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Pakistan - Prime Minister Bhutto (1)
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Pakistan - Prime Minister Bhutto (1)
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Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders (Ford Administration)
Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders
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The original documents are located in Box 3, folder "Pakistan - Prime Minister Bhutto
(1)" of the National Security Adviser's Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders
Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
1354 2A
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONEIDENTIAL (GDS)
VIA LDX
March 10, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR
GEORGE SPRINGSTEEN
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT: Presidential Message of Reply to Pakistani Prime
Minister Bhutto -- S/S 7504012 (Letter from Bhutto)
and LDX #69 of March 3 (Proposed Reply)
Attached is the revised cleared text of the President's reply (per
LDX 69 of March 3) to the letter (S/S 7504012) from Pakistani Prime
Minister Bhutto on the decision of the U.S. Government to lift the
embargo against the sale of arms to Pakistan and India. State is
authorized to transmit the President's message of reply through
appropriate channels.
James Jeanne W. Bornem Davis
Staff Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
NSC-ROakley
lab 3/8/04
FORD
GEHALD ?
Digitized from Box 3 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
2B
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO OF PAKISTAN
"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Thank you for your message concerning the decision of the
United States Government to lift the embargo on arms supplies
to Pakistan and India. I share your hope that this action will
further strengthen the excellent relations between our two coun-
tries.
At the same time, I will be most gratified if, as you have
suggested, this decision contributes to the strengthening of security
and stability in South Asia. This remains the underlying goal of
our policies in the Subcontinent.
I was particularly pleased to learn that you have written to
Prime Minister Gandhi to assure her of your Government's commit-
ment to the Simla Agreement. As I emphasized during our meeting
here, the United States strongly supports the political normalization
taking place between your two countries. I hope that in the near
future you find a way to move this process forward in some concrete
way so as to alleviate concerns regarding the possible adverse
effects our action might have on your bilateral relations with India
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
&
Wh 3/8/04
GERALD
LIBRARY
2C
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS) -- 2
and on regional stability.
I am confident that the personal understanding which we
achieved in our recent talks will prove an important resource
in maintaining the warm and cooperative relations which our
two countries have traditionally enjoyed. I look foward with
pleasure to the time when I may visit you in Pakistan in response
to your kind invitation. Sincerely, [Gerald R. Ford]"
CONF IDENTIAL (GDS)
FORD
&
BENALD
THE WHITE HOUSE
TIME SENT
in
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE LDX NR 20
WHITE INCUSE
CIA
DIA/G
STATE
DIA/H
'75 MAR 10 PM 4 02
NNCC
DASA
ANMCC
NPIC
NSA
NUMBER OF PAGES 3
FROM: JEANNE DAVIS
CONFIDENTIAL
TO: GEORGE SPRINGSTEEN
URGENT
11 CI
STATE
RECEIVED
Jew
DATE/TIME:
BY:
\
of
1354
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
March 10
FOR JEANNE DAVIS
Jeanne,
General Scowcroft has approved a revised
text (Tab A of memo to President on left)
of a Presidential message of reply to
Prime Minister Bhutto.
This takes care of LDX 69 of March 3
which State submitted for clearance and
is in response to S/S 7504012 -- incoming
letter from Bhutto.
You could LDX the attached to George
Springsteen advising State of the revised
text.
Rosemary AA Niehuss
1354
MEMORANDUM
of
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
ACTION
March 5, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
ROBERT B. OAKLEY
SUBJECT:
Presidential Reply to Prime Minister
Bhutto on South Asian Arms
At Tab I is a self-explanatory memo for the President recommend-
ing he send a message of reply to Prime Minister Bhutto in response
to the latter's message expressing appreciation for the U.S. arms
decision. The President's message expresses the hope that Bhutto
will take action to move the Simla process forward "in some concrete
way" but is otherwise non-substantive.
Mr. Springsteen has informed Jeanne Davis that Secretary Kissinger
has cleared the substance of State's suggestedreply (attached in cable
form). All that remains is White House clearance. (immodiasely Below)
RECOMMENDATION: That you clear the proposed Presidential reply
at tab a of the package at Tab I.
APPROVE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE BD
Alternatively, that you forward the memo at Tab I to the President
seeking his approval of the suggested reply. [Paul Theis has cleared
the proposed message]
APPROVE FORWARDING MEMO
CONFIDENTIAI
bla 3/8/04
FORD
&
2th
FORM DS 322{0CR}
LDX 69 of
move 3
CONFEDENTIAL
NEA/PAB:RAPECK/MU
2/28/75 X 22441
Paul Paue Theis', Theis',
THE SECRETARY
Milton Friedman's
NEA - MR. SOBER
S/S:
WH:
P: MR. SISCO
(spechuriters)
changes shown
below
ROUTINE
ISLAMABAD
ROUTINE
NEW DELHI
HAK
E.O. 11652: GDS
RAPE
TAGS: PFOR, PK, IN
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO PRIME MINISTER
SS
BHUTTO
S/S:
1. PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER
WH:
=
BHUTTO:
to
concerning
JJJ
of
QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT
MESSAGE RELATING TO THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT LIFTING THE EMBARGO ON ARMS SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN
AND INDIA. I SHARE YOUR HOPE THAT THIS ACTION WILL FURTHER
STRENGTHEN THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUN-
At TRIES. the same time, I
WE WILL BE MOST GRATIFIED IF, AS YOU HAVE SUGGESTED, THIS
DECISION with CONTRIBUTESTO THE STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY
AND STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIAs E&R THIS REMAINS THE UNDER-
LYING GOAL OF OUR POLICIES IN THE SUBCONTINENT. PI WAS
PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO LEARN THAT YOU HAVE WRITTEN TO
PRIME MINISTER GANDHI TO ASSURE HER OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S
COMMITMENT TO THE SIMLA AGREEMENT. AS I EMPHASIZED DURING
OUR MEETING HERE, THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE
IMPORTANT PROCESS OF POLITICAL NORMALIZATION TAKING PLACE
BETWEEN YOUR TWO COUNTRIES. I HOULD HOPE THAT IN THE NEAR
FUTURE YOU NIGHT FIND A WAY TO MOVE THIS PROCESS FORWARD
IN SOME CONCRETE WAY so AS TO ALLEVIATE CONCERNS REGARDING
CONFIDENTIAL
lab 3/8/04
FORM DS 322A{0CR}
CONFIDENTIAL
la
THE POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OUR ACTION MIGHT HAVE ON YOUR
BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND ON REGIONAL STABILITY.
am confident
I BELIEVE THAT THE PERSONAL UNDERSTANDING WHICH WE
ACHIEVED IN OUR RECENT TALKS WILL PROVE AN IMPORTANT RE-
SOURCE IN MAINTAINING THE WARM AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS
WHICH OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE TRADITIONALLY ENJOYED. I
A# LOOKING FORWARD WITH PLEASURE TO THE TIME WHEN I MAY
VISIT YOU IN PAKISTAN IN RESPONSE TO YOUR KIND INVITATION.
{SIGNED} GERALD R. FORD. UNQUOTE. YY
FORD
&
NO
CONFIDENTIAL
2H
UNITED BY:
RECEIVED BY:
URG
CE
: :!=4 Stamp)
(Date s Time Sta=p)
5M
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
C
Operations Center
'75 MAR 3 PM 12 : 33
IDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
1.8
S/S 0
:
69
MESSAGE 50.
.
CLASSIFICATION CONPIDENTIAL
, NO. PACES 2
CRIPPION OF MSC. Telegram to Islamabad re Message fm President to
Prime Minister Bhutto
S/S
.
,
,
Officer
Office Symbol
Extension
Room Number
::
DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION:
ROOM NUMBER:
ESC
- Mrs. Jeanne Davis
,
9
,
9
,
,
,
,
is
CLEARANCE / XXX INFORMATION
PER REQUEST
[____|
COMMENT
MARKS:
LIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY:
Executive Secretaria Officer
1354
21
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
ACTION
March 5, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Reply to Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto
on U.S. Arms Supply Policy
Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan has sent you a warm message of
appreciation [Tab B] following the public announcement of your
decision to lift the embargo on the sale of lethal military equip-
ment to Pakistan and India. In this message, the Prime Minister
reaffirmed his intention to continue the Simla process of negotiations
with India and to avoid the escalation of an arms race in the Sub-
continent. He also informed you that he is making these points
in a separate message to Prime Minister Gandhi of India.
I regard Bhutto's messages to you and to Mrs. Gandhi, reaffirm-
ing principles central to your decision and to our overall South
Asian policy, as a constructive gesture. I believe it would be
desirable for you to round our your exchanges with Bhutto on
this subject by responding to his message, taking note of his
commitments -- which you and he discussed - -- and encouraging
him in his efforts toward reconciliation in South Asia.
A proposed message to be dispatched through the Department of
State is at Tab A. [Paul Theis concurred in the suggested text. ]
RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the dispatch of the message
from you to Prime Minister Bhutto at Tab A.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
lab 3/8/04
FORD LIBRAR &
Approved Scowarth 25
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
by
MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO OF PAKISTAN
'Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Thank you for your message concerning the decision of the
United States Government to lift the embargo on arms supplies
to Pakistan and India. I share your hope that this action will
further strengthen the excellent relations between our two coun-
tries.
At the same time, I will be most gratified if, as you have
suggested, this decision contributes to the strengthening of security
and stability in South Asia. This remains the underlying goal of
our policies in the Subcontinent.
I was particularly pleased to learn that you have written to
Prime Minister Gandhi to assure her of your Government's commit-
ment to the Simla Agreement. As I emphasized during our meeting
here, the United States strongly supports the political normalization
taking place between your two countries. I hope that in the near
future you find a way to move this process forward in some concrete
way so as to alleviate concerns regarding the possible adverse
effects our action might have on your bilateral relations with India
CONF IDENTIAL (GDS)
ab 3/8/04
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS) -- 2
and on regional stability.
I am confident that the personal understanding which we
achieved in our recent talks will prove an important resource
in maintaining the warm and cooperative relations which our
two countries have traditionally enjoyed. I look foward with
pleasure to the time when I may visit you in Pakistan in response
to your kind invitation. Sincerely, [Gerald R. Ford]"
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM MR. ZULFIKAR
ALI BHUTTO, PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN,
ADDRESSED TO HIS EXCELLENCY GERALD
R. FORD, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA.
As the lifting of the embargo on arms supplies
from the United States to Pakistan and India has been
announced, I take this opportunity to convey my govern-
ment's deep appreciation of this decision of your
Administration which will further cement the relations
between the United States of America and Pakistan.
This decision has been taken, we know with the object
of removing a cruel anomally and strengthening the
security and stability of our region. I have stated publicly
and am also writing to the Prime Minister of India that,
in seeking an end to the arms ban, we wish neither to
depart from the Simla Agreement nor to enter an arms
race in the sub-continent. I am sure that no propaganda
to the contrary will influence collective and responsible
opinion and your decision will be impartially considered
to be a valuable contribution to peace in a volatile and
vital region of the world. May I, Mr. President, take
contd
2
- 2 -
this opportunity to recall the warmth and mutual
understanding which permeated our exchanges during
my recent visit to express my confidence that, under
your leadership, the U.S.A. will play a leading part
in ending the insecurity of States less powerful than
their neighbours and thus consolidating the foundation
of international peace.
-----
EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN
Washington, D.C.
February 24, 1975.
26
7504012
EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN
2315 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20008
No. SS/A-1/1/75
February 24, 1975
AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN
Excellency,
I have the honour to forward herewith two
messages from the Prime Minister of Pakistan, one
for the President and the other for you.
2.
May I also take this opportunity to express
my deep appreciation to you for your contribution to
the decision announced yesterday which, we are
agreed, meets a long standing legitimate desire of
Pakistan and which would contribute to the stability
of the region. I would be grateful if you would convey
my appreciation to the President.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances
of my highest consideration.
(Sahabzada Yaqub Khan)
The Honorable
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Secretary of State,
The Department of State,
FORD
Washington D.C.
?
GERALD
LIBRARY
2m
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
NSC CORRES PONDENCE PROFILE
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
3
/
35
10
7501354
REFERENCE:
Oakley O
APPROPRIATE
TO: PRES
FROM: KISSINGER, H
UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
KISSINGER
COLBY, W
S/S OTHER 7504254
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
COWCROFT
X
SCHLESINGER, J
C
EYES ONLY EXDIS
X
DAVIS
ST EX SEC
S
CODEWORD
SUBJECT: Message to Pres From PM Bhutto TS SENSITIVE
of new arms Policy
INTERNAL
ROUTING
AND
DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT
FOR
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
(
)
REPLY FOR
FAR EAST
(
)
AP ROPRIATE ACTION
X
(
X
)
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA
X
MEMO
TO
(
)
EUROPE / CANADA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
REFER TO
FOR:
(
)
ECONOMIC
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
CONCURRENCE
(
)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMENTS: *Wold (INCLUDING 3/20 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
DUE DATE:
OCEANS POLICY
INTELLIGENCE
DATE
FROM
TO
S
CY TO
3/5
Oakley
Scowcroff
4X"
3/10
3/10
Memo to syringteen
Scroft Unio approved (03/08) regory
Decision SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
Balley
S
12)
3/10
Dahley
Sign memo to Springsteen
LDXing revised text.
3/10
C
DAVIS sgd memo to Springster
&
LIBRARY
DISPATCH SEELABOVE done PLUS: by LDX
CY RQMTS:
MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
NSC/S DISP INSTR
NOTIFY
& DATE
BY
MAR
BY
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
SA
SF
CROSS REF W/
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
x
OPEN CRT IDO AB 12 1975 1975
NS
FOLDER:
CLOSE
B
EP
PA
DY
(
(NBC-74-21)
533-147
)
(Outside the System) 3a
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
June 26, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
ROBERT B. OAKLEY
I am staffing, with Dick Soloman, a memo to accompany this letter
from Prime Minister Bhutto to the President. The letter was stimulated
by HAK's conversation with Aziz Ahmed (copy attached). The total
exercise is very similar to that which transpired in June and July of
1974 when Prime Minister Bhutto wrote, asking President Nixon to
raise the Pakistan security issue in Moscow. President Nixon replied
to Bhutto on July 31 that he had made clear to the Soviet leadership
our support for the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan.
President Nixon had already (on June 24) assured Prime Minister
Bhutto in a letter that this was a "cornerstone" of our foreign policy
(this was published by Aziz Ahmed in Islamabad on July 19).
B
coll LIBRARY & 07VH30
34
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
4570X
SECRET/NODIS
June 30, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GEORGE SPRINGSTEEN
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Draft Letter for Prime
Minister Bhutto
Would you please have the Departme nt prepare a draft reply
to the attached letter for the President from Pakistani Prime
Minister Bhutto.
MAINS Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY lb
, NARA, DATE 3/8/04
BERALD R FORM
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
PRIME MINISTER
Prime Minister's House
Rawalpindi
13 June 1975
Dear Mr. President,
I have been wanting to write to you on a matter
of vital interest both to the security of Pakistan and to the
peace and stability of our vast and populous region. However,
since you have been preoccupied with momentous issues relating
to Europe and the Middle East, I thought it better to wait until
you returned home and had time to address your attention to
other matters of importance to world peace.
On May 22, Secretary Kissinger and my Minister
of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmed, met
in Ankara. In the course of that meeting, Dr. Kissinger informed
Mr. Ahmed that he had spoken to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
in very strong terms to the effect that an Indian attack on Pakistan
with Soviet equipment would invite a response from the United
Guidelines state Review 9/16/03
States.
It is an established fact that practically all of
India's armed forces are equipped with Soviet weapons.
DECLASSIFIED
NARA, Date 3/8/04
Moreover, in wiew will the Indo Soviet Treaty of 1971, an armed
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
attack on Pakistan by India would necessarily carry Soviet approval
and, indeed, direct involvement.
State Dept.
As you are aware, Mr. President, my Government
is determined to further the process of normalization of relations
with India in accordance with the Simla Agreement. We will
sustain this policy as long as it is reciprocated by India.
PRIME MINISTER
-2-
Nevertheless, our considered assessment of the situation,
as Mr. Ahmed conveyed to Dr. Kissinger, is that war could
come at any time the Soviet Union wanted it, as India would
have no difficulty in contriving an excuse for starting one.
For instance, India could brazenly assert its spurious claim
to the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral
part of India and prepare the stage for an invasion of Azad
Kashmir on the pretext that it sought to release it from Pakistan's
control. All-out hostilities would be ineluctable result.
Dr. Kissinger asked what China would do in the
event of an Indian attack on Pakistan. We had put precisely
the same question to the Chinese Vice-Promier when he visited
Pakistan recently. The Chinese Government are considering
this question but have given us no answer so far. Their
decision in this regard cannot but be influenced by the existence
of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. The constraint on China's freedom
to act as a result of this Treaty was tragically demonstrated
when India attacked Pakistan in 1971. China was hamstrung while
Pakistan was dismembered with Soviet instigation and support.
Dr. Kissinger then enquired whether he could
ask China what exactly it would do if India attacked Pakistan
and added that, if China posed the counter-question as to what
the United States would do in such an event, it would be informed
that if India attacked Pakistan and China came to its help and if
in consequence the Soviet Union attacked China, the United
States would not be able to stay out of that situation.
PRIME MINISTER
-3-
To Pakistan, confronted with an overwhelming
military threat from India and Afghanistan, both armed and
backed by the Soviet Union, this forthright enunciation of the
determination of the United States to ward off a danger of vast
and incalculable proportions comes as most welcome news.
I am deeply impressed, Mr. President, by the
clarity with which your Administration has perceived the
implications of an attack on Pakistan for the peace and stability
of this strategic area. This unclouded approach envisages, for
the first time, a concrete step which could restore the power
equilibrium in this region. This could operate as a decisive
factor in maintaining peace, defending freedom and protecting
the vital interests of the United States in South Asia. If the
shadow of blackmail and the spectre of war which darken the
horizons of this strife-torn subcontinent were removed from it,
a turning point would be reached in its history. The global
balance of power would gain reality and the structure of peace
in our critical region could become truly inviolable.
With best wishes and warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
Julyih hi Shoulds
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
I
His Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America
White House,
GERALD
Washington D.C.
MEMORANDUM
3d
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, SEC. 3.5
BY NSC MEMO, Calor 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Peview alls
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
, NARA, DATE 3/8/04
PARTICIPANTS:
Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defense and
Foreign Affairs of Pakistan.
Mr. Mansur Ahmed, Director General, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff PAR
TIME AND DATE:
Thursday, May 22, 1975
11:50 a.m. - 12:25 p.m.
PLACE:
CENTO Headquarters, U.S. Delegation Room
Ankara, Turkey
Sisco: Mr. Secretary, there is a chance of Pakistan getting on the Security
Council. It can't be that we can't have a country friendly to us! As our
Ambassador said, you'd better get someone else to put your name forward.
If we did, it's the kiss of death. [Laughter]
Kissinger: Is there a chance?
Sisco: Sure. They're TC wisely putting the case on its merits and not just
FUND
because India has been on it three times.
Kissinger: The Chinese will support it.
Sisco: Sure.
CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2.
Kissinger: That means there will be two votes [for us] on the Security
Council -- ours and, occasionally, Pakistan. [Laughter] Occasionally.
Who is the Latin American?
Sisco: They haven't decided.
Kissinger: It is Peru this year. Unless they put Cuba on. [Laughter]
Ahmed: I appreciate this opportunity to greet you. On the whole you've done
well with this ship [the Mayaguez incident].
Kissinger: It had to be done.
Ahmed: It was done efficiently.
Kissinger: Our press now is a bit sick. I never saw a more disappointed
group than when our President stepped into the press room to announce that
all the men were recovered.
Really, it was good. It was not a major event in history, but it helped
psychologically. It also helped the President, and also internationally.
Ahmed: It was very good.
Well, you placed the ball in our court by lifting the ban. But we've
placed no orders yet. No money!
Kissinger: We've talked to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Couldn't you arrange some-
thing with Saudi Arabia?
Ahmed: Our Prime Minister will be going to Saudi Arabia.
I've asked our Chief of Staff to prepare something.
Kissinger: You should start in a modest way. Because the Indians will make
a huge racket anyway. They placed huge orders when Grechko was there, and
we can make a fuss and make it look later as a reaction to it.
Ahmed: Our estimate is that we haven't more than two years to make good our
deficiencies.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
ECRET/NODIS/XGDS
3.
Kissinger: There is a good possibility, and that is because the Indians are
basically a pacific nation. [Laughter] You know, the Indian Ambassador in
Washington is your biggest asset. In a toast at one dinner I went to, he
said, "Some people emphasize economic power, some emphasize military
power, but we in India emphasize moral power. " [Laughter] I said in reply,
"I thought he was going to say nuclear power. " [Laughter]
I wouldn't go to a dinner with him alone but he fixes it so I can't refuse.
He makes it in honor of some senior Senator whom I couldn't offend. He goes
around the table and makes a comment about everyone and gives a fifteen
minute lecture against American foreign policy.
He's a friend of Atherton's.
Ahmed: Did the Shah show you our estimates?
Kissinger: Yes, he showed us estimates of what the Indians arranged with the
Soviets. We told him we were sympathetic. We told him we would warn him
[Gromyko] against making any move against Pakistan.
[To Sisco]: Tell this to the Shah. Add it to what already went.
I told Gromyko we would hold them responsible for the use made of their
equipment anywhere, but especially in Pakistan.
Ahmed: They have some US equipment.
Kissinger: That they got since 1962?
Ahmed: Yes.
Kissinger: But where do they get spare parts?
Atherton: We don't give them any. I think it's from the international arms
market; it's mostly old equipment. But they have some of yours.
Kissinger: My point to him was not to tell him to use non-Soviet equipment.
It was to tell him they would be held responsible.
This is for your Prime Minister, not to make publicly.
How do you think they can start a war? Under what pretext?
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
CECRET/NODIS/XGDS
4.
Ahmed: They'll say they've waited 30 years to settle the border. As they did
in 1965, they'll open the main front. It would be an all-out war.
We think they cannot start a war without Soviet concurrence, because of
the Treaty of 1971. Because in case of any attack on India, the Soviets are
obligated to respond.
Kissinger: What will the Chinese do?
Ahmed: They say, "We will resolutely respond. Their Vice Premier came
through and we put this question to him: "We'd like to know exactly what you'll
do if Pakistan is attacked. We di dn't expect an immediate answer. We also
asked them to step up military supplies.
Kissinger: And their answer?
Ahmed: He said they'll consider it seriously. There already is a program of
supply. He said they'll insure the delivery of everything that has been
promised; as to new deliveries, he'd suggest it to his Government. They have
limited capacity. With the end of the war in Vietnam and Cambodia, they may
have more.
We need sophisticated equipment. Because a man can fight, but he needs
equipment. Manpower is important, but nevertheless, we must keep up with
technology. And we need to train them, and it's important for morale. They
see Iran -- we welcome it -- and India with the finest arms.
If our assessment is correct, we've at the most two years.
Kissinger: What do you base that assessment on?
Ahmed: On a number of things -- these comings and goings, Grechko and
others. The Romanian Ambassador told me he thought that there might be
an agreement, an understanding reached between Daoud and Indira.
Kissinger: Why would Afghanistan want India as a neighbor?
Ahmed: I think it's madness. The Indians say their line is on the Hindu
Kush, not the MacMahon line.
Kissinger: Do you think there is no chance of a negotiation with the Afghans?
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET /NODIS/XGDS
5.
Ahmed: It is very unfortunate. The Prime Minister invited Daoud and said,
"Don't announce it. These will be preliminary talks. " And suddenly came
the assassination of Sherpao. The students who put a tape recorder on the
table fled into Afghanistan. At a press conference.
Atherton: Another reason not to have press conferences. [Laughter]
Ahmed: The police couldn't find any traces, because there were thousands
of little pieces.
Kissinger: Where was he assassinated?
Ahmed: At the Peshawar University Historical Society. The two students who
did it escaped into Afghanistan. Some others who were involved were detained.
This was very unfortunate, apart from anything else, because it created
a deadlock in our talks. They said, "We won't talk unless you lift the ban and
release the students. " This would mean allowing their right to interfere in our
affairs. This deadlock is of their creation.
Kissinger: I had the impression when I was in Kabul that they were ready for
talks. This was before the assassination.
Ahmed: At that time things were moving very well. We were talking of the
principles of peaceful coexistence, which was fine, because one of the
principles is non-interference.
To show you how dishonest the Soviets can be: When we were negotiating
the communique with the Soviets, I negotiated with Kuznetzov. I suggested,
"How about -- on Afghanistan -- talking about 'on the basis of non-inter-
ference. I " He said they can't do that. I said, "How about on the basis of "the princi
of
peaceful coexistence," thinking he'd say no. But he said all right.
They were eager to placate the Prime Minister because the insurgency
in Baluchistan had collapsed. They might have come to the conclusion they
could try and WOO this country a bit. But it was just a change of tactics.
They've been quite rough to us. They said we had to agree to the line in
Baluchistan and the Northeast as drawn by Kaul, and also agree to join the
Asian Security System. Then this assassination.
Kissinger: Do you mind if we put this same question to the Chinese? Perhaps
some assurance against Soviet attack. If the Soviets attack them after an
Indian attack on you, we might be able to do something. In our present
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
6.
situation, until there is a presidential election, we couldn't use force ourselves
But we would certainly urge the Shah to help. If there is an Indian attack on
you, and then China tries to give assistance and the Soviets attack them, I
don't see how we could avoid doing something. It would look like a massive
attack on the whole structure in Asia.
Ahmed: We can take care of ourselves and don't need your manpower. What
we need really is the tools, and we'll do the job. We have excellent material.
We have no trouble finding the men; they can be trained.
We need the funds. Three billion dollars is the minimum requirement
over the next two years, because of the big gaps in our armed forces. I put
it to the Shahanshah, Between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the most we can get
is $1 billion. The Prime Minister got some from the Shahanshah and now he
will go to Saudi Arabia. If there is an attack
Kissinger: Then we'd have a new situation. Why don't you let us know how
it comes out.
On other issues, I don't think we have anything [to discuss]. We got you
more PL 480.
Ahmed: With the high cost of food.
Our main worry is what the Indians and Soviets and Afghans are up to.
We get intelligence, and we give some to your Ambassador. He's a fine man.
Kissinger: Byroade.
Ahmed: He's personally convinced we have a case. He came in and asked
after three months and said, "Where's your list? " We showed him one.
Kissinger: We didn't get it.
Ahmed: I told him not to send Because the State Department would say,
"What are they up to?" But he looked at it and said he would look into
delivery times, etc. I said we'd check first with Iran. So it's only a
tentative list.
[The meeting endéd]
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
COPY / OF 15 COPIES
4
ZODIU
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF MEMBER
TELEGRAM
SECRET
N00239
PAGE 01 STATE 184791
DECLASSIPIED
64
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
ORIGIN NODS-00
State Dept. Guidelines state Devices 9/16/03
By
Cala , NARA, Date 3/8/04
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R
DRAFTED BY NEA/PAB:POCONSTABLE/MW
APPROVED BY NEA - MR. ATHERTON
S/S: LCJOHNSTONE
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
s, P, D, MR, EAGLEBURGER, S/P, NEA ONLY.
ZODIU
089680
R. 0522072 AUG 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
6 Lall C R E T STATE 184791
NODIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS3
TAGS: PFOR, PK, US
SUBJECT: TEXTS OF LETTERS FROM PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO
FOR THE AMBASSADOR
1. FOLLOWING ARE THE TEXTS OF THE LETTERS TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE SECRETARY FROM PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO DATED JUNE 13,
ZODIU
1975, THESE WERE DELIVERED TO THE DEPARTMENT BY THE PAKI-
STAN EMBASSY.
2. QUOTE: DEAR MR, PRESIDENT,
I HAVE BEEN WANTING TO WRITE TO YOU ON A MATTER OF VITAL
INTEREST BOTH TO THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN AND TO THE PEACE
AND STABILITY OF OUR VAST AND POPULOUS REGION. HOWEVER,
SINCE YOU HAVE BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH MOMENTOUS ISSUES
RELATING TO EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST, I THOUGHT IT BETTER
TO WAIT UNTIL YOU RETURNED HOME AND HAD TIME TO ADDRESS
YOUR ATTENTION TO OTHER MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE TO WORLD
PEACE.
SECRET
FORD LIBRARY & OF
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
202-0
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 184791
ON MAY 22, SECRETARY KISSINGER AND MY MINISTER OF STATE
FOR DEFENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR. AZIZ AHMED, MET IN
ANKARA. IN THE COURSE OF THAT MEETING, DR. KISSINGER
INFORMED MR. AHMED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO SOVIET FOREIGN
MINISTER GROMYKO IN VERY STRONG TERMS TO THE EFFECT THAT
AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT WOULD
N
INVITE A RESPONSE FROM THE UNITED STATES.
IT IS AN ESTABLISHED FACT THAT PRACTICALLY ALL OF INDIAIS
ARMED FORCES ARE EQUIPPED WITH SOVIET WEAPONS. MOREOVER,
IN VIEW OF THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF 1971, AN ARMED ATTACK
ON PAKISTAN BY INDIA WOULD NECESSARILY CARRY SOVIET AP-
PROVAL AND, INDEED, DIRECT INVOLVEMENT.
AS YOU ARE AWARE, MR. PRESIDENT, MY GOVERNMENT IS DETER-
MINED TO FURTHER THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS
WITH INDIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SIMLA AGREEMENT. WE
WILL SUSTAIN THIS POLICY AS LONG AS IT IS RECIPROCATED BY
S
INDIA. NEVERTHELESS, OUR CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT OF THE
SITUATION, AS MR. AHMED CONVEYED TO DR. KISSINGER, IS THAT
WAR COULD COME AT ANY TIME THE SOVIET UNION WANTED IT, AS
INDIA WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN CONTRIVING AN EXCUSE
FOR STARTING ONE. FOR INSTANCE, INDIA COULD BRAZENLY
ASSERT ITS SPURIOUS CLAIM TO THE WHOLE OF THE STATE OF
JAMMU AND KASHMIR AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF INDIA AND PREPARE
N
THE STAGE FOR AN INVASION OF AZAD KASHMIR ON THE PRETEXT
THAT IT SOUGHT TO RELEASE IT FROM PAKISTAN'S CONTROL.
ALL-OUT HOSTILITIES WOULD BE INELUCTABLE RESULT.
DR. KISSINGER ASKED WHAT CHINA WOULD DO IN THE EVENT OF
AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN, WE HAD PUT PRECISELY THE
SAME QUESTION TO THE CHINESE VICE-PREMIER WHEN HE VISITED
PAKISTAN RECENTLY. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ARE CONSIDERING
THIS QUESTION BUT HAVE GIVEN us NO ANSWER SO FAR, THEIR
DECISION IN THIS REGARD CANNOT BUT BE INFLUENCED BY THE
EXISTENCE OF THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY. THE CONSTRAINT ON
CHINA'S FREEDOM TO ACT AS A RESULT OF THIS TREATY WAS
S
TRAGICALLY DEMONSTRATED WHEN INDIA ATTACKED PAKISTAN IN
1971. CHINA WAS HAMSTRUNG WHILE PAKISTAN WAS DISMEMBERED
FORD
SECRET
&
GERALO
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
200-0
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 184791
WITH SOVIET INSTIGATION AND SUPPORT.
DR. KISSINGER THEN ENQUIRED WHETHER HE COULD ASK CHINA WHAT
EXACTLY IT WOULD DO IF INDIA ATTACKED PAKISTAN AND ADDED
THAT, IF CHINA POSED THE COUNTER-QUESTION AS TO WHAT THE
UNITED STATES WOULD DO IN SUCH AN EVENT, IT WOULD BE
INFORMED THAT IF INDIA ATTACKED PAKISTAN AND CHINA CAME TO
ITS HELP AND IF IN CONSEQUENCE THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED
CHINA, THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STAY OUT OF
THAT SITUATION.
ZODIU
TO PAKISTAN, CONFRONTED WITH AN OVERWHELMING MILITARY
THREAT FROM INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN, BOTH ARMED AND BACKED
BY THE SOVIET UNION, THIS FORTHRIGHT ENUNCIATION OF THE
DETERMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO WARD OFF A DANGER
OF VAST AND INCALCULABLE PROPORTIONS COMES AS MOST WELCOME
NEWS,
I AM DEEPLY IMPRESSED, MR. PRESIDENT, BY THE CLARITY WITH
WHICH YOUR ADMINISTRATION HAS PERCEIVED THE IMPLICATIONS
OF AN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN FOR THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF
THIS STRATEGIC AREA. THIS UNCLOUDED APPROACH ENVISAGES,
FOR THE FIRST TIME, A CONCRETE STEP WHICH COULD RESTORE
THE POWER EQUILIBRIUM IN THIS REGION. THIS COULD OPERATE
AS A DECISIVE FACTOR IN MAINTAINING PEACE, DEFENDING FREE-
DOM AND PROTECTING THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES
IN SOUTH ASIA. IF THE SHADOW OF BLACKMAIL AND THE SPECTRE
N
OF WAR WHICH DARKEN THE HORIZONS OF THIS STRIFE-TORN
SUBCONTINENT WERE REMOVED FROM IT, A TURNING POINT WOULD
BE REACHED IN ITS HISTORY. THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER
WOULD GAIN REALITY AND THE STRUCTURE OF PEACE IN OUR CRITI-
CAL REGION COULD BECOME TRULY INVIOLABLE.
WITH BEST WISHES AND WARM REGARDS, YOURS SINCERELY,
ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO, END QUOTE
3. QUOTE: MY DEAR DR. KISSINGER,
AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE HAVE DONE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO,
OUR UTMOST TO NORMALIZE OUR RELATIONS WITH INDIA IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE SIMLA AGREEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, WE
FORD
SECRET
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
200-0
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
SECRET
PAGE 04 STATE 184791
ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED OVER THE PROBABILITY OF INDIA
DECIDING TO LAUNCH A WAR AGAINST PAKISTAN IN WHICH AFGHANI-
STAN WILL ALSO JOIN AND BOTH WILL HAVE THE FULL BACKING OF
THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH A WAR COULD COME AT ANY TIME THE
SOVIET UNION SHOULD JUDGE THE SITUATION TO BE RIPE. IT
IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT IT COULD BE UNLEASHED WITHIN TWO
YEARS, BEFORE WE HAVE HAD THE TIME ADEQUATELY TO STRENGTHEN
OUR DEFENCE CAPABILITY. INDIA COULD CONTRIVE A PRETEXT
ON THE BASIS OF ITS BRAZEN CLAIM TO JAMMU AND KASHMIR BEING
AN INTEGRAL PART OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN BEING IN CONTROL OF
ZODIU
A PART OF THE STATE,
AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR FROM MR.
AZIZ AHMED WHAT YOU HAD TOLD GROMYKO AND WHAT YOU PLANNED
TO TELL THE CHINESE ABOUT THE ACTION THE UNITED STATES
WOULD TAKE IF THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA FOR COMING
TO PAKISTANIS ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF AN INDIAN ATTACK
ON PAKISTAN,
THIS LATTER ASSURANCE COULD HAVE A MOST VITAL BEARING ON
THE BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA AND FORTIFY PEACE AND STABIL-
ITY IN THIS CRITICAL REGION. I CONSIDER IT TO BE THE MOST
EFFECTIVE COUNTER YET TO THE SOVIET AMBITIONS TO EXTEND
HEGEMONY TO PAKISTAN, WHICH IS THE IMMEDIATE TARGET OF
THESE AMBITIONS, IT COMES AS A REFRESHING INDICATION OF A
NEW DETERMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION TO
SAFEGUARD PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA.
200-0
I SHOULD ALSO ADD THAT THIS ASSURANCE IS ANOTHER MANIFESTA-
TION OF THE FAR-SIGHTED STATESMANSHIP AND CLARITY OF VISION
WHICH I, LIKE MANY OTHERS, HAVE ALWAYS ADMIRED IN YOU,
ONLY SUCH A PERCEPTION OF LURKING DANGERS AND THE UN-
DISTRACTED WILL TO AVERT THEM CAN TRANSFORM THE FEARS OF
TODAY INTO THE HOPES OF TOMORROW.
MAY I SUGGEST THAT THE QUESTION OF CHINESE ASSISTANCE TO
PAKISTAN IN THE EVENT OF AN INDIAN ATTACK MAY BE TAKEN UP
WITH THE CHINESE LEADERS WHILE THEY ARE STILL CONSIDERING
THE ISSUE. IT COULD HELP THEM MATERIALLY TO DECIDE WHAT
CHINA COULD DO IN THAT CONTINGENCY.
SECRET
GERALD LIBRARY FORD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
200-0
OF STATE DE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 05 STATE 184791
MR. AZIZ AHMED TOOK UP THE MATTER OF THE CHINESE PRESS
ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES WITH THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR
ALONG THE LINES INDICATED BY YOU SOON AFTER HIS RETURN
FROM ANKARA.
WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, YOURS SINCERELY, ZULFIKAR ALI
BHUTTO. END QUOTE, KISSINGER
ZODIU
200-0
SECRET
GEAALD a FORD LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 8, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
The Situation Room
SUBJECT:
Message From Prime Minister Bhutto
Aeronautical Radio in New York City relayed the following
message from Prime Minister Bhutto to President Ford as the
prime minister's plane was leaving the United States at
9:30 P.M. tonight.
"To His Excellency Gearld R. Ford, President of the United
States of America:
As I leave the United States of America on the conclusion of
my visit, I wish to express on behalf of my delegation and my-
self of my sincere thanks and gratitude of the warm hospitality
extended to us throughout our stay in your country. In terms
of relations between our two countries, as well as from me
personally, it was a memorable visit. It gave me invaluable
opportunity to meet you and useful exchange of views on
matters of multiple interest. I return with renewed confidence
that the special friendship of our two countries will continue
to grow and develop in the coming years. I wish you Mr. President
personal health and well being and every success in realizing
goals for your country and the world.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto"
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
5A
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/NODIS
INFORMATION
August 23, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
ROSEMARY NIEHUS
SUBJECT:
New Message for the President from
Prime Minister Bhutto
Ambassador Yaqub-Khan returned from Pakistan late yesterday
with another letter to the President from Prime Minister Bhutto.
The original was delivered here with the hope that it would be
transmitted immediately. I believe it is safe to assume that the
Ambassador will seek an early meeting with you (he has not re-
quested this yet) on your return from Vail to discuss the range of
Pakistani security concerns and such issues as (a) the President's
trip to Pakistan and (b) a possible meeting for Aziz Ahmed with the
President during UNGA (Chavan has asked for a meeting -- the Paks
will be sensitive), as well as developments in South Asia (Bangladesh).
The full text of Bhutto's message is attached, but its main themes --
Soviet/Indian/Afghan pressures on Pakistan and the need for greater
US support for Islamabad -- are consistent with Bhutto's previous
two messages to the President and Secretary Kissinger of June 13.
Two points are worth noting, however: (a) The linkage between
the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit (paragraph 2) and prospects
for accelerated Soviet efforts to carve out a sphere of influence in
South Asia; (b) The assertion that US assurances to Pakistan to date
(while greatly appreciated) have not curbed Soviet designs (paragraph
6) and particularly, that this situation only further encourages Moscow
in its pressures on Pakistan (paragraph 7). While Bhutto makes no
specific requests in this letter, by developing a negative line on US
support for Pakistan, he is in effect asking for increased political
and materiel support, arms being of foremost interest to Islamabad.
You will note that Bhutto makes no mention of having received replies
to his two messages of June 13 and this has probably prompted his
third letter. I have checked with State and understand that the Secretary has not
(as of this writing) given final clearance to the proposed replies and
that he has this action package with him. State is now aware of this
FORD
SEGRET/NODIS
a
DECLASSIFIED
GERALD
LIBRARY
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review 9/17/03
BY We
NARA. DATE 3/8/04
SECRET/NODIS -- 2
new message and Deputy Assistant Secretary Sober will be staffing
the Secretary. I am also doing a daily briefing item. In sum, this
action is now on the tracks.
SECRET/NODIS
Attachment: Message from the Prime Minister to the President
dated August 17, received NSC late August 22.
FORD LIBRARY & 07VH20
Islamabad,
August 17, 1975.
PRIME MINISTER
Dear Mr. President,
I am writing to share with you our
apprehensions over the likely Soviet role in
Asia after the Helsinki Summit, particularly
following recent developments in our region.
2.
We feel deeply disturbed over the
establishment of an authoritarion system in
India on the one hand, and the growing hostility
of an unstable Afghan regime towards Pakistan
on the other. Our fears are heightened by our
perception of the increasing dependence of these
two regimes in our immediate neighbourhood on
the Soviet Union with which they are allied and
which is enabled by the Helsinki accord to pay
greater attention to our region in pursuance of its
historic objectives and global ambitions. We
foresee that, assured of security in Europe, the
Soviet Union will relentlessly exert pressures on
the smaller states of Asia and on Pakistan in
particular, with a view to achieving its purpose
of establishing an unchallengable sphere of influence
in this continent.
3.
Situated as we are, we cannot but be
conscious of Soviet designs and the nature of
Soviet ambitions in Asia, and what these portend
for us. Despite the Soviet Union's role in the
dismemberment of our country in 1971, we have,
within the framework of our principles and policies,
DECLASSIPIED
FORD
B.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
By
We State Dept. Guidelines state view 9/17/03
LIBRARY
, NARA, Date 3/8/04
Page- 2
PRIME MINISTER
left no stone unturned to improve our relations
with it in order to reduce its hostility towards
Pakistan which, rightly or wrongly, it has
regarded as an obstacle in the path of its
ambitions in Asia. This above all was the
purpose of my visit to Moscow in March 1972 and
again in October last year.
4.
Soviet goals and ambitions are inflexible
and hardly amenable to any basic change as a result
of the efforts of a small country such as ours,
which in the interest of the preservation of its
own sovereignty, national independence and
territorial integrity, has stoutly declined to toe
FORD
LIBRARY
the Soviet line. The passage of time makes clearer
both the ever-growing threat to our existence from
Moscow's expansionist policies and the woeful
inadequacy of our resources to meet this threat.
5.
The Soviet Union is determined to subject
7
Thisis a recast of a
us to intensified pressures while continuing to be
recent message to
outwardly affable. The most recent and disturbing
Byroade - that Paks
illustration of this came during recent exchanges
have "definite proof"
between our diplomats and their Soviet counter parts
in Kabul. Our Minister was asked by his Soviet
low-level
of Soviet support for
Afghan twitorial ambitions
counter part whether Pakistan would agree to cede
In Pakistan and that this
some territory to Afghanistan. On receiving a firm
is a major change in the
reply in the negative the Soviet Minister threw
Sovietposition. Bothour
up his hands and said, "Then God alone knows what
imbassies in Kabue and will happen." When our Ambassador sought clarification
Islamabad noted the low of the Soviet attitude from the Soviet Ambassador,
level of the Sov-Afghan
the latter not only accused Pakistan of not wanting
exchange, conchaed account to improve relations with Afghanistan but went so far
was exaggerated and surmisedes to assert that the Durand Agreement - defining
for it was US Pak Arms. lead-in to pressing the international frontier between Afghanistan and
Page- 3
PRIME MINISTER
Pakistan - was a legacy of the colonial times
which Pakistan should not try to defend and that the
Durand Line had been foisted upon the Afghans,
since no nation would, according to the Soviet
Ambassador, "willingly agree to have its own
people divided into two parts." The Soviet Ambassador
concluded by saying that the Asian Security Pact was
the real and the only answer for establishing
peace and security in Asia.
6.
I have no doubt that the United States
is cognizant of the Soviet threat to the countries
of this region and in particular to Pakistan which
has 80 far stood its ground. We greatly appreciate
the various statements of political support to
Pakistan which were given to us by the United States
at the highest level to counter the Soviet threat.
The fact, however, needs to be registered that
these declarations, valuable though they are, seem
to have made little impact on Soviet expansionism.
Soviet policies continue to be stridently asserted
and Soviet purposes aggressively reiterated.
7.
In these circumstances, our ability to
resist Soviet pressures will depend not so much
on the reliance we place on the American political
assurances as on the credibility the Soviet Union
attaches to them. The lack of a credible evidence
of support from the U.S. encourages the Soviet Union
to expect that the security requirements of Pakistan
would compel us to make readjustments demanded by
the changing power equilibrium in our region.
Page -4
PRIME MINISTER
8.
I need hardly assure you, Mr. President,
of how much we cherish our relations with the United
States. We sincerely hope that they will continue
to expand and gain strength in the coming months
and will be sustained by our commitments to the
goals and objectives of peace and stability which
we share.
9.
With my best wishes and warmest
personal regards,
Yours sincerely,
Zulfilen hi December
(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)
His Excellency
Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America,
WASHINGTON D.C.
FORD
&
GERALO
LIBRARY
6a
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
September 24, 1975
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS-3) ATTACHMENT
NSC/S:
Attached is the original letter to the President
from Prime Minister Bhutto dated June 13,
1975. Bhutto also sent a parallel message to
the Secretary. Replies to both June 13 messages
were contained in the attached State cable and
take care of the original message at back.
Therefore, you can close out the attached
documents.
There is a new message from Bhutto dated
August 17, 1975, which has been handled in
Log #5743-Addon #2 dated September 23, 1975.
Rosema ru y Niehuss
DECLASSIFIED
FORD
E.O. 12850, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEFT. GUIDELINES
BY lels
, NARA, DATE 3/8/04
LIGHARD'S
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS-3) ATTACHMENT
Palastane
1AB1
OF STATE
30 AUG 75Z 10 06
6b
Department of State
008449
UNITED 5
SECRET
N00658
TELEGRA
SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 3009462
21
ACTION NODSABB
6409
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
030931
0 3089132 AUG 75 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTO 10198
NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY
Reply to Bhutt
D
ED. 11652: XGDS-3
Messages of June
TAGS: PFOR, PK, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE POR PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO
to President a.
REF: STATE 232508 TOSEC 100162
Secretary
1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING FROM ME TO PRIME MINISTER
BRUTTO,
2, BEGIN MESSAGE:
DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:
SINCE I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU PLAN TO VIST SAUDI ARABIA
THIS COMING MUNDAY, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TU GIVE
0
YOU A BRIEF RE URT ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE CUMING TO THE AREA, I have BEEN ENGAGED
IN THE INTENSIVE NEGUTIATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO HELP EGYPT AND
ISRAEL ACHIEVE A FURTHER INTERIM AGREEMENT KHICH WOULD, IN OUR
VIEW, CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TUHARD THE JUST AND
LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH REMAINS OUR OVERRIDING
DBJECTIVE. THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT. THE ISRAELIS
ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
OF NITMORAWAL FROM THE PASSES AND UIL FIELDS IN SINAI IN CIR-
SECRET
FORD
DECLASSIPIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines state Review 9/17/03
By
, NARA, Date 3/8/04
LIBRARY & QERALD
THE
EXECUTIVE
SECR
OF STATE
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEO
STATES
OF
SECRET
RACE 02 SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 300946Z
CUMSTANCES WHERE AN END TO BELLIGERENCY AND PEACE STIL LIE
IN THE FUTURE. THE EGYPTIANS, FUR THEIR PART, ARE CONCERNED
ABOUT ENTERING POLITICAL UNDERTAKINGS ThAT ARE OF SIGNIFICANCE
TO THE ARAB HURLD GENERALLY IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE MUCH OF
THEIR AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORY REMAINS OCCUPIED AND THE
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF Tnic PALESTINIANS KEMAIN UNFULFILLED,
DESPITE THESE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON BOTH SIDES, 1 BELIEVE WE
HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS AND THAT THE CHANCES FOR
ACHIEVING THIS AGREEMENT ARE GOUD. EVEN THOUGH A NUMBER OF
OBSTACLES REMAIN TO BE OVERCUME AND A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION
IS NOT YET FULLY ASSURED. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE IN PARTICULAR
THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAS APPROACHED THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH
GENUINE STATESMANSHIP, AND THAT WE have MAU HEARTCNING SUPPORT
FROM OUR SAUDI FRIENDS,
I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS CONCERN IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT
THIS AGREEMENT, IF ACHIEVED, WILL LEAD TO DIMINISHED INTEREST
IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF ALL
ASPECTS- OF Tht ARAB-ISKAELI PROBLE, IT IS OUR FIRM IN-
TENTION, HOWEVER, THAT THERE MUST BE UN-GOING NEGOTIATIONS --
HOWEVER DIFFICULT THEY WILL BE AND HOWEVER MUCH TIME THEY
MAY TAKE HITH RESPECT TO THE SYRIAN AND OTHER ASPECTS
OF THE PROBLEM. OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS REQUIRE NOTHING
LESS. I AM CERTAIN THAT THE SAUDI LEADERS WOULD BE RE-
ASSURED BY ANY ENCOURAGEMENT YOU COULD GIVE THEM. THE
PRESIDENT AND I ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE THIS EFFORT AND,
DESPITE SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES NE ARE EXPERIENCING AT
HOME, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND
EPOPLE HILL SUPPORT DUR PEACE EFFORTS AND OUR POLICIES OF
STRENGTHENING RELATIONS WITH OUR ARAB FRIENDS. THE VERY
ACHIEVEMENT OF A NEA AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE A POSITIVE
EFFECT UN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE AND, If IT IS
SCRUPULOUSLY IMPLEMENTED AND OBSERVED, CAN BROADEN THE
BAIS OF CONFIDENCE WHICH IS NEEDED FOR OUTH SIDES TO TAKE
THE HARD POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED AS THE NEGOTIA
PROCESS GOES FORWARD IN THE MONTHS AMEAD.
I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE ThIS OCCASION, MR. PRIME
MINISTER, TO TELL YUU MUN PLEASED THE PRESIDENT AND I
WERE TO HEAR FROM YOU IN YOUR LETTERS OF JUNE 13 REGARDING
YOU CONCERNS FOR PAKISTANIS SECURITY, I REGRET THAT
SECRET
FORD
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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECR
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PAGE 03 SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 3009467
THE DEMANDS OF THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS HAVE DELAYED
MY SENDING YOU A CONSIDERED RESPONSE BEFORE THIS, I
HAVE DISCUSSED YOOK LETTERS IN DETAIL NIT11 THE PRESIDENT
AND KE HAS ASKED ME TU ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE DEEPLY
SYMPATMETIC TO YOUR CONCEERNS. IT WAS h1TR TMESE IN MIND
THAT THE PRESIDENT ORDERED THE LIFTING OF ThE EMBARGO ON
ARMS SALES TO PAKISTAN LAST FEBRUARY. WE ARE ALSU COMMITTED
TO DU WHAT NC CAN TU HELP MEET YOUR FOOD AND ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE YEAR ANEAD. THIS IS AN
N
INTEGRAL PART OF OUR EFFORTS 10 ASSURE PAKISTANIS CONTINUED
SECURITY AND WELL-BEING. I HAVE ALSO ASKED AMBASSADOR BYROADE
TO CONVEY OUR VIEKS UN VARIOUS SPECIFIC PUINTS YOU RAISED IN
YOU EARLIER LETTER,
So
Since MY DEPARTURE F.OR THE MIDDLE EAST, THE
PRESIDENT HAKEU WITH Mt YOUR AUGUST 17 LETTER TO RIM, RE
EMPHASIZING YOUR CONCERNS IN THE CONTEXT OF RECENT CONVERSATION
BETWEEN YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN KADUL.
UPON MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON, I KILLDISCUSS ThIS SUBJECT WITH
THE PRESIDENT, AND HE WILL, of COURSE, BE RESPONDING TO YOU,
MEANNAILE, I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM THE
SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE
BY ITS OFFICIALS IN KABUL, AND I HOPE YOU WILL KEEP
AMBASSADUR BYROADE INFORMED,
WARM REGARDS,
HENRY s. KISSINGER
END MESSAGE
3, IN CONVEYING ABOVE MES AGE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO,
FORD
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OF STATE
30 AUG 752 10 12
008450
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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PAGE 01 SECTO 10198 02 OF 02 301007Z
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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA
TO AMEMBASSY ISLANABAD NIACT IMMEDIATE
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SEE £ R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTO 10198
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FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY
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YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
WE HERE PLEASED TO NOTE THE PRIME MINISTER'S EX=
PRESSION, IN nIS JUNE LETTERS, OF CONTINUING SUPPORT
FOR THE SIMLA PROCESS. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED THE WISE POLICIES
S
OF CAUTION AND RESTRAINT SHOWN BY THE GOP DURING ThIS
DELICATE PERIOD OF DIFFICULTIES IN INDIA.
IT IS OUR VIEK THAT CONTINUED PROGRESS UNDER THE
SIMLA PROCESS WILL REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED
HOSTILITIES UN THE SUBCONTINENT. THE IMMEDIATE INTEREST
OF THE UNITED STATES, AND ONE WHICH wt FULLY SHARE WITH
N
PAKISTAN, IS TO AVERT SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. IT WAS WITH
TRIS OBJECTIVE 1N MIND THAT THE SECRETARY CONVEYED TO
FOREIGN MINISTER GRUMYKO IN MAY THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH
THE UNITED STATES KOULD REGARD AN INDICAN ATTACK AGAINST
PAKISTAN. TO BELIEVE THAT THE SUVIET
LEADERSHIP HAS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE PUSITION OF THE UNITED
STATES ON THIS QUESTION.
DIRECT INVOLVEMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA IN A
SOUTH ASIAN CONFLICT WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE GRAVEST NATURE AND WOULD BE OF GREAT CONCERN TO
THE UNITED STATES. THE RESPONSE UF THE UNITED STATES
WOULD BE A MATTER FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE EXECUTIVE
FORD
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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UNITED
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PAGE 22 SECTO 12198 62 OF 02 301007Z
OFF
BRANCH IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS IN
ACCORDANCE HITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR CONSTITUTION
AND OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1959 MUTUAL COOPERATION
AGREEMENT kITh PAKISTAN.
THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY ARE HOPEFUL THAT THEY
HILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HOLD TALKS IN PEKING WITH
LEADERS OF ThE PEOPLETS REPUBLIC UF CHINA LATER THIS YEAR,
THESE TALKS KOULD PROVIDE Aiv OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE
N
FULL RANGE OF SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING RELATIONS BETWEEN
OUR COUNTRIES AND PAKISTAN, AND WAYS IN whICH OUR GUVERNMENT
MIGHT CONTINUE TO ASSIST PAKISTAN IN ITS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN
ITS SECURITY.
THE SECRETARY KAS MOST APPRECIATIVE THAT MR, AZIZ
ARMED KAS COMMUNICATED TO THE CHINESE OUR CONCERN ABOUT
THE FFECT WHICH THEIR PROPAGANDA KAS ON OUR ABILITY
TO MOBILIZE DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRC'S SECURITY.
IN DISCUSSNG YOUR LETTERS IN WASHINGTON, I FOUND A
DEEP AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE ADMINISTRATION IN
S
PAKISTAN'S SECURITY AND RELFARE, AND A STRONG DESIRE TO
BE HELPFUL IN WAYS THAT ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR OWN
LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.
AS I KNOW YOU ARE AWARE FROM YOU UWN DISCUSSIONS WITH
AMERICAN LEADERS, INCLUDING SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN,
N
THE UNITED STATES IS NOT AULE TO UNDERTAKE ADDITIONAL
FORMAL SECURITY COMMITMENTS, OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF
OUR FORMAL TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS,
WITH REGARD TO THE RECENT STATEMENTS MADE BY SOVIET
REPRESENTATIVES TO PAKISTANI OFFICIALS IN KABUL CONCERNING
THE DURANU LINE, IF THESE IN FACT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN
SOVIET POLICY TUNARD PAKISTAN, WE WOULD OF COURSE VIEW
THEM WITH GRAVE CONCERN.
WE WILL BE INTERESTED TO HAVE YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON
THE SOVIET POSITION, FOLLOWING YOUR FURTHER CONVERSATIONS
KITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES.
SECRET
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SFC
OF STATE s
Department of State
LATTED STATES OF H AMERICA
TELEGRAM
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PAGE 23 SECTO 10196 02 of 32 3616072
4, IN ADDITION TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS ABOVE, YOU
SHOULD SEEK TU CORRECT THE DIFFERENCES "MICh EXIST BETWEEN
S
WHAT I SAID TO AZIZ AHMEU IN ANKAKA ON MAY 22 AND THE
INTERPRETATION UF THESE REMARKS CUNTAINED IN BHUTTO'S
LETTERS OF JUNE 13. THE FULLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE
MADE so THAT THE RECORD WILL BE CLEAR:
DURING MY HASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, I REVIEWED THE
N
MINUTES DF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MINISTER AZIZ AHMED
AND SECRETARY KISSINGER, OUR RECURD CONTAINS SOME
IMPORTANT NUANCES WHICH, IF NOT PRECISELY GRASPED, COULD
LEAD TU MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH ht BOTH HANT TO AVOID,
ThE SECRETARY INFORMED AZIZ AHMED HE HAD TOLD THE
SOVIETS THAT WE HOULU HOLD THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
USE MADE OF THEIR EQUIPMENT ANYWHERE, AND ESPECIALLY
IN PAKISTAN.
(BHUTTOIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: "DR, KISSINGER
INFORMED MR. ARMED THAT RE HAD SPOKEN TO GROMYKO IN
$
VERY STKNG TFRMS TO THE EFFECT THAT AN INDIAN ATTACK ON
PAKISTAN KITM SOVIET EQUIPMENT WOULD INVITE A RESPONSE
FROM THE UNITED STATES.
THE SECRETARY ASKED AZIZ AHMED IF WE COULD ASK THE
CHINESE HHAT THEIR RESPONSE WOULD BE IF PAKISTAN IS
ATTACKED. THE SECRETARY ALSO INDICATED THAT A GENERAL
N
WAK FOLLOWING AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN AND INVOLVING
THE SUVIETS AND CHINESE WOULD HAVE THE GRAVEST IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE WHULE OF ASIA AND FOR u.s. POLICY IN THE AREA.
(SHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY STATES: I WAS
RELIEVED TO HEAR FROM MR. AZIZ ARMED WHAT YOU PLANNED TO
TELL THE CHINESE ABOUT THE ACTION THE UNITED STATES WOULD
TAKE IF THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA FOR COMING TO PAKISTANIS
ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN.
BHUTTO'S LETTER TO ThE PRESIDENT STATES: "DR. KISSINGER
...ADDED THAT, IF CHINA POSED THE COUNTERQUESTION AS TO
WHAT THE UNITED STATES HOULD DU IN SUCH AN EVENT AN
INDIAN ATTACK UN PAKISTAN), IT WOULD HE INFORMED THAT IF
INDIA ATTACKED PAKISTAN AND CHINA CAME TO ITS HELP AND
FORD
IF IN CONSEQUENCE THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA, THE
R
SECRET
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Department of State
FRDAT
BELIEVER
UNITED THE STATES OF
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PAGE 04 SECTO 10198 02 OF 02 3010072
UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STAY OUT OF THAT
SITUATION. )
KISSINGER
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96
His Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America,
White House,
Washington D.C.
(+
PRIME MINISTER
Prime Minister's House
Rawalpindi
13 June 1975
Dear Mr. President,
I have been wanting to write to you on a matter
of vital interest both to the security of Pakistan and to the
peace and stability of our vast and populous region. However,
since you have been preoccupied with momentous issues relating
to Europe and the Middle East, I thought it better to wait until
you returned home and had time to address your attention to
other matters of importance to world peace.
On May 22, Secretary Kissinger and my Minister
of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmed, met
in Ankara. In the course of that meeting, Dr. Kissinger informed
Mr. Ahmed that he had spoken to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
in very strong terms to the effect that an Indian attack on Pakistan
with Soviet equipment would invite a response from the United
States.
It is an established fact that practically all of
India's armed forces are equipped with Soviet weapons.
Moreover, in view of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, an armed
attack on Pakistan by India would necessarily carry Soviet approval
and, indeed, direct involvement.
As you are aware, Mr. President, my Government
is determined to further the process of normalization of relations
with India in accordance with the Simla Agreement. We will
sustain this policy as long as it is reciprocated by India.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines state 9/16/03
, NARA, Date 3/8/04
PRIME MINISTER
-2-
Nevertheless, our considered assessment of the situation,
as Mr. Ahmed conveyed to Dr. Kissinger, is that war could
come at any time the Soviet Union wanted it, as India would
have no difficulty in contriving an excuse for starting one.
For instance, India could brazenly assert its spurious claim
to the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral
part of India and prepare the stage for an invasion of Azad
Kashmir on the pretext that it sought to release it from Pakistan's
control. All-out hostilities would be ineluctable result.
Dr. Kissinger asked what China would do in the
event of an Indian attack on Pakistan. We had put precisely
the same question to the Chinese Vice-Premier when he visited
Pakistan recently. The Chinese Government are considering
this question but have given us no answer so far. Their
decision in this regard cannot but be influenced by the existence
of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. The constraint on China's freedom
to act as a result of this Treaty was tragically demonstrated
when India attacked Pakistan in 1971. China was hamstrung while
Pakistan was dismembered with Soviet instigation and support.
Dr. Kissinger then enquired whether he could
ask China what exactly it would do if India attacked Pakistan
and added that, if China posed the counter-question as to what
the United States would do in such an event, it would be informed
that if India attacked Pakistan and China came to its help and if
in consequence the Soviet Union attacked China, the United
States would not be able to stay out of that situation.
PRIME MINISTER
-3-
To Pakistan, confronted with an overwhelming
military threat from India and Afghanistan, both armed and
backed by the Soviet Union, this forthright enunciation of the
determination of the United States to ward off a danger of vast
and incalculable proportions comes as most welcome news.
I am deeply impressed, Mr. President, by the
clarity with which your Administration has perceived the
implications of an attack on Pakistan for the peace and stability
of this strategic area. This unclouded approach envisages, for
the first time, a concrete step which could restore the power
equilibrium in this region. This could operate as a decisive
factor in maintaining peace, defending freedom and protecting
the vital interests of the United States in South Asia. If the
shadow of blackmail and the spectre of war which darken the
horizons of this strife-torn subcontinent were removed from it,
a turning point would be reached in its history. The global
balance of power would gain reality and the structure of peace
in our critical region could become truly inviolable.
With best wishes and warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
Julian in
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
\
His Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America
White House,
Washington D.C.
bf
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