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Korea - U.N. Command (Working File) (5)
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24468974
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Korea - U.N. Command (Working File) (5)
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National Security Council East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files (Ford Administration)
Working Files on Guam, Micronesia, and Korea
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Korea (South)
United Nations
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1976-01-31
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1976
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1975-02-01
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The original documents are located in Box 35, folder "Korea-UN Command (Working File)
(5)" of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Solomen
la
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRET
February 3, 1975
MEMORANDUM TO: NSC - Mr. Solomon
FROM: S/P - Michael H. Armacost
SUBJECT: US Policy on Korea and the UN Command
Dick:
Here is my redraft of Dan's paper. I regret that I
have been unable to devote much time to it. It might be
more useful if it spelled out at the end some additional
measures that might be undertaken to prepare the ground
for the day when substantive discussions might be taken
up with Pyongyang. A few measures occur to me:
-- Efforts to soften up the Russians and Chinese
for contacts with Seoul. I believe that our own dis-
cussions with the North Koreans would be much easier to
what
Is
handle politically (with Congress and with the ROKG) if
they take place in the context of reciprocal contacts.
You will have noted that we have indicated to the ROKG
our intent to allow North Koreans to attend various
non-governmental conferences in this country. This is a
small gesture, defensible in terms of our desire to
remain a suitable site for major international conferences.
It may also make it easier for the Russians and Chinese
to justify some marginal contacts with the South. It is
a small step, but an unavoidable and useful one.
-- If we move to eliminate "op con," the ROKG ought
to benefit in its diplomatic competition with the North.
I suspect this evidence of our involvement in the ROK
command chain does damage South Korean credibility with
a number of Third World countries.
-- We might also want to draw attention to marginal
No
changes anticipated in our force levels. Heretofore we
have emphasized the stability of our deployments. But
some adjustments are being considered, most particularly
draw downs in our air defense units as Nike Hawk units
come out. What would you think about calling attention to
such cuts through a statement indicating that they GREAT reflect !
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET - GDS
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3,
By
hh State Dept Guidelines stuniew 12/14/03
NARA, Date 2/3/11
Digitized from Box 35 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECRET
-2-
growing South Korean air defense- capabilities? We could
note in passing that future adjustments are to be antici-
NO!
pated in the context of growing South Korean strength,
particularly if there is evidence of North Korean
moderation and steps to improve relations between North
and South. At the same time we could note that we
anticipate the continued presence of US air units on the
peninsula for the indefinite future. This would leave
our most flexible military power there--and the element
of our power most highly valued, I suspect, by the
credite and mess you
Chinese.
A statement of this kind would introduce a slight
element of movement re our force levels, but leave us in
control of the timing and pace of redeployments. It
would signal some further future draw downs in our ground
forces. These have long been anticipated. They would be
welcome in the Congress. They are unlikely to unsettle
the ROKG if they do not apparently presage a general
disengagement. By coupling them with a statement of our
disposition to keep air units there a good long time, we
might convey to the North both a measure of flexibility
and a determination not to withdraw unilaterally.
In short, a statement of this kind might amount to
a sort of unilateral "Shanghai Communique" for the Korean
peninsula. It would not break very much substantive
ground, but it would give a slightly different nuance to
our public posture that could help us in the diplomatic-
actional
political competition while marginally enhancing future
destry
possibilities for negotiating something with the other
side.
Attachment
S/P:MHA:mjk
2/3/75:x21095
GROAD FORD
SECRET
1b
SECRET
DRAFT 2/3/75
ACTION MEMORANDUM
DECLASSIFIED
To:
The Secretary
E.O. 12958 assended) SEC 3.3
State (as Dept Guidelines stateview 12/4/03
From:
EA - Philip C. Habib
By
h
NARA, Date 2/3/11
IO - William P. Buffum
S/P - Winston Lord
US Policy on Korea and the UN Command
The Problem
Although we achieved a satisfactory outcome in the recent
UNGA debate on the Korea item, we now need to dev ise a strategy
for dealing with this issue during the period ahead. We
should devote priority attention to (a) enhancing our chances
of negotiating a termination of the UNC in return for North
Korean and Chinese agreement to preserve the essentials of
the armistice; (b) failing that, positioning ourselves more
effectively to avoid a UNGA debate on this issue next Fall if
possible, and to prevail in that debate if the issue proves
unavoidable; (c) establishing a clearer distinction between
the future of the UNC and decisions on US forces in Korea; and
(d) laying the ground work for future initiatives which may
help to stabilize the situation in the peninsula.
Background
Efforts to negotiate a mutually acceptable consensus
arrangement with the Chinese and North Koreans on the UNC issue
failed last Fall. In the ensuing UNGA debate we declared our
willingness to terminate the UNC if continuation of the armistice
agreement is ensured. Our position was embodied in the
SECRET
2
resolution adopted by a substantial margin in the UNGA. At
the same time the other side's resolution--calling for the
unconditional termination of the UNC and for the withdrawal
of US forces from the peninsula--was barely defeated by a
tie vote in the First Committee.
Both we and the South Korean Government agree that:
-- We have nothing to gain from another sterile UN
debate on the UNC question.
-- The momentum on this issue rests on North Korea and
its supporters, and they will presumably introduce another
hostile resolution on the UNC and our troop presence at the
30th UNGA.
--- Barring some adjustments in our policy there is a strong
possibility USUN believes a near certainty- that such a
resolution will pass with a substantial margin.
While our UN resolution opened the door to future Security
Council consideration of the UNC issue, China and the USSR are
likely to block Council action, and efforts to stimulate
Security Council action on the issue could complicate our
relations with both.
SECRET
3
At present the North Koreans seem less interested in an
early negotiated resolution of this problem than in using it
to place South Korea on the defensive in the UNGA, to cast
in the role of international "pariah," and to generate
additional pressures for the withdrawal of US forces from
the peninsula. The prospects for leveraging a settlement
through Peking seem distinctly limited. Authoritative North
Korean statements suggest that they are not interested in
conceding Peking a major role as interlocutor with us on this
issue; they apparently prefer to deal directly with the ROKG
and with us.
The conditions for productive bilateral discussions
between the North and South or between ourselves and Pyongyang,
however, do not appear encouraging at this time. North-South
talks are stalled. The North Koreans are calling openly for
President Park's overthrow. The North insists that the DPRK
is "the only legitimate government in Korea.' Pyongyang's
propaganda mills have recently directed vitriolic tirades
against you and Phil Habib, denouncing in particular the idea
of reciprocal recognition. President Park is highlighting the
Northern "threat," and pushing dual membership in the UN, a
move which the North denounces as an effort to ratify the
division of Korea. While the North continues to put out feelers
for contacts with us, they doubtless intend to utilize such
contacts to build pressures for US toop withdrawals and to SOW
discord between ourselves and Seoul.
SECRET
4
Policy Options
Under these circumstances, we have essentially four
broad options:
1. Stand pat. We have set forth reasonable conditions
for the termination of the UNC. We could just sit tight and
hope through persuasion and arm twisting to prevail once again
this year. Gloomy USUN prognostications on our voting prospects
have been wrong before. More truculent North Korean behavior--
for example, their tunneling activities in the DMZ--might help
us preserve a majority. In any event, we could live with the
passage of a hostile resolution, or alternatively the passage
of our own and a hostile resolution. GA resolutions are
unenforceable; we could ignore a hostile resolution, arguing
that since the UNC was created by the Security Council, only
the Council can dissolve it.
There are, however, serious disadvantages. This option
offers no hope of avoiding a UNGA debate, and it ensures that
the initiative will rest with the supporters of the DPRK.
Even if it is unenforceable, passage of a hostile UN resolution
would undermine the legitimacy of the UNC, blur the distinction
between decisions on the UNC and US force levels, and diminish
our prestige and that of the ROKG. The prospect of another
debate would also stimulate a variety of third parties to
undertake unhelpful initiatives.
2. Unilaterally Dissolve the UNC. We could declare the
Commanders of US forces in Korea and of South Korea's armed
SECRET
5
forces as "successors in command" to CINCUNC, announce our
intention to continue to honor the armistice agreement, and
indicate our expectation that other parties to the armistice
will likewise uphold their obligations under that agreement.
By dissolving the UNC, we might possibly short circuit
the prospect of another UNGA debate on Korea. We would
dissolve the link between the UN's involvement in Korea and
the continuing presence of our forces. This course of action
would rest on the premise that the PRC/DPRK stake in stability
on the peninsula would inhibit them from using this move as a
pretext for renouncing their commitment to the armistice.
There are obvious risks. The armistice agreement, despite
occasional incidents, provides an essential political framework
for stability, and this action would raise uncertainties about
its continuing validity. Since neither the ROK nor the US
military representatives per se signed the armistice, the North
Koreans could claim that it had lapsed with the dissolution of
the UNC. Opening such uncertainties would be the more dangerous
given the currently fragile state of North-South relations. Of
special concern in this connection is the Northwest Islands
question. The armistice clearly stipulates that the Islands
fall within our jurisdiction. If the validity of the armistice
were called into question, however, we could not rule out DPRK
territorial claims and possible military moves to buttress them.
Dissolution of the UNC would obviously necessitate the
creation of new command relationships between US and ROK forces,
SECRET
6
but these may be justified and advisable even in the absence
of action to terminate the UNC.
3. Seek a better "holding position" without essentially
altering the substance of our policy. While holding out for
a negotiated settlement of the UNC issue, we could seek to
position ourselves more effectively on this question. * The
objective would be to seize the initiative, place the North on
the defensive, and complicate its efforts to mobilize active
support from the PRC and the USSR. P 3d world
*
A variety of tactical initiatives have been proposed. The
British have suggested early Security Council consideration of
the UNC issue. The ROKG has proposed various tactical ploys,
e.g., reduce the visibility of the UNC by appointing a lower
ranking General as CINCUNC and issuing a public statement close
to the next UNGA debate emphasizing our readiness to terminate
the UNC and proposing concrete steps to transfer armistice
agreement responsibilities to a successor entity, subject only
to prior agreement by the other side. We have also given
some thought to publicizing at some point our past contacts
with the PRC as evidence of the efforts we have made to reach
an understanding with the other side. Such tactical gambits
as these might produce some temporary illusion of movement,
but none would fundamentally alter our situation; each could
be counterproductive.
Efforts to stimulate Security Council action could
complicate our relations with the PRC and USSR, meet obstruction
from both, and thus assure that the issue is thrown back into
the UNGA. Purely cosmetic changes in the UNC would invite
suspicion without winning any votes. Disclosure of our past
contacts with the PRC would embarrass Peking and further
diminish chances that they could play a constructive role.
FORD
SECRET
7
A better holding position might be achieved by:
- Stripping the UN Command of all functions except
those directly related to administering the armistice.
This would dissolve the link between the UN's involvement
in Korea and the presence of US forces in the peninsula.
It would reinforce for UN members the logical premise
underlying our policy, i.e., the need to assure continuity
in the armistice arrangements in return for UNC dissolution.
A by-product of such a decision would be to relinquish
operational control over South Korean forces. Operational
control is a wasting asset in any event. It is doubtful that
it gives us real control over ROK forces in an emergency. It
may threaten to automatically involve us in hostilities arising
out of incidents over which we exercise no direction or control.
The exercise of operational control is not consistent with the
spirit of the Nixon Doctrine, it is untenable in the long run
given the evident ROK determination to stake out a self-reliant
defense posture, and it may assist Pyongyang to drive home to
Third World visitors their point that the pressure of foreign
troops is evidence of the ROK's subservience to the US.
In working out alternative command arrangements we
should place a premium upon informal agreements which assure
a coordinated approach to such issues as rules of engagement,
contingency planning and the performance of those defense tasks
in which we retain a significant role, e.g., air defense.
SECRET
ands
is LIBRARY 077533
8
Coincident with changes in these command relationships we
might contemplate broadening the focus of consultative arrange-
ments with the ROK to emphasize the broader strategic-diplomatic
context in the Far East.
-- Announcing these changes in the character and role of
the UNC in a letter to the President of the Security Council
sometime this Spring. In this letter we would indicate also
our willingness to terminate the residual component--i.e.
armistice-monitoring element--of the UNC, subject to agreement
of the parties most directly concerned on alternative means
of preserving the armistice or replacing it with more durable
peacekeeping arrangements. We could affirm our readiness
to meet directly with the parties concerned at an early date
to discuss this matter either in Panmunjom or any other
mutually acceptable site. We would also note our intention
of reporting progress toward this objective to the Security
Council at periodic intervals.
A letter of this kind would not require Security Council
action. Consequently, it should not give the Chinese or
Russians any great heartburn. It would define the continuing
UN role in terms more likely to be acceptable to a broad
segment of the UNGS. It puts forward our negotiating
proposition in a forward-looking way, making no reference to
the discussions we conducted through the Chinese last Fall.
By announcing our intention to report to the Security Council
SECRET
LICCARY
9
at some point in the future it will keep the Security Council
"seized" with the issue. That should give us a legal position
from which to argue against a UNGA debate on this issue next
Fall. Our political defense would be the inherent reasonable-
ness of our position. We would also signal to the North-- and
to the rest of the world--our willingness to negotiate the UNC
issue and to take up other questions related to stability on
the peninsula.
This may not be sufficient to avoid a UNGA debate,
but it would give us a better defensive position from which
to await signs of North Korean flexibility.
4. Undertake new initiatives to negotiate the termination
of the UNC through the Chinese or directly with Pyongyang.
A. With the Chinese. We might tell the Chinese we would be
prepared to unilaterally terminate the UNC, and issue a statement
designating a successor ROK/US military entity to assume our
armistice agreement responsibilities. We would explain that
this approach does not demand any formal response from them and
from the North Koreans, but would require an explicit informal
prior agreement by them. That agreement must include assurances
that the present military armistice commission machinery would
continue to function when the UNC Senior Member was replaced by
the successors in command.
Alternatively we might propose privately and then publicly
that the four parties concerned with the Armistice Agreement
SECRET
10
(US, ROK, DPRK, PRC) meet to discuss dissolution of the UNC
and continued implementation of the armistice, as was implicitly
suggested in the UNGA resolution.
Informal assurances regarding the continuity of the
armistice would satisfy our own requirements. Certainly such
assurances- if they could be obtained--would make this option
preferable to Option 2 (above). If we managed to obtain them,
we could announce termination of the UNC's mandate under the
pertinent Security Council resolutions in a letter from the USG
to the SC President. The problems relate to feasibility. Given
the intransigence of the North, the current state of play in our
contacts with the PRC, and Peking's limited leverage on
Pyongyang, an approach of this kind this year seems no more
likely to succeed than last year's scenario. It will probably
invite a counter proposal that we terminate the UNC and remove
our troops from South Korea forthwith. A call for a four power
meeting is little more than a tactical ploy and would be most
advantageously put forward in the context of other tactical
maneuvers, e.g., Option 3. If the other side responded to such
a proposal, their objective would be to utilize that forum to
publicize well established positions on UNC and US troop
withdrawals.
We might, nonetheless, approach the PRC in the Spring to
inform them of our readiness to unilaterally terminate the UNC
in return for informal assurances regarding the armistice andone
SECRET
11
to explain our intentions of making adjustments in the role
of the UNC. We would undertake these actions mainly to avoid
misunderstandings with the Chinese and without high expectations
of a forthcoming response.
B. With the North Koreans. An alternative approach would
explore possibilities for direct negotiations with Pyongyang
through an appropriate third party, e.g., Romania (?). Ultimately
the concession that would probably evince North Korean flexibility
on the UNC issue will be our readiness to establish some
official relations with the North. That is the rub. Whereas
direct negotiations with the North has utility for us insofar as
we can use them to sustain the armistice and stabilize conditions
on the peninsula, the North is still interested in such negoti-
ations primarily in order to hasten our withdrawal from the
peninsula, stimulate frictions in US/ROK relations, and thus
compound the political uncertainties and divisions in the South.
Without some indication of DPRK willingness to restrict the
scope of initial negotiations and to assume a forthcoming attitude
on the armistice issue, the initiation of new contacts with the
North would enhance their prestige with no assurance of compen-
sating advantages for us or for the ROK. To explore the possi-
bility of talks with the North without explicit approval by the
ROKG would stimulate grave mistrust in Seoul and play directly
into the North's hands. Without some prospect of Chinese and/or
Russian willingness to establish contacts with Seoul, ROKG
approval of direct discussions between Washington and Pyongyang
seems problematic.
SECRET
12
Recommendation
In view of the foregoing considerations, the most
promising approach appears to be the one outlined in (3) above.
This would require the immediate initiation of discussions
with DOD on measures to limit the UNC to only those functions
which relate to the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement.
These discussions must include consideration of alternative
US/ROK bilateral military arrangements. We should attempt to
prepare a detailed proposal that we might outline to the ROK
Foreign Minister during his consultations here in late March.
We recommend that you approve this general approach.
Approve
Disapprove
S/P: MHArmacost:mjk
2/3/75:x21095
SECRET
1.1"
2
MEMORANDUM
and
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
A=
SECRET/SENSITIVE
January 15, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR TOM BARNES
FROM:
JAY TAYLOR
of
SUBJECT:
U.N. Command Issue in the United Nations 1976
In looking ahead to the Korean issue in the U.N. this year, we seem
to have three general options:
-- Stand on our position that we are prepared to terminate the
UNC, provided there are satisfactory arrangements to continue the
Korean Armistice; again call for a conference to discuss arrangements
with the parties concerned; and muster our forces for the struggle for
General Assembly votes.
-- Consider ways in which we could unilaterally terminate the
UNC and satisfactorily handle the continued administration of the
Armistice and the Panmunjon meetings. The U.S. and the ROK could
unilaterally notify the Security Council that the United Nations Command
was being terminated and that a new "command in being" composed of
U.S. and ROK commanders had been constituted to continue to administer
the Armistice on the allied side. A U.S. officer could continue to
represent the allied side at the Panmunjon talks, but we could announce
that as a member of the new Armistice administering "command in being,"
the ROK in the future could also represent our side.
Make new diplomatic gestures:
Agree to a one-time bilateral meeting with North Korea
to discuss the format of discussions, including the ROK, on the administration
of the Armistice.
Elaborate on our proposal of last year for a meeting
of those concerned'to a formal call for an international conference to
conclude a peace treaty for Korea.
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET SENSITIVE
E.O. 12838 (as amended) SEC 3.3
By
NSC in Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept, Guidelines
NARA, Date 2/3/11
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
2
These moves could be made in conjunction with the unilateral
termination of the UNC as proposed in Option 2, above.
Proposed Scenario
-- Prepare a NSSM on U.S. security role in South Korea over
the next three to five years, include consideration of unilateral
withdrawal of the Second Division and elaborate on the conditions
necessary for agreement to a total withdrawal of U.S. forces over a
set time frame.
Consult with the ROK over the ending of OPCON by the UNC.
Inform the Chinese that we are willing to participate in an
international conference on Korea and that such a conference could
discuss any and all issues, including the question of troop withdrawal.
Agreement on troop withdrawal, however, would be possible only in
the context of a complex of other agreements that would strengthen
stability on the Peninsula.
If the Chinese are prepared to talk seriously about such conference,
indicate to them the general outline of the settlement that we would
see emerging:
A pledge from both Korean sides to peaceful unification
and the nonuse of force.
Establishment of a "Korean Union" which would
institutionally symbolize the unity of Korea and which would have no
political powers. (The Korean Union could be entrusted with the functions
of promoting cultural communications and economic links between the
two Koreas.)
A commitment to withdraw all foreign military units
within a specified time frame (no less than five years).
A guarantee by the powers, including Japan, of peace
on the Peninsula and an undertaking by the powers not to upset the
military balance.
Continuation of the U.S. -ROK Mutual Defense Treaty
and the Soviet and Chinese treaties with the DPRK.
FORD
Recognition of an inviolate "provisional demarcation
line" in Korea.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET SENSITIVE
3
The establishment of some form of mutual presence
in both Koreas by the three powers and Japan.
The admission of both Koreas to the United Nations
without prejudice to the eventual unification of the country.
-- The U.S. and ROK notify the Security Council that the United
Nations Command is terminated, and that they have established a
"command in being" to continue to administer the Armistice.
-- Concurrently with theabove move, the U.S. inform North Korea
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations or through the
Chinese that we are prepared to meet with them separately to discuss
the format of formal talks on the future administration of the Armistice.
We would also inform the North Koreans that for the time being the U.S.
representative will continue to represent the U.S. -ROK side in the
Panmunjon talks.
-- Concurrently, the U.S. or the ROK formally calls for an
international conference to conclude a Korean peace treaty.
Obviously, the ROK would have to agree to this strategy. In addition,
it would be essential to consult with the Japanese and our other important
supporters on the Korean issue in the United Nations.
This scenario would allow us to terminate the UNC in a context that
would make it most difficult for the North Koreans and their supporters
to oppose our unilateral arrangement for continuation of the administration
of the Armistice on our side.
SECRET/SENSITIVE