE OF
HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. THUS, ARBATOVIS METAPHOR (MOSCOM 15952)
THAT WE HAVE NOW REACHED 4 TIME WHFU A "WINDOW" MAY BE
BRIEFLY OPENING IN OUR RELATIONS M 19 JUST AS h WINOOW OPENS
FOR L PLANETARY PROBE AND THEN CLOSES AGAIN-MAY BF ENTIRELY
APT.
MATLOCK
FORD
H
GERALD
LUBRARY
CONF
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ACTION COPY
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
10 DEC752 07 5
002476
Department of State
LINE
SECRET
N00848
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 17689 01 OF 02 100719Z
11
ACTION NODS-00
COPY
/
OF 15 COPIES
INFO OCT-01 ISD-00 1001 W
094357
R 100519Z DEC 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7608
SECRE 4 SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 17609
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: UR. US, PFOR
SUBJECT: THE MOOD IN MOSCOW
REF: MOSCOW 17607
1. IN VIEW OF OUR MEETING IN LONDON AND, MORE IMPORTANT, YOUR
POSSIBLE VISIT TO MOSCOW, IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE TO CONVEY OUR
THOUGHTS ON SOME OF THE PROBLEMS YOU WILL BE DEALING WITH,
SINCE YOU SAW GROMYKO IN SEPTEMBER, THE SOVIETS HAVE RUN INTO
UNEXPECTEDLY HEAVY WEATHER IN BOTH DOMESTIC AND, TO A LESSER
EXTENT, FOREIGN POLICY. THESE SETBACKS HAVE, IN ONE SENSE,
INCREASED THE SOVIET INCENTIVE TO KEEP THE RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE us ON TRACK. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THEY MAY HAVE LIMITED
THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IN MAKING THE NECESSARY
COMPROMISES TO 00 SO.
2. OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS BECOME
INCREASINGLY PREOCCUPIED WITH PREPARATIONS FOR THEIR CONGRESS IN
FEBRUARY. IT HAS BEEN CLEAR THAT BREZHNEV WISHED TO MAKE THIS
CONGRESS A TRIUMPHANT RATIFICATION OF A DECADE OF SUCCESSFUL
LEADERSHIP. BUT THE SECOND HARVEST DISASTER IN A FOUR YEAR PERIOD
WILL UNQUESTIONABLY CAST A PALL OVER DOMESTIC PROSPECTS AND THE
CONGRESS THEREFORE PROMISES TO BE HUMDRUM AFFAIR AT BEST. WHILE
THE LEADERSHIP WILL CLAIM AN UNBROKEN RECORD OF DOMESTIC ACHIEVEMENT
MARRED BY UNAVOIDABLE "NATURAL DISASTERS," THE ACTUAL STATE CF THE
SEPRET
FOHD
66 8/1/01
GERALO
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED OF THE
TELEGRAM
STATES
SECRET
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 17509 01 OF 02 100,197
ECONOMY AND THE MOOD OF THE COUNTRY IS FAR FROM EXUBERANT (REFTEL),
S
CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET LEADERS MUST RUN ON THEIR FOREIGN POLICY
RECORD EVEN MORE THAN BEFORE AND HERE TOO THERE IS A MIXED PICTURE'.
3, AT LEAST PARTLY IN PREPARATION FOR THE CONGRESS, THE
SOVIETS HAVE BEEN GIVING MORE TIME AND ATTENTION TO
CONSOLIDATING THE "SOCIALIST CAMP" AND PRESSING THEIR
INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD. THE POST-HELSINKI SERIES
N
OF BILATERAL SUMMITS WITH WESTERN LEADERS--KEKKONEN, COSTA
GOMES, GISCARD, SCHEEL, LEONE HAS BEEN MATCHED BY AN
EVEN SPLASHIER SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH MEMBERS OF THEIR
OWN CLUB--HONECKER, LAZAR, LE DUAN, HUSAK AND NOW
GIEREK AND OTHERS AT THE POLISH CP CONGRESS. UPCOMING
PARTY CONGRESSES IN HAVANA AND ELSEWHERE, AS WELL
AS SOVIET EFFORTS TO ENGINEER A EUROPEAN COMMUNIST
PARTY CONFERENCE AND POSSIBLY ALSO A COMECON SUMMIT,
MAY PROVIDE SOMETHING MORE TO COME ON THE "SOCIALIST"
SIDE. WHATEVER THE SPECIFIC SUBSTANCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL
MEETINGS, ONE STRATEGIC PURPOSE OF THIS FLURRY OF ACTIVITY
HAS BEEN TO BRING THE SOVIETS UP TO THE CONGRESS WITH A
S
"BALANCED" RECORD OF FOREIGN POLICY ACCOMPLISHMENT,
4. OVERALL, FROM A TEN YEAR PERSPECTIVE, IT SHOULD BE KEPT
IN MIND THAT BREZHNEVIS RECORD IS IMPRESSIVE.
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF DETENTE WITH THE CAPITALIST WORLD HAS
BEEN BALANCED BY AN ENORMOUS INCREASE IN SOVIET ARMED STRENGTH
AND INCREASING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, AFRICA, AND EVEN LATIN AMERICA. THE
VAGARIES OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THE VIETNAM WAR HAVE, IN THE INTERIM, WEAKENED THE USSRIS
TWO MAJOR RIVALS. BREZHNEVIS PLATFORM
OF FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS AT THE CONGRESS MAY THEREFORE NOT BE AS
RICKETY AS RECENT SETBACKS MIGHT SUGGEST.
5. THE RECORD IN RECENT MONTHS, HOWEVER,
IS NOT IMPRESSIVE. THE EXPECTED POST-CSCE EUPHORIA NOT ONLY HAS
NOT MATERIALIZED, BUT THE MOOD HAS TURNED EVEN MORE PARTICU-
LARLY IN THE UNITED STATES. SINAI II IS SEEN HERE AS A CLEAR
S
FOREIGN POLICY REVERSAL. THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN PORTUGAL
CANNOT BE PLEASING TO THE KREMLIN. AND AREAS WHICH PREVIOUSLY
LOOKED MANAGEABLE WITH SOME EFFORT--THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST
SECRET
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 17609 01 OF 02 100719Z
CONFERENCE, RELATIONS WITH YUGOSL AVIA AND ROMANIA--HAVE
PROVEN UNEXPECTEDLY THORNY.
6, FACED WITH THESE DISAPPOINTMENTS, THE SOVIETS APPEAR
TO HAVE REACTED MAINLY BY HUNKERING DOWN AROUND BREZHNEV
AND "HIS" OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY LINE. IT HAS NOW BEEN
ANNOUNCED THAT BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN WILL GIVE THE KEY
ADDRESSES AT THE CONGRESS, AND THE MOUNTING CHORUS OF
PUBLIC PRAISE FOR BREZHNEV PERSONALLY (E.G., "THAT
N
FLAMING WARRIOR FOR PEACE, "THE MOST OUTSTANDING LEADER OF OUR
TIME") ALSO EXTENDS TO DOMESTIC POLICIES ASSOCIATED
WITH HIM.
and
7. WE WILL THEREFORE BE DEALING WITH FAMILIAR LEADERS
AND POLICIES AT LEAST UP TO THE CONGRESS AND PROBABLY IN ITS
IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH AS WELL. BREZHNEV IS A DIMINISHED MAN PHYSI-
CALLY, BUT HE DOES NOT YET SEEM TO BE A "LAME DUCK" IN SOVIET EYES
AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE SERIOUSLY THREATENED AT THIS POINT. HE
THEREFORE SEEMS TO HAVE RETAINED HIS CAPACITY FOR
PREVAILING IN MOST INTERNAL INTRA-BUREAUCRATIC STRUGGLES
S
IN THE USSR AND, CONSEQUENTLY, FOR CONDUCTING SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS
WITH US ON THE MAJOR POINTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.
SECRET
FORD
R
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
10 DEC 75Z 08.00
Department of State
002481
TELEGRAM
STATES
of
SECRET
N00851
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 17609 02 OF 02 100749Z
11
ACTION NODS-00
S
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 /001 W
094603
R 100619Z DEC 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7609
S
SCRE SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 17609
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY
8. THE "TOUGHENING" OF SOVIET POLICY IN RECENT MONTHS
IS PARTLY OPTICAL: THE SOVIETS HAVE MOVED AHEAD MORE
BRISKLY IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE "SOCIALIST CAMP" AND
THE THIRD WORLD THAN THEY HAVE IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH US.
BUT SINCE THE U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN THE
CENTERPIECE OF "BREZHNEV'S" FOREIGN POLICY, LAGGING
PROGRESS WITH US STANDS OUT IN BOLDER RELIEF, AND PUTS
MORE PRESSURE ON THE RELATIONSHIP. HOWEVER, THERE IS
ALSO LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS
HONESTLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL UNHAVELLING EFFECT
ON THE DETENTE PROCESS OF CSCE BACKLASH IN THE WEST, AND
ESPECIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES, AND FEELS THAT THE GROWING
CHILL IN OUR RELATIONS IS PRIMARILY WASHINGTON'S FAULT.
WHILE THEY ARE QUITE CAPABLE FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES OF EXAGGERATING
THEIR DOUBTS ABOUT OUR CAPACITY TO DELIVER, THERE IS A HARD CORE
OF REAL DISQUIET IN THE CRESCENDO OF RECENT MUSINGS ABOUT THE STRENGT
OF "RIGHT-WING" FORCES IN WESTERN POLITICAL SYSTEMS.
AND, WHILE THEY MAY WELL HAVE BEEN COMFORTED BY SCHLESINGER'S
REMOVAL, IT WOULD BE STRETCHING THE EVIDENCE TO SAY THEIR BASIC
DISQUIET HAS BEEN ALLAYED. IN FACT, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT SAID
MUCH ABOUT IT. THEY WERE PROBABLY DIS-URSED BY
THE PRESIDENT'S CHINA TRIP AND BY THE LIBERAL USE OF THE WORD
"HEGEMONY"--TO THEM AN ANTI-SOVIET CATCHWORD.
S
FURTHERMORE, THE THREAT OF REAGAN-JACKSON "FORCES" DISMANTLING
THE WHOLE STRUCTURE OF DETENTE IS DNF THAT THEY
FORD
SECRET
LIBRARY
1
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 22 MOSCOW 17609 02 OF 02 1007497
DO NOT TAKE LIGHTLY.
S
9 IN HIS MEETINGS WITH YOU, BREZHNEV WILL THEREFORE
RE SEEKING EVIDENCE OF THE ADMINISTRATION!S INTENTION AND
CAPACITY TO PROCEED WITH THE BASIC THRUST OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, ON
BALANCE, THEREFORE, YOU WILL PROBABLY FIND THE SOVIETS
WARY AND PERTURBED, BUT WILLING TO MOVE FORWARD WITH US
IN SPECIFIC AREAS, AND MORE THAN WILLING TO LISTEN TO
YOUR VIEWS ON WHERE THE RELATIONSHIP IS AND SHOULD BE
HEADING.
10. AS FOR SPECIFICS, THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP REMAINS
PREEMINENT IN SOVIET THINKING, AND SALT WILL, OF COURSE,
BE THE MAJOR FOCUS OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS' AS USUAL, WE CAN
EXPECT TOUGH BARGAINING WITH ULTIMATE CONCESSIONS ONLY
AT THE LAST POSSIBLE MINUTE, BUT I THINK SOME CONCESSIONS
WILL COME. BREZHNEV WANTS AN AGREEMENT AND PROBABLY HAS
A REALISTIC APPRECIATION OF THE DIFFI-ULTIES YOU WILL
FACE IN OBTAINING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL IN AN ELECTION
YEAR. THE FIXATIONS WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED CONCERNING
CRUISE MISSILES MAY RESULT FROM REALIZATION
THAT THEY ARE SO FAR BEHIND IN THIS FIELD. THESE WEAPONS
PROBABLY REPRESENT THE SPECTER OF TECHNOLOGICAL BACK-
WARDNESS WHICH DOMINATES so MUCH OF THEIR GENERAL STRATEGIC
THINKING. HOWEVER, IT HAS PROBABLY NOT ESCAPED
SOVIET STRATEGISTS THAT SOME LIMITATION ON OUR ABILITY AND
DESIRE TO DEVELOP THIS WEAPON IS BETTER THAN NO LIMITATION
AT ALL. THUS--TO TO GO OUT ON A LIMB--I TEND TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT
YOUR SALT NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THINK THERE WILL BE TOUGH SLEDDING
ON ALL OTHER TOPICS.
11. WHILE THEY WILL NOT BE IN A PARTICULARLY RECEPTIVE
MOOD, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR YOUR INTERLOCUTORS TO
CARRY AWAY SOME IMPRESSION OF THF RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S
TRIP TO CHINA AND OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL. THEY MAY HAVE
BEEN COMFORTED BY OUR DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE
CHINESE OVER DETENTE, BUT THEIR OWN STANCE
VIS-A-VIS CHINA HAS HARDENED IN RECENT MONTHS, THEY ARE
LOCKED IN STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE WITH THE PRC
S
NOT ONLY AROUND THE PERIPHERY OF ASIs BUT IN AFRICA AS
FORD
WELL, AND THEY ARE HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF CHINESE EFFORTS
SECRET
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 17629 02 OF 02 1007497
TO SELL US AND THE EUROPEANS ON ANTI-SOVIETISM AND TO
SELL THE THIRD WORLD ON THE NEED TC RESIST "GREAT POWER
S
HEGEMONY.' A PRESENTATION FROM YOU REMINDING THEM OF SOME
OF THE BASIC VERITIES OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY WOULD BE A
USEFUL FORM OF GENERAL REASSURANCES, EVEN IF CERTAIN ASPECTS
WILL BE UNWELCOME.
12, THE MOST UNWELCOME OF THESE RELATE TO SOVIET CONDUCT
IN THIRD AREAS, ESPECIALLY ANGOLA. A MODICUMI OF THE INJURED
INNOCENCE THEY WILL SEEK TO PROJECT IS GENUINE, BUT IT
WOULD STILL BE USEFUL TO REMIND THEM THAT WE SEE PURSUIT
OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES IN THIRD AREAS FIRMLY WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES TO WHICH WE BOTH
ADHERED IN 1972, AT THE SAME TIME, I BELIEVE
YOU SHOULD TAKE WHATEVER ORPORTUNITY ARISES TO REAFFIRM
OUR COMMITMENT TO WORK TOGETHER WITH THEM FOR A STABLE
SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ONCE MORE TO DISAVOW ANY
INTENTION OF EXCLUDING THEM FROM THE PROCESS. AS WE REPORTED,
OUR FEELING IS THAT THEIR NOVEMBER 9 PROPOSAL REPRESENTED
PRIMARILY AN ATTEMPT TO ESCAPE FROM À DEAD END, RATHER THAN
AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE TROUBLE FOR US. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT
WE CAN AFFORD TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS
AT LITTLE COST TO OURSELVES AND SOME BENEFIT TO OUR RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE SOVIETS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF WE EXPECT THEM TO
PLAY THE GAME, WE SHOULD TREAT THEM THEM--OR AT LEAST APPEAR
TO TREAT THEM--AS AS A LEGITIMATE PLAYER.
13. DURING YOUR DISCUSSIONS, IT WILL BE USEFUL TO
SUGGEST TO BREZHNEV THE DESIRABILITY OF SUPPLEMENTING
WHATEVER PROGRESS WE CAN ACHIEVE ON SALT WITH A MORE
SERIOUS APPROCH TO PNE AND MBFR. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN
DILATORY IN THE PNE TALKS AND THEY ARE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT ON
MATTERS OF BASIC IMPORTANCE TO THE AGREEMENT WHICH, OF COURSE, HAS A
MARCH 1976 DEADLINE. WITH REGARD TO MBFR, YOU SHOULD
PROBABLY TAKE THE OCCASION TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT
WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE WEST TO GO FURTHER THAN OPTION
III IN SHORT ORDER, SQ THAT EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING WILL BE
REQUIRED IF WE ARE TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS IN VIENNA. WILLINGNESS
TO ENGAGE IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON MBFR WOULD
PROBABLY BE HELL-RECEIVED.
FORD
SECRET
&
BERALD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED of AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
SECRET
PAGE 04 MOSCOW 17609 02 OF 02 100749Z
14. FINALLY, YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE THE POINT THAT OUR OVERALL
RELATIONSHIP CANNOT MOVE FORWARD AS WE WOULD WISH IT TO IF
S
OUR DIRECT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IS IN POOR HEALTH,
AND TO STRESS HOW MUCH TO DIRECT RELATIONSHIP DEPENDS ON
CONTINUING PROGRESS IN SPECIFIC AREAS OF MUTUAL IMPORTANCE--
PARTICULARLY ON WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE ABLE TO DO IN PRACTICAL
WAYS IN THE EMIGRATION FIELD. FOR OUR PART, WE WILL
ALSO BE LOOKING AT WAYS TO MOVE AHEAD ON POINTS OF
INTEREST TO THEM, IN THE TRADE FIELD AND ELSEWHERE, AND
WE LOOK FORWARD TO SERIOUD AND PRAGMATIC TALKS ON CSCE
IMPLEMENTATION. BUT WE NEED HARD EVIDENCE TO CONVINCE THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC OF THE BENEFITS TO us OF THE BASKET III
PROVIDIONS OF CSCE, AND HENCE OF CSCE ITSELF, AND IT
IS HARD TO EXAGGERATE THE POSITIVE EFFECT THAT VISIBLE
PROGRESS IN SUCH AREAS AS FAMILY REUNIFICATION MIGHT HAVE ON
AMERICAN ATTITUDES IN THIS REGARD. STOESSEL
SECRET
FORD LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
1.2
200-0
OF STATE
3
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
SECRET
NOD217
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 17803 1218342
43
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
010525
R 21636Z DEC 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7754
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
Retain Class'n
Change to
Declassify in part and excise as shown
N
SECRET MOSCOW 17803
EO 12958, 25X( )( )( )
Declassify
After
NODIS
With concurrence
PS by PV
(not)(obtained)
Date 8/4/00
E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PFOR, UR, AD, CA
SUBJECT: SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON ANGOLA
REF: KINSHASA 10492
1. ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT YET REFLECT THE SPECIFICS
S
REPORTED REFTEL, HINTS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON
ANGOLA HAVE ALSO BEGUN TO CIRCULATE IN MOSCOW.
2. AT QUADRIPARTITE MEETING DECEMBER 11, UK DCM
SUTHERLAND (PROTECT) REPORTED THAT OUTGOING UK AMBASSADOR
GARVEY HAD RAISED ANGOLA DURING FARREWELL CALL ON PODGONRY
WEEK OF DECEMBER 2=6, NOTING THAT "MANY THINK" SOVIET
CONDUCT THERE IS INCONSISTENT WITH PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND
DETENTE. ACCORDING UK REPORT, PODGORNY REPLIED THAT PROBLEM
IS PRINCIPALLY ONE FOR AFRICANS THEMSELVES TO SOLVE, BUT THAT
200-0
SOVIETS HAD RECGONIZED MPLA AS LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, THAT
IT HAD RIGHT TO REQUEST THEIR ASSISTANCE, AND THAT SOVIETS
HAD RIGHT TO PROVIDE IT. PODGORNY COMPLAINED THAT WESTERN
PRESS HAS PRINTED A LOT ON THE SOVIETS AND LITTLE ON SOUTH
AFRICAN INTERVENTION, AND SAID THAT "TEN OR TWENTY" SOVIET
SPECIALISTS CANNOT BE CALLED "MASSIVE." PODGORNY SAID THE
SOVIETS SAW "THE MPLA OR A COALITION AROUND THE MPLA" AS THE
FUTURE OF ANGOLA.
3. COMMENT: WE PASS ON ABOVE IN VIEW OF PODGORNY'S RANK, AND
SECOET
DECLASSIFIED
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES, statevisit 8/4/00
E.O. 12968, SEC. 3.5
FORD
&
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE TEGRALO SECRETARY
BY life
, MARA, DATE 8/1/01
LIBRARY
200-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 MOSeOW 17803 121834Z
BECAUSE IT TENDS TO CORROBORATE SUGGESTIONS IN REFTEL REPORT
THAT SOVIETS PREPARING THEMSELVES FOR POSSIBILITY OF COALITION
BUILT AROUND MPLA.
MATLOCK
200-0
200-0
FORD
SECRET
4
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
4
ZOPIU
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED AMERICA
JAN76Z15
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET
NOD193
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01436 311456Z
ED-File
42
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
125617
0 311405Z JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9329
ZODIS
& ECRE T MOSCOW 1436
NODIS CHEROKEE
FOR THE SECRETARY
FORD
E.O. 116521. XGDS-3,4
4
TAGS: ASEC, US, UR
SUBJ: MOSCOW SIGNAL: APPROACH TO GROMYKO
GERALU
REF: STATE 24166
1. GROMYKO RESPONDED WITHIN A FEW MINUTES TO MY URGENT REQUEST
FOR A MEETING WITH HIM ON SATURDAY AND RECEIVED ME. AT 12:45
TODAY, JAN. 31. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DCM. KOMPLEKTOV, DEPUTY
DIRECTOR, USA DIVISION IN MFA, AND SOVIET NOTE TAKER WERE
N
ALSO PRESENT. AFTER REFERRING TO PREVIOUS COMMUNICATIONS ON
THIS SUBJECT. I COVERED TALKING POINTS PROVIDED IN PARA 2 REFTEL,
O
AND LEFT INFORMAL PAPER WITH GROMYKO WHICH CONTAINED FIRST EIGHT
OF THESE POINTS (I.E., FROM "THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTEO... TO
"WILL BE HIGHLY VISIBLE"). FOLLOWING THREE POINTS DELIVERED
D
ORALLY, BUT NOT IN ARITING. IN ADDITION, I LEFT WITH GROMYKO :-
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE U.S. EXPERTS,
TEXT OF WHICH IS BEING SENT IN SEPARATE MESSAGE, AND OFFERED TO
SEND COMPLETE REPORT OF OUR SPECIALISTS MONDAY MORNING.
2, GROMYKO REPLIED AS FOLLOWS:
S
-- HE DID NOT WISH TO GET INTO TECHNICAL QUESTIONS, BUT WOULD
DAY THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT THIS QUESTION IS AN IMAGINARY ONE.
IT IS DIFFICULT TO FERRET OUT THE REASONS IT IS RAISED. HE
WOULD LIMIT SELF TO THREE OBSERVATIONS.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
E.O. 12956, SEC. 8.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELING
BY
as
NADA DATE 8/1/01
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
200-0
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
FORD
&
SECRET
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01436 311456Z
GERALD
LIBRARY
-- FIRST, HE WOULD CONFIRM THE MESSAGE OF BREZHNEV TO PRESIDENT
FORD, I.E., ANY RADIATIONS REACHING EMBASSY FROM OUTSIDE IS OF
INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN. THERE IS NO NEW RADIATION. CONJECTURES OF U.S.
SPECIALISTS CANNOT CHANGE THIS FACT.
N
-- SECOND ALLEGED HEALTH DANGER IS FABRICATION (IZOBRETENIE).
SOVIET SPECIALISTS HAVE EXAMINED EVIDENCE AND SAY THAT DANGER IS
O
IMAGINED (VYDUMKA). us SPECIALISTS REFUSED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
SOVIET STANDARDS FOR SAFE LEVEL OF RADIATION EXPOSURE.
-- THIRD, AS FOR THE ALLUSION TO THE POSSIBILITY U.S. AND SOV
EMBASSIES, OF STAFF REDUCTION AT OUR EMBASSY, THIS IS FOR U.S.
TO DECIDE. BUT IF U.S. PROCEEDS IN THIS MANNER, SOVIETS WILL
DRAW THE NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS. FURTHERMORE, IF US PUBLICIZES
ALL OF THIS, THE SOVIETS WILL ALSO BRING THIS MATTER TO THE
ATTENTION OF THE PUBLIC AND WILL PRESENT THE "TRUE FACTS.
S
- - GROMYKO THEN EXPRESSED HIS SUPPRISE THAT WE CONTINUE TO
RAISE MATTER AND PROFESSED NOT TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE ARE DOING SO,
AND CONCLUDED THAT HE COULD SAY NO MORE. OUR SCIENTISTS HAVE
CONFIRMED JOINT READINGS IN U.S. EMBASSY AND AS FOR DIFFERING
INTERPRETATIONS, THERE ARE NOT TWO "SCIENCES, BUT ONLY ONE.
N
3. I POINTED OUT TO GROMYKO THAT THIS IS A SERIOUS MATTER WHICH.
HAS IN NO WAY BEEN CREATED ARTIFICALLY. WE TOO WISH THAT IT HAD
NOT COME UP, BUT OUR SPECIALISTS ARE OF FIRM OPINION THAT THERE
O
ARE INDEED DIRECTIONAL SIGNALS AND THAT MEDICAL RECORDS OF OUR
PERSONNEL DISPLAY SUSPECT SYMPTOMS. I THEREFORE REITERATED
OUR REQUEST THAT THE SOVIET HYGIENE SERVICE LOCATE THE SOURCES
D
AND HAVE THEM TURNED OFF.
4, GROMYKO OBSERVED THAT SOVIETS CANNOT ADOPT ATTITUDE OTHER
THAN ONE BASED ON THE REAL SITUATION. KOMPLEKTOV MENTIONED
INTERNAL RACIATION IN EMBASSY, AND GROMYKO REMARKED THAT THEIR
S
EXPERTS FOUND EVIDENCE THAT THERE ARE SOURCES OF RADIATION FROM
INSIDE THE EMBASSY. I REPLIED THAT THESE LEVELS WERE MINIMAL, IF
EXISTENT AT ALL, WHEREUPON GROMYKO OBSERVED THAT U.S.
SPECIALISTS WISH TO SHIFT BLAME ENTIRELY TO SOVIET SIDE.
5. I CONCLUDED BY REMINDING HIM THAT, IN ANY EVENT, IF SIGNALS DO
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
200-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 01436 311456Z
NOT GO OFF, WE MUST BRIEF OUR PERSONNEL ON FEBRUARY 4.
6. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT OUR DISCUSSION, GROMYKO WAS CALM AND
MODERATE IN TONE, BUT COMPLETELY UNVIELDING. I DD NOT FIND HIS
REACTION SURPRISING, SINCE HAVING SENT MESSAGE FROM BREZHNEV
DENYING EXISTENCE OF ANY BEAMED RADIATION SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY
CANNOT ADMIT THAT SUCH EXISTS, IF THEY DECIDE TO TURN OFF
ZODIS
SIGNALS, I ASSUME THAT THEY WILL SIMPLY SE TURNED OFF WITH NO
EXPLANATION GIVEN, EITHER PRIVATELY OR OFFICIALLY. IT WOULD
PROBABLY BE MOST HELPFUL IF APPROACH IS ALSO MADE TO DOBRYNIN
AT THIS JUNCTURE, SINCE HE IS PROBABLY IN BETTER POSITION THAN
MOST SOVIET OFFICIALS TO REALIZE DANGER TO OUR RELATIONSHIP AND
TO THE OPERATIONS OF AIS OWN MISSION WHICH PUBLIC AIRING OF THIS
MATTER WOULD INEVITABLY ENTAIL. FULL REPORT OF EXPERTS WILL BE
FORWARDED THIS WEEKEND IN CASE YOU WISH TO PASS IT TO DOBRYNIN,
STOESS
EL
ZODIS
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
5
ZODIU
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF MEMBER
TELEGRAM
FUND
SECRET
NOD197
GERALD
LIBRARY
PAGE 01 311544Z
42
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT=01 ISO=00 /001 W
126092
0 311450Z JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 9330
DECLASSIFIED
ZODIU
SECRET FEE MOSCOW 1437
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
NODIS CHEROKEE
BY. 66
NARA, DATE 8/1/01
,
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3,4
TAGS: ASEC, us, UR
SUBJ: MOSCOW SIGNAL - APPROACH TO GROMYKO
REF: MOSCOW 1436
1, FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF INFORMAL PAPER LEFT WITH GROMYKO, AS
MENTIONED IN PARA ONE REFTEL.
BEGIN QUOTE
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS OF U.S. EXPERTS
--MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS TAKEN BY US SPECIALISTS IN
200-0
U.S. EMBASSY MOSCOW OVER PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS INDICATE THAT
EMBASSY IS RECEIVING TWO RADIATION BEAMS OF MICROWAVE ENERGY IN
THE FREQUENCY RANGE ABOVE ONE GIGAMERZ. ONE COMES FROM A POINT
TO THE EAST OF THE CHANCERY AND THE OTHER FROM A POINT TO THE
SOUTH.
THESE EMANATIONS ARE PRESENT, EITHER ALTERNATELY OR OCCASIONALLY
SIMULTANEOUSLY, FOR PERIODS APPROXIMATING 18 HOURS PER DAY.
THESE BEAMS HAVE RESULTED IN RADIATION DENSITIES WITHIN CHANGERY
OFFICES AND SOME APARTMENTS OF PERSONNEL RANGING FROM 1 TO 15
MICROWATTS PER SQUARE CENTIMETER.
--JOINT MEASUREMENTS CONDUCTED WITH SOVIET EXPERTS ON JANUAYR 28,
SEGRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
200-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 3115442
WHEN ONLY ONE OF THE PREVIOUSLY DETECTED SOURCES WAS EMITTING IN
THE LOWER ENERGY RANGE OBSERVED PREVIOUSLY, WERE CONSISTENT WITH
PREVIOUS u.s. MEASUREMENTS. IN PARTICULAR THEY CLEARLY REVEALED
THE DIRECTIONALITY OF THE BEAM FROM THE EAST.
N
-THE LEVELS OF RADIATION IN THE EMBASSY BUILDING MEASURED OVER
TIME BY U.S. TECHNICIANS, AND THOSE MEASURED JOINTLY WITH SOVIET
TECHNICIANS, ARE SEVERAL ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE ABOVE THE TYPICAL
O
BACKGROUND LEVEL IN U.S. CITIES, AND ALSO ABOVE THE BACKGROUND
LEVEL MEASURED IN U.S. RESIDENCES IN MOSCOW WHICH ARE AWAY FROM
THE CHANCERY BUILDING.
--OUR MEDICAL EXPERTS ARE OF THE CONSIDERED OPINION THAT PROLONGED
EXPOSURE TO MICROWAVE RADIATION AT THE LEVELS MEASURED IN THE
U.S. EMBASY CONSTITUTE A POTENTIAL HEALTH HAZARD.
--NO LEVEL OF RADIATION IN THE U.S. EMBASSY WHICH IS SIGNIFICANTLY
S
ABOVE THE TYPICAL BACKGROUND LEVEL IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS OF LARCE
INDUSTRIAL CITIES IS ACCEPTABLE TO US.
END QUOTE.
2. SUMMARY OF FULL REPORT WILL BE TRANSMITTED AS SOON AS AVAILABLE,
HOPEFULLY TODAY, AND TEXT FULL REPORT WILL BE SENT SO AS TO DE
AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON BY OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB. 2,
STDESSEL
200-0
EOT
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
6
DEPARTMENT OP STATE
2 FED 762 22
00
000260
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF H AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
N00497
MAGE 01 МОЗСОИ 01523 0221392
02
Up
ACTION NOUS-00
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1002 W
PAGE
/
OF 15.
014987
R 5216452 FEB 76 ZFF-4
FM AMENGASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9393
The
SECRET MOSCOW 1323
NODIS
E.O. 11852 GDS
TABS: PFOR, AO, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIETS AND ANGOLA
1. DURING CALL ON GROMYKO ON ANOTHER MATTER JANUARY 31, HE
REMARKED TO ME TOWARD END OF CONVERSATION THAT HE HAD JUST READ
THE FULL TEXT OF YOUR TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON
S
ANGOLA. HE THEN SAIO THAT HE REGRETTED THAT YOU WERE SPENDING
so MUCK TIME AND ENERGY ON THIS QUESTION AND ADDED THAT YOUR
EXPOSITION "DOES NOT ACCORD WITH THE REAL SITUATION."
2. I REPLIED THAT HE HAD HEARD WHAT YOU SAID WHEN YOU WERE HERE,
AND THAT THE POSITION YOU TOOK BEFORE CONGRESS WAS QUITE
CONSISTENT. THE FACT REMAINS THAT SOVIET POLICY IN ANGOLA IS
TL
STRAINING THE FABRIC OF DETENTE. AT THIS HE DROPPED THE SUBJECT
AND CONCLUDED THE CONVERSATION WITH A FEW REMARKS ABOUT THE
WEATHER.
STOESSEL
@
FORD
&
SECRET
GERALD
LIBRARY
bb 8/1/01
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
4
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
STATES OF AMOUNT
TELEGRAM
SECRET
NOD915
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01756 051921Z
42
ACTION NODS
INFO OCT-01 /001 W
069450
0 0517247 FEB 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHOC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9569
6 ECR ET MOSCOW 1756
NODIS CHERCKEE
FOR DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
OC: PLEASE DESTROY ALL TAPES AND DELIVER SIX COPIES DIRECTLY
TO EAGLEBURGER ONLY
E.O. 11652: XG05-3,4
TAGS: ASEC, US, UR
SUBJ: MOSCOW SIGNAL
REF: MOSCOW 1696
1, I CALLED ON FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETSOV
ON HIS REQUEST AT 18:30 HOURS. AFTER BRIEF REFERENCE
TO COLD WEATHER, HE READ STATEMENT FROM HANDWRITTEN
TEXT, COVERING FOLLOWING POINTS.
2. HE SAID ME HAD FOLLOWING TO COMMUNICATE IN REFERENCE TO
THE DUESTION RAISED BY ME WITH GROMYKO ON JANUARY 31.
THE SOVIET SIDE HAS GIVEN CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE CONCERN
EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. REGARDING THE LEVEL OF ELECTRO-
MARNETIC FIELD INSIDE THE U.S. EMBASSY. THERE
IS NO NEED TO SPELL OUT THE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN
TAKEN. SOVIETS INVITED U.S. EXPERTS TO
COME TO MOSCOW AND JOINT MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN
ON THE 9TH AND 6TH FLOORS OF THE U.S. EMBASSY.
HE MENTIONED MINTH FLOOR IN PARTICULAR BECAUSE
FORD
IN DOBRYNING CONVERSATION WITH HYLAND LATTER
&
SAID THAT THE SOVIET EXPERTS REFUSED TO MEASURE
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, SEC. 3.5
GERALD
LIBRARY
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
MARA, DATE 8/1/01
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION BY OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
SERVICE
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01756 051921Z
THE ELCTRO-MAGNETIC FIELD IN THE UPPER FLOORS. THEY
DID IN FACT PARTICIPATE IN JOINT MEASUREMENTS ON
NINTH FLOOR.
3. THESE JOINT MEASUREMENTS, KUZNETSOV CONTINUED,
SNOWED THAT THE LEVEL OF THE "MAGNETIC POLE"
IN THE EMBASSY IS LOWER THAN EXISTING SOVIET
NORMS AND THAT THEY ARE NO DANGER TO HEALTH.
NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE THESE FACTS, THE U.S. SIDE
IS ATTEMPTING TO SHARPEN (OBOSTRIT!) THIS QUESTION.
4. THE MINISTER (GTOMYKO) HAD GIVEN HIS
VIEWS ON THIS APPROACH. IT IS A TENDENTIOUS
APPROACH WHICH GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF A TRHREAT.
SUCH AN APPROACH CANNOT PRODUCE POSITIVE RESULTS.
IF THE SOVIET UNION TOOK SUCH AN APPROACH THEN
NATURALLY IT COULD EXPECT DIFFICULTIES IN OUR
RELATIONS. BUT THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT FOLLOW
SUCH AN APPROACH.
5. THE SOVIET UNION WILL FIRMLY PURSUE THE
APPROVED LINE OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE
UNITED STATES AND STRENGTHENING WHAT HAS BEEN
ACHIEVED IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE SOVIET UNION
DOES NOT WANT ARITIFICAL IMPEDIMENTS AND
EXPECTS THE GAME ATTITUDE FROM THE UNITED STATES.
6. GUIDED BY THIS AND TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION
THE CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET
AUTHORITIES HAVE DIRECTED APPROPRIATE ORGANS
TO REDUCE TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE THE
INDUSTRIAL SOURCES OF THE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC FIELD
INSIDE THE EMBASSY. SOVIET SPECIALISTS
NOTED THE PRESENCE OF INTERNAL SOURCRES OF RADIATION
DURING THE JOINT NEASUREMENTS. IF THE U.S. SIDE
WOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASUREST TO STOP THESE,
THIS WOULD BRING ABOUT A CORRESPONDING
REDUCTION OF THE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC FIELD INSIDE
THE EMBASSY. IT IS HOPED THAT THE U.S. SIDE
FORD
WILL GIVE CONSIDERATION (RASSMOTRETI) THIS.
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED
AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 01756 0519212
7. KUZNETSOV CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT AMBASSADOR
DOBRYNIN WILL BE SPEAKING TO HYLAND IN WASHINGTON
TODAY ALONG THESE SAME LINES.
8, WHEN KUZNETSOV HAD FINISHED HIS STATEMENT, I
MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:
A. REGARDING THE PLACE OF THE JOINT MEASUREMENTS,
WE OFFERED THE ROOFS OF THE WINGS OF THE EMBASSY.
SOVIET SPECIALISTS DID NOT AGREE TO TAKE THEM THERE.
THEY ALSO WOULD NOT AGREE TO MEASURE
AMBIENT LEVELS OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY. THIS IS
PROBABLY WHAT HYLAND REFERRED TO,
B. AS I HAD EXPRESSED TO GROMYKO, OUR CONCERN
IS THAT THE EMISSIONS WE ARE RECEIVING, WHILE
LOWER THAN SOVIET STANDARDS MOST OF THE TIME,
ARE HIGHER THAN THE AMBIENT LEVEL AND IN OUR VIEW
POSE 4 HEALTH RISK.
C, SINCE WE FEEL THAT THERE IS A HEALTH RISK,
WE CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE SITUATION
TO OUR EMPLOYEES. THIS OF COURSE COULD RESULT
IN SOME PUBLICITY. WE HAVE ABSOLUTELY
NO DESIRE TO SHARPEN OR WORSEN RELATIONS WITH
THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS THE SITUATION WHICH
CONSTITUTES AN IMPEDIMENT TO OUR RELATIONS.
D. I TOOK NOTE OF ThE STATEMENT THAT
APPROPRIATE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WILL BE DIRECTED
TO REDUCE TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT THE INDUSTRIAL
RADIATION REACHING OUR EMBASSY AND STATED THAT WE HOPE
THESE EMISSIONS WILL BE ELIMINATED ENTIRELY
AND TRUST THAT THIS WILL HAPPEN.
9, KUZNETSOV SAID THAT HE WAS NOT AN
EXPERT, BUT FROM HIS EXPERIENCE AS AN ENGINEER
IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE
UAD
WHAT THE CONCENTRATION OF POLLUTANTS IS, FOR
EXAMPLE, AS REGARDS AIR, POLLUTION, MORE Is CONCENTRATED
GERALD
THE
AROUND TRAFFIC LIGHTS WHERE CARS START AND STOP THAN
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 04 MOSCOW 61756 051921Z
ELSEWHERE. THEREFORE, THERE ARE WIDE VARIATIONS
IN A CITY, AND THIS MAY ALSO APPLY TO RADIATION:
CONCENTRATIONS WILL DIFFER FROM ONE PLACE TO ANOTHER.
10. I POINTED OUT THAT THE JOINT MEASUREMENTS WHICH
WERE TAKEN LAST WEEK SHOWED, IN THE VIEW OF OUR
SPECIALISTS, THAT THE RADIATION IS DIRECTIONAL,
AND ASKED WHEN THE DIRECTIVE HE HAD MENTIONED
HOULO TAKE EFFECT.
11. KUZNETSOY REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT SAY,
BUT ADDED: "WE WILL DO OUR BEST."
12. Y ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS ANTICIPATED FURTHER
TALKS IN WASHINGTON ON THIS MATTER. KUZNETSOV
SAID HE KAD NO DIRECT INFORMATION ON THIS POINT,
BUT DIO NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY. THI3
MAY BE CLEARER, HE ADDED, FOLLOWING THE HYLAND-
DOBRYNIN MEETING TODAY.
13. IN ENDING THE CONVERSATION, KUZNETSOV REMARKED THAT HE ROPED
WE HOULD APPROACH THE MATTER WITH A BUSINESS-LIKE ATTITUDE.
STOESSEL
URD
GERALD
LIBRARY
SEGRET
NOT
TO
DE
8
6
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
$ FED 787 14
12
001179
CONFIDENTIAL
N00882
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01696 0512397
41
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 1001 W
063268
0 0512012 FEB 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHOC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9523
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, SEC. 3.5
C 0 N F I 0 E N I A MOSCOW 1696
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY GG
,
NARA, DATE 8/1/01
NODIS CHEROKEE
FOR DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
DC: PLEASE DESTROY ALL TAPES AND DELIVER SIX COPIES DIRECTLY
TO EAGLEBURGER ONLY
E.O. 116521 XGDS-3,4
TAGS: ASEC, US, UR 1
SUBJ: MOSCOW SIGNAL
REF1 STATE 27189
1, CANCELLATION OF EMBASSY BRIEFING HAS, AS ANTICIPATED,
PRODUCED WIDESPREAD AND INTENSE SPECULATION WITHIN
EMBASSY. THIS SI ATION AT MINIMUN, WILL
LEAD TO SERIOUS MORALE PROBLEMS IF EXPLANATION NOT
FORTHCOMING IN VERY NEAR FUTURE.
FORD
2. AS FOR POSSIBILITY OF LEAKS, WE ARE TOTALLY CONFIDENT
&
THAT NO EMPLOYEE AND HAS BEEN PRIEFED ON PROBLEM IS
ENGARING IN ANY SPECULATION OR GOSSIP WHATEVER. HONEVER,
SITUATION IS SUCH THAT VAHIOUS UNBRIEFED MEMBERS OF STAFF
GERALO
LIBRARY
ARE BEGINNING TO TAKE NOTE OF VARIOUS RECENT
ANOMALITIES OF PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES
HERE AND ARE SPECULATING ON THE BASIS OF THESE
BITS AND PIECES. CANCELLATION OF UNPRECEDENTED SCHEDULED BRIEFING
HAS IN ADDITION ALERTED ALL TO FACT THAT
SOMETHING HIGHLY UNUSUAL 15 GUING ON ANU THAT
THEY ARE NOT BEING INFORMED.
CONFIGENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01695 051239Z
3, FOLLOWING EXAMPLES ARE ILLUSTRATIVE OF
GENERAL PROBLEM WHICH IS NOW SPREADING WITH
SPEED OF PRAIRIE FIRE:
---GSO EMPLOYEE WHO WIFE IS NURSE HAS NOTED ARRIVAL OF
SCREENING AND MEDICAL TECHNICIAN AND HAS CONVEYED TO SUPERVISOR
SERIOUS CONCERN OF BOTH THAT OST FACING UNSTATED MEDICAL PROBLEMS.
***WIFE OF LOCAL CORRESPONDENT WHO IS LAB TECHNICIAN AND
WORKS PART TIME IN DISPENSARY IS AWARE NOW THAT DOCTOR HAS CANCELLED,
THEN REINSTATED, APPOINTMENTS TWO DAYS IN ROW AND THAT FULL-TIME
MEDICAL TECHNICIAN MAS ARRIVED.
***TWO C&R EMPLOYEES WITH ELECTRONICS TRAINING HAVE EXPRESSED
(TO SUPERVISOR) CONCERN OVER FIGURES SEEN IN SY CHANNEL MESSAGES
4. LOCAL PRESS IS AWARE THAT MEETING WAS CALLED FOR PRIEFING
(PRESS ATTACHE WAS INUNDATED WITH CALLS EVENING OF FEB. 4 FOR
EXPLANATION) AND ARE DOUBTLESS BY NOW AWARE THAT IT WAS CANCELLED.
STORIES TO THIS EFFECT, WITH POSSIBLE SPECULATION BY CORRESPONDENTS,
MAY WELL BE FILED SOON.
5. REGARDING CURRENT MEDICAL SITUATION, DR.
POLLACK MAS PROVIDED FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS.
THERE ARE PREGNANT WOMEN LIVING IN EMBASSY
COMPOUND WHU MAL BECOME PREGNANT SINCE
EARLY DECEMBER. DELAYS IN BRIEFING INCREASE
THE PROBLEMS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE EVENT OF GENETIC
DEFECTS, REGARDLESS OF CAUSE. HE RECOMMENDS
OUR ARRANGING WITH WIESBADEN FOR FACILITIES TO
CARRY OUT TEST ON THESE WOMEN FOR CHROMOSONAL
DEVIATIONS INAMNIUTIC FLUID. FURTHERMORE,
MRS. DAVID FERGUSON, WHO RECENTLY DEPARTED
MO9COW AND IS NOW IN WASHINGTON EN ROUTE
TO NEW POST, IS ALSO PREGNANT, DR. POLLACK
FORD
UD
SUGGESTS THAT AS SOON AS BRIEFINGS ARE COMPLETED
a
THAT SIMILAR STUDIES BE CARRIED OUT BY MEDICAL
DIVISION. I STRONGLY URGE THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION
BE TAKEN IN REGARD TO THESE PARTICULAR CASES.
GERALD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
TO DC REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF STATE STATEMENT
TELEGRAM
CONF IDENTIAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 01696 0512392
6. I HAVE CONSIDERED ALTERNATIVE OF PROCEEDING
WITH SCREENING OF MOST EXPOSED OFFICES AND
APARTMENTS, SIMPLY INFORMING THOSE DIRECTLY INVOLVED
THAT THIS IS A SECURITY MEASURE. UPON RELPECTION,
HOWEVER, I FEEL THAT THIS COURSE WOULD NOT BE
ADVISABLE IN THE ABSENCE OF A GENERAL BRIEFING. IT WOULD BE
VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCOMPLISH WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF
A FAIRLY WIDE CIRCLE OF EMPLOYEES AND IT WOULD OPEN US TO CHARGES
LATER OF FAVORITISM,
7, RE PARA 2, STATE 27561, I ASSUME YOU ARE AWARE OF PLANS FOR
SUPPORT FLIGHTS FEB. 21 AND MARCH 10. THESE WOULD INVOLVE USE,
FOR FIRST TIME OF LARGER AIRCRAFT THAT HITHERTO. WHILE WE HAVE
NO RECORD OF SOVIETS COMPLAINING HERE ABOUT TYPE OF CARGO, I
WOULD NOTE THAT CARGO SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY AND MARCH IS MUCH
GREATER VOLUME AND WEIGHT THAN ANY SHIPMENTS IN RECENT MEMORY.
8. IN SUM, I MUST STATE FRANKLY THAT WE MAY HAVE CRUSSED
RUBICON IN ANNOUNCING BRIEFING, AND IN VIEW OF FACT THAT SIGNAL
IS ON AGAIN TODAY, FURTHER DELAYS SEEM NORE LIKELY TO COMPLICATE
THAN SOLVE PROBLEM. IN ANY EVENT, IT APPEARS MOST UNLIKELY THAT
WE WILL BE ABLE TO WITHHOLD INFORMATION MUCH LONGER FROM OUR
EMPLOYEES, WHETHER OR NOT SIGNALS ARE TURNED OFF.
9, MFA HAS JUST CALLED TO SET APPOINTMENT FOR ME WITH KUZNETSOV
FOR 1830 HOURS LOCAL. ANY INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD ae SENT FLASH.
STOESSEL
FORD
&
CONFIDENTIAL
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
COPY OF 6 COPIES
9
PURKTMENT OF STATE
-5 FEB76Z 03 21
001105
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
NDD856
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01605 0508027
11
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 /001 W
059742
0 050743Z FEB 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9514
$ E C R E T MOSCOW 1685
NODIS CHEROKEE
FOR DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
DC: PLEASE DESTROY ALL TAPES AND DELIVER SIX COPIES DIRECTLY
TO EAGLEBURGER ONLY
E.O. 116521 XGDS-3,4
TAGS: ASEC, UR, US
SUBJ: MOSCOW SIGNAL
REF: STATE 27189, STATE 27561
1. SCHEDULED BRIEFING CANCELLED.
2. KOMPLEKTOV TELEPHONED DCM AT 9120 THIS MORNING
"REGARDING QUESTION WITH WHICH WE HAVE BEEN INVOLVED. 11
HE ASKED IF AMBASSADOR INFORMED OF DOBRYNIN-HYLAND
MEETING YESTERDAY AND WAS TOLD THAT AMBASSADOR
AWARE OF MEETING. KOMPLEKTOV THEN SAID THAT THEY
WISHED TO MAKE SURE THAT EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS THAT
"THIS QUESTION IS UNDER CONSIDERATION" (ETOT VOPROS
RASSMATRIVAYETSYA). HE CONCLUDED CONVERSATION
BY SAYING "THAT IS ALL."
3, KOMPLEKTOV TELEPHONED AGAIN AT 9:50 TO NOTIFY US
THAT FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETSOV WOULD
PROBABLY REPEAT PROBABLY ASK AMBASSADOR TO COME
FORD
BY THIS AFTERNOON.
4
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
GRAND
LIBRARY
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY Gh
MARA, DATE 8/1/01
,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 MOSCON 01685 050802Z
4, SIGNALS WENT OFF AT 1800 HOURS FEB, 4,
WHICH IS UNUSUAL BUT NOT TOTALLY UNPRECEDENTED, BUT EAST SIGNAL
REAPPEARED AT 0730 FEB. 5.
STOESSEL
CR
FORD
SECRET
?
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ZODIS
OF STATE
10
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF HEALTH
3 MAR 70Z 10 07
TELEGRAM
SECRET
N00555
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03251 031030Z
11
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
102506
0 0310087 MAR 76
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 714
ZODIS
S E C R E T MOSCOW 3251
CORRECTED COPY
NODIS/CHEROKEE
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
E.O. 11652: GDS:
TAGS: PFOR, ETRD, UR, US
SUBJECT: SCHEDULED MEETING OF US-USSR JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION
1. I UNDERSTAND THAT A FINAL DECISION HAS NOT YET
BEEN MADE REGARDING THE NEXT MEETING OF THE US=USSR JOINT
COMMERCIAL COMMISSION. IF IT FOLLOWS THE ANTICIPATED
SCHEDULE, IT WOULD BE HELD THIS SPRING IN WASHINGTON.
2. GIVEN THE UNACCEPTABLE SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN ANGOLA, THE
STRESS IN BREZHNEV'S REPORT TO THE PARTY CONGRESS
ON AID TO PNATIONAL-LIBERATION STRUGGLES" -- WHICH CAN
BE USED TO EXPLAIN AWAY MORE OF THE SAME ELSEWHERE --
200-0
AND ALSO THE SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE ON OTHER IMPORTANT
BILATERAL MATTERS SUCH AS THE RADIATION ISSUE, IT SEEMS
TO ME THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO MOVE FROM WORDS OF
WARNING TO SOME SLOWING OF ACTIVITIES IMPORTANT TO THE
SOVIETS. ONE OBVIGUS CANDIDATE IS THE MEETING OF THE
JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE
THRUST OF ThE ECONOMIC POLICY ENUNCIATED AT THE PARTY
CONGRESS IMPLIES INCREASED RESORT TO THE IMPORT OF
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY.
FORD
3. I THEREFORE URGE THAT THE SOVIETS BE TOLD THAT
&
THIS SPRING IS NOT A PROPITIOUS TIME FOR A MEETING OF
SECRET
GERALD
LIBRARY
THE JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION. A POSTPONEMENT SINE DIE
GG 8/1/01
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ZODIS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
SECRET
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 03251 031030Z
WOULD NOT OF COURSE COMMIT US TO ANY PARTICULAR COURSE
OF ACTION IN THE TRADE FIELD, BUT WOULD BE A CLEAR
SIGNAL THAT WE MAY IF NECESSARY BE FORCED TO CONSIDER
STEPS WHICH WOULD AFFECT THEIR ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT A
FEATURE OF THEIR CURRENT ECONOMIC POLICY TO WHICH THEY
OBVIOUSLY ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE. STOESSEL
ZODIS
200-0
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY