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President Ford's Trip to Seoul, November 1974 (1)
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President Ford's Trip to Seoul, November 1974 (1)
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The original documents are located in Box 18, folder "President Ford's Trip to Seoul,
November 1974 (1)" of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 18 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Rewrite 5393
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4
then Ambassddor Hodgson will also sit in. This detail remains
to be resolved with the Japanese. I plan also to hold separate
but parallel talks with Foreign Minister Kimura.
C. Press Arrangements. The press arrangements are still being
worked out with the Japanese.
III. TALKING POINTS
A. Reaffirmation of the Alliance. You will want to leave no doubt
in the Japanese mind of the importance of the alliance to the US
and of your personal commitment to it.
-- I want to assure you that the U.S. attaches the highest
importance to our alliance with Japan.
-- It has been and remains the vital cornerstone of our policy
in the Pacific.
B. Continuity of U.S. Policies Globally. Given Japan's basic dependence
on us for its ultimate security and its still strong inclination to
follow our lead diplomatically, Prime Minister Tanaka will be
keenly interested in your views on principal world issues.
1. Detente with the Soviets. You will want to reassure Tasaka
that we intend to pursue detente with the USSR in a way that
will contribute to global stability. We are aware in our
negotiations with the Soviets of a need for balanced conces-
sions, and we will not compromise the vital interests of our
allies or other third countries (See Tab A.).
.. During Secretary Kissinger's visit to Moseow last month,
progress was made toward a SALT negotiating
framework that should be helpful in achieving an
agreement on strategic arms limitations that will
extend until 1985.
-- My visit to Viadivostok is designed to establish a
personal relationship with Soviet leaders and to
review where we stand in our relationship at present.
-- We are hopeful that, as regards the Middle East situation,
the Soviets will continue to show restraint and will permit
the step-by-step progress we believe is essential to an
overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
DECLASSIFIED
FORD
:
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958 - amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. 10/11 Guidelines
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-- We look for improvement in our bilateral economic relations
with the Soviet Union, particularly if our Congress passes
the Administration's Trade Bill in the near future, as we
anticipate. As regards the question of U.S. grain sales to
the Soviet Union, we are moving on two fronts in an effort to
asoid disruption of our domestic and world markets and to
prevent hardships to our customers. Demestically, I have
acted to provide government supervision for our grain sales.
Externally, we have made clear to the Soviets the importance
of advance information on their requirements and of the need
of them to regulate their purchases.
-- In general, we are trying to convince the Soviets that they
have a basic national interest in cooperating to solve the
problems of international monetary reform, food, and
energy.
2. Normalisation of Relations with the PRC. We have since 1971
consulted closely with Japan on both of our countries normalisation
of relations with the PRC. The outcome has been quite satis-
factory: we have both achieved step-by-step progress in this
direction, avoiding a competitive race to Peking that could
only hurt both of us. Tankka will be interested in whether any
new major progress toward normalisation of U. -PRC relations
can be expected from my upcoming visit to Peking. (See Tab A.)
-- As you know, Secretary Kissinger's coming Peking visit
is another of the periodic high-level U.S. -PRC exchanges
contemplated in the Shanghai Communique.
-- We expect no drastic change in U.S. -PRC relations in the
future. As Secretary Kissinger told Foreign Minister
Kimura in late September, we see our political selations
with the PRC as being "exactly the appropriate relationship"
for now. If we anticipate any sharp departures, we will
inform you in advance.
-- Any complete normalisation of relations would require a
resolution of basic problems such as the U.S. defense
commitment to Faiwan. We intend to move very cautiously
on that problem.
-- The kind of progress we look for in the near future is the
further development of trade relations and cultural exchanges
with the PRC.
:-
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6
-- We are careful to insure that the Chinese understand that
our relationship with the Seviet Union is not directed
against Peking.
-- On the Korean issue, the PRC so far has not been willing
to compremise on the U.N. Command issue now before
the current session of the U.N. General Assembly. Publicly,
however, the PRC continues to distinguish between U.S.
forces in Korea and those under the U.N. flag.
C. Multilateral Issues
1. U.S. . Japan Energy Cooperation. (See Tab B.)
a. on
Japan's heavy dependence on imported energy (88% of
energy is imported) accontuates ito historical feelings of
isolation and insecurity. While Japan recognizes the
importante of consumer country enoporation, its
vulnerabilities make it reluctant to take positions which
appear to confront producers. Our objective is to under-
score the importance we attach to Japanese support for and
cooperation in efforts to increase consumer solitarity and
to demonstrate an understanding of Japan's need to diversify
energy sources.
-- We realise that Japan relies heavily on imported energy,
places a high premium on assurance of continued petroleum
supplies, and has suffered serious disruption as the result
of higher oil prices.
-- We genuinely appreciate Japan's constructive cooperation
in the Energy Coordinating Group, and believe that its
decision to join the International Energy Program is an
essential stop toward reducing its vulnerability to an
interruption of oil supplies.
-- The major consuming nations now need to move rapidly
to establish effective programs is such areas as conserva-
tion and financial solidarity.
is
FORD
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7
-- On conservation, we de not envision a rigid burden-sharing
exercise but conserted efforts by each nation to do what
is necessary to reduce imports. This helps reduce the
transfer of financial (and with it political and military)
power to oil producing countries, reduces the build up of
debt to oil producers, and reduces vulnerability to future
oil cutoffs.
-- On financial solidarity, we believe that arrangements are need-
ed so that consuming countries could provide economic
support to individual countries to avoid internationally
disruptive unilateral action. Our proposal is that countries
agree to undertake lean commitments which a common
fund could call on when loan assistance was needed, and
approved, for a particular country.
-- With respect to a consumer/produser dialogue, since the
Washington Energy Conference we have operated under
the assumption that a meeting with producers would be
useful only after consumer cooperation had strengthened
to the point that such a dialogue could ashieve results in
the common interest of consuming nations. Progress has
been made through the ECG and IEP. but we believe more
needs to be done before such a dialogue can achieve
positive results.
B. Yakutsk Natural Gas Project
-- We understand Japan's desire for U.S. participation is the
Yakutsk natural gas project. We are, in principle, favorably
disposed toward participating in the exploratory phase. A
final decision on Ex-Im credits, however, can be made only
after we see the outcome of Ex-Im Bank legislation now in
Congress and have examined the recently submitted blue-
print for Operation Independence.
-- I hope we will have an answer for you in Desember. In
the interim, we have no objection if you move ahoad or if
US firms wish to participate with Japanese firms. We
would provide political support for participating American
firms if problems arese which warranted this.
is
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c. Uranium Enrichment Services for Japan
-- I want to assure you of our ability and our determination
to continue as Japan's primary partner in the develop-
meat of its nuclear power capabilities. We intend to
meet the contractual obligations with Japan for uranium
earlehment, and to meet future requests for earlchment
services through the construction of new capacity.
-- The US supports the establishment of a joint US-Japan
enrichment venture in the US. We strongly encourage
Japanese financial participation. Under shitable arrange-
ments, we are prepared to share our gaseous diffusion and
contrifuge earichment technology with Japan for the con-
struction of an enrichment plant in Japan or elsewhere.
2. Trade and Monetary Issues: The Japanese trade balance
is recovering quickly from the shock of higher oil prices.
We want to ensure that Japan dees not improve its trade
balance at the expense of the US and others; and we want to
emphasise our desire to cooperate with Japan in coming
multilateral trade negotiations. (See Tab C).
.. It is essential that countries cooperate in meeting their
balance of payments problems and refrain from actions
which will exacerbate the deficits in their trade balances.
We have heard reports that Japan is attempting to realise
a very large trade surplus in the future. This is bound
to adversely affect our trade balance and that of others.
It will raise fears of the recurrence of the major imbalances
of past years. We both have an interest in avoiding the
development of such a situation, and we should both watch
it closely. It might be useful if the sub-cabinet level
economic meeting planned for January could carefully
review this situation.
3. Food. Japan is the largest market for US agricultural experts
and, as is the case of oil, extremely vulnerable to supply
disruptions. In this period of shortage it is entremely impor-
is
renu
tant that major producing and consuming countries equally
BERALD
LIBRARY
share the burden of adjustment and that while we give assur-
ances of our intention to continue providing adequate supplies,
Japan avoid disruptive actions--such as over-fishing in the
northeast Pacific and excessively restrictive limits on US
beef imports--and cooperate in migotiating our WFC proposals.
(See Tab D).
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
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9
.. We have a common interest in an improved world feed
situation. We hope that Japan is prepared to work with us
to establish a system of world feed reserves involving
equitable distributions of food stocks among major trading
countries. Combined with increased agricultural produc-
tion and increased food aid, this can help assure future
adequasy of world food availabilities.
-- We value Japan as our most important agricultural export
market. The US fully intends to remain a reliable supplier
of feed to Japan. This will, of course, require continuation
of the close cooporation and consultation which have helped
enable us to meet Japan's essential food import require-
ments during recent periods of shortage. It is particularly
important that Japan continue to refrain from speculative
purchases and to provide us with information on its
commodity availabilities and requirements.
.. We are confident that Japan recognizes that dependability
of markets is important to the US, much as dependability
of supply is to Japan. We deeply appreciate the efforts
of Japan, and you personally, to reduce import barriers
in recent years. We are conserned, however, that certain
Japanese restrictions limit the market for various US
products. We especially hope that Japan will resume the
importation of reasonable amounts of beef from the US
and other normal suppliers. We recognise the sensitivity
of this issue in Japan: but, barriers to beef imports force
American cattlemen to boar a dispreportionste share of
the burden of tow beef prices and high feed Sprises.
-- With regard to the question of over-fishing in the northeast
Pacific, our scientists are firmly convinced that significant
(roughly 30 percent) reductions by all countries involved
will be required to ensure an optimum sustainable yield
from this valuable source of protein. Our exports and
yours are now negotiating this issue. I urge you to urge
your negotiators to work with ours to find a solution.
Otherwise Congress is likely to move unilatorally to
impose a 200 mile jurisdiction over coastal fishing.
4. Asian Regional Problems -- Kerea and Indochina. Although
we are working with Japan on a wide range of issues in Asia,
both of us are particularly interested in the situations
017836
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Kerea and Indochina. Japan has a heavy stake in the stability
of the Kerean Peninsula. Since the Korean War, Japan
has strongly supported South Korea oconomically and
politically. Diplematic relations with Seoul have taken a
turn for the werse in the past year, however, as a result
of the August 1973 abduction of the Korean opposition
leader Kim Tae-Chung from Tekye, and last August's
murder of President Park's wife by a Korean resident of
Japan in an assassination attempt on Park himself. In the
context of detente, Japan is also cautiously expanding trade
and cultural contacts with North Kerea. (See Tab E.)
As regards Indochina, Japan has given active political
support and economic assistance to South Vistaam and
Cambodia and new to the new coalition government of Lace.
We want to ensourage Japan to increase its aid to South
Vistasm. Japan has taken a lead is this year's UN General
Assembly fight to preserve the present Cambedian Govera-
ment's seat there. Japan has recognized North Victnam,
but is proceeding carefully in expanding its relations with
economic assistance to North Victnam.
] a. Korea
-- The US attaches great importance to Japan's continued
strong support of South Korea. We approxiate your
restraint during the recent diplomatic erisis with
Seoul over the assassination attempt against President
Park.
-- (If raised) I understand the effects produced in Japan
by the Park Government's tightened authoritarian
controls. There has been a similar resetion in the
US. We have made our views known privately to the
Park Government, but we regard this primarily as a
matter for the people of South Kerea to resolve
themselves.
-- I appreciate your caution in expanding trade and
cultural relations with North Korea. I believe it
essential, given the continuing militancy of North Kerea,
to take fully into account the effect that expanded
relations with North Kerea could have on the stability
of the Peninsula.
is
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11
b. Indoshine
-- The US firmly intends to maintain the level of our
assistance in Indochina, and particularly that to
South Vietnam and Cambedia.
-- We approciate the strong assistance, both economically
and diplematically, that Japan is giving. This is
especially true of Japan's current efforts in behalf
of the Cambedian Government's sent in the UN General
desembly. We hope that Japan will make every effort
to increase its aid and investment, especially in South
Victnam,
-- We are encouraged by the outsome of the recent Indol
china Aid Donors Conference, and appreciate the
constructive role you played there.
:
We share Japan's hopes for meaningful talks between
the several parties is Cambedia. We have discussed
our views with both Peking and Mossow. Newever, until
the Khmer UN credentials question has been succesfully
resolved, we do not expect much movement toward
these talks.
-- We approciate Japan's cautious approach to expanded
relations with North Vistnam.
5. Nonoreliferation. You should reaffirm the US interest is
Strengthening multilateral constraints against the pro-
liferation of auclear weapons. Japan has been concerned
that we did not react more strongly to India's auslear
explesion, and that we offered nuclear power plants and
fuel to Egypt and Israel. Japan's participation is non-
proliferation efforts is essectial to an effective strategy
is this area. It is thus in our interest that Japan proceed
next year, as the Tanaka Government recently indicated
it would, with ratification of the Nonpreliferation Treaty
(which it signed in 1970), and that Japan cooporate with us
is strengthening restraints on the further proliferation of
muslear weapons.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
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12
..
We welsomed your Government's statement that you
intend to seek ratification of the Nonpreliferation
Treaty at your coming Diet session. This will do
much to help enhance confidence in the nonprolifers-
tion system.
-- We look forward to Japan's cooperation in improving
restraints against the proliferation of nuclear weapons
through measures such as strengthened coordinated
anslear export policies by key supplier states and
improved physical security standards for nuclear
facilities and material.
-- Let me reasoure you unequivocally, is this context,
that the US intends to fulfill its commitments under
the US-Japan mutual security treaty.
D. Bilateral Issues
1. US-Janan Security Relations. You will want to express
appreciation to Prime Minister Tanaka for his government's
continued esoperation on our military basing problems is
Japan. Our bases in Japan are essential to our strategy in
Asia, as well as to our defense commitment to Japan. We
currently have about 55,000 forces in Japan (including
about 23, 000 on Okinawa). We are reducing the land we
occupy, and particularly that is or nearby crowded urban
areas, through an on-going base consolidation program.
-- I want to leave no doubt in your mind as to the vital
importance we attach to the continuation of our military
bases in Japan. These are indispensable to our
strategy in Asia, and thus we believe to stability in
the region.
:
I want to convey to you my despest appreciation for
the cooporation you and your Government have extended
to us on the base problem. I understand the demestic
political problems these bases can sometimes cause
you, and we want to do our utmost to help alleviate
these frictions wherever possible.
STCRET/SENSITIVE
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-- The US Government intends to continue its cooperative
effort with your Government to consolidate our bases
and facilities in Japan wherever feasible. We always
welcome your Government's suggestions in this regard.
Attachments:
Tab A .
Tokyo's Relations with Moseow and Peking
Tab B .
US-Japan Energy Cooperation
Tab c -
Trade and Monetary Issues
Tab D -
Food
Tab E -
Asian Regional Problems . Korea and Indochina
:
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MEMORANDUM
ROK
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)(3)
ACTION
November 12, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. MR
SUBJECT:
Recommended Talking Points for
the President's Meeting with South Korean
President Park Chung-hee During the
President's
Visit to Korea,
November 22-23, 1974
At Tab I is a draft briefing memorandum from you to the President
containing suggested talking points for his meeting with President Park
Chung-hee during the President's
visit to South Korea,
November 22-23, 1974.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the draft memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Concurrence:
Mr. Hormats RH/JON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
FORD
By
NSC Memo, in 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
for SEGRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS) (3)
NARA, Date 43/11
2B
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 033095
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇBriefing Paper
CREATOR'S NAME
Henry A. Kissinger
RECEIVER'S NAME
The President
TITLE
Meeting with President of the Republic
of Korea, Park Chung-hee
CREATION DATE
11/1974
VOLUME
9 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700344
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
18
FOLDER TITLE
President Ford's Trip to Seoul,
November 1974 (1)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/24/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
SECRET
20
PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
Key Conclusions
The possibility of another war in Korea seems remote under present
circumstances.
The presence of U.S. forces in South Korea and the Mutual
Security Treaty with the U.S. deter North Korea from major
military adventures.
North Korea cannot rely on the firm support of its allies for
another invasion of the South.
-- The North does not have the military strength to deliver a
knockout blow to the South at the outset of any invasion.
There has been only very limited progress, however, in defusing
the inherently unstable Korean situation.
The USSR and China appear constrained by their competition
for favor in Pyongyang from cooperating in measures to guarantee
the legitimacy of South Korea.
-- The North-South talks have had no concrete result.
- - Occasional military incidents continue to hold the potential for
escalation into serious clashes.
The North has not given up its hope of unifying the peninsula
under communist rule. Political instability in the South, if it
becomes much worse, might entice the North to act in support
of anti-Pak elements.
Involvement of the Powers
The prospect of renewed hostilities on the Korean peninsula has
decreased basically as a result of Moscow and Peking's unwillingness
to endorse or support North Korean aggression. This attitude has
been reinforced in recent years by the changes in relations among
the major powers. The deepening of the Sino-Soviet split, the Sino-U. S.
rapprochement, and progress in U.S. -Soviet detente have created an
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
SECRET
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
12/5/03
By
WA
NARA, Date 1/0/11
SECRET
2
atmosphere in which the powers -- and Japan as well - now share a
common interest in preserving stability in Korea and removing the
peninsula as a potential source of friction among them. In practical
terms, this has meant unspoken approval of the continued division
into "two Koreas. 11
Despite this common interest, there has been only limited cooperation
among the powers in dealing with the Korean problem. Since Korea
remains an integral element in the rivalry between Moscow and Peking,
they have found it important to their interests to court North Korea
as an ally. This has permitted Pyongyang to play one against the
other -- though it is now much closer to Peking -- and to seek and obtain
increasing quantities of sophisticated weaponry as the price for good
relations. The quest for influence in the North has also inhibited
Moscow and Peking in responding to overtures from the U.S. for mutual
recognition of the two Korean governments.
Mutual recognition by the major Communist powers has so far been
strongly opposed by Pyongyang which sees it as a major step in the
direction of ratifying the permanent division of the peninsula. Peking,
however, did cooperate with the U.S. a year ago in working out a
compromise resolution on the Korean question at the U.N. The Chinese
helped avert an acrimonious debate in which the presence of U. S.
forces in South Korea would have been loudly attacked. The Soviets
also went along with the compromise. Pyongyang's disappointment was
lessened somewhat by a concurrent agreement to dissolve the U.N.
political apparatus in South Korea.
The North Koreans are asking for more at the U.N. this year -- the
withdrawal of all "foreign troops under the U.N. flag. 11 The Soviets
are again backing Pyongyang, though without enthusiasm. Peking's
support for the hard North Korean line seems firmer than a year ago,
though the Chinese may again show interest in a last-minute compromise
if as is likely -- a pro-Seoul resolution has the votes to pass.
The North-South Dialogue
While changed relationships among the powers have reduced the possibility
of a new Korean war, they also have generated anxieties in both Pyongyang
and Seoul, neither certain of the reliability of its allies. Their most
notable adjustment has been an exploratory dialogue opened in 1971.
At high tide, in July 1972, this dialogue produced a joint communique
in which the two sides agreed to work for peaceful reunification.
SEGRET
SECRET
3
By mid-1973, the dialogue had foundered on conflicting views of its
objectives. During the past year, Pyongyang and Seoul have returned
to the pattern of harsh propaganda exchanges which prevailed before
1971. Neither side, however, has moved to end the bilateral talks.
Neither wants to accept the onus of doing so. Both find uses, however
marginal, for the forum.
Diplomatic Competition
In the changed international environment, North and South have also
undertaken a wide-ranging search for additional sources of political,
economic, and military support. Pyongyang has had dramatic success
in increasing the number of states with which it has official relations.
Some 70 states now recognize Pyongyang, compared to 38 before the
1972 joint communique. Many of the Third World and European countries
that have recognized North Korea previously had ties only with Seoul;
in most cases, these ties have been maintained. Pyongyang accepts
this duality as a necessity if it is to achieve international parity
with the South. Pyongyang is making considerable progress in expanding
its foreign trade beyond the confines of the communist world, especially
with Western Europe and Japan.
The South Koreans still have relations with more countries than
Pyongyang -- 94 at last count. But Seoul is seriously concerned that
it has lost the diplomatic initative to the North Koreans. In particular,
South Korea wants to open contacts with Peking, Moscow, and the
Eastern Europeans to balance Pyongyang's gains in the West. Efforts
to do so, however, have had no significant success.
The Military Balance
The military balance on the peninsula favors South Korea with respect
to ground forces, but North Korea in the air and on the sea. Both,
however, remain dependent on external support to sustain any major
military operation beyond a few weeks duration. This situation is
unlikely to change for some years despite increased emphasis in both
countries on developing independent capabilities for carrying on warfare
against the other. This effort includes increased military budgets, the
provision of additional domestic weapons production capacity, and
increased interest in overseas procurement of relatively sophisticated
equipment, especially from Western Europe.
SECRET
SECRET
4
Thus, while the opposition of the major powers to renewed hostilities
is a strong inhibiting factor, it is also leading to a situation in which
the Koreas, over time, will be less restrained by their respective
allies. Pyongyang, for example, will soon for the first time have
extensive oil storage capacity -- now an inhibiting factor in its war
planning. The North, moreover, has recently demonstrated willingness
to initiate risky actions in the air and sea space along its frontiers.
With regard to Seoul, there is reliable reporting that it is bent on
developing a nuclear deterrent as soon as possible.
North Korea's Internal Situation
Among the major concerns of the South Koreans is the nature of the
competing regime in the North, one of the most disciplined and assertive
in the world. State and party are dominated by the 62 -year old Kim Il-song,
the object of a personality cult of extreme intensity. There is no sign
that Kim, after more than 25 years in power, is threatened by any
segment of the North Korean party, bureaucracy, or army. But he
does have domestic critics and has felt compelled at times to respond
by switching major domestic and foreign policy lines. Nepotism is
one criticism of Kim that has not been met. Kim has groomed a
younger brother and, more recently, a son as potential successors
to his leadership. Speculation on the succession, however, conters
heavily on the extraordinary difficulties any new Northern leadership
would encounter in maintaining tight control.
SECRET
SECRET
POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN SOUTH KOREA
In the three years since his narrow victory in the 1971 presidential
election, Pak Chung-heehas undertaken a systematic campaign to
strengthen and perpetuate his control over South Korea. He has used
threats and intimidation, declared martial law and emergency situations,
rewritten the constitution to his own specifications, and issued emergency
decrees providing for severe punishment of any who question his policies.
To a great extent, the South Korean populace has tacitly accepted Pak's
policies and acquiesced in the loss of the democratic processes that
seemed ready to flourish in the late 1960s. Pak's support among many
South Koreans stems from the fact that under his leadership the country
has been transformed from a backward agricultural society to an
important light industrial state with a powerful military and considerable
international prestige.
The Opposition
But Pak has never been totally successful in getting a significant portion
of the educated urban elite to accept his authoritarian policies. He
has faced persistent opposition from university students who, however,
have lacked the organization and popular appeal that would make them a
serious threat to the regime. But in the past year the nature of the
opposition has changed. Partly as a result of the government's heavy-
handed tactics against the students and partly because of increasing
disaffection with the regime's uncompromising policies, Christian
leaders, the press and spokesmen for the political opposition have
joined ranks with the students adding heretofore missing organizational
talent, resources, commitment and the ability to focus foreign criticism
on Seoul's domestic policies particularly in the U.S. and Japan.
The goals of those opposed to Pak vary. Many simply want to return
to the pre-1972 system of limited parliamentary government which Pak
tolerated partly out of deference to his government's then heavy
dependence on the U.S. Others, however, increasingly believe that
if Pak will not change his policies, he must be removed. Their
determination to press for changes has, in recent weeks, raised the
prospect of increasingly serious domestic unrest in South Korea.
With the potential for domestic turmoil mounting, Pak is also facing
the prospect of erosion of the support he has always enjoyed from
more conservative elements in the society. His willingness to risk
FORD
a break in relations with Japan in the wake of the assassination of his
DECLASS
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines:
statemeview
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By
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wife was unsettling for many in Korea. Though the dispute was settled
to Seoul's satisfaction, some may still be disturbed about Pak's
seemingly irrational handling of the situation. Perhaps more significantly,
Pak's ability to provide the nation with strong and imaginative economic
leadership a basic underpinning of his regime - - may come into
question with Seoul now entering its most serious economic slump in
a decade.
Pak is dealing firmly with the renewed unrest. Universities have been
closed down, at least temporarily. Dissident leaders have been picked
up for police interrogation and warnings. But probably out of concern
for U.S. reactions on the eve of your visit, the authorities have avoided
the use of mass arrests and strong-arm tactics. Indeed, the opposition
has been counting on at least this measure of government flexibility
in the period preceding your visit.
Pak is also moving to head off increased unemployment and labor
unrest and is seeking to shore up relations with his allies particularly
the U.S. He recognized that holding Seoul's economy on course will
require strong backing from Tokyo and Washington and that his ability
to count on the loyalty of the armed forces will in large measure be
determined by a continued American security commitment to his
government.
Pak's measures have had a fallout in the U.S. -- in Japan as well.
U.S. church organizations and media have inveighed against Pak's
tight controls. In Congress, the Fraser Sub-Committee has held hearings
on human rights in South Korea. This in turn has added momentum
to moves to reduce drastically our military assistance to South Korea
or to terminate it outright. A recent letter to you from Congressman
Fraser and seven others asked you to tell Pak that "unless human rights
are restored to the Korean people, the United States will begin to
disengage from South Korea. 11
The Outlook
Perhaps the most compelling reason for concern over South Korea's
future is the fact that President Pak appears to have foreclosed the
possibility of peaceful change in political leadership. Pak may indeed
be able to maintain control for another period of months, or even
years, through a judicious combination of concessions and restraints.
He still has the loyalty, if not the wholehearted approval, of the
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powerful military leadership. He has an effective Security Service.
And, most important, the bulk of the South Korean population probably
continues to view him as the best man for the job.
Pak appears to have weighed carefully the odds for and against certain
domestic policies and the possible foreign repercussions. Though
withdrawn and taciturn, Pak is not isolated from the day-to-day
functioning of his government nor is he unfamiliar with the mood of
the people. His advisors, though wary of challenging his views, are
not merely sycophants anxious to share in the power of the leader.
In short, Pak is not an enfeebled Syngman Rhee, nor is there any
similarity between Pak's regime and the Rhee Government in its final
days.
But Pak must deal with a determined opposition, committed increasingly
to achieving fundamental changes in his regime's policies. Their
agitation can be suppressed, or at least contained, perhaps for a long
time. The outlook, however, is for an increase of the scope and intensity
of the political unrest of the past year so long as Pak refuses to set
some limit on what appears to be open-ended occupancy of South Korea's
presidential office.
B.TURD
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 033099
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇBriefing Paper
CREATOR'S NAME
Henry A. Kissinger
RECEIVER'S NAME
The President
TITLE
Meeting with the President of the
Republic of Korea, Park Chung-hee
DESCRIPTION
Duplicate
CREATION DATE
11/14/1974
VOLUME
9 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700344
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
18
FOLDER TITLE
President Ford's Trip to Seoul,
November 1974 (1)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/24/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH