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Germany (FRG) - Chancellor Schmidt (3)
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1555808
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Germany (FRG) - Chancellor Schmidt (3)
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This file contains material relating to NORTHAG Brigade.
citationUrl
collections
Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders (Ford Administration)
Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders
subjects
Tanzania
Great Britain
Germany (West)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (4/4/1949 - )
Finance
Steel
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1555808
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1976-12-31
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12
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1976
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1976-04-01
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4
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1976
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder "Germany (FRG) - Chancellor
Schmidt (3)" of the National Security Adviser's Presidential Correspondence with
Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives
collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are
in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations
are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is
subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
614
COPY
OP IMMED
DE NTE #1898 1041727
D 131716Z APR 76
FM PRESIDENT FORD
TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT
H60492
APRIL 13, 1976
DEAR MP. CHANCELLOR:
THANK YOU FOR SHARING WITH ME YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE SPECIALTY
STEEL PROBLEM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE BROADER PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY. AS YOU NOTED, WE AGREED AT
RAMBOUILLET THAT THE MAJOR TRADING NATIONS SHOULD AVOID
SOLVING THEIR PROBLEMS AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHERS. THIS CON-
SIDERATION WAS HIGH AMONG THOSE THAT LED ME TO DECIDE NOT
TO ACCEPT THE REMEDIES PROPOSED BY THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION IN THIS CASE AND TO CHOOSE INSTEAD TO
ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE AN ORDERLY MARKETING AGREEMENT.
THUS, I AM SEEKING TO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S. AND
ITS TRADING PARTNERS TO DEVELOP A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY
RESOLUTION OF THIS DIFFICULT PROBLEM. I HOPE THAT THIS
WILL BE THE END RESULT OF THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS NOW
SET IN MOTION.
I BELIEVE BOTH OF us RECOGNIZE THAT ON A NUMBER OF FRONTS THE
MONTHS AMEAD POSE SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC COOPERATION. IT WILL BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT
WE REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT DURING THIS PERIOD. I GENUINELY
HELCOME RECEIVING YOUR VIEWS, AND CAN ASSURE YOU THAT ANY
OBSERVATIONS YOU SHOULD MAKE ON ANY SUBJECT WILL BE HEAVILY
WEIGHED IN OUR INTERNATIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS.
SINCERELY YOURS
GERALD R. FORD
0245
*WHSR COMMENT
HYLAND, MCFARLANE, RODMAN
RECALLED
P8N1002327
PAGE 01
OF 01
TOR:104/17:27Z
DTG#131716Z APR 76
S COPY
FORD
3
0
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
GERALD
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY ha
, NARA, DATE 3/5/DM
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
2159X
SECRET/NODIS
April 20, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Specialty Steel
I am attaching for the information of your principals only copies
of an exchange of messages between President Ford and
Chancellor Schmidt on the specialty steel issue. These copies
should be handled as NODIS and should not be transmitted outside
the Department.
Jeanne mm Davis
Staff Secretary
Attachments
&
SEGRET/NODIS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BERALD
BY
we
, NARA, DATE 3/5/04 3/5
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
REW E 1459
26
3/26/76
Dear Mr. Chancellor:
Thank you for sharing with me your thoughts on the specialty
steel problem and its relationship to the broader problems of inter-
national economic policy. As you noted, we agreed at Rambouillet
that the major trading nations should avoid solving their problems at
the expense of others. This consideration was high among those that
led me to decide not to accept the remedies proposed by the Inter-
national Trade Commission in this case and to choose instead to
attempt to negotiate an orderly marketing agreement.
Thus, I am seeking to provide an opportunity for the U.S. and
its trading partners to develop a mutually satisfactory resolution of
this difficult problem. I hope that this will be the end result of the
consultative process now set in motion.
I believe both of us recognize that on a number of fronts the
months ahead pose significant challenges to international economic
cooperation. It will be especially important that we remain in close
contact during this period. I genuinely welcome receiving your views,
and can assure you that any observations you should make on any
subject will be heavily weighed in our international policy considerations.
Sincerely yours,
Herald R. Ford
GERALD
Gerald R. Ford
The Digitized from Box of the NSA at the Presidential Library
Dear Mr. President:
The International Trade Commission has proposed to you on the basis of
the Trade Act of 1974 to introduce import quotas for specialty steels.
The restrictive nature of that proposal causes me -- and I suppose not
me alone -- considerable concern. If that recommendation were accepted
the climate throughout the world would essentially deteriorate. For
there can be no doubt that in the case of protectionist measures being
taken by the United States, other countries, if faced with internal
economic difficulties, would immediately follow suit and restrict their
imports. This would be a heavy blow economically, and place in jeopardy
the first successes we have achieved with difficulty through our policy of
stimulating economic activity. Thus, the decision you will have to make
within a few days on the proposal made the International Trade Commission
assumes an importance reaching far beyond the United States national
sphere. It could have the effect of an international signal.
I assume that when making your decision you will take into account the
arrangements which we made in the Declaration of Rambouillet on
17 November 1975 concerning the international economic and trade policy
to be followed jointly. One of the main points on which we had agreed
then was that we as main trading nations would avoid resorting to
measures by which an attempt would be made to solve internal, national
problems at the expense of other countries, with damaging consequences
in the economic, social and political fields. In view of this understanding,
I am convinced that in making your decision you will live up to the great
responsibility which precisely your country has to bear in the present
phase of world economic development.
With kind regards,
Yours,
Helmut Schmidt
FORD
&
GERALD
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
2159X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
ACTION
April 13, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
Quty.13
FROM:
Mr. Clift ld
SUBJECT:
Message to Chancellor Schmidt
In the package at Tab I, the President has approved and signed a
message to Chancellor Schmidt responding to Schmidt's message of
concern over implementing U.S. actions on specialty steel.
As the incoming Schmidt message was received via the direct
Bonn line to the White House, I recommend that you approve
dispatch of the President's response via the White House's direct
line to Bonn.
Bob Hormats concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve immediate dispatch of the message at Tab A via
the White House line to Bonn.
APPROVE RMfors
DISAPPROVE
ETabA
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY his
, NARA, DATE 3/5/04
SECRET
XGDS
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
I
1974
GERALD ? 1948817 FORD
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE PRESIDENT HAS SWEE
1459 - Add on
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
ACTION
April 9, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
B
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Response to Message from
Chancellor Schmidt
As you will recall, on March 11 Chancellor Schmidt sent you a message
(Tab B) stating his concern that your acceptance of the ITC recommendation
on specialty steel would cause a deterioration in the international economic
climate and trigger other countries to restrict imports. He noted that
at Rambouillet it was agreed that the main trading nations would avoid
resorting to measures to solve internal problems at the expense of
other countries.
At Tab A is a message thanking Schmidt for sharing his thoughts with
you, emphasizing that the Rambouillet agreement was high among the
considerations that led you to decide to negotiate an orderly marketing
agreement rather than accept the ITC recommendation, expressing the
hope that negotiations will lead to a mutually satisfactory solution of
the problem, and welcoming Schmidt's views in the future on the difficult
challenges now being posed to international economic cooperation.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the response to Schmidt at Tab A. William Seidman
concurs.
SECRET - GDS
3/5/04
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
2
The following messa has been received from Chan llor Schmidt:
Dear Mr. President:
The International Trade Commission has proposed to you on the basis of
the Trade Act of 1974 to introduce import quotas for specialty steels.
The restrictive nature of that proposal causes me -- and I suppose not
me alone -- considerable concern. If that recommendation were accepted
the climate throughout the world would essentially deteriorate. For
there can be no doubt that in the case of protectionist measures being
taken by the United States, other countries, if faced with internal
economic difficulties, would immediately follow suit and restrict their
imports. This would be a heavy blow economically, and place in jeopardy
the first successes we have achieved with difficulty through our policy of
stimulating economic activity. Thus, the decision you will have to make
within a few days on the proposal made the International Trade Commission
assumes an importance reaching far beyond the United States national
sphere. It could have the effect of an international signal.
I assume that when making your decision you will take into account the
arrangements which we made in the Declaration of Rambouillet on
17 November 1975 concerning the international economic and trade policy
to be followed jointly. One of the main points on which we had agreed
then was that we as main trading nations would avoid resorting to
measures by which an attempt would be made to solve internal, national
problems at the expense of other countries, with damaging consequences
in the economic, social and political fields. In view of this understanding,
I am convinced that in making your decision you will live up to the great
responsibility which precisely your country has to bear in the present
phase of world economic development.
With kind regards,
Yours,
Helmut Schmidt
GERALD
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
2
MEMORANDUM
1459
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
March 11, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
ROBERT HORMATS RH
SUBJECT:
Message from Chancellor Schmidt on
Specialty Steel Issue
We have just received the following communication from Chancellor
Schmidt for the President regarding the specialty steel decision.
It would be useful for the President to have this as soon as possible
so that it can be factored into his decision. The memorandum at
Tab I transmits Schmidt's message to the President.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.
sent Tab Illinois 70 President
by
FOR:
&
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
zi
J
A
GERALD R LIBRARY FORD
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
REWRITE 1459
3/26/76
Dear Mr. Chancellor:
Thank you for sharing with me your thoughts on the specialty
steel problem and its relationship to the broader problems of inter-
national economic policy. As you noted, we agreed at Rambouillet
that the major trading nations should avoid solving their problems at
the expense of others. This consideration was high among those that
led me to decide not to accept the remedies proposed by the Inter-
national Trade Commission in this case and to choose instead to
attempt to negotiate an orderly marketing agreement.
Thus, I am seeking to provide an opportunity for the U.S. and
its trading partners to develop a mutually satisfactory resolution of
this difficult problem. I hope that this will be the end result of the
consultative process now set in motion.
I believe both of us recognize that on a number of fronts the
months ahead pose significant challenges to international economic
cooperation. It will be especially important that we remain in close
contact during this period. I genuinely welcome receiving your views,
and can assure you that any observations you should make on any
subject will be heavily weighed in our international policy considerations.
Sincerely yours,
Herald R. Ford
Gerald R. Ford
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
REWRITE 1459
3/26/76
Dear Mr. Chancellor:
Thank you for sharing with me your thoughts on the specialty
steel problem and its relationship to the broader problems of inter-
national economic policy. As you noted, we agreed at Rambouillet
that the major trading nations should avoid solving their problems at
the expense of others. This consideration was high among those that
led me to decide not to accept the remedies proposed by the Inter-
national Trade Commission in this case and to choose instead to
attempt to negotiate an orderly marketing agreement.
Thus, I am seeking to provide an opportunity for the U.S. and
its trading partners to develop a mutually satisfactory resolution of
this difficult problem. I hope that this will be the end result of the
consultative process now set in motion.
I believe both of us recognize that on a number of fronts the
months ahead pose significant challenges to international economic
cooperation. It will be especially important that we remain in close
contact during this period. I genuinely welcome receiving your views,
and can assure you that any observations you should make on any
subject will be heavily weighed in our international policy considerations.
Sincerely yours,
Herald R.
Gerald R. Ford
Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Pres
pl
2159X
-
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 19, 1976
TO:
WILLIAM G. HYLAND
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davi
m
SUBJECT: Copy of Schmidt Exchange
to State
Shall I send a copy of the attached exchange
to State? They will, of course, want to
send it to our Embassy.
Denis Clift is doubtful but believes it should
go NODIS, if at all. State has been
complaining about our insistence on NODIS
handling of messages primarily because
they were originally transmitted backchannel,
rather than on content.
Send to State NODIS:
Yes With No
LIMDIS: Yes
No
Authorize FYI transmission to Embassy Bonn:
Yes
No woff
-
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
2
2159X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 19, 1976
TO:
WILLIAM G. HYLAND
FROM:
Jeanne W. Dav
SUBJECT:
Copy of Schmidt Exchange
to State
Shall I send a copy of the attached exchange
to State? They will, of course, want to
send it to our Embassy.
Denis Clift is doubtful but believes it should
go NODIS, if at all. State has been
complaining about our insistence on NODIS
handling of messages primarily because
they were originally transmitted backchannel,
rather than on content.
Send to State NODIS:
Yes
No
LIMDIS:
Yes
No
Authorize FYI transmission to Embassy Bonn:
Yes
No
FORD
GERALD
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
REWRITE 1459
3/26/76
Dear Mr. Chancellor:
Thank you for sharing with me your thoughts on the specialty
steel problem and its relationship to the broader problems of inter-
national economic policy. As you noted, we agreed at Rambouillet
that the major trading nations should avoid solving their problems at
the expense of others. This consideration was high among those that
led me to decide not to accept the remedies proposed by the Inter-
national Trade Commission in this case and to choose instead to
attempt to negotiate an orderly marketing agreement.
Thus, I am seeking to provide an opportunity for the U.S. and
its trading partners to develop a mutually satisfactory resolution of
this difficult problem. I hope that this will be the end result of the
consultative process now set in motion.
I believe both of us recognize that on a number of fronts the
months ahead pose significant challenges to international economic
cooperation. It will be especially important that we remain in close
contact during this period. I genuinely welcome receiving your views,
and can assure you that any observations you should make on any
subject will be heavily weighed in our international policy considerations.
Sincerely yours,
Heard R. 17d
Gerald R. Ford
The following message has been received from Chancelor Schmidt:
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Dear Mr. President:
The International Trade Commission has proposed to you on the basis of
the Trade Act of 1974 to introduce import quotas for specialty steels.
The restrictive nature of that proposal causes me -- and I suppose not
mc alone -- considerable concern. If that recommendation were accepted
the climate throughout the world would essentially deteriorate. For
there can be no doubt that in the case of protectionist measures being
taken by the United States, other countries, if faced with internal
economic difficulties, would immediately follow suit and restrict their
imports. This would be a heavy blow economically, and place in jeopardy
the first successes we have achieved with difficulty through our policy of
stimulating economic activity. Thus, the decision you will have to make
within a few days on the proposal made the International Trade Commission
assumes an importance reaching far beyond the United States national
sphere. It could have the effect of an international signal.
I assume that when making your decision you will take into account the
arrangements which we made in the Declaration of Rambouillet on
17 November 1975 concerning the international economic and trade policy
to be followed jointly. One of the main points on which we had agreed
then was that we as main trading nations would avoid resorting to
measures by which an attempt would be made to solve internal, national
problems at the expense of other countries, with damaging consequences
in the economic, social and political fields. In view of this understanding,
I am convinced that in making your decision you will live up to the great
responsibility which precisely your country has to bear in the present
phase of world economic development.
With kind regards,
Yours,
Helmut Schmidt
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
2nd
2159X
SECRET
ACTION
April 13, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Mr. Clift
SUBJECT:
Message to Chanceller Schmidt
In the package at Tab I, the President has approved and signed a
message to Chancellor Schmidt responding to Schmidt's message of
concern over implementing U.S. actions on specialty steel.
As the incoming Schmidt message was received via the direct
Bonn line to the White House, I recommend that you approve
dispatch of the President's response via the White House's direct
line to Bonn.
Bob Hormats concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve immediate dispatch of the message at Tab A via
the White House line to Bonn.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
FORD LIBRARY b 07V650
ADClift:gw:4/13/76
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
OERALD Pr FORD LIBRARY
BY lab
' NARA, DATE 3/5/04
XGDS
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
an-2
MEMORANDUM
PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
1459 - Add on
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
ACTION
April 9, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
B
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Response to Message from
Chancellor Schmidt
As you will recall, on March 11 Chancellor Schmidt sent you a message
(Tab B) stating his concern that your acceptance of the ITC recommendation
on specialty steel would cause a deterioration in the international economic
climate and trigger other countries to restrict imports. He noted that
at Rambouillet it was agreed that the main trading nations would avoid
resorting to measures to solve internal problems at the expense of
other countries.
At Tab A is a message thanking Schmidt for sharing his thoughts with
you, emphasizing that the Rambouillet agreement was high among the
considerations that led you to decide to negotiate an orderly marketing
agreement rather than accept the ITC recommendation, expressing the
hope that negotiations will lead to a mutually satisfactory solution of
the problem, and welcoming Schmidt's views in the future on the difficult
challenges now being posed to international economic cooperation.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the response to Schmidt at Tab A. William Seidman
concurs.
LIBRAR
SECRET - GDS
bb 3/5/04
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
n
REWRITE 1459
3/26/76
Dear Mr. Chancellor:
Thank you for sharing with me your thoughts on the specialty
steel problem and its relationship to the broader problems of inter-
national economic policy. As you noted, we agreed at Rambouillet
that the major trading nations should avoid solving their problems at
the expense of others. This consideration was high among those that
led me to decide not to accept the remedies proposed by the Inter-
national Trade Commission in this case and to choose instead to
attempt to negotiate an orderly marketing agreement.
Thus, I am seeking to provide an opportunity for the U.S. and
its trading partners to develop a mutually satisfactory resolution of
this difficult problem. I hope that this will be the end result of the
consultative process now set in motion.
I believe both of us recognize that on a number of fronts the
months ahead pose significant challenges to international economic
cooperation. It will be especially important that we remain in close
contact during this period. I genuinely welcome receiving your views,
and can assure you that any observations you should make on any
subject will be heavily weighed in our international policy considerations.
Sincerely yours,
Herald R.
Gerald R. Ford
The Digitized following from Box 2 of nicssage the NSA Presidential as correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Library
2n-4
Dear Mr. President:
The International Trade Commission has proposed to you on the basis of
the Trade Act of 1974 to introduce import quotas for specialty steels.
The restrictive nature of that proposal causes me -- and I suppose not
me alone -- considerable concern. If that recommendation were accepted
the climate throughout the world would essentially deteriorate. For
there can be no doubt that in the case of protectionist measures being
taken by the United States, other countries, if faced with internal
economic difficulties, would immediately follow suit and restrict their
imports. This would be a heavy blow economically, and place in jeopardy
the first successes we have achieved with difficulty through our policy of
stimulating economic activity. Thus, the decision you will have to make
within a few days on the proposal made the International Trade Commission
assumes an importance reaching far beyond the United States national
sphere. It could have the effect of an international signal.
I assume that when making your decision you will take into account the
arrangements which we made in the Declaration of Rambouillet on
17 November 1975 concerning the international economic and trade policy
to be followed jointly. One of the main points on which we had agreed
then was that we as main trading nations would avoid resorting to
measures by which an attempt would be made to solve internal, national
problems at the expense of other countries, with damaging consequences
in the economic, social and political fields. In view of this understanding,
I am convinced that in making your decision you will live up to the great
responsibility which precisely your country has to bear in the present
phase of world economic development.
With kind regards,
Yours,
Helmut Schmidt
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
got
2159X
SECRET
ACTION
April 13, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Mr. Clift
SUBJECT:
Message to Chanceller Schmidt
In the package at Tab 1, the President has approved and signed a
message to Chancellor Schmidt responding to Schmidt's message of
concern over implementing U.S. actions on specialty steel.
As the incoming Schmidt message was received via the direct
Bonn line to the White House, I recommend that you approve
dispatch of the President's response via the White House's direct
line to Bonn.
Bob Hormats concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve immediate dispatch of the message at Tab A via
the White House line to Bona.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
ADClift:gw:4/13/76
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
GERALD A FORD
SECRET
BY
, NARA, DATE 3/5/04
XGDS
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
PRESIDENT HAS SETT
1459 - Add on
20.2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
ACTION
April 9, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
B
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Response to Message from
Chancellor Schmidt
As you will recall, on March 11 Chancellor Schmidt sent you a message
(Tab B) stating his concern that your acceptance of the ITC recommendation
on specialty steel would cause a deterioration in the international economic
climate and trigger other countries to restrict imports. He noted that
at Rambouillet it was agreed that the main trading nations would avoid
resorting to measures to solve internal problems at the expense of
other countries.
At Tab A is a message thanking Schmidt for sharing his thoughts with
you, emphasizing that the Rambouillet agreement was high among the
considerations that led you to decide to negotiate an orderly marketing
agreement rather than accept the ITC recommendation, expressing the
hope that negotiations will lead to a mutually satisfactory solution of
the problem, and welcoming Schmidt's views in the future on the difficult
challenges now being posed to international economic cooperation.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the response to Schmidt at Tab A. William Seidman
concurs.
SECRET - GDS
th 3/5/04
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
20.3
REWRITE 1459
3/26/76
Dear Mr. Chancellor:
Thank you for sharing with me your thoughts on the specialty
steel problem and its relationship to the broader problems of inter-
national economic policy. As you noted, we agreed at Rambouillet
that the major trading nations should avoid solving their problems at
the expense of others. This consideration was high among those that
led me to decide not to accept the remedies proposed by the Inter-
national Trade Commission in this case and to choose instead to
attempt to negotiate an orderly marketing agreement.
Thus, I am seeking to provide an opportunity for the U.S. and
its trading partners to develop a mutually satisfactory resolution of
this difficult problem. I hope that this will be the end result of the
consultative process now set in motion.
I believe both of us recognize that on a number of fronts the
months ahead pose significant challenges to international economic
cooperation. It will be especially important that we remain in close
contact during this period. I genuinely welcome receiving your views,
and can assure you that any observations you should make on any
subject will be heavily weighed in our international policy considerations.
Sincerely yours,
Herald R.
Gerald R. Ford
The Digitized following from Box 2 of messag the NSA Presidential as correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Geold Library
20.4
Dear Mr. President:
The International Trade Commission has proposed to you on the basis of
the Trade Act of 1974 to introduce import quotas for specialty steels.
The restrictive nature of that proposal causes me -- and I suppose not
me alone -- considerable concern. If that recommendation were accepted
the climate throughout the world would essentially deteriorate. For
there can be no doubt that in the case of protectionist measures being
taken by the United States, other countries, if faced with internal
economic difficulties, would immediately follow suit and restrict their
imports. This would be a heavy blow economically, and place in jeopardy
the first successes we have achieved with difficulty through our policy of
stimulating economic activity. Thus, the decision you will have to make
within a few days on the proposal made the International Trade Commission
assumes an importance reaching far beyond the United States national
sphere. It could have the effect of an international signal.
I assume that when making your decision you will take into account the
arrangements which we made in the Declaration of Rambouillet on
17 November 1975 concerning the international economic and trade policy
to be followed jointly. One of the main points on which we had agreed
then was that we as main trading nations would avoid resorting to
measures by which an attempt would be made to solve internal, national
problems at the expense of other countries, with damaging consequences
in the economic, social and political fields. In view of this understanding,
I am convinced that in making your decision you will live up to the great
responsibility which precisely your country has to bear in the present
phase of world economic development.
With kind regards,
Yours,
Helmut Schmidt
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
2P
P
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 017581
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
Robert Hormats, Denis Clift
RECEIVER'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
RECEIVER'S TITLE
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
TITLE
Response to Message from Chancellor
Schmidt
CREATION DATE
03/22/1976
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
035100026
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN LEADERS
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
Germany (FRG) - Chancellor Schmidt (3)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/12/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
Saintized 4/12/05
Digitized from Box 2 of Collection theZGerald R Ford Presidential Library
945
MEMORANDUM
1459 - Add on
wall
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET
March 22, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
ROBERT HORMATS
OUH
DENIS CLIFT en
SUBJECT:
Response to Message from
Chancellor Schmidt
At Tab A is a draft Presidential message responding to Schmidt's
message (Tab B) stating his concern that the President's acceptance
of the ITC recommendation on specialty steel would cause a deteriora-
tion in the international economic climate and trigger other countries
to restrict imports, and would be inconsistent with Rambouillet
The President's response thanks Schmidt for sharing his thoughts,
emphasizes that the Rambouillet agreement was high among the
considerations which led him to reject the ITC recommendations in
favor of negotiating an orderly marketing agreement, expressing the
hope that the negotiations will achieve satisfactory results and welcoming
Schmidt's views in the future on international economic issues.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum for the President recommending his
approval of the message to Schmidt at Tab A.
That if the President approves, you approve transmittal to Schmidt
25X1
:1
and our sending a copy
of the final reply to State.
DECLASSIFIED, with postions exempt
AUTHORITY RAC 4/12/05; State Abc guideliness
Y Un
NLF, DATE 11/26/07
Presidential Library Review of NSC and DOS Equiti
SECRET GDS
Approved For Release 2005/04/12 : NLF-PC_F_L-2-1-1-5
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
3
562
*******U NCLASSIFIE ********S COPY
OP IMMED
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DE RGFAK 003 1131415
0 2214152 APR 75
FM CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT
TO PRESIDENT FORD
UNCLAS ANNEX CHARLIE MESSAGE MSGNR 0912
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR
BONN, APRIL 22TH, 1976
DEAR MR PRESIDENT,
I THANK YOUR VERY MUCH FOR YOUR LETTER OF 15 APRIL 1976
IN WHICH YOU SUGGEST THAT THE RAMBOUILLET TALKS BE CON-
TINUED. I AM VERY MUCH IN FAVOUR OF YOUR IDEA AND I FULLY
CONCUR WITH YOU IN YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE PRODUCTIVE AND
HELPFUL EFFECTS WHICH THE RAMBOUILLET CONFERENCE HAS HAD,
BEFORE WE DEFINITELY DECIDE FOR ANOTHER CONFERENCE
TO BE HELD IT SHOULD HOWEVER BE MADE SURE, AS WAS DONE
LAST TIME, THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT SUBSTANCE TO WARRANT
A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE. I WOULD BE GLAD
TO GO INTO THESE QUESTIONS WITH MY OLD FRIEND GEORGE SHULTZ,
I BUGGEST THAT IN ORDER TO ARRANGE FOR AN EARLY APPOINTMENT
GEORGE SHULTZ GET IN TOUCH WITH THE HEAD OF THE FEDERAL
CHANCELLERY, STATE SECRETARY DR SCHUELER.
AFTERWARDS A SIMILAR GROUP OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES AS LAST
TIME SHOULD EXPLORE THE SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION, PROVIDED
THAT THE SUGGESTION TO CONTINUE OUR RAMBOUILLET TALKS EETS
WITH A FAVOURABLE REACTION FROM OUR COLLEAGUES AS WELL.
I AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY, MR PRESIDENT, TO
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 13 APRIL AND ESPECIALLY
FOR YOUR PERSONAL COMMITMENT AS REGARDS QUESTIONS OF
TRADE POLICY, I AM CONVINCED THAT THE SUCCESS OF OUR
POLICIES WHICH IS NOW BECOMING INCREASINGLY APPARENT IS
DUE DECISIVELY TO OUR EFFORTS TO AVOID UNSUITABLE WAYS
AND MEANS IN REVIVING OUR NATIONAL ECONOMIES.
WITH KIND REGARDS,
SGD. HELMUT SCHMIDT,
BT
*WHSR COMMENT
SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, MCFARLANE, RODMAN
RECALLED
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OP IMMED
DE WTE #2324 1211929
0 3020272 APR 76
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT
ECREP SENSITIVE EYES ONLY WH60609
APRIL 30, 1978
FROM:
BRENT SCONCROFT
TD:
CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS ASKED THAT I PASS TO YOU AND
FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER THE FOLLOWING REPORT THAT HE PREPARED
PERSONALLY FOR YOU SOTH ON HIS MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE:
QUOTE:
I HOPE THE FOLLOWING REPORT ON MY DISCUSSIONS WITH
NYERERE WILL PROVE HELPFUL TO YOU DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT,
NYERERE IS AN INFLUENTIAL LEADER AND AN ENGAGING INTERLOCUTOR.
MY STOP IN TANZANIA WAS THE KEY ONE FOR MY ENTIRE TRIP AND
IT WOULD NOT HAVE GONE BETTER. I FORESHADOWED MY LUSAKA
SPEECH AND OUR APPROACH ELICITED A VERY POSITIVE RESPONSE
FROM HIM WHICH HE IN TURN IS PASSING ON TO OTHER KEY AFRICAN
LEADERS, MORE FUNDAMENTALLY, WE FOUND MUCH COMMON GROUND
DESPITE ESSENTIAL IDEOLOGICAL ANTIPATHY. WE BOTH WANT TO
KEEP APRICA FREE OF EXTRACONTINENTAL RIVALRY AND INFLUENCE,
AND WE BOTH SEE AFRICAN UNITY AND RAPID PROGRESS ON SOUTHERN
AFRICAN ISSUES AS THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL.
I EMPHASIZED THE FOLLOWING POINTS, WE WERE PUTTING THE
AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE SIDE OF A RAPID NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA. WE HAVE HAD OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AND DOMESTIC PREOCCUPATIONS AND MAY HAVE NEGLECTED AFRICA,
BUT NOW WE WERE PREPARED TO MOVE FORCEFULLY. AT THE SAME TIME,
I STRESSED THAT WE WOULD OPPOSE SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION.
I OUTLINED FOR HIM THE ELEMENTS OF OUR STANCE ON RHODESIA
WHSR COMMENT
HYLAND, MCPARLANE, RODMAN
RECALLED
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
GEWALD
STRIIARY
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Deview 9/16/03
BY lula
NARA, DATE 3/5/04
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECRET
*******S COPY
AND SOUTHERN AFRICA GENERALLY WHICH I GAVE IN MY SPEECH IN
ZAMBIA THE NEXT DAY. WE WANTED MAJORITY RULE TO COME THROUGH
A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND WANTED TO SEE A GOVERNMENT
EMERGE THAT WAS TRULY AFRICAN, NOT THE PUPPET OF MOSCOW
OR HAVANA. WE WERE DETERMINED TO PREVENT ANY FUTURE ANGOLAS.
WE WOULD GIVE MORAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR
MAJORITY RULE IN ORDER TO BRING SMITH AROUND. AT THE SAME
TIME, WE COULD NOT AID THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS DIRECTLY,
AND WE WANTED TO SEE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE WHITE
MINDRITY, THUS WE HAD SOME PARALLEL INTERESTS WITH THE
AFRICANS BUT IN ORDER FOR us TO HELP THEY HAVE TO STOP
ATTACKING us ALL THE TIME. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD NOT
UNDERSTAND WHY WE WERE HELPING THOSE WHO SEEMED TO BE
ENEMIES.
NYERERE RESPONDED TO OUR APPROACH IN VERY POSITIVE FASHION,
SAYING THAT IT CONSTITUTED A MAJOR STEP FORWARD, HE
STRESSED OUR JOINT DESIRE TO KEEP OUT GREAT POWER RIVALRY
WHICH ONLY SERVES TO DIVIDE AFRICA. TO THIS END HE AND
OTHER BLACK AFRICANS WERE TELLING THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
IN RHODESIA TO PULL TOGETHER: AND WERE FLATLY ORDERING MOSCOW,
HAVANA, PEKING AND THE SCANDINAVIANS TO PROVIDE ALL AID
THROUGH THE JOINT LIBERATION COMMITTEE OF THE DAU RATHER THAN
DIRECTLY TO INDIVIDUAL RHODESIAN FACTIONS so AS TO MANIPULATE
THEN. IN SHORT, HE SHARED OUR DESIRE TO HEAD OFF ANY FUTURE
ANGOLAS. THE AFRICANS, HAVE TURNED TO GUERRILLA WARFARE IN
RHODESIA BECAUSE SMITH MADE CLEAR THAT HE WASN'T YET READY
TO NEGOTIATES HE SAID THAT HE AND THE OTHER APRICANS WOULD
SUPPORT THE NEGOTIATION ROUTE AGAIN ONCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT
SHITH WAS SERIOUS. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES FOR THE WHITES WHO WISH TO REMAIN
IN RHODESIA, THOUGH PEOPLE LIKE SMITH AND THE "SEEKERS OF
COMFORT" WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE AND COULD BE COMPENSATED. HE
ALSO MADE A BRIEF PITCH ON EARLY NAMISIA INDEPENDENCE,
HE ALSO VOLUNTEERED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR LIMITS, HE DID
NOT EXPECT us TO GIVE ARMS TO AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS.
ME RECOGNIZED THAT SOUTH APRICA WOULD REQUIRE A LONGER
PERIOD OF TIME TO BOLVE THAN RHODESIA AND NAMISIA.
NYERERE ORCHESTRATED HIS MEDIA, AND HIS MEETINGS WITH US
IN A SKILLFULLY INTEGRATED WAY THAT REMINDS ME OF THE CHINESE.
IN ALL THESE CONTEXTS HE DELIBERATELY CHOSE NOT TO HIT US
FRONTALLY WITH DEMANDS WHICH WOULD HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE
FOR US TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY. INSTEAD HE MADE CLEAR THAT
HE UNDERSTOOD THE LIMITATIONS ON OUR ACTIONS (SUCH AS MILITARY
AID TO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS) AND STRESSED THEMES (SUCH AS
PREVENTING FUTURE ANGOLAS) WHERE WE COULD FIND COMMON GROUND.
HE CONCENTRATED ON THE FUTURE RATHER THAN THE PAST.
RECALLED
PSN#021595
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SECRET
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A8 YOU KNOW, HE IS NOW THE MOST INFLUENTIAL AFRICAN
LEADER ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES AND ONE OF THE LEADERS OF
THE THIRD WORLD. HE COMBINES IMPECCABLE REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS,
A WIDE-RANGING INTELLECT, AND HARD-HEADED REALISM. HE IS BOTH
AN ARTICULATE IDEOLOGUE AND A PRAGMATIST WHO IS INTERESTED
IN RESULTS, HE MAS PARTICULAR INFLUENCE WITH ZAMBIA, MOZAMBIQUE
AND BOTSWANA, BUT ALMOST ALL AFRICAN STATES LISTEN TO HIM
ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES. IF HE DECIDES TO BE HELPFUL,
HE CAN HELP SET A DIRECTION AND TONE FOR THE CONTINENT.
SINCE MY TANZANIA STOP NYERERE HAS IN FACT BEEN HELPFUL.
HE HAS GIVEN CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY TO OUR APPROACH. BASED ON
MY PREVIEW OF THE SPEECH, HE CONTACTED KAUNDA IN ADVANCE AND
TALKED TO MOZAMBIQUE'S MACHEL IN DAR ES-8ALAAM THE DAY OF
THE SPEECH, AT THE LUSAKA LUNCH KAUNDA GOT UP AFTER MY PRESENTATION
AND WARMLY WELCOMED IT ON BEHALF OF THE FOUR PRESIDENTS
(ZAMBIA, TANZANIA, MOZAMBIQUE AND BOTSWANA), WE HAVE RECEIVED
A VERY POSITIVE REACTION so FAR IN AFRICA AND THE UNITED
STATES, WITH A FEW INEVITABLE EXCEPTIONS.
IN SHORT, I THINK YOU WILL FIND THE TALKS WITH NYERERE
VERY STIMULATING. YOU WILL, OF COURSE, WANT TO STRESS YOUR
OWN THEMES BUT I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO
ALL OF us IN THE WEST IF YOU COULD UNDERLINE TWO POINTS.
FIRST, AFRICANS SHOULD SOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS WITHOUT
RESORTING TO THE USE OF EXTERNAL POWERS, INTERPERENCE BY
ONE OUTSIDE COUNTRY IS BOUND TO LEAD OTHERS TO COUNTER IT.
SECOND, COUNTRIES LIKE TANZANIA CANNOT EXPECT THE WEST
TO HELP ON PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AND DEVELOPMENT WHILE
SIMULTANEOUSLY BEING ATTACKED AND OPPOSED AT EVERY TURN,
THERE MUST BE SOME TONING DOWN OF RHETORICAL CONFRONTATION
IF WE ARE TO BUILD THE NECESSARY DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR POSITIVE
POLICIES.
I WOULD WELCOME HEARING THE RESULTS OF YOUR TALKS.
WARM REGARDS,
HENRY A. KISSINGER
UNQUOTE
SINCERELY,
BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
RECALLED
PSN#21696
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Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED BY THE SITUATION ROOM:
TO THE PRESIDENT FROM CHANCELLOR CF FRG OVER DUBUQUE
FRG 707
MR. PRESIDENT,
UPON LEAVING THE UNITED STATES I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS
TO YOU MY SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR THE VERY GOOD TALKS
WE HAD IN WASHINGTON AND MY GRATITUDE FOR THE FRIENDSHIP
AND HOSPITALITY YOU EXTENDED TO ME DURING MY STAY IN
THE UNITED STATES.
WITH WARMEST REGARDS,
SINCERELY
HELMUT SCHMIDT
CHANCELLOR OF THE FED.
REP. OF GERMANY
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
6a
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
August 30, 1976
Dear Mr. Chancellor:
Thank you for your letter of July 29 concerning our
discussions on defense issues during your recent
visit. I wish to confirm your understanding that the
traditional balance of payments offset arrangements,
typified by those implemented between 1961 and 1975
pursuant to the NATO Resolutions of July 26, 1957,
are no longer relevant.
I note with pleasure your expectation that military
procurement by the Armed Forces of the Federal
Republic in the United States, which has formed the
basic element of such agreements, can be expected
to continue as in the past.
I confirm with you the importance which both our
governments attach to the transfer of a United States
combat brigade to North Germany, and I welcome
your offer to contribute an amount of DM 171. 2 million
toward the costs of the brigade's initial relocation.
Continuing stationing costs are, of course, under the
Status of Forces Agreement and the supplementary
agreement thereto, the responsibility of the stationing
power.
Finally, I also confirm our understanding that your
government does not rule out the possibility of
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
BY
NSC MEMO, ba 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review. 9/16/03
GERALD
LIBRARY
, NARA, DATE 3/5/04
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECRET
-2-
contributions being considered in future exceptional
cases which lie in the interests of collective defense.
With kind regards.
Sincerely,
Herald R. Food
His Excellency Helmut Schmidt
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Bonn
SECRET
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
4503X
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
ACTION
August 25, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Brent Scowcroft B
SUBJECT:
Reply to Chancellor Schmidt on NORTHAG/Offset
FRG Chancellor Schmidt has sent you a letter (at Tab B) stating his
interpretation of US-FRG understandings on defense issues reached during
his official visit to Washington last month. His letter is an accurate
expression of the discussions and understandings between the two of you
and between Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Genscher.
The reply for your signature to Chancellor Schmidt at Tab A would confirm
these understandings, specifically, that:
-- the traditional balance of paymentsoffset arrangements are no
longer relevant;
-- FRG military procurement in the US can be expected to continue
as in the past;
-- the FRG will contribute DM 171. 2 million toward initial relocation of
a US combat brigade to North Germany;
-- continuing stationing costs are the responsibility of the stationing
power; and
-- the FRG does not rule out the possibility of contributions being
considered in future exceptional cases which lie in the interests of collective
defense.
Your reply to Chancellor Schmidt has been coordinated with the Departments
of State, Treasury and Defense.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter to Chancellor Schmidt at Tab A.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state loview 9/16/03
XGDS
BY the
, NARA, DATE 3/5/04
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Segret
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
Bonn, July 29, 1976
DER BUNDESKANZLER
Dear Mr. President,
the question of balance of payments offset arrangements
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United
States of America has been discussed on several recent
occasions by the Secretary of State of the United
States of America and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
They were agreed that the offset arrangement implemented
by our two governments between 1964 and 1975 in pursuance
of the NATO Resolution of July 26, 1957, is no longer
applicable in view of significant improvements in the
fields of international monetary and economic policy.
Therefore, I wish to note our agreement that the
traditional balance of payments offset has lost its
relevance.
However, military procurement by the Armed Forces of
the Federal Republic in the United States, which has
formed the basic element of past such agreements, can
be expected to continue as in the past.
His Excellency
Mr. Gerald Ford
President of the United States
of America
Washington, D.C.
DECLASSIFIED
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review 9/16/03
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
BY m
1 NARA, DATE 3/5/04
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
- 2 -
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
welcomes the intention of the United States administratio
to transfer a combat brigade to North Germany. It
attaches special importance to this step to strengthen
the defense capability of the alliance, and is prepared
in this exceptional case to make a single payment of
up to 171,2 million Deutsche Mark towards the cost of
the military accomodation of the brigade. However, the
Federal Government deems it important to state that this
special, single contribution does not establish any
obligation on the part of the Federal Republic of
Germany to pay stationing costs which, under the Status
of the Forces Agreement and the supplementary agreement
thereto, is the responsibility of the stationing power.
The Federal Government does not rule out the possibility
of contributions being considered in future exceptional
cases which lie in the interests of collective defense.
With kind regards,
Sincerely,
yours Mann Summy
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
4503X
MEMORANDUM
Discharge
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
August 11, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Richard T. Boverie
RTB
Robert Gates Rg.
SUBJECT:
Presidential Reply to Chancellor Schmidt on
NORTHAG/Offset
Chancellor Schmidt has sent the President a letter (at Tab B) setting
forth his interpretation of US-FRG understandings on defense issues
reached during his official visit to Washington last month. The points
in the letter are, in our view and that of the Department of State, an
accurate reflection of the discussions and understandings between the
two leaders and between Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister
Genscher.
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES 9/16/03
The memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab I would
forward the Chancellor's letter, together with a brief summary and a
proposed reply. The President's reply at Tab A, prepared by State with
minor, non-substantive revisions here, would confirm the understandings
noted by the Chancellor. (State's draft, annotated with our changes, is
NARA, DATE 13/5/04
at Tab II. State has concurred in our revisions.)
As we noted in our earlier memorandum to you on the Chancellor's letter,
we believe that Defense clearance should be handled by you with Staser Holcomb
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
to avoid reopening State-Defense disagreements at the bureaucratic level.
Similarly, Bob Hormats recommends (and we concur) that you inform Under
Secretary Yeo at Treasury of the Chancellor's letter and the substance of
the President's reply. Treasury has been involved throughout this process
until recent weeks and has a legitimate interest in knowing of the President's
BY an
reply to Chancellor Schmidt. Your clearance with Yeo would satisfy the need
to touch base with Treasury without delaying the President's reply.
Bob Hormats concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
1. That you clear the Presidential reply at Tab A with Holcomb at Defense
and Yeo at Treasury.
2. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
45031 the
6d
MEMORANDUM
anne 8/23 /
Nent
Presedent freward 8/26 am
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
August 11, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Richard T. Boverie RTD
Robert Gates Rg.
SUBJECT:
Presidential Reply to Chancellor Schmidt on
NORTHAG/Offset
Chancellor Schmidt has sent the President a letter (at Tab B) setting
forth his interpretation of US-FRG understandings on defense issues
reached during his official visit to Washington last month. The points
in the letter are, in our view and that of the Department of State, an
accurate reflection of the discussions and understandings between the
two leaders and between Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister
Genscher.
NBC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Beview 9/16/03
The memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab I would
forward the Chancellor's letter, together with a brief summary and a
proposed reply. The President's reply at Tab A, prepared by State with
minor, non-substantive revisions here, would confirm the understandings
noted by the Chancellor. (State's draft, annotated with our changes, is
NARA, DATE 3/5/04
at Tab II. State has concurred in our revisions.)
As we noted in our earlier memorandum to you on the Chancellor's letter,
we believe that Defense clearance should be handled by you with Staser Holcomb
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
to avoid reopening State-Defense disagreements at the bureaucratic level.
Similarly, Bob Hormats recommends (and we concur) that you inform Under
Secretary Yeo at Treasury of the Chancellor's letter and the substance of
the President's reply. Treasury has been involved throughout this process
until recent weeks and has a legitimate interest in knowing of the President's
reply to Chancellor Schmidt. Your clearance with Yeo would satisfy the need
to touch base with Treasury without delaying the President's reply.
FORD
BY
Pr
Bob Hormats concurs.
GERALD
AMERICA
RECOMMENDATION
1. That you clear the Presidential reply at Tab A with Holcomb at Defense
and Yeo at Treasury.
2. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
7617035
Washington, D.C. 20520
August 10, 1976
SECRET
NODIS
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Proposed Reply from President to Letter from
FRG Chancellor on Northag/Offset
Attached is a proposed reply from the President
to a letter from FRG Chancellor Schmidt on the
subject of Northag/offset.
for
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
1. Proposed letter from the President
2. Letter from Chancellor Schmidt
SECRET
GDS
3/5/04 3
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECRET
Dear Mr. Chancellor:
Thank you for
concerning our discussions
your letter of July 29
to
the
on defense issues
during your recent visit. I wish to
balance
of
payments
confirm your understanding that the traditional offset
A
arrangements, typified by those implemented between 1961
and 1975 pursuant to the NATO Resolution of July 26, 1957,
are no longer relevant.
I note with pleasure [however] your expectation
that military procurement by the Armed Forces of the
Federal Republic in the United States, which has formed
the basic element of such agreements, can be expected to
continue as in the past.
I confirm with you the importance which both our
governments attach to the transfer of a United States
combat brigade to North Germany, and I welcome your offer
to contribute an amount of DM 171.2 million toward the
costs of the brigade's initial Continuing
stationing costs are, of course, under the Status of
Forces Agreement and the supplementary agreement thereto,
the responsibility of the stationing power.
His Excellency
Helmut Schmidt,
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Bonn.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES state 9/16/03
BY
NARA DATE 3/5/04
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECRET
-2-
Finally, I also confirm our understanding that your
government does not rule out the possibility of contri-
being considered
[
Note:
butions in future exceptional cases which lie in the
<
Added phrase
interests of collective defense.
makes consistent
with text of
With kind regards.
Schmidt letter.] ]
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford
SECRET
LIBRARY
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
4503
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET/NODIS
August 9, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR
C. Arthur Borg
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Letter From FRG Chancellor
on NORTHAG/Offset
The attached letter has been received from Chancellor Schmidt stating
his interpretation of the US-FRG understanding on defense issues
reached during his official visit to Washington last month.
It would be appreciated if the Department of State would prepare a
proposed reply from the President to Chancellor Schmidt setting
forth the U.S. position on this issue. The draft reply should be
forwarded no later than August 11, 1976 for consideration by the President.
Staff JMD Secretary
Jeanne Davis
Attachment
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 4b
, NARA, DATE 3/5/04
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
4503
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
ACTION
August 6, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
A. Denis Clift and
Richard T. Boverie LTB
SUBJECT:
Schmidt Letter on NORTHAG/Offset
The memorandum for Jeanne Davis' signature to State at Tab A would
forward Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's letter of July 29 setting forth his
understanding of the agreement reached with the President on NORTHAG
and Offset. The memorandum would request the Department of State to
prepare a proposed reply from the President to the Chancellor stating
the U.S. position on these issues. The reply is requested by August 11
to permit Presidential action prior to the departure for Kansas City.
We believe that Defense clearance should be handled by you with Holcomb
following receipt of the State draft to avoid reopening State-Defense
disagreements at the bureaucratic level.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the memorandum at Tab A.
APPROVE BD
OTHER
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12968, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review 9/16/03
BY ben
, NARA, DATE 3/5/04
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
6
So to
THE WHITE Schuckft HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Delivered by
Charge Neils Hower,
FRE, 6 10pm, 8/5/76
[RE: SCHMOT LTR TO Pres]
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Geheim
BENDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
Bonn, den 29. Juli 1976
DER BUNDESKANZLER
Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident,
die Frage von Devisenausgleichsvereinbarungen zwischen
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Vereinigten
Staaten von Amerika wurde jüngst verschiedentlich vom
Außenminister der Vereinigten Staaten und dem Bundes-
minister des Auswärtigen erörtert. Sie stimmten darin
überein, daß die Devisenausgleichsregelung, die aufgrund
der NATO-Resolution vom 26. Juli 1957 in den Jahren
1961 bis 1975 von unseren beiden Regierungen durchgeführt
wurde, angesichts der bedeutenden Verbesserungen im
internationalen währungspolitischen und wirtschafts-
politischen Bereich nicht mehr anwendbar ist.
Daher möchte ich unser Einvernehmen darüber feststellen,
daß der herkömmliche Zahlungsbilanzausgleich gegen-
standslos geworden ist. Es kann jedoch davon ausgegangen
werden, daß die militärischen Beschaffungskäufe durch
die Streitkräfte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, die das wesentliche
Element solcher früheren Vereinbarungen dargestellt
haben, wie in der Vergangenheit fortgeführt werden.
Seiner Exzellenz
dem Präsidenten der
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika
Herrn Gerald Ford
DECLASSIFIED
Washington
E.D. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES 9/16/03
BY
in
NAD^
3/5/04
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
2
Die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland begrüßt
die Absicht der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten von
Amerika, eine Kampfbrigade nach Norddeutschland zu
verlegen. Sie mißt diesem Vorhaben eine besondere
Bedeutung für die Stärkung der Verteidigungskraft der
Allianz bei und ist in diesem außergewöhnlichen Falle
bereit, mit einer einmaligen Zahlung bis zu 171,2 Mio DM
zu den Kosten der militärischen Unterbringung der Brigade
beizutragen. Die Bundesregierung legt allerdings Wert auf
die Feststellung, daß dieser besondere einmalige Kosten-
beitrag keine Verpflichtung der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land zur Zahlung von Stationierungskosten begründet, die
nach dem Truppenvertrag und der Zusatzvereinbarung den
Stationierungsmächten obliegt.
Die Bundesregierung schließt nicht aus, daß sie in
künftigen, im Interesse der gemeinsamen Verteidigung
liegenden außergewöhnlichen Fällen prüfen wird, ob die
Möglichkeit einer Kostenbeteiligung besteht.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen
Her evgluence
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
CLASSIFICATION SECRET ATTACHMENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
REFERRAL
Date: 31 August 1976
NSC log # 4503
NSC Receipt # 1202
MEMORANDUM FOR:
C. Arthur Borg
Executive Secretary
Department of State
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: PRESIDENTIAL "GREEN" LETTER
To: Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
From: President Ford
Date:
30 August 1976
Subject:
ACTION REQUESTED:
Draft reply for:
President's Signature
White House Staff
Other
Direct reply
Furnish info copy
XXX Dispatch VIA CLASSIFIED POUCH!
Translation
Recommendations / Comments
Appropriate Handling
Other
Information
DUE DATE:
COMMENTS:
**
ATTACHED IS ONE SEALED ENVELOP & CY FOR YOUR FILE ONLY!
HANDLE AS NODIS
for B.Menhont Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET ATTACHMENT
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
DOC
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LOG NUMBER
6x
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INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
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of agreement w/ Pres re NORTHAG + offset - LA
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FOR:
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA UN
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DATE
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
7A
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
INFORMATION
December 12, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
The following message has just been received from Chancellor Schmidt:
"Dear Mr. President,
"Concerning the project of a safety-net for sterling balances, I am informed
that the Central Bankers of the Club of Ten will meet tomorrow Monday in
Bale/Switzerland. The USA will be represented by Mr. Wallich. The
German Federal Bank Chairman Klasen and the Bank of England Chairman
will also participate. In regard to this meeting I would like to propose that
Mr. Wallich is being given instructions so as to enable the meeting to
envisage the safety-net solution in so far as is necessary for Prime Minister
Callaghan to tell the British Parliament on Wednesday about the fact that the
safety-net is in the making.
"I believe that Mr. Callaghan needs not to speak more specifically. I do
assume that German Government officials and German Central Bank
officials will meet their American counterparts in Washington, D.C. on
Wednesday.
"They should then be in a position to draw up the agreement on the safety-
net for sterling balances. If my assumptions are correct this would make
it possible to announce the principles of the safety-net in the later course
of this week. One should hope that thereby any psychologic danger for
sterling balances can be avoided.
"I beg your understanding for bothering you over the weekend but I think
the matter is important.
"I have not informed our British friend about this message.
/s/ Your Truly, Helmut Schmidt
Federal Chancellor of Germany"
DECLARCIFIED
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Deview 9/16/03
BY
John
, NARA, DATE 3/5/04
Digitized from Box 2 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
7Pm
Thank you for your message of December 10. Derek Mitchell
has already arrived in Washington and has been meeting with Arthur
Burns and Ed Yeo.
I can assure you that we will, in the discussions on the sterling
balances problem, convey what we believe to be constructive, substantive
ideas and proposals which both meet our domestic requirements and are
responsive to your needs. We are also aware that the United Kingdom
has a number of ideas and proposals, and that a considerable amount of
work has been done in the BIS. It is my hope and expectation that con-
structive negotiations can reach a positive, mutually satisfactory solution
to this problem.
While we intend to move as rapidly as possible, I believe that on
an issue as complex as this, final agreement will be unlikely by Monday
evening. I do understand your concerns, however, and we shall be as
responsive as possible in conveying by Monday evening wording which
reflects the progress of our discussions as of that time.