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    "localId": "24468963",
    "label": "Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, August 19, 1976 (Korean Incident)",
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{
    "id": "24468963",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, August 19, 1976 (Korean Incident)",
    "description": "This file unit contains material related to the North Korean Tree Incident.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/24468963",
    "collections": [
        "National Security Council East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files (Ford Administration)",
        "Meetings Files"
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    "subjects": [
        "Korea (North)",
        "Korea"
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    "coverageEndDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1976-08-31",
        "month": 8,
        "year": 1976
    },
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        "logicalDate": "1976-08-01",
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        "year": 1976
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{
    "seq": 1,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/ford/grf-0337/186745/24468963.pdf",
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 27, folder \"WSAG, August 19, 1976, Korean\nIncident\" of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R.\nFord Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nMEMORANDUM\nINFORMATION\n1.6\n4796X\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSECRET-(XGDS) (3)\nAugust 25, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nJeanne W. Davis\nwith\nSUBJECT:\nMinutes of WSAG Meeting,\nHeld August 19, 1976\nAttached are the minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group\nmeeting held August 19, 1976, to discuss Korea.\nAttachment\ncc: William G. Hyland\nWilliam Gleysteen\nSECRET (XGDS) (3)\nESA440 FORD\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12956 (as amended) SEC 3.3\nNSC he Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines\nNARA. Date 1/21/11\nDigitized from Box 27 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\n1B\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 033323\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇMemorandum of Conversation\nTITLE\nWashington Special Actions Group\nDESCRIPTION\nRe North Korean Tree Incident\nCREATION DATE\n08/19/1976\nVOLUME\n12 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700440\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n27\nFOLDER TITLE\nWashington Special Actions Group\nMeeting, August 19, 1976 (Korean\nIncident)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n04/20/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\nIC\nDCI Briening\nLUSAG 19 Aug 76\nSECRET\nThis morning I will address two questions. First, likely\nNorth Korean responses to measures we might take. Second, what\nthe intelligence community is doing to keep North Korean move-\nments under maximum surveillance.\nShow of force. Demonstrative military measures of the\ntype we have already taken will reinforce existing deterrents\nto major North Korean acts of force and also discourage further\nprovocations for the immediate future.\n-- The North Koreans will read our actions as evidence\nthat we will be more alert to the possibility of violence and\nquicker to take effective defensive action for some time to\ncome.\n-- Pyongyang's propaganda response is entirely predictable:\nUS military movements will be described as further efforts on\nour part to \"light the fuse of war,\" in line with their in-\ntensive propaganda campaign of the past several months portray-\ning the US as the major source of tension in Korea. We believe\nthat their announcement of a state of alert is essentially a\npropaganda move.\nAt the same time, Pyongyang will be attentive to the\nreaction in the US to the loss of American lives and to the\nsubsequent actions taken by the administration.\n-- If the North Koreans perceive the promise of a\nsignificant debate over the troop presence and our commitment,\nthey may well resort to additional small scale violence in\norder to point up the continuing threat to American lives.\nThe tree clearing exercise. Two alternate actions have been\nproposed by General Stillwell, who believes--out of tactical\nnecessity and principle--that the original tree clearing\nexercise must be completed.\n-- with no prior warning, cut down the tree using the\nmaximum legal guard force of 35 men, and depart as rapidly\nas possible. The advantage would lie in completing the operation\nbefore the North Koreans could react. The disadvantage is that\nthe North Koreans might still have time to react--and with a\nforce larger than the rules permit.\n-- alternately, to the North Koreans in advance our intent\nto prune the tree, and invite neutral observers and members of\nthe press as witnesses. This course would underscore the\nSECRET\nFORD\nRAC\nNLF-NSC.EA.PA-297-11-24912303\nin NLF, DATE 1/12/09\nLIBRARY\nSECRET\n2.\nnon-provocative nature of our intent; the disadvantages are\nthat the North Koreans would dispute our right to proceed and\nthat the proposal would be submerged in inconclusive debate.\nGeneral Stillwell prefers the first course. Assuming that\nthe tree clearing exercise must be completed soon, we would\nagree with the General's preferred course of action--provided\nthat he feels he has an adequate back up force on hand. We\nbelieve the North Koreans would react if they have the time\nand superior forces on hand. As for the second alternative,\nthe North Koreans are likely to object to our proposal and it\nis unlikely to move forward quickly.\nReprisals. We do not know how the North Koreans calculate\nthe odds of a US reprisal. They are certainly aware of the\npossibility, even though previous incidents involving US loss\nof life in Korea (the seizure of the USS Pueblo and the shoot\ndown of the EC-121 in the late 1960's) did not prompt one.\nIn any event, a US reprisal would present the North Koreans\nwith several difficult decisions.\n-- their response to the reprisal itself would be dictated\nby the balance of forces immediately at hand. The North\nKoreans would probably react to a reprisal--or any aspect of\na reprisal operation--if superior forces could be deployed.\nConversely, Pyongyang would probably not risk deploying a\nreaction force if its chances of success were no better than\neven.\n-- in the wake of successful reprisal, Pyongyang would\nconsider retaliatory action against US forces elsewhere in the\ngeneral area--lightly armed ships or aircraft within range or\nUS personnel at Panmunjom. Should Pyongyang perceive no\nvulnerable US target, it might consider attacking a South\nKorean target most anywhere along the DMZ or perhaps by\nattempting to duplicate the form of the US reprisal.\nOn balance, we do not believe that Pyongyang would decide\nto embark upon a series of escalatory incidents. A military\nresponse at an equal or somewhat lower level is more probable,\nwhile a response at a higher level--perhaps caused by differing\nUS and North Korean perceptions--certainly cannot be ruled out.\nSECRET\nDIA FACT BOOK\n12\nNORTH KOREAN AIR FORCE\n124\n125\n128\n130\nSungart\nNORTH KOREA\nReturnels\nFIGHTERS AND BOMBERS\nMiG-15/17\n300\nMiG-19\n36\nMIG-21\n120\n= Su.7\n24\nU.S.S.R\nIL-28\n70\nTotal: 610\nAIRFIELDS (JET CAPABLE)\nTumen\nPEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA\no\n25\n50\n75 Miles\n0\n25\n50\n75 Kilemators\n42\n12\nSinmusong\n40 MiG-15/17\nYalu\nHoemun Ni\nManpo Up\n50 MiG-15/17\n*\n4 M16 15/17\nOIRANG\nREADY\nHwangsuwon\n4\nR\nChangjin Up\n2 M16-195\nYalw\n4 11-280\n20 IL-28\nREADY\nUniu\nREADY\n50 IL-28\n36 MiG-21\n40\nHamhung\n81 MiG-15/17\n*\nNamsi\nSondeng Ni\n2 M16-210\n34 MiG-15/17\nTaechon\nREADY\n62 MiG-19\nSEA\nSaamcham\nAN-240\n4\n2 M16-17A\nMIG 210\nPukchang Ni\nOF\n2 27\nREADY\n47 M:G-21\n2 MIG-21s\nAN-ASE\nPEADY\nPyong Ni\nREADY\nJAPAN\nLI-2,JAY\n24 Su-7\nSunan Up\nWonsan\n3 M16-190\n65 MiG-15/17\n2 MIG-17A\nREADY\nPyongyang East\nOnchen-Up\nREADY\n34, MiG-19\n30 MC-15/17\nKoksan\nDemarcation line\nIMIG-21\nHwangju\nREADY\n37 MIG-21\nHyon Ni\nPungchon\nINCREASED\nTaetan\n38\nACTIVITY\n38\n!\nSOUTH\nKOPEA\nYELLOW SEA\n00:00\n\"\nAND\n124\nNOT\n:\n128\n130\n&\nFORD\nDECLASSIFIED\nAUTHORITY DIA RAC Parient 9/24/03; nGA BAC Review, 9/26/03\n76F nsc. PB.- 27-11-3-3\nGERALD\nBY oh\nNLF, DATE 5/18/05\n3.22\nSECRET"
}