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Korea (3)
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Korea (3)
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National Security Council East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files (Ford Administration)
Country Files
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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "Korea (3)" of the NSC East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 5 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
M. Fracle
MEMORANDUM
ROK
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
d
January 28, 1974
N
MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. Donald G. MacDonald
Assistant Administrator for Asia
Agency for International Development
SUBJECT:
PL-480 for Korea
We have considered your draft message on PL-480 to Korea
at a senior level in the NSC and CIEP staffs. We believe the
U.S. should be more positive and that the nature of our PL-480
programs in FY-75 and following years should be left com-
pletely open at this time. We have discussed our concerns
with Ambassador Habib.
At this difficult time of rapid change in the South Korean
situation we want to preserve the image of the U.S. as a
sound and reliable friend on whose word and commitment the
Koreans can rely.
Attached is our suggested redraft of the proposed cable. I
am available to discuss this with you or your staff at any time.
JaneBuhall John A. Bushnell
Staff Member
Copies to:
ASIA/DP:AShakow
FFP:WJennette
USDA:AMead
EA/K/State:HNewsom
EB:MSmith
ASIA/EA/K:BCRichardson
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
lb
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DRAFT CABLE TO AM EMBASSY SEOUL
SUBJECT:
Korea PL-480 Programs
REF:
Seoul 169
FOR ADLER FROM MACDONALD
1. Fully understand your need for Washington policy guidance on USG
plans to deal with Korea PL-480 commitments, and appreciate your
thoughtful suggestions on how program could be implemented over the next
few year period in the face of possible reductions in overall USG agricul-
tural commodity availabilities for PL-480 and other concessional food
assistance.
2. It remains our intention to meet our PL-480 commitments as soon
as our commodity availabilities permit. The extreme market conditions in
FY-74 have caused us to fall substantially behind. Fortunately Korea has
been able to overcome the problems caused by this unexpected shortfall in
our assistance. We hope to meet our commitment in FY-75. However,
shipments of rice will not be possible until our harvest is largely in, perhaps
December. The market situation for wheat and cotton is unclear, and we may
again be short of some commodities in which Korea is interested next fiscal
year depending not only on our own production but also on production and
demand in other parts of the world. In our FY-75 budget we are making
provision for a full $150 million program for Korea, but this of course does
FORD
not guarantee that commodities will be available.
GERALD
LIBRARY
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
2
3. We fully recognize that uncertainties on PL-480 complicate Korean
planning. There is no easy solution for these uncertainties. The Koreans
should be aware that there is no guarantee we shall have commodities avail-
able. Suspect experience of this year has brought this element of uncertainty
home to them. They should also understand that should they choose to budget
for less than the full $150 million, this would not prejudice their receipt of
the full amount if commodities are available.
4. At this point it does not appear likely that we will be able to make up
a large part of the FY-74 shortfall in FY-75. However, we have our total
commitment in mind and we shall address the problem of making up deficiencies
as the commodity situation in FY-75 and subsequent years becomes clearer.
5. With regard to your specific question on anticipated extent of PL-480
shipments in second half CY 74 (para 6 reftel), I regret that we still cannot
be any more specific than I was in my November letter to you on this subject.
a
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
2a
MEMORANDUM
572 X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET/SENSITIVE
February 11, 1974
Guidelines 9/17/03
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
W. R. SMYSERW RS s/on
JOHN A. FROEBE, JR tax
SUBJECT:
U.K. Plans to Expand Relations
with North Korea
The U.K. Embassy here has informed the State Department (at the Korean
Desk level) that it is prepared to recognize North Korea, but will not do so
until after next fall's U.N. General Assembly. The U.K. does intend,
Date
however, within the next few weeks to tell Pyongyang that they can open a
trade office in London; the U.K. for its own part does not plan to open one
in Pyongyang in the near future. London has informed Seoul of its contem-
plated move; the ROK reaction was strongly negative.
E.O.
We are concerned over the potential consequences of the planned U.K.
NSC
move, particularly since this would come on the heels of Australia's
By
recognition of North Korea, which will probably take place within the
coming month:
-- Others will be encouraged to follow suit, so as to be among the
first and not the last to climb on board. The attached table (Tab A) of
Asian and Western European states having diplomatic and consular relations
with either or both Koreas makes clear that there are several states in
Asia and perhaps half a dozen in Western Europe that would be stimulated to
establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. (Tokyo would hopefully
do no more than accelerate its expansion of trade and cultural relations
with Pyongyang.) Our concern, of course, is that this would happen in
the absence of any reciprocal movement from the Communist states toward
South Korea. This is likely to be the outcome, given Australia's intention
to go ahead despite the unresponsiveness of the East European states it
has approached on this score.
-- North Korea will be encouraged toward intransigence, which
will be particularly important to us as it may affect our upcoming negotia-
tions over the termination of the U.N. Command.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
XGDS 5b (3)
BYAUTH Sec Kissinger
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
2
-- North Korea's success will add to the Park Government's problems
as it grapples with the recently intensified political criticism at home.
State (EA) does not believe that the U.K. move, any more than Australian
recognition of North Korea, will impact adversely on our upcoming negotia-
tions on the UNC. We disagree. While we cannot positively assert that
their moves will have a substantial impact, we believe this to be a risk that
we should not take.
We believe it would be useful if Under Secretary Sisco would call in the
U.K. Ambassador and ask that the U.K. delay any approach to North Korea
on a trade office or otherwise expanded relations until after next fall's UNGA.
The U.K. may be somewhat reluctant since it has already informed Seoul of
its intended move -- although London's proceeding in this manner seems to
be something short of the sort of consultations we might hope for on this
problem.
Recommendation:
That you ask Under Secretary Sisco to call in the U.K. Ambassador to
urge him strongly to delay any approach to North Korea on a trade office
or otherwise expanded relations until after next fall's UNGA.
Approach
Disapprove
Concurrences:
Mr. Solomon RHS/tron
SEGREF/SENSITIVE
2
2b
Asian Countries
Diplomatic Relations
Diplomatic Relations
with Democratic
with Republic of
People's Republic
Asian Country
Korea (ROK)
of Korea (DPRK)
Australia
Yes
Burma
Consular Relations
Consular Relations
Cambodia
Yes
China, Republic of
Yes
Fiji
Yes
India
Yes
Yes
Indonesia
Yes
Yes
Japan
Yes
Malaysia
Yes
Yes
New Zealand
Yes
Pakistan
Counsular Relations
Yes
Philippines
Yes
Singapore
Consular Relations
Consular Relations
Thailand
Yes
Vietnam, Republic of
Yes
FORD
RALD
2c
Western European Countries
Diplomatic Relations
Diplomatic Relations
with Democratic
Western European
with Republic of
People's Republic
Countries
Korea (ROK)
of Korea (DPRK)
North Korean
Austria
Yes
Trade Mission
Belgium
Yes
Canada
Yes
Denmark
Yes
Yes
Finland
Yes
Yes
North Korean
France
Yes
Trade Mission
Germany, Federal Republic of
Yes
Greece
Yes
Iceland
Yes
Yes
Italy
Yes
Luxembourg
Yes
Netherlands
Yes
Norway
Yes
Yes
Portugal
Yes
Spain
Yes
Sweden
Yes
Yes
Switzerland
Yes
P-10K 3
MEMORANDUM
1077-X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Gigidelinos 9/17/03
ACTION
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
March 19, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting with South Korean
NARA, Date 12/3/10
Foreign Minister Kim on March 20,
1974 at 6:00 p.m.
You have agreed to meet with Foreign Minister Kim Dong-jo on March 20,
1974 at 6:00 p.m. Kim is on his way back to Seoul from a tour of South
America. He will likely be interested mainly in discussing with you the
issue of U.N. Command (UNC) termination and related questions,
particularly since he is one of two Korean officials designated by President
By
Park to be the conduit to us on this problem.
As you know, we believe we must move soon to coordinate a negotiating
package and strategy with Seoul so that we can approach the PRC and have
the ROK approach North Korea hopefully sometime next month. We expect
to have the response to NSSM on this question, together with agency comments
and recommendations, ready for your and the President's consideration
this week.
Suggested Talking Points
1. Termination of the UNC.
-- It is evident from Ambassador Habib's initial discussion of this
question with President Park that we both agree that the UNC cannot be
preserved except at an unacceptable political cost.
-- (Responding to Park's concern that U.S. forces continue in Korea
if the UNC is terminated) We plan no substantial changes in U.S. force
levels at least in the near term -- at least until we have completed the
transition to the post-UNC termination security arrangements. We would
consult the ROK in advance on any changes we would contemplate. Also,
we have made no decision to assign the Army division in Korea an additional
role of a regional contingency reserve; this is only one longer-term option.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
XGDS 5b (3)
BYAUTH Sec Kissinger
FOR CECRET/SENSITIVE
2
-- Our major objective in the negotiations on the UNC's termination
is to arrive at substitute arrangements that will preserve at least the
present degree of security for the ROK.
-- We expect to be ready in the next few weeks for detailed discus-
sions with the ROK (Foreign Minister Kim and Presidential Special Assistant
Choe) on a negotiating package and strategy.
2.
Diplomatic recognition of North Korea by Australia. Kim may raise
the question of Australia's opening negotiations with North Korea looking
toward diplomatic recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations.
At our urging, Australia approached several East European states suggesting
that they recognize South Korea in order to maintain a long-term balance
in the diplomatic positions of the two Koreas. The East European states
were unresponsive.
-- We will continue to urge friendly governments to expand relations
with North Korea no faster than the other side expands relations with South
Korea.
-- As appropriate, we will also take up with the PRC and the Soviets
our desire for a balanced expansion of relations with both Koreas.
-- We think it would be desirable for the ROK to begin an active
campaign to expand trade and diplomatic contacts with states where it does
not now have relations.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TO
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
7405588
3b
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
s/skm
074 MAR 13 PM 6 47
ASIAN
i.l j AiRS
TO:
The Secretary
FROM: EA - Robert S. Ingersoll
Your Meeting with ROK Foreign Minister Kim
Wednesday, March 20-6:00 pm
Participants:
ROK: Foreign Minister Kim Dong Jo
Hahm Pyong Choon, Korean Ambassador
US:
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Ingersoll
Donald Ranard, EA/K (Notataker)
Wesdey Kricber, DA/R (Note Taker)
Biographic information is attached at Tab A.
Setting:
On instructions, Ambassador Habib has started
discussions with President Park and Foreign Minister
Kim on alternative arrangements to the UN Command.
Your meeting with Foreign Minister Kim will empha-
size the importance we attach to this matter and
our determination to proceed as quickly as we can
toward resolving the UN Command problem.
Background
Kim is on his way home after an official trip to
Latin America. He has been charged by Prosident Park
with leading the discussions with us on the UN Command
problem and he desires an exchange of views with you.
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET/NODIS
E.
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
XGDS
By
th
State Dept Guidelines stdereview 9/17/03
NARA, Date 12/3/10
Hunald
FORD-LIBRARY
zop SECRET/NODIS
2
We expect that the UN Command issue and the
related problem of the fall UN General Assembly
session will be the main topics of his conversation.
Kim will probably raise the importance of discussions
with the PRC on this issue. We have not yet made
specific decision on the various problems connected
with the Command so that your response will necessarily
be of a general nature. Lie would like to be sure the
Koreans understand that we desire that Seoul be the
primary site of discussions.
Kim may also want to raise a number of perennial
subjects with you, primarily to provide public and
private evidence of US support which is particularly
important to the ROKG at this time when its dealings
with the North have stalemated.
Kim may well try to develop an argument that the
North has abandoned peaceful unification and is pre-
pared to undertake some kind of overt action against
the ROK. We do not think we should encourage him in
this line. The whole issue of North-South relations
is now deeply enmeshed with the ROKG's own internal
difficulties and the South is taking any opportunity
to use the security issue with its friends abroad as
well as with its populace at home.
Issues/Talking Points
1.
Courtesv Talking Points
-- Congratulate him on his appointment as Foreign
Minister (December, 1973).
-- Recall effective manner in which Kim repre-
sented his country as Ambassador to US (67-73).
2.
UN Command Alternatives
ROK Position: President Park has agreed with
us that the growing difficulties of defending the
UN Command against attack in the UN General Assembly
make it necessary to consider alternative arrange-
FORD
TOP SECRET/NODIS
XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/NODIS
3
ments. He does not want to risk defeat in the UN
General Assembly on this issue. He has emphasized
his desire to have US troops continue their presence
in Korea. Ambassador Habib believes the ROKG prefers
to respond to our suggestions rather than advance its
own.
US Position: The UN Command problem has been
examined in the response to NSSM 190, but the imple- charges
menting decisions have not yet been made. There is 4LL decided
agreement in both State and Defense that prior to on a information
the opening of the UN General Assembly this fall we
should make clear to the other side we are prepared
to terminate the UN Command and that we should
ascertain PRC views at an early date.
Your Talking Points:
il the them mile will agree to edequate
understand means managements,
-- We welcome the ROKG response to Ambassador
Habib's initial presentation on the UN Command prob-
lem, a problem of great importance to both countries.
-- We have not made detailed decisions on the
UN Command but we expect to send instructions to
Ambassador Habib within the next few weeks for dis-
cussions with Kim.
-- We want to move with deliberate speed but we
also want to ensure insofar as we are able that any
changes we make do not lessen the security of the
peninsula.
-- We recognize importance of discussion with
the PRC and at an appropriate point we will approach
them.
3. UN General Assembly Consideration of a Korean
Item
ROK Position: They strongly wish to avoid a
debate at: New York this year because it would focus
on the UN Command and the US troop presence to the
detriment of the ROK. They are unsure the world-wide
lobbying required would be worth the effort. They
is
FORD
TOP SECRET/NODIS
GERALD
LIBRARY
XGDS
TOP SECRET/MODIS
4
look to us to work out some arrangement with the
PRC to avoid inscription of a Korean item on the
basis that we will have made some progress on the
termination of the UN Command. At the same time
the ROK Ambassador at New York has raised with
Ambassador Scali the possibility of preemptively
inscribing a Korean item which would likely give
us the tactical advantage in the General Assembly
of prior consideration of our resolution. This
proposal has probably been discussed with Foreign
Minister Kim.
US Position: We share the ROK's preference for
no UN debate this year. The likelihood of North
Korea's supporters moving to inscribe a "hostile"
Korean item on the UNGA agenda will increase if
there is no movement from our side on the UN Command
issue. Thus consultations with the ROK and PRC on
the UNC are necessary to forestall inscription;
after inscription, it will be more difficult to
work out a compromise with the PRC. USUN has also
pointed out to the ROK the anomaly of stimulating
a debate on Korea by preemptive inscription. How-
ever, if it is not possible to reach some agreement
with the other side on termination of the UN Command
and a debate appears likely, inscription of a "friendly"
Korean item in advance of the other side's move would
be tactically desirable.
Your Talking Points:
-- We would like to avoid a debate on Korea at
the UNGA if this is possible.
-- The idea of a preemptive inscription has some
attraction but there is the obvious disadvantage of
forcing a debate in the absence of any consultation
with the other side and of requiring us to make public
prematurely proposals on the UN Command. I suggest
our UN missions stay in close touch on this question
and submit their recommendations.
-- We should concentrate on our own consultations
on the UN Command to develop a position we can then
discuss with the PRC and others.
FURD
TOP SECRET/NODIS
GERALD
LIBRARY
XGDS
TOP SECRET/NODIS
5
4. US Troop Presence
ROK Position: The ROKG has had our assurances
(following inaccurate press accounts of Secretary
Schlesinger's testimony February 28) that no changes
in US troop levels in Korea are blanned. Kim will
likely want your reiteration of this assurance.
US Position: We have no plans to reduce US
force levels in Korea for the next year or two
(i.e. until the UNC issue is settled and new ar-
mistice arrangements are in place).
Your Talking Points:
-- We have no plans for reducing US troop levels
this year.] to male in Ld. free
for the new term al lecal through the transition L5 UNC units
-- We will consult with the ROKG before making averyones
further troop reductions.
-- The question of a mobile reserve role for the
US division in Korea has, as Secretary Schlesinger
told Congress, been studied as one of a number of
very long-range possibilities.
$.
ROK Relations with North Korea
ROK Position: The ROKG has taken the position
that North Korea is becoming increasingly belligerent
as shown by the Western Islands dispute, the recent
attack on ROK fishing boats and the uncovering of a
spy ring aimed at overthrowing the ROKG. The North's
military preparations are increasing and its unaccept-
able demands in the North-South talks show that its
real aim continues to be domination of the South.
US Position: We have no hard evidence that the
North is preparing for overt military action. The
North had stalemated the talks and although it now
has shown renewed interest in them it probably does
not expect significant progress until it is clear
that the Park Government can survive its expected
spring confrontation with students and christian groups.
FORD
TOP SECRET/NODIS
XGDS
CERALD
LIBERTY
TOP SECRET/NODIS
6
Your Talking Points:
-- We hope the ROKG will react firmly but non-
provocatively to North Korean provoked incidents and
will continue to do its part in efforts to reduce
tension in the peninsula.
-- We hope the ROKG will continue its efforts to
engage the North in serious discussion.
6. Diplomatic Recognition of North Korea
ROK Position: The ROKG is distressed by
Australia's decision to recognize North Korea and
by its own inability to obtain recognition from any
of the communist states. It considers its position
in the South-North dialogue weakened and would like
our help in discouraging other friendly states from
recognizing North Korea and in obtaining recognition
from communist states particularly the PRC.
US Position: We have agreed to counsel restraint
to friendly states proposing to recognize North Korea
in those cases we think appropriate. We have also agreed
when appropriate to raise the question of recognition
with the PRC, USSR and other communist states.
Your Talking Points:
ore ma C. Time to under pricently governments C5 expend relations
[-- Prospects for recognition of the ROK by the
PRC or USSR are limited but we will ão what we can.]
[-- The ROKG should not over-react to Western
recognition of Pyongyang but should continue its own
program of seeking recognition by non-aligned countries.]
with Natt Knee we party Than Cc. other ride
Attachments:
effects relations with Smtt lene, l ice
as appropriate everything approach to the PNC Ii
Tab A -Biographies on Foreign Minister Kim and
E
Ambassador Hahm
TOP SECRET ENODIS
are
Drafted: EA/K:PWKriebel:dpw
LIERARY BARALD FORD
3/18/74:X22332
Concurrences:
EA/K - Mr. Ranard
IO - Mr. Buffum (draft) Pick for
EA - Mr. Sneider
PM/ISP - Mr. Brown (draft) Pick june
3C
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032779
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇBiography
DESCRIPTION
Re Republic of Korea Official
CREATION DATE
03/1974
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700244
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN
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WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
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3D
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DESCRIPTION
Re Republic of Korea Official
CREATION DATE
03/1974
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700244
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN
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Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
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ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
W.R. Smyser, Richard H. Solomon,
Richard T. Kennedy
RECEIVER'S NAME
Secretary Kissinger
TITLE
NSSM 190: Diplomatic Initiatives in
Korea
CREATION DATE
03/20/1974
VOLUME
6 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700244
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN
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:
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CREATOR'S NAME
Henry A. Kissinger
RECEIVER'S NAME
The President
TITLE
Negotiations on Terminating the United
Nations Command in Korea
CREATION DATE
03/1974
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700244
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILE:
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN
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WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
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18.50804
4e
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
National Security Decision Memorandum
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
SUBJECT:
Termination of the U.N. Command in Korea
The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 190 and agency
comments thereon, and has made the following decisions:
1. Negotiating Package
To maintain and improve ROK security the United States should seek:
-- Substitution of U.S. and ROK military commanders for the
Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command as our side's signa-
tory to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The ROK and North
Dept. Guidelines
Korean representatives should then become the principal members
of the Military Armistice Commission.
E.O. SEC 3.3
12/3/10
-- Tacit acceptance by the other side of a continued U.S. force
DECLASCIFIED
presence in South Korea for at least the short term, in return for
NARA, Date
a Shanghai-type communique committing ourselves to reduce and
ultimately withdraw U.S. forces as the security situation on the
Peninsula is stabilized.
NSC Memo,
-- A. non-aggression pact between the two Koreas.
By
-- U.N. Security Council endorsement of the agreed-upon package of
substitute security arrangements.
-- Avoidance of other changes in the Armistice Agreement.
2. Negotiating Strategy
The United States should pursue a negotiating strategy along two tracks.
The Seoul-Pyongyang track should be primary. In the second track, we
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
XGDS 5b(3)
BYAUTH H.A. Kissinger
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
2
should make parallel approaches to the major powers involved -- the PRC,
the Soviet Union, and Japan. Specifically, we should:
-- Consult with the ROK before raising proposals with any of the major
powers. We should also seek ROK agreement to transfer operational
control of ROK forces from CINCUNC upon its termination to a new
U. S.- - ROK combined command under a senior U.S. military officer.
-- Keep the Soviets generally informed but discourage any spoiling
role or direct Soviet involvement.
-- Keep Japan continuously informed. In addition, (a) seek an explicit
agreement from the Japanese Government that would extend the
secret 1961 Kishi Minute to the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty
following termination of the UNC, but (b) not seek any extension in
Japan of third country basing rights under the U.N. Status of
Forces Agreement following termination of the UNC.
The minimum objective of the United States in this negotiating approach
is to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position for possible
debate of the Korean issue in the U.N. General Assembly this coming fall.
3. U.S. Force Presence in South Korea
There should be no substantial changes in the level or missions of
our forces in the ROK during the period of transition to new security
arrangements following termination of the UNC.
Henry A. Kissinger
FORD
TOP SECRE /SENSITIVE
9x
See SRC book
for NSSM 190
4g
C
a. FORD
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032783
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
TITLE
Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea
CREATION DATE
03/06/1974
VOLUME
10 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700244
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
D
42
4J
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WITHDRAWAL ID 032784
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
RECEIVER'S TITLE
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
TITLE
Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea
CREATION DATE
03/07/1974
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700244
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
4K
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TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇReport
TITLE
Assigned ROK, US, and Katusa Strengths
as of 31 December 1973
CREATION DATE
12/31/1974
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700244
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
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4.l
E
a.
BENGLD
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WITHDRAWAL ID 032786
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TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
W.E. Colby
CREATOR'S TITLE
Director
RECEIVER'S TITLE
The President
TITLE
Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea;
NSSM-190
CREATION DATE
03/02/1974
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700244
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
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sanitizel 9/7/02/
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SECRETI
stoffing
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
4m
2 March 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea; NSSM-190
1. Regarding the issue of preserving the UN
Command in Korea, I believe that it probably cannot
be sustained at the UN beyond this fall's General
Assembly session, and that an effort to preserve
the UNC for another year would be counterproductive.
2. I feel that North Korea is unlikely to be
attracted to any of the three options offered in the
response to NSSM-190, but least of all by Option 1.
I believe that Option 2, however, stands a chance of
gaining serious North Korean consideration, although
I am not sanguine in the light of North Korea's cur-
rent harsh attitude toward the US and South Korea.
Therefore, the issue might hinge on China's willing-
ness and ability to persuade Pyongyang that the time
had come to modify its hard-line posture.
3. I am concerned that there may be an over-
estimation of the degree of influence that China might
be able to exercise over North Korean actions in the
near term, although I believe that China does want to
play a constructive role regarding stability on the
Korean peninsula.
4. In this connection, the response to NSSM-190,
in its heavy emphasis on US consultation with Peking,
may have understated the USSR interest in the situation.
I am concerned that Moscow might read the negotiations,
w/portions exampted
RACNLF-NSC.EA. RACNLF-NSC.EA.PA-5-3-4-591-104 -5-3-4-5 9/7/04
NSC Guifelines
BY
HR NLF, DATE 1/6/09
25X1
TS No. 200531-74
Cy No.
#1
s
FORD
Presidential Library Review of NSC Equities Requiredor
BALO
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TOP SECRET
25X1
if pursued as projected, as an effort to exclude it
from an influential role in Korean affairs.
5. The other matters raised in the response to
NSSM-190 and the associated papers on future United
States force dispositions in South Korea are in my
view primarily operational in nature, not calling for
intelligence comment.
WEColly Colby
Director
FORD
&
LIGRAL
-2-
TOP SECRET
25X1
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F
OLVER
1044 is LIDNA
40
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
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WITHDRAWAL ID 032787
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
Fred C. Ikle
RECEIVER'S NAME
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
TITLE
Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea
CREATION DATE
03/04/1974
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700244
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
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4p
G
e. FORD
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TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
TITLE
NSSM 171 Follow-On -- Analysis of the
Role of the Army Division in Korea
CREATION DATE
10/13/1973
VOLUME
17 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700244
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
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H
FORD is 0972 his
Kennedy
7322517
45
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
November 27, 1973
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Strategy and Forces for Asia - NSSM 171
In his memorandum of August 28, 1973, to members
of the Defense Program Review Committee, Dr. Kissinger
directed the Department of State to prepare an analysis
of the political and diplomatic implications of con-
verting the U.S. Second Infantry Division to a more
mobile configuration.
The analysis is attached.
2) Thomas 102 R. Pickering
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Analysis
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 8.3
NSC Memo; 3/30/06, State Dept, Gaidelines
By NARA, Date 12/3/11
FORD
TOP SECRET
GDS
RERALO
LIBRARD\
H
4T
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Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032789
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
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TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇReport
DESCRIPTION
US Force Structure in South Korea
CREATION DATE
11/27/1973
VOLUME
7 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700244
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH