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1555804
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France - President Giscard d'Estaing (2)
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1555804
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France - President Giscard d'Estaing (2)
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Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders (Ford Administration)
Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders
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France
Syria
Middle East conflicts
Sinai Accord between Egypt and Israel, 1975
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1975-11-30
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1975
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1975
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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder "France - President Giscard d'Estaing
(2)" of the National Security Adviser's Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders
Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 1 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
for close out green
to NSC/5
I have have of School
Joseph
&
filr
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
1b
DOC
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LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
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11
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7507790x
REFERENCE:
CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
TO: PRES
FROM KISSINGER,
KISSINGER
COLBY, OAKLEY W
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UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
OTHER
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SCHLESINGER, J
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EYES ONLY EXDIS
DAVIS
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CODEWORD
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT: Drogt refly for Prer Ford to Pres geocard
D'Estaing of France - LA
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO.
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT
FOR
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
(
)
REPLY FOR
FAR EAST
(
)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
APPROPRIATE ACTION
(
)
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA
MEMO
TO
(
)
EUROPE / CANADA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
REFER TO
FOR:
(
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ECONOMIC
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
CONCURRENCE
-
)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
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COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL
OCEANS POLICY
INTELLIGENCE
DATE
FROM
TO
S
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):
CY TO
11/21
Scroft
X
DECISION (11/30)
11/24
Oahly
Scowdoft
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
12/22
NSC/S
Scowcraft charedable
GERALD ? FORD
DISPATCH
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:
MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
NSC/S DISP INSTR
NOTIFY
& DATE
BY
M/F'D
BY
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
CRT ID:
SA
SF
CROSS REF W/
OPEN
HP
NS
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
FOLDER:
CLOSE
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(
NSC 75-22
575-600
)
MEMORANDUM
7790-X
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Cable from President Giscard d'Estaing
of France
President Giscard d'Estaing has sent you the message he received from
President Asad of Syria (Tab B), as he promised at Rambouillet he would
do.
Asad's cable to Giscard covers two major subjects; the Sinai Accord
and the situation in Lebanon. Asad takes his usual negative view of
Sinai as dividing the united Arab front, giving too much to Israel, and
ignoring the rights of the Palestinians. He notes that Syria believes it
necessary "to deal with the two great powers without falling in the
political wake of one of them,' and says the Sinai Accord will polarize
the region. He further notes that the secret clauses relating to the
Sinai Accord reinforce Syria's conviction about the danger of the Accord,
show that the United States will continue to not recognize the PLO, and
reveal that the United States has tied its position on the Geneva Confer-
ence to the Israeli position.
On Lebanon, Asad despairs over the fratricidal killing and underscores
the importance of the cooperation of all friendly countries, and particu-
larly France, to dissuade Israel from attempting to exploit the present
situation in Lebanon.
Asad's views on the Sinai Accord are consistent with Syria's recent
demand for use of the United Nations Security Council rather than Geneva
as the forum for further peace talks, Syria's strong championing of the
Palestinians, the uncertainty which it has shown concerning renewal of
the UNDOF mandate, and the first terrorist incidents on the Golan since
the May, 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. As you know,
SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 9/16/03
BY
, NARA. DATE 3/3/04
HA"
SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
-2-
Ambassador Murphy will be seeing President Asad soon to reassure
him of our determination to maintain the momentum of the peace
process, and encourage him to adopt a more helpful attitude.
At Tab A is a suggested reply from you to President Giscard thanking
him for his cooperation in providing us with this useful information.
The message does not attempt to answer the specific points made by
Asad, but instead is a general reaffirmation of our position on an overall
peace settlement as well as an expression of the concern (which we share
with France) over the tragic, dangerous situation in Lebanon.
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
LIBRARY n'
s GERALD
FORD
Blue
VIA GABINET LINE
sent 12/22
le
For: President Giscard d'Estaing
December 22, 1975
Dear Mr. President:
I very much appreciate your sending me the October 30
message you received from President Asad of Syria. It is very useful
to me and to Secretary Kissinger to have the benefit of President Asad's
thinking as expressed to you.
As you know from our discussions at Rambouillet, I am deter-
mined to maintain momentum toward an eventual overall peace settlement
in the Middle East, one which will deal with all the issues involved.
Secretary Kissinger and I are aware of the importance of the role
which Syria as a nation and President Asad as its leader have for the
future of the Middle East and the success of efforts to help bring peace
to the region.
President Asad's letter to you presents his viewpoint and pro-
blems with great clarity I hope that in time we will be able to convince
both sides on practical, effective means of moving ahead toward an
overall settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
The climate of opinion in this country for such a settlement is becoming
increasingly more favorable. However, recent actions such as the
anti-Zionist resolution at the United Nations General Assembly and
the fedayeen attacks on the Golan front are disturbing because they
tend to reverse this favorable trend and create greater Israeli resistance
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
BY NSC lab MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State State heview 9/16/03
, NARA, DATE 3/3/04
- 2 -
to any further movement. I am sure you understand the difficulties
such developments create, and I trust that President Asad is aware
of this important factor.
Secretary Kissinger will be in touch with Minister Sauvagnargues
to keep you both abreast of our thinking with respect to the most
effective next steps in the Middle East.
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford
LIBRARY'S
GERALD
&
FORD
19
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 017577
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Cable
CREATOR'S NAME
Elysee France
RECEIVER'S NAME
White House
DESCRIPTION
English translation of President
Giscard d'Estaing's letter to President
Ford re Syria
CREATION DATE
11/19/1975
VOLUME
10 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
035100022
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN LEADERS
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
France - President Giscard d'Estaing
(2)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/12/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
-
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 24, 1975
Bob Oakley
Brent reviewed the attached and believed
that the incomi ng ought to go to the
President. Over the weekend, to avoid
bothering you, Art House roughed out
a draft for your consideration (memo to
the President). Could you take a look
at it and make any changes you see fit
and send it back? Brent also said
that it would be OK to coordinate the
package on a close hold basis with Roy.
Perhaps you've already done this.
Many thanks
FORD
&
Bud
BERALD
RALD
JBANNY
7790X Ii
MEMORANDUM
AH
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE (GDS)
ACTION
November 21, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
ROBERT B. OAKLEY
SUBJECT:
Draft Reply from President
Ford to President Giscard
Attached at Tab A is a draft reply from President Ford to President
Giscard of France, thanking him for sending the letter from Syrian
President Asad which the two men discussed at Rambouillet (Tab B).
I have not tried to answer Asad's many points, but did inject a few
of our basic themes for the benefit of the French and made it clear
that we are interested in working with Asad if at all possible. This
is because it is likely something will filter back from Giscard to
Asad concerning his communications with President Ford. I checked
the general line of the proposed reply with Roy Atherton, on a personal
basis.
Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
on December 31, 1983
1000
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 9/16/03
LIBRARY
BY lab
, NARA, DATE 3/3/04
HAR has Tob I
7790X
'j
Re-do
MEMORANDUM
Retyped Sabs A
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SEGRET/SENSITIVE (GDS)
ACTION
November 24, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
Retyped
Pro
FROM:
ROBERT B. OAKLEY
Tabs I&A
11-29
SUBJECT:
Draft Reply from President
Ford to President Giscard
Attached at Tab I is a draft memo from you to President Ford,
attaching a draft reply from him to President Giscard of France,
thanking Giscard for sending the letter from Syrian President
Asad which the two men discussed at Rambouillet (Tab B). I have
not tried to answer Asad's many points, but did inject a few of our basic
themes for the benefit of the French and made it clear that weare
interested in working with Asad if at all possible. This is because
it is likely something will filter back from Giscard to Asad concern-
ing his communications with President Ford. I have coordinated this
with Roy Atherton, on a personal basis.
= your
Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified
on December 31, 1983
SEGRET/SENSITIVE (GDS)
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/06, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state feview 9/16/03
BY Ida
, NARA, DATE 3/3/04
ERALD
? FORD
LIBRARY
Il
MEMORANDUM
ACTION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Cable from President Giscard d'Estaing
of France
the
President Giscard d'Estaing has sent you a cable (Tab B) which includes
message to him from President Asad of Syria,
President
Giscard
promised to send this to you at Rambouillet
corners
3
D.
President Asad's cable to Giscard concerns two major subjects; the
Middle East and the Sinai Accord and the situation in Lebanon. Asad
takes his usual negative view of Sinai as dividing the united Arab front,
giving too much to Israel, and ignoring the rights of the Palestinians.
He notes that Syria believes it necessary "to deal with the two great
powers without falling in the political wake of one of them, " and says the
Sinai Accord will polarize the region. He further notes that the secret
clauses relating to the Sinai Accord reinforce Syria's conviction as to about
the danger of the Accord, show that the United States will continue to
not recognize the PLO, and reveal that the United States has tied its
position concerning the Geneva Conference to the Israeli position.
On Lebanon, Asad despairs over the fratricidal killing and underscores
the importance of the cooperation of all friendly countries and particularly
France to dissuade Israel from attempting to exploit the present situation
in Lebanon.
Asad's views on the Sinai Accord are consistent with Syria's recent
demand for use of the United Nations Security Council rather than Geneva
as the forum for further peace talks, Syria's strong championing of the
Palestinians, the uncertainty which it has shown concerning renewal of
the UNDOF mandate, and the first terrorist incidents on the Golan since
the May, 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. Following his-
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRAR
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12058, SEC. 3.5
BY NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 9/16/03
, NARA, DATE 3/3/04
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
- 2 -
determination
meeting with you and consultations with Secretar Kissing Only Ambassador )
Of you brown
Murphy will be seeing President Asad soon to reassure him of our sincerity
in wanting to maintain the momentum of the peace process, and urge him
to adopt a more belpful realistic attitude.
encomage
At Tab A is a suggested reply from you to President Giscard thanking
him for his cooperation in providing us with this useful information. We-
Themssaye
have does not attempte to answer the specific points made by Asad, but instiad is
have included a general reaffirmation of our position on an overall
peace settlement as well as an expression of the concern (which we share
with France) over the tragic, dangerous situation in Lebanon.
FORD
SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
n GERALD a LIBRARY
REWRITE
7790 K 1m
redd
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Cable from President Giscard d'Estaing
of France
President Giscard d'Estaing has sent you the message to him from
President Asad of Syria, (Tab B) as he premised at Rambouillet he
would de.
Asad's cable to Giseard covers two major subjects; the Sinai Accord
and the situation in Lebanen. Asad takes his usual negative view of
Sinai as dividing the united Arab front, giving too much to Israel, and
ignoring the rights of the Palestinians. He notes that Syria believes it
necessary "to deal with the two great powers without falling in the
political wake of one d them," and says the Sinsi Accord will polarise
the region. He further notes that the secret clauses relating to the
Sinai Accord reinforce Syria's conviction about the danger of the Accord,
show that the United States will continue to not recognise the PLO, and
reveal that the United States has tied its position on the Geneva Confer-
ence to the Israeli position.
On Lebanon, Asad despairs over the fratricidal killing and underscores
the importance of the cooperation of all friendly countries and particularly
France to dissuage Israel from attempting to exploit the present situation
in Lebanon.
Asad's vieweam the Sinai Accord are consistent with Syria's recent
demand for use of the United Nations Security Council rather than Geneva
as the forum for further peace talks, Syria's strong championing of the
Palestinians, the uncortainty which it has shown concerning renewal of
the UNDOF mandate, and the first terrorist incidents on the Golan since
the May, 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. As you know,
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
DECLASSIFIED
REWRITE by kln/11/27/75
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES stateleview 9/16/03
BY da
, NARA, DATE 3/3/04
REWRITE
-2-
Ambassador Murphy will be seeing President Asad soon to reassure
him of our determination to maintain the momentum of the peace
process, and encourage him to adopt a more helpful attitude.
At Tab A is a suggested reply from you to President Giscard thanking
him for his cooperation in providing us with this useful information.
The message does not attempt to answer the specific points made by
Asad, but instead is a general reaffirmation of our position on an overall
peace settlement as well as an expression of the concern (which we share
with France) over the tragic, dangerous situation in Lebanon.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
GERALD A. FORD LIBRARY
REWRITE by kin/11/27/75
- 2 -
order to realize a just peace, on the basis of complete withdrawal of
Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, and of the
reestablishment of the rights of the people of Palestine.
We have realized, obviously, after the adoption of Resolution 338
of the Security Council following the October war, that action aiming towards the
establishment of a just and durable peace in the region will go hand in
hand with a thorough program based on the resolutions of the United Nations.
We have thought. that nothing justifies the policy of partial steps, especially
since Resolution 338, confirmed by all the parties concerned, stipulates
in its articles 2 and 3 the immediate beginning of a complete actionfor the
establishment of the (garbled phrase - looks like "durable peace").
Consequently, we have not found any justification for dividing this resolution.
And when some have proclaimed the necessity of the separation
of engaged forces on the lines of ceasefire with the aim of lessening
tension and creating a better climate for the work of (garbled, possibly
"peace"), we accepted the disengagement of forces, out of a sincere
desire for peace, on the basis that the disengagement would be followed
by a serious political action in order to attain an overall solution of all
the aspects of the conflict.
But we have been disappointed to see the efforts converging toward
the policy of small steps. Afterwards, it was said that it was necessary
to have a second disengagement of forces even though the second
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Deview 9/16/03
GERALD
BY Cala
I
NARA, DATE 3/3/04
10
7790X Re-do
Rewrite
. 2 .
order to realise a just peace, on the basis of complete withdrawal of
Israell troops from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, and of the
reestablishment of the rights of the people of Palestine.
We have realised, obvieusly, after the adoption of Resolution 338
of the Security Council following the October war, that action alming towards
the establishment of a just and durable peace in the region will go hand in
hand with a thorough program based on the sesolutions of the United Nations.
We have thought that nothing justifies the policy of partial steps, especially
since Resolution 338, confirmed by all the parties concerned, stipulates
in its articles 2 and 3 the immediate beginning of a complete action for
the establishment of a durable peace. Consequently, we have not found
any justification for dividing this resolution.
And when some have preclaimed the necessity of the separation
of engaged forces on the lines of ceasefire with the aim of lessening
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review9/16/03
tension and creating a better climate for the work of peace, we accepted
the disengagement of forces, out of a sincere desire for peace, on the
NARA, DATE 3/3/24
basis that the disengagement would be followed by a serious political
action in order to attain an overall solution of all the aspects of the
conflict.
But we have been disappointed to see the efforts converging toward
the policy of small steps. Afterwards, it was said that it was necessary
FORD
to have a second disengagement of forces even though the second
BY
p.2 Tab B BS:RCM:igd:11/26/75
GERALD
LIBRARY
FORD
?
Dear Mr. President:
GERALO
LISHARY
2 very anuch appricate examer
te you poon
in
Thank you for sending me the,message President Asad of Syria.
October 30
sent you last October 30. It is very useful to me and to Secretary
our
with
Kissinger as have been the exchanges you and Minister Sauvagnargues
on the Middle East.
As you know from our discussions at Rambouillet, I am determined
to maintain the momentum toward an eventual overall peace settlement
in the Middle East, one which will deal with all the issues involved.
Secretary Kissinger and I are aware of the importance of the roles which
Syria, as a nation and President Asad as, its leader, have for the future
of the Middle East and the success of efforts to help bring peace to
the region.
musting,
it might be prosible
I had hoped to arrange a meeting somewhere in Europe with President
wrt
Asad in connection with my trip to France. It was not, however, convenient
for him at that time. In order to consider how to strengthen the dialogue
which Secretary Kissinger established in his meetings with President Asad,
and hami herefore
for consultationson they thering one
^ we have asked our Ambassador to Syria to return to Washington He has
Follmwing
OLD
dis cussions with me and with Secretary Kissinger, as part of our
effort to move the peace process forward. He returned to Damascus
this past weekend and hopes to see President Asad this week.
presents his
After reading President Asad's letter to you and after talking with
our Ambassador and Secretary Kissinger, President Asad's viewpoint
with great claim
Mach
and problems are more clear. I hope that we will be able to agree with
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
BY NSC MEMO, We 11/24/98, STATE NARA, DEPT. DATE GUIDELINES 3/3/06/ State Deriew / assent
beligis with Presedent and
- 2 -
him on practical, effective means of moving ahead toward an overall
settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The
climate of opinion in this country for such a settlement is becoming
increasingly n more favorable. However, actions such as the anti-Zionist resolution
recent
attachs
at the United Nations General Assembly and the recent fedayeen actions
on the Golan front are disturbing because they tend to reverse this
favorable trend and create greater Israeli resistence to any furthe r
trust
movement. I am sure you understand, this, and I-hope that President
Asad dear is aware f this important Parta
Secretary Kissinger will be in touch with Minister Sauvagnargues
arrived nta The
as soon as we have reached conclusions on what can most effectivel next
be steps-in done hent vis a vis the Middle East.
Sincerely,
GRF
the expentis much ercete
GERALD R LIBRARY FORD
if
Dear Mr. President:
I very much appreciate receiving the copy of the message that
President Asad of Syria sent you last October 30. It is very useful
to Secretary Kissinger and myself, just as have been the æxchanges
we have had with you and Minister Sauvagnargues on the Middle East.
As you know from our discussions at Rambouillet, I am determined
to maintain the momentum of movement toward an eventual overall
peace settlement in the Middle East, one which will deal with all the
issues involved. Secretary Kissinger and I are fully aware of the
vital importance of the roles of Syria, as a nation, and President Asad,
as a leader, for the future of the Middle East and the success of efforts
to help bring peace to that area.
I had hoped to arrange a meeting somewhere in Europe with President
Asad in connection with my trip to France. However, for understandable
reasons, it was not convenient for him at this time. In order to maintain
the dialogue which Secretary Kissinger has established in his meetings
with President Asad, we asked our Ambassador to Syria to return
to Washington. He has had discussions with Secretary Kissinger as
well as meeting with me, as part of our extensive review of how best
to move the peace process forward. He returned to Damascus November
23 and has asked to see President Asad soon.
After reading President Asad's letter to you and talking with our
Ambassador and Secretary Kissinger, I believe I have an understanding
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review 9/16/03
LIBRARY & GERALD
BY lah
, NARA, DATE 3/3/04
PAGE 2
of his viewpoint and problems. We have a high regard for President
Asad and take his concerns seriously. In our dialogue with him we
shall explain our conviction, with which you are familiar from
Secretary Kissinger's talks with Minister Sauvagnargues, that the recent
Sinai Accord was the only realistically achievable means of making earl y
progress, We shall also explain that we recognize the need for early
movement on the other aspects of the Middle East problem, including
those of particular interest to Syria, and why we believe that transferring
the negotiating process to the Security Council will not advance matters.
At the same time, we will seek to reach agreement with him on practical, effec-
tive means of moving ahead toward an overall settlement based on
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The climate of opinion in this
country for such a settlement is becoming more favorable. However,
actions such as the anti-Zionist resolution at the United Nations General
Assembly and the recent fedayeen actions on the Golan front are disturbing
because they tend to reverse this favorable trend, as well as creating
greater resistance on the part of Israel to any further movement. I am
FORD
R
sure you understand this, and I hope that President Asad does.
ERALD
LIBRARY
On the subject of Lebanon, we have discussed with President Asad,
as Secretary Kissinger has with Minister Sauvagnargues, our concern
over the situation and our desire to see that tragic country's independence,
territorial integrity, national unity and cohesion maintained. The Syrian
PAGE 3
role has, on balance, been positive and is obviously crucial to the
resolution of the Lebanese problem. Our Ambassador has been instructed
to raise this matter again upon his return, indicating our continued
desire to cooperate with Syria in working for a peaceful political solution.
In this connection, I am very appreciative of the initiative which you have
taken in sending Couve de Murville to Lebanon. If there is anything
we can do to assist his mission, I am sure you will let us know. This is
a problem on which our governments should maintain close contact.
Secretary Kissinger will be in touch with Minister Sauvagnargues
as soon as we have come to some clearer conclusions on what can
most effectively be done next vis-a-vis the Middle East.
Sincerely,
GRF
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
REWRITE
7790X
IN
Dear Mr. President:
re-do
I very much appreciate your sending me the October 30 message
to you from President Asad of Syria. It is very useful to me and to
Secretary Kissinger, as have been our emchanges with you and Minister
Sauvagnargues on the Middle East.
As you know from our discussions at Rambouillet, I am determined
to maintain momentum toward an eventual overall peace settlement
in the Middle East, one which will deal with all the issues involved.
Secretary Kissinger and I are aware of the importance of the role
which Syria as a nation and President Asad as its leader, have for
the future of the Middle East and the success of efforts to help bring
peace to the region.
President Asad's letter to you presents his viewpoint and problems
with great clarity. I hope that we will be able to reach agreement with
him on practical, effective means of moving ahead toward an overall
settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The
climate of opinion in this country for such a settlement is becoming
increasinglylmore favorable. However, recent actions such as the
anti-Zionist resolution at the United Nations General Assembly and
the fedayeen attacks on the Golan front are disturbing because they
tend to reverse this favorable trend and create greater Israeli resistence
REWRITE by kin/11/27/75
& FORD LIGRARY
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Deview 9/16/03
BY Can
, NARA, DATE 3/3/04
REWRITE
-2-
to any further movement. I am sure you understand the difficulties
such developments create, and I trust that President Asad is aware
of this important factor.
Secretary Kissinger will be in touch with Minister Sauvagnargues
as soon as we have arrived at a judgment as to the most effective next
steps in the Middle East.
Sincerely,
GRF
FORD
REWRITE by kin/11/27/75
GERALD A ABVASIT
ACTION
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Cable from President Giscard d'Estaing
of France
President Giscard d'Estaing has sent you a cable (Tab B) which includes
a message to him from President Asad of Syria. President Giscard
premised to send this to you at Rambouillet.
President Asad's cable to Giscard concerns two major subjects; the
Middle East and the Sinai Accord, and the situation in Lebanon. Asad
takes his usual negative view of Sinai as dividing the united Arab front,
giving too much to Israel, and ignoring the rights of the Palestinians.
He notes that Syria believes it necessary "to deal with the two great
powers without falling in the political wake of one of them,' and says the
Sinai Accord will polarise the region. He further notes that the secret
clauses relating to the Sinai Accord reinforce Syria's conviction as to
the danger of the Accord, show that the United States will continue to
not resognise the PLO, and reveal that the United States has tied its
position concerning the Geneva Conference to the Israeli position.
On Lebanon, Asad despairs over the fratricidal killing and underscores
the importance of the cooperation of all friendly countries and particularly
France to dissuade Israel from attempting to exploit the present situation
in Lebanon.
Asad's views on the Sinal Accord are consistent with Syria's recent
demand for use of the United Nations Security Council rather than Geneva
as the forum for further peace talks, Syria's strong championing of the
Palestinians, the uncertainty which it has shown concerning renewal of
the UNDOF mandate, and the first terrorist incidents on the Golan since
the May, 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. Following his
FORD
SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
DECLASSIFIED
LIBRARY & OF
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state kview 9/16/03
BY labs
, NARA, DATE 3/3/04
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
- 2 -
meeting with you and consultations with Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador
Murphy will be seeing President Asad soon to reassure him of our sincerity
in wanting to maintain the momentum of the peace process, and urge him
to adopt a more realistic attitude.
At Tab A is a suggested reply from you to President Giscard thanking
him for his cooperation in providing us with this useful information. We
have not attempted to answer the specific points made by Asad, but
have included a general reaffirmation of our position on an overall
peace settlement as well as an expression of the concern (which we share
with France) over the tragie, dangerous situation in Lebanon.
BS:RCMcF:feg:11/25/75
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/GDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
7790
Retype
Dear Mr. President:
Thank you for sending me the message President Asad of Syria
sent you last October 30. It is very useful to me and to Secretary
Kissinger as have been the exchanges you and Minister Sauvagnargues
on the Middle East.
As you know from our discussions at Rambouillet, I am determined
to maintain the momentum toward an eventual overall peace settlement
in the Middle East, one which will deal with all the issues involved.
Secretary Kissinger and I are aware of the importance of the roles
Syria, as a nation, and President Asad, as a leader, have for the future
of the Middle East and the success of efforts to help bring peace to
the region,
I had hoped to arrange a meeting somewhere in Europe with President
Asad in connection with my trip to France. It was not, however, convenient
for him at that time. In order to consider how to strengthen the dialogue
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state 9/16/03
Review
which Secretary Kissinger established in his meetings with President Asad,
we have asked our Ambassador to Syria to return to Washington. He has
had discussions with me and with Secretary Kissinger as part of our
NARA, DATE 3/3/04
effort to move the peace process forward. He returned to Damascus
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
this past weekend and hopes to see President Asad this week.
GERALD
LIBHARY
DECLASSIFIED
After reading President Asad's letter to you and after talking with
our Ambassader and Secretary Kissinger, President Asad's viewpoint
and problems are more clear. I hope that we will be able to agree with
BY.
. 2 -
him on practical, effective means of moving ahead toward an overall
settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The
climate of opinion in this country for such a settlement is becoming
more favorable. However, actions such as the anti-Zionist resolution
at the United Nations General Assembly and the recent fedayeen actions
on the Golan front are disturbing because they tend to reverse this
favorable trend and create greater Israeli resistence to any further
movement. I am sure you understand this, and I hope that President
Asad does.
Secretary Kissinger will be in touch with Minister Sauvagnargues
as soon as we have reached conclusions.on what can most effectively
be done next vis-a-vis the Middle East.
Sincerely,
GRF
GREATO & FORD JERANT
7790
10
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Cable from President
Giscard d'Estaing of France
President Giscard d'Estaing has sent you a cable (Tab B) which
includes a message to him from President Asad of Syria. President
Giscard promised to send this to you at Rambouillet.
President Asad's cable to Giscard concerns two major subjects;
the Middle East and the Sinai Accord, and the situation in Lebanon.
Asad takes his usual negative view of Sinai as dividing the united
Arab front, giving too much to Israel, and ignoring the rights of the
Palestinians. He notes that Syria believes it necessary "to deal with
the two great powers without falling in the political wake of one of them,"
and says the Sinai Accord will polarize the region. He further notes
that the secret clauses relating to the Sinai Accord reinforce Syria's
NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review 9/16/03
conviction as to the danger of the Accord, show that the United States
will continue to not recognize the PLO, and reveal that the United States
has tied its position concerning the Geneva Conference to the Israeli
NARA, DATE 3/3/04
position.
GERALD
LIBRARY
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
On Lebanon, Asad despairs over the fratricidal killing and under-
scores the importance of the cooperation of all friendly countries and
particularly France to dissuade Israel from attempting to exploit the
BY in
present situation in Lebanon.
PAGE 2
Asad's views on the Sinai Accord are consistent with Syria's recent
demand for use of the United Nations Security Council rather than Geneva
as the forum for further peace talks, Syria's strong championing of the
Palestinians, the uncertainty which it has shown concerning renewal of
the UNDOF mandate, and the first terrorist incidents on the Golan since
the May, 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. Following his
meeting with you and consultations with Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador
Murphy will be seeing President Asad soon to reassure him of our sincerity
in wanting to maintain the momentum of the peace process, and urge him
to adopt a more realistic attitude.
At Tab A is a suggested reply from you to President Giscard thanking
him for his cooperation in providing us with this useful information. We
have not attempted to answer the specific points made by Asad, but
have included a general reaffirmation of our position on an overall
peace settlement as well as an expression of the concern (which we share
with France) over the tragic, dangerous situation in Lebanon.
FORD
?
GERALD
LIBRARY
11/24/75
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Bud-
/
At Housis cever
memo was Fire,with a
couple I minor charges.
Roy wanted to add a
genual defense F the Sinai
Accord to the draft message,
which also reflects the
Concern we share with the
French over Lebanon.
Peab
7790X
Re-do
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE (GDS)
ACTION
November 24, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
T20
FROM:
ROBERT B. OAKLEY
SUBJECT:
Draft Reply from President
Ford to President Giscard
Attached at Tab I is a draft memo from you to President Ford,
attaching a draft reply from him to President Giscard of France,
thanking Giscard for sending the letter from Syrian President
Asad which the two men discussed at Rambouillet (Tab B). I have
not tried to answer Asad's many points, but did inject a few of our basic
themes for the benefit of the French and made it clear that we are
interested in working with Asad if at all possible. This is because
it is likely something will filter back from Giscard to Asad concern-
ing his communications with President Ford. I have coordinated this
with Roy Atherton, on a personal basis.
Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified
on December 31, 1983
SECRET/SENSITIVE (GDS)
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 9/16/03
BY. lab
, NARA, DATE 3/3/04
GERALD
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Cable from President
Giscard d'Estaing of France
President Giscard d'Estaing has sent you a cable (Tab B) which
includes a message to him from President Asad of Syria. President
Giscard promised to send this to you at Rambouillet.
President Asad's cable to Giscard concerns two major subjects:
the Middle East and the Sinai Accord, and the situation in Lebanon.
Asad takes his usual negative view of Sinai as dividing the united
Arab front, giving too much to Israel, and ignoring the rights of the
Palestinians. He notes that Syria believes it necessary "to deal with
the two great powers without falling in the political wake of one of them,'
and says the Sinai Accord will polarize the region. He further notes
that the secret clauses relating to the Sinai Accord reinforce Syria's
leview
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, GUIDELINES state 9/16/03
conviction as to the danger of the Accord, show that the United States
will continue to not recognize the PLO, and reveal that the United States
has tied its position concerning the Geneva Conference to the Israeli
NARA, DATE 3/3/04
position.
11/24/98, STATE DEPT.
On Lebanon, Asad despairs over the fratricidal killing and under-
scores the importance of the cooperation of all friendly countries and
particularly France to dissuade Israel from attempting to exploit the
BY
present situation in Lebanon.
GERALD
URARY
PAGE 2
Asad's views on the Sinai Accord are consistent with Syria's recent
demand for use of the United Nations Security Council rather than Geneva
as the forum for further peace talks, Syria's strong championing of the
Palestinians, the uncertainty which it has shown concerning renewal of
the UNDOF mandate, and the first terrorist incidents on the Golan since
the May, 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. Following his
meeting with you and consultations with Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador
Murphy will be seeing President Asad soon to reassure him of our sincerity
in wanting to maintain the momentum of the peace process, and urge him
to adopt a more realistic attitude.
At Tab A is a suggested reply from you to President Giscard thanking
him for his cooperation in providing us with this useful information. We
have not attempted to answer the specific points made by Asad, but
have included a general reaffirmation of our position on an overall
peace settlement as well as an expression of the concern (which we share
with France) over the tragic, dangerous situation in Lebanon.
GERALD
LIBRARY
Dear Mr. President:
I very much appreciate receiving the copy of the message that
President Asad of Syria sent you last October 30. It is very useful
to Secretary Kissinger and myself, just as have been the exchanges
we have had with you and Minister Sauvagnargues on the Middle East.
As you know from our discussions at Rambouillet, I am determined
to maintain the momentum of movement toward an eventual overall
peace settlement in the Middle East, one which will deal with all the
issues involved. Secretary Kissinger and I are fully aware of the
vital importance of the roles of Syria, as a nation, and President Asad,
as a leader, for the future of the Middle East and the success of efforts
to help bring peace to that area.
I had hoped to arrange a meeting somewhere in Europe with President
Asad in connection with my trip to France. However, for understandable
reasons, it was not convenient for him at this time. In order to maintain
the dialogue which Secretary Kissinger has established in his meetings
with President Asad, we asked our Ambassador to Syria to return
to Washington. He has had discussions with Secretary Kissinger as
well as meeting with me, as part of our extensive review of how best
to move the peace process forward. He returned to Damascus November
23 and has asked to see President Asad soon.
GERALD
,GRARY
After reading President Asad's letter to you and talking with our
Ambassador and Secretary Kissinger, I believe I have an understanding
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
BY hh
NSC MEMO, 11/24/06, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State deview 9/16/03
, NARA, DATE 3/3/04
PAGE 2
of his viewpoint and problems. We have a high regard for President
Asad and take his concerns seriously. In our dialogue with him we
shall explain our conviction, with which you are familiar from
Secretary Kissinger's talks with Minister Sauvagnargues, that the recent
Sinai Accord was the only realistically achievable means of making earl y
progress, We shall also explain that we recognize the need for early
movement on the other aspects of the Middle East problem, including
those of particular interest to Syria, and why we believe that transferring
the negotiating process to the Security Council will not advance matters.
At the same time, we will seek to reach agreement with him on practical, effec-
tive means of moving ahead toward an overall settlement based on
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The climate of opinion in this
country for such a settlement is becoming more favorable. However,
:
actions such as the anti-Zionist resolution at the United Nations General
Assembly and the recent fedayeen actions on the Golan front are disturbing
because they tend to reverse this favorable trend, as well as creating
greater resistance on the part of Israel to any further movement. I am
sure you understand this, and I hope that President Asad does.
On the subject of Lebanon, we have discussed with President Asad,
as Secretary Kissinger has with Minister Sauvagnargues, our concern
over the situation and our desire to see that tragic country's independence,
territorial integrity, national unity and cohesion maintained. The Syrian
GERALD
199891
PAGE 3
role has, on balance, been positive and is obviously crucial to the
resolution of the Lebanese problem. Our Ambassador has been instructed
to raise this matter again upon his return, indicating our continued
desire to cooperate with Syria in working for a peaceful political solution.
In this connection, I am very appreciative of the initiative which you have
taken in sending Couve de Murville to Lebanon. If there is anything
we can do to assist his mission, I am sure you will let us know. This is
a problem on which our governments should maintain close contact.
Secretary Kissinger will be in touch with Minister Sauvagnargues
as soon as we have come to some clearer conclusions on what can
most effectively be done next vis-a-vis the Middle East.
Sincerely,
GRF
GERALD R LIBRARY FORD
12
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 017578
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Cable
CREATOR'S NAME
Elysee France
RECEIVER'S NAME
White House
DESCRIPTION
English translation of French President
Giscard d'Estaing's letter to President
Ford re Syria (duplicate)
CREATION DATE
11/19/1975
VOLUME
10 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
035100022
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN LEADERS
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
France - President Giscard d'Estaing
(2)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/12/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG