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    "title": "Pakistan - Prime Minister Bhutto (3)",
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        "logicalDate": "1975-10-01",
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 3, folder \"Pakistan - Prime Minister Bhutto\n(3)\" of the National Security Adviser's Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders\nCollection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 3 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\n/\nMEMORANDUM\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\n5743 Add-on #3\nSECRET/NODIS (GDS)\nACTION\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nSECRETARY KISSINGER\nHAK\nOctober thinkson 15, 1975\nFROM:\nROBERT B. OAKLEY\nTO\nSUBJECT:\nPresidential Reply to Letter of August 17\nfrom Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan\nYou will recall Prime Minister Bhutto's messages to the President\nand you of June 13 following your meeting with Aziz Ahmed in Ankara\n[Tab II]. You replied to both of these via a message to Bhutto and oral\ninstructions to Ambassador Byroade, which Byroade noted, effectively\nclosed out the June 13 messages [Tab III]. In your message to Bhutto,\nyou also acknowledged his new letter to the President of August 17,\nindicating that the President would respond after you had a chance to\ndiscuss it with him following your return from the Middle East.\nThe President has now seen Aziz Ahmed but he still owes Bhutto a\nreply to the August 17 letter. At Tab I is a memo transmitting that\nletter and proposing a reply. The suggested reply has been developed\nfrom a State draft and coordinated here, revised to reflect the fact of\nthe Presidential meeting last week.\nRECOMMENDATION: That you forward the memo at Tab I to the\nPresident seeking his signature on a letter of reply to Bhutto.\nAPPROVE\nAPPROVE AS AMENDED\nConcurrence in Presidential reply: Messrs. Solomon, Clift\nRepe Peper\nMICROFILM DATA\nDO\nNOV 11 1975\nSubject to GDS of E.O. 11652\nTO\n)\nAutomatically Downgraded at Two\nWHO\nYear Intervals and Declassified on\nSUBF\nDecember 31, 1983.\nFORD\nSECRET/NODIS (GDS)\na\nlabs 3/9/04\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\n5743 - Add-on #3\nACTION\nSECRET/NODIS (GDS)\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHENRY A. KISSINGER\nSUBJECT:\nReply to Letter from Prime Minister\nBhutto of Pakistan\nAt Tab B is a letter to you from Prime Minister Bhutto expressing his\nconcern over the direction of Soviet policies in South Asia. These con-\ncerns are not new but they have been heightened by recent events such\nas the Helsinki Summit--which Bhutto thinks will permit the Soviets to\ndevote even more time to their ambitions in South Asia--and statements\nallegedly made recently by the Soviet representative in Kabul implying\nsympathy for Afghan designs on Pak territory.\nBhutto does not make explicit new appeals to you for greater political\nand material support but does state that Soviet aggressive designs on\nPakistan are encouraged by the lack of \"credible evidence of support\nfrom the US. 11\nBhutto's letter is a further attempt to keep his security concerns before\nyou and to elicit your personal reassurance and support. Aziz Ahmed\nfollowed the same themes in his talks with you here and with me in\nNew York. Within the framework of our current policy toward South Asia\nand our interest in avoiding any destabilizing moves, we are doing about\nas much as we can for Pakistan, including economic assistance, PL-480\nand military sales programs. You and I have made this clear to Aziz\nAhmed.\nIf only for reasons of courtesy, I believe that you should send a written\nreply to Bhutto, giving broad reassurance on the issues he raises,\nalthough you have said as much to Aziz Ahmed.\nFURD\nA\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you sign the letter to Prime Minister Bhutto at Tab A. (The text\nGERALD\nhas been cleared with Paul Theis.)\nSubject to GDS of E. O. 11652\nSECRET/NODIS (GDS)\nAutomatically Downgraded at Two\nWh 3/9/04\nYear Intervals and Declassified on\nDecember 31, 1983.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDear Mr. Prime Minister:\nThank you for your letter of August 17. It is important\nthat we maintain the close personal dialogue which we\nso effectively began in our very constructive meetings\nof last February. I know that Secretary of State Kissinger\nhas also been in touch with you, and both of us have now\nhad the opportunity to exchange views with your Minister\nof State, Aziz Ahmed.\nLet me assure you at the outset there is no question that\nthe integrity and independence of Pakistan are important\nto the United States and essential to the stability of South\nAsia. In a period in which we are working to lessen\ntensions between the major powers while safeguarding\nour vital security interests and those of our friends, my\nGovernment remains fully cognizant of its responsibility\nto insure that an easing of tensions in one area does not\ncreate opportunities for exploitation elsewhere. Nor can\nit in any way impact adversely on our relations with other\ncountries in our objectives of regional stability and world\npeace. We have, therefore, made clear to the Soviet\nleadership that our continuing attention to improved\nrelations between the United States and the Soviet Union\nis heavily conditioned by developments in other parts of\nthe world. I believe this position is well understood and\nwill continue to benefit your Nation's security and inde-\npendence.\nLet me emphasize that there will be no lessening of our\nresolve to help our friends in South Asia. Secretary\nKissinger has already made clear our appreciation for\nPakistan's concerns. These have been the subject of\ncontinuing attention in the United States Government for\nsome time, as you know from our discussions here last\nFebruary and as you have certainly heard from Aziz Ahmed\nand your Ambassador in Washington.\nI believe we have taken significant steps to help Pakistan,\nboth through the lifting of the arms embargo and in our\non-going economic assistance programs. In the months\nahead there will be visible results, as we respond to\nspecific requests for arms purchases and as we reach\nnew agreements on various economic development programs.\nWe admire the progress you have stimulated in the process\nof normalization of relations among the countries of South\nAsia and we intend to continue to offer maximum encourage-\nment to your efforts.\nIn closing, I want to reiterate my strong wish to visit\nPakistan at an early date and to meet with you again.\nIt now appears that my schedule through the remainder\nof this year will make it impossible for me to accept your\nwarm hospitality at this time. As you know, I do plan to\nvisit the People's Republic of China fairly soon. I intend\nto discuss with the Chinese leaders our common interests\nin promoting stability in South Asia and your important\ncontribution to that end. I look forward to accepting your\nhospitality at a mutually convenient time. In the meantime,\nI remain grateful for and committed to the further strength-\nening of the close relations between our two countries.\nWith best personal wishes,\nSincerely,\nHis Excellency\nZulfikar Ali Bhutto\nPrime Minister of the\nIslamic Republic of Pakistan\nIslamabad\nIslamabad,\nAugust 17, 1975.\nPRIME MINISTER\nDear Mr. President,\nI am writing to share with you our\napprehensions over the likely Soviet role in\nAsia after the Helsinki Summit, particularly\nfollowing recent developments in our region.\n2.\nWe feel deeply disturbed over the\nestablishment of an authoritarion system in\nIndia on the one hand, and the growing hostility\nof an unstable Afghan regime towards Pakistan\non the other. Our fears are heightened by our\nperception of the increasing dependence of these\ntwo regimes in our immediate neighbourhood on\nthe Soviet Union with which they are allied and\nwhich is enabled by the Helsinki accord to pay\ngreater attention to our region in pursuance of its\nhistoric objectives and global ambitions. We\nforesee that, assured of security in Europe, the\nSoviet Union will relentlessly exert pressures on\nthe smaller states of Asia and on Pakistan in\nparticular, with a view to achieving its purpose\nof establishing an unchallengable sphere of influence\nin this continent.\n3.\nSituated as we are, we cannot but be\nconscious of Soviet designs and the nature of\nSoviet ambitions in Asia, and what these portend\nfor us. Despite the Soviet Union's role in the\ndismemberment of our country in 1971, we have,\nwithin the framework of our principles and policies,\n2-\nDECLASSIFIED\nB.O. 12938, Sec. 3.5\nState Dept. Guidelines\nStateleview 9/17/03\nBy\n, NARA, Date 3/9/04\nPage- 2\nPRIME MINISTER\nleft no stone unturned to improve our relations\nwith it in order to reduce its hostility towards\nPakistan which, rightly or wrongly, it has\nregarded as an obstacle in the path of its\nambitions in Asia. This above all was the\npurpose of my visit to Moscow in March 1972 and\nagain in October last year.\n4.\nSoviet goals and ambitions are inflexible\nand hardly amenable to any basic change as a result\nof the efforts of a small country such as ours,\nwhich in the interest of the preservation of its\nown sovereignty, national independence and\nterritorial integrity, has stoutly declined to toe\nthe Soviet line. The passage of time makes clearer\nboth the ever-growing threat to our existence from\nMoscow's expansionist policies and the woeful\ninadequacy of our resources to meet this threat.\n5.\nThe Soviet Union is determined to subject\nus to intensified pressures while continuing to be\noutwardly affable. The most recent and disturbing\nillustration of this came during recent exchanges\nbetween our diplomats and their Soviet counter parts\nin Kabul. Our Minister was asked by his Soviet\ncounter part whether Pakistan would agree to cede\nsome territory to Afghanistan. On receiving a firm\nreply in the negative the Soviet Minister threw\nup his hands and said, \"Then God alone knows what\nwill happen. When our Ambassador sought clarification\nof the Soviet attitude from the Soviet Ambassador,\nthe latter not only accused Pakistan of not wanting\nSERALO\nto improve relations with Afghanistan but went so far\nas to assert that the Durand Agreement - defining\nthe international frontier between Afghanistan and\nPage- 3\nPRIME MINISTER\nPakistan - was a legacy of the colonial times\nwhich Pakistan should not try to defend and that the\nDurand Line had been foisted upon the Afghans,\nsince no nation would, according to the Soviet\nAmbassador, \"willingly agree to have its own\npeople divided into two parts.\" The Soviet Ambassador\nconcluded by saying that the Asian Security Pact was\nthe real and the only answer for establishing\npeace and security in Asia.\n6.\nI have no doubt that the United States\nis cognizant of the Soviet threat to the countries\nof this region and in particular to Pakistan which\nhas so far stood its ground. We greatly appreciate\nthe various statements of political support to\nPakistan which were given to us by the United States\nat the highest level to counter the Soviet threat.\nThe fact, however, needs to be registered that\nthese declarations, valuable though they are, seem\nto have made little impact on Soviet expansionism.\nSoviet policies continue to be stridently asserted\nand Soviet purposes aggressively reiterated.\n7.\nIn these circumstances, our ability to\nresist Soviet pressures will depend not so much\non the reliance we place on the American political\nassurances as on the credibility the Soviet Union\nattaches to them. The lack of a credible evidence\nof support from the U.S. encourages the Soviet Union\nto expect that the security requirements of Pakistan\nwould compel us to make readjustments demanded by\nthe changing power equilibrium in our region.\nPage -4\nPRIME MINISTER\n8.\nI need hardly assure you, Mr. President,\nof how much we cherish our relations with the United\nStates. We sincerely hope that they will continue\nto expand and gain strength in the coming months\nand will be sustained by our commitments to the\ngoals and objectives of peace and stability which\nwe share.\n9.\nWith my best wishes and warmest\npersonal regards,\nYours sincerely,\nZulfilen ui Illunts\n(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)\nHis Excellency\nMr. Gerald R. Ford,\nPresident of the United States of America,\nWASHINGTON D.C.\nPrime Minister House\nRawalpindi\nTab 4\n13 June 1975\nTAB II\nMy de r Dr. Kissinger,\nAs you are aware, we have done, and will continue\nto do, Jar utmost to normalize our relations with India in\naccor ince with the Simla Agreement. Nevertheless, we are\nseriou ly concerned over the probability of India deciding to\nlaunch it war against Pakistan in which Afghanistan will also\njoin a: both will have the full backing of the Soviet Union. Such\na war ould come at any time the Soviet Union should judge the\nsituati to be ripe. It is our assessment that it could be unleashed\nwithin two years, before we have had the time adequately to\n.strengthen our defence capability. India could contrive a pretext\non the basis of its brazen claim to Jammu and Kashmir being an\nintegral part of India and Pakistan being in control of a part of the\nState.\nAgainst this background, I was relieved to hear\nleview\nGuidelines state 9/17/13\nfrom Mr. Aziz Ahmed what you had told Gromyko and what\nyou planned to tell the Chinese about the action the United States\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nState Dept. 3/9/04\nwould take if the Soviet Union attacked China for coming to\nNARA, Date\nPakistan's assistance in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan.\nThis latter assurance could have a most vital\nbearing on the balance of power in Asia and fortify peace and\nFORD\nstability in this critical region. I consider it to be the most\n&\nGERALD\neffective counter yet to the Soviet ambitions to extend hegemony\nover the region comprising the Persian Gulf and the sub-continent.\n-2-\nTo Pakistan, which is the immediate target of these ambitions,\nit come ; as a refreshing indication of a new determination in the\nUnited States Administration to safeguard peace and stability in\nSouth ;ia.\nI should also add that this assurance is another\nmanifestation of the far-sighted statesmanship and clarity of\nvision which I, like many others, have always admired in you.\nOnly SU h a perception of lurking dangers and the undistracted\nwill to avert them can transform the fears of today into the hopes\nof tome row.\nMay I suggest that the question of Chinese assistance\nto Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack may be taken up with\nthe Chinese leaders while they are still considering the issue. It\ncould help them materially to decide what China could do in that\ncontingency.\nMr. Aziz Ahmed took up the matter of the Chinese\npress attacks on the United States with the Chinese Ambassador\nalong the lines indicated by you soon after his return from Ankara.\nWith warm personal regards,\nYours sincerely,\nZurs hn hi Shinado\nZulfikar Ali Bhutto\nHis Excellency Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,\nSecretary of State for Foreign Affairs,\nGERALD a LIBRARY FORD\nWashington D.C.\nPRIME MINISTER\nPrime Minister's House\nRawalpindi\n13 June 1975\nDear Mr. President,\nI have been wanting to write to you on a matter\nof vital interest both to the security of Pakistan and to the\npeace and stability of our vast and populous region. However,\nsince you have been preoccupied with momentous issues relating\nto Europe and the Middle East, I thought it better to wait until\nyou returned home and had time to address your attention to\nother matters of importance to world peace.\nOn May 22, Secretary Kissinger and my Minister\nof State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmed, met\nin Ankara. In the course of that meeting, Dr. Kissinger informed\nMr. Ahmed that he had spoken to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko\nin very strong terms to the effect that an Indian attack on Pakistan\nwith Soviet equipment would invite a response from the United\n9/17/03\nStates.\nIt is an established fact that practically all of\nDECLASSIMED\nState E.O. Dept. Guidelines state leview\nIndia's armed forces are equipped with Soviet weapons.\nNARA, Date 3/9/04\nher\nesvcr,\nwisw 19 the Inde-Soviei Treaty of 1971, an armed\n12958, Sec. 3.5\nattack on Pakistan by India would necessarily carry Soviet approval\nand, indeed, direct involvement.\nAs you are aware, Mr. President, my Government\nis determined to further the process of normalization of relations\nwith India in accordance with the Simla Agreement. We will\nsustain this policy as long as it is reciprocated by India.\nPRIME MINISTER\n-2-\nNevertheless, our considered assessment of the situation,\nas Mr. Ahmed conveyed to Dr. Kissinger, is that war could\ncome at any time the Soviet Union wanted it, as India would\nhave no difficulty in contriving an excuse for starting one.\nFor instance, India could brazenly assert its spurious claim\nto the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral\npart of India and prepare the stage for an invasion of Azad\nKashmir on the pretext that it sought to release it from Pakistan's\ncontrol. All-out hostilities would be ineluctable result.\nDr. Kissinger asked what China would do in the\nevent of an Indian attack on Pakistan. We had put precisely\nthe same question to the Chinese Vice-Premier when he visited\nPakistan recently. The Chinese Government are considering\nthis question but have given us no answer so far. Their\ndecision in this regard cannot but be influenced by the existence\nof the Indo-Soviet Treaty. The constraint on China's freedom\nto act as a result of this Treaty was tragically demonstrated\nwhen India attacked Pakistan in 1971. China was hamstrung while\nPakistan was dismembered with Soviet instigation and support.\nDr. Kissinger then enquired whether he could\nask China what exactly it would do if India attacked Pakistan\nand added that, if China posed the counter-question as to what\nthe United States would do in such an event, it would be informed\nthat if India attacked Pakistan and China came to its help and if\nin consequence the Soviet Union attacked China, the United\nStates would not be able to stay out of that situation.\nPRIME MINISTER\n-3-\nTo Pakistan, confronted with an overwhelming\nmilitary threat from India and Afghanistan, both armed and\nbacked by the Soviet Union, this forthright enunciation of the\ndetermination of the United States to ward off a, danger of vast\nand incalculable proportions comes as most welcome news.\nI am deeply impressed, Mr. President, by the\nclarity with which your Administration has perceived the\nimplications of an attack on Pakistan for the peace and stability\nof this strategic area. This unclouded approach envisages, for\nthe first time, a concrete step which could restore the power\nequilibrium in this region. This could operate as a decisive\nfactor in maintaining peace, defending freedom and protecting\nthe vital interests of the United States in South Asia. If the\nshadow of blackmail and the spectre of war which darken the\nhorizons of this strife-torn subcontinent were removed from it,\na turning point would be reached in its history. The global\nbalance of power would gain reality and the structure of peace\nin our critical region could become truly inviolable.\nWith best wishes and warm regards,\nYours sincerely,\nJuly Jun his Shunks\nZulfikar Ali Bhutto\n\\\nHis Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford,\nPresident of the United States of America\nWhite House,\nWashington D.C.\nCOPY 9 OF 15 COPIES\nPalastan TABITI\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\n30 AUG 75Z 10 06\n12\nDepartment of State\n008449\nAMERICA\nSECRET\nN00658\nTELEGRAM\nPAGE\n19\nSECTO 10198 01 OF 02 300946Z\n21\nACTION NODS-00\nINFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1001 W\n030931\n0 3009132 AUG 75 ZFF-6\nFM USDEL SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA\nTO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD NIACT IMMEDIATE\nINFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE\nSECRE T SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTO 10198\nNODIS\nFOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY\nReply to Bhutto's\nED. 11652: XGDS-3\nMessages of June3\nTAGS: PFOR, PK, US\nSUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO\nto President and\nREF: STATE 202508 TOSEC 100162\nSecretary\n1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING FROM ME TO PRIME MINISTER\nBHUTTO,\n2, BEGIN MESSAGE:\nDEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:\nSINCE I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU PLAN TO VIST SAUDI ARABIA\nTHIS COMING MONDAY, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO GIVE\n0\nYOU A BRIEF REPORT ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MIDDLE EAST\nNEGOTIATIONS. SINCE COMING TO THE AREA, I HAVE BEEN ENGAGED\nIN THE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO HELP EGYPT AND\nISRAEL ACHIEVE A FURTHER INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD, IN OUR\nadded by Sec.\nVIEW, CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD THE JUST AND\nLASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH REMAINS OUR OVERRIDING\nOBJECTIVE. THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT. THE ISRAELIS\nARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS\nOF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PASSES AND OIL FIELDS IN SINAI IN CIR-\nSECRET\nFORD\n?\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nWe\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nState Dept. Guidelines State Review 9/17/03\n, NARA, Date 3/9/04\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETA\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE #2 SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 300946Z\nCUMSTANCES WHERE AN END TO BELLIGERENCY AND PEACE STIL LIE\nIN THE FUTURE. THE EGYPTIANS, FOR THEIR PART, ARE CONCERNED\nABOUT ENTERING POLITICAL UNDERTAKINGS THAT ARE OF SIGNIFICANCE\nTO THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE MUCH OF\nTHEIR AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORY REMAINS OCCUPIED AND THE\nLEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF Tnc PALESTINIANS REMAIN UNFULFILLED.\nDESPITE THESE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON BOTH SIDES, 1 BELIEVE WE\nHAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS AND THAT THE CHANCES FOR\nACHIEVING THIS AGREEMENT ARE GOOD EVEN THOUGH A NUMBER OF\nOBSTACLES REMAIN TO BE OVERCOME AND A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION\nIS NOT YET FULLY ASSURED. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE IN PARTICULAR\nTHAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAS APPROACHED THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH\nGENUINE STATESMANSHIP, AND THAT WE HAVE HAD HEARTENING SUPPORT\nFROM OUR SAUDI FRIENDS,\nI RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS CONCERN IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT\nTHIS AGREEMENT, If ACHIEVED, WILL LEAD TO DIMINISHED INTEREST\nIN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF ALL\nASPECTS OF THE ARAB ISKAELI PROBLE, IT IS OUR FIRM IN-\nTENTION, HOREVER, THAT THERE MUST BE ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS --\nHOWEVER DIFFICULT THEY WILL BE AND HOWEVER MUCH TIME THEY\nMAY TAKE -- WITH RESPECT TO THE SYRIAN AND OTHER ASPECTS\nOF THE PROBLEM. OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS REQUIRE NOTHING\nLESS. I AM CERTAIN THAT THE SAUDI LEADERS WOULD BE RE-\nASSURED BY ANY ENCOURAGEMENT YOU COULD GIVE THEM. THE\nPRESIDENT AND I ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE THIS EFFORT AND,\nDESPITE SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES WE ARE EXPERIENCING AT\nHOME, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND\nEPOPLE HILL SUPPORT OUR PEACE EFFORTS AND OUR POLICIES OF\nSTRENGTHENING RELATIONS WITH OUR ARAB FRIENDS. THE VERY\nACHIEVEMENT OF A NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE A POSITIVE\nEFFECT UN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE AND, IF IT IS\nSCRUPULOUSLY IMPLEMENTED AND OBSERVED, CAN BROADEN THE\nBAIS OF CONFIDENCE WHICH IS NEEDED FOR BUTH SIDES TO TAKE\nTHE HARD POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED AS THE NEGOTIATNG\nPROCESS GOES FORWARD IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.\nI WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE ThIS OCCASION, MR. PRIME\nMINISTER, TO TELL YOU HOW PLEASED THE PRESIDENT AND I\nState\nWERE TO HEAR FROM YOU IN YOUR LETTERS OF JUNE 13 REGARDING\nYOU CONCERNS FOR PAKISTANIS SECURITY, I REGRET THAT\npart\nSECRET\nFORD\nWITH\n&\nLIBRARY\nmine\nCLAALD\nrevisic\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nAMERICA\nTELEGRA\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 3009462\nTHE DEMANDS OF THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS HAVE DELAYED\nMY SENDING YOU A CONSIDERED RESPONSE BEFORE THIS. 1\nHAVE DISCUSSED YOUR LETTERS IN DETAIL WITH THE PRESIDENT\nAND ME HAS ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE DEEPLY\nSYMPATHETIC TO YOUR CONCEERNS. IT WAS HITH THESE IN MIND\nTHAT THE PRESIDENT ORDERED THE LIFTING OF ThE EMBARGO ON\nARMS SALES TO PAKISTAN LAST FEBRUARY. WE ARE ALSO COMMITTED\nTO DO WHAT AC CAN TO HELP MEET YOUR FOOD AND ECONOMIC\nASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE YEAR AMEAD, THIS IS AN\nINTEGRAL PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO ASSURE PAKISTANIS CONTINUED\nSECURITY AND wELL WELL-BEING. I HAVE ALSO ASKED AMBASSADOR BYROADE\nTO CONVEY OUR VIEWS UN VARIOUS SPECIFIC POINTS YOU RAISED IN\nYOU EARLIER LETTER,\nSince MY DEPARTURE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, THE\nPRESIDENT HARED WITH ME YOUR AUGUST 17 LETTER TO HIM, RE\nEMPHASIZING YOUR CONCERNS IN THE CONTEXT OF RECENT CONVERSATION\nBETWEEN YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN KABUL.\nUPON MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON, I WILLDISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH\nTHE PRESIDENT, AND HE WILL, or COURSE, BE RESPONDING TO YOU.\nMEANNAILE, I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM THE\nSOVIET GOVERNMENT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE\nBY ITS OFFICIALS IN KABUL, AND I HOPE YOU WILL KEEP\nAMBASSADUR BYROADE INFORMED,\nWARM REGARDS,\nHENRY A. KISSINGER\nEND MESSAGE\n3, IN CONVEYING THE ABOVE MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO,\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nSTATE\n30 AUG 75Z\n10 12\n008450\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nAMERICA\nSECRET\nNOD660\nTELEGRAM\nD\nSTATES OF\nPAGE 01 SECTO 10198 02 OF 02 301007Z\n12\nACTION NODS-00\nS\nINFO OCT-01 IS0-00 /001 W\n031197\n0 300913Z AUG 75 ZFF-6\nFM USDEL SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA\nTO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD NIACT IMMEDIATE\nINFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE\nN\nSECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTO 10198\nNODIS\n0\nFOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY\nD\nYOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:\nWE WERE PLEASED TO NOTE THE PRIME MINISTER'S EX-\nPRESSION, IN nIS JUNE LETTERS, OF CONTINUING SUPPORT\nFOR THE SIMLA PROCESS. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED THE WISE POLICIES\nS\nOF CAUTION AND RESTRAINT SHOWN BY THE GOP DURING ThIS\nDELICATE PERIOD OF DIFFICULTIES IN INDIA.\nIT IS OUR VIEW THAT CONTINUED PROGRESS UNDER THE\nSIMLA PROCESS WILL REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED\nHOSTILITIES ON THE SUBCONTINENT. THE IMMEDIATE INTEREST\nOF THE UNITED STATES, AND ONE WHICH wt FULLY SHARE WITH\nPAKISTAN, IS TO AVERT SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. IT WAS WITH\nTHIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND THAT THE SECRETARY CONVEYED TO\nFOREIGN MINISTER GRUMYKO IN MAY THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH\nTHE UNITED STATES KOULD REGARD AN INDICAN ATTACK AGAINST\nPAKISTAN. ER Rt N TL BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET\nLEADERSHIP MAS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE POSITION OF THE UNITED\nSTATES ON THIS QUESTION.\nDIRECT INVOLVEMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA IN A\nSOUTH ASIAN CONFLICT WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE IMPLICATIONS\nOF THE GRAVEST NATURE AND WOULD BE OF GREAT CONCERN TO\nFORD\nTHE UNITED STATES. THE RESPONSE UF THE UNITED STATES\nS\nWOULD BE A MATTER FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE EXECUTIVE\nSECRET\nGENATE\nNOI TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZ ATION OF THE ENECUTIVE SECRETARY\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nSTATES\nOF\nPAGE 02 SECTO 10198 62 OF 02 301007Z\nBRANCH IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS IN\nACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR CONSTITUTION\nAND OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1959 MUTUAL COOPERATION\nAGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN.\nTHE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY ARE HOPEFUL THAT THEY\nHAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HOLD TALKS IN PEKING WITH\nWILL LEADERS OF THE PEOPLETS REPUBLIC OF CHINA LATER THIS THE YEAR,\nTHESE TALKS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS\nFULL COUNTRIES AND PAKISTAN, AND WAYS IN WHICH OUR GOVERNMENT\nRANGE OF SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING RELATIONS BETWEEN\nOUR MIGHT CONTINUE TO ASSIST PAKISTAN IN ITS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN\nITS SECURITY.\nTHE AHMED HAS COMMUNICATED TO THE CHINESE OUR CONCERN ABOUT\nSECRETARY WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE THAT MR. AZIZ\nTHE FFECT WHICH THEIR PROPAGANDA HAS ON OUR ABILITY\nTO MOBILIZE DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRC'S SECURITY.\nDISCUSSNG YOUR LETTERS IN WASHINGTON, I FOUND A\nDEEP IN AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE ADMINISTRATION IN\nPAKISTAN'S SECURITY AND WELFARE, AND A STRONG DESIRE TO\nBE HELPFUL IN WAYS THAT ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR OWN\nLEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.\nI KNOW YOU ARE AWARE FROM YOU UWN DISCUSSIONS WITH\nAS AMERICAN LEADERS, INCLUDING SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN,\nTHE UNITED STATES IS NOT AULE TO UNDERTAKE ADDITIONAL OF\nFORMAL SECURITY COMMITMENTS, OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK\nOUR FORMAL TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS,\nREGARD TO THE RECENT STATEMENTS MADE BY SOVIET\nWITH representatives TO PAKISTANI OFFICIALS IN KABUL CONCERNING\nTHE SOVIET POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN, WE WOULD OF COURSE VIEW\nDURAND LINE, IF THESE IN FACT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN\nTHEM WITH GRAVE CONCERN.\nWE THE SOVIET POSITION, FOLLOWING YOUR FURTHER CONVERSATIONS\nWILL BE INTERESTED TO HAVE YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON\nWITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES.\nSECRET\nBE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR\nOF STATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED\nAMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE 23 SECTO 16196 02 of 02 3616072\n4, IN ADDITION TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS ABOVE, YOU\nSHOULD SEEK TU CORRECT THE DIFFERENCES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN\nWHAT I SAID TO AZIZ AHMED IN ANKARA ON MAY 22 AND THE\nINTERPRETATION OF THESE REMARKS CONTAINED IN BHUTTO'S\nLETTERS OF JUNE 13. THE FULLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE\nMADE SO THAT THE RECORD WILL BE CLEAR:\nDURING MY WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, I REVIEWED THE\nN\nMINUTES OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MINISTER AZIZ AHMED\nAND SECRETARY KISSINGER, OUR RECORD CONTAINS SOME\nIMPORTANT NUANCES WHICH, IF NOT PRECISELY GRASPED, COULD\nLEAD TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WE BOTH WANT TO AVOID,\nTHE SECRETARY INFORMED AZIZ AHMED HE HAD TOLD THE\nSOVIETS THAT WE WOULD HOLD THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE\nUSE MADE OF THEIR EQUIPMENT ANYWHERE, AND ESPECIALLY\nIN PAKISTAN.\n(BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: \"DR. KISSINGER\nINFORMED MR. AMMED THAT ME HAD SPOKEN TO GROMYKO IN\nVERY STRNG TERMS TO THE EFFECT THAT AN INDIAN ATTACK ON\nPAKISTAN WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT WOULD INVITE A RESPONSE\nFROM THE UNITED STATES.\nTHE SECRETARY ASKED AZIZ AHMED IF WE COULD ASK THE\nCHINESE WHAT THEIR RESPONSE WOULD BE IF PAKISTAN IS\nATTACKED. THE SECRETARY ALSO INDICATED THAT A GENERAL\nWAR FOLLOWING AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN AND INVOLVING\nTHE SUVIETS AND CHINESE WOULD HAVE THE GRAVEST IMPLICATIONS\nFOR THE WHOLE OF ASIA AND FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE AREA.\n0\n(BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY STATES: \" I WAS\nRELIEVED TO PEAR FROM MR. AZIZ ARMED HAT YOU PLANNED TO\nTELL THE CHINESE ABOUT THE ACTION THE UNITED STATES WOULD\nTAKE IF THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA FOR COMING TO PAKISTANIS\nASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN.\nBHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: \"DR. KISSINGER\nADDED THAT, IF CHINA POSED THE COUNTERQUESTION AS TO\nWHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IN SUCH AN EVENT AN\nINDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN), IT WOULD BE INFORMED THAT IF\nINDIA ATTACKED PAKISTAN AND CHINA CAME TO ITS HELP AND\nIF IN CONSEQUENCE THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA, THE\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\n^^\n1\nUNITED DEPARTMENT OF BA STATE\nDepartment of State TELEGRAM\nSTATES OF\nSECKET\nPAGE 04 SECTO 10198 02 OF 02 3010072\nUNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STAY OUT OF THAT\nSITUATION. )\nKISSINGER\nN\nZOP\nD\nSECRET\nTHE\nAITHORIZATION\nOF\nTYF\nEXECUTIVE\nSECRETARY\nor\nSTATE\nPakistan\nDepartment of State\nTHE\nmy\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRE 2244\nPAGE 01 ISLAMA 98056 0217392\nAFR/UN\nEUR/CAN\nA3\nFE\nACTION SS-25\nLA\nINFO OCT-01 IS0-00 1026 W\nD/DT\nNEA/SA\n059650\n3\nPRC\nSEA\nR 0217312 SEP 75 ZOK\nNSC/PLNS\nFM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD\nSecretary's reply closes\nPGM/ANL\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 1835\nSCI/ENV\nSECRET\nISLAMARAD 8056\nout June 13 messages\nECON\nOPIIL\nOPIL/INT\n(ace to Byroade -par 5->)\nSS/PR\nFXDIS\nCONGR\nF.O. 11652: GDS\nTAGS: PFOR, PK, US\nSURJ: BHUTTO INFORMED OF USG POSITION CONCERNING POINTS\nRAISED IN HIS LETTERS TO PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY\nREF: SECTO 10198\n!. I SAW BHUTTO IN KARACHI ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE\nFOR SAUDI ARABTA ON THE SUBJECT OF REFTEL CONTAINING\nYOUR LETTER TO HTM AND INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING MY ORAL\nREMARKS IN CONNECTION WITH PAST LETTERS FROM HIM TO\nvon AND THE PRESIDENT BHUTTO WAS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED\nTO RECEIVE THIS DIRECT COMMUNICATION FROM YOU IN THE\nMIDDLE EAST, AND THE OPPORTUNITY IT GAVE HIM TO BE\nUP-TO-DATE AND IN TOUCH WITH YOU JUST BEFORE VISITING\nSAUDI ARABIA.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nState Dept. Guidelines stateleview\nNARA, Date 3/9/04\nE\n?. AFTER HTS REMARKS TO ME ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH\nHAVE BEEN REPORTED SEPARATELY, I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS\nUNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE A NUMBER OF POINTS TO HIM\nTN CONNECTION WITH THESE EXCHANGES UF CORRESPONDENCE.\nT SAID THE EXACT PHRASEOLOGY OF THF POINTS I WAS\nINSTRUCTED TO MAKE HAD BEEN WORKED OUT VERY CAREFULLY\nAND THAT SOME OF THE POINTS TO BE COVERED WERE COMPLEX,\nCONTAINING IMPORTANT NUANCES. 1 SAID THAT IN THE INTEREST\nOF COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING, AND AS A KINDNESS TO HIM,\n: MIGHT BE REST THAT BE READ THE TEXT OF THESE POINTS\nPA HER THAN JUST LISTEN TO AN ORAL PRESENTATION FROM ME.\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nSECRET\nor\nSTATE\nDepartment of State\nCurred STATES /\nTELEGRAM\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 ISLAMA 08056 0217392\n3. BHUTTO READ CAREFULLY MY PREPARED TEXT WHICH HAD\nBEFN EXTRACTED VERRATIM FROM ABOVE REFTEL. WHEN HE\nFINISHED, HE TOLD ME THAT HE UNDERSTOOD COMPLETELY AND\nWAS GLAD TO HAVE THIS MATTER SETTLED so THAT NO FURTHER\nCONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT BETWEEN US WOULD BE NECESSARY\nHE SAID AGAIN HE REGRETTED HAVING ACCEPTED BAD ADVICE\nON His LETTERS TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT GROWING OUT\n!\nnp YOUR TALK WITH AZIZ AHMED IN ANKARA 1 HAVE NO\nпопвт BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOND COMPLETELY THAT I WAS IN THE\nPROCESS OF A NECESSARY CORRECTION OF THE RECORD.\nA. BHUTTO ASKED IF HE COULD KEEP THE COPY OF MY\nADDITIONAL POINTS THAT HE HAD READ. WHILE I OBVIOUSLY\nDO NOT WANT TO BECOME A PARTY IN HIS FRICTIONS WITH\n12\"2 AHMED, I GAVE HIM MY PERMISSION TO DO SO THINKING\nTHAT THIS WOULD HELP TO SERVE TO MAKE THE RECORD\nCOMPLETELY CLEAR FOR OUR OWN PURPOSES. THERE WAS NO\nDOUBT BUT THAT HE PLANNED SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH BOTH\nAZ-Z AHMED AND AGHA SHAHI ON THE PLANE TO SAUDI ARABIA\nON BOTH YOUR LETTER AND MY ADDITIONAL POINTS.\n5. YOU MAY RFST ASSURED, HOWEVER, THAT BHUTTO HOLDS\nNO RESENTMENT AT US ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED. IT IS A\nCOMPLETELY CLOSED SUBJECT AND BEST NOT REFERRED TO\nX\nAGAIN ON ANY LEVEL.\nBYROADE\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nSECRET\nSTATE\nPakistan\n10\n(?)\nDepartment of State\nTELEGRAM\n/\nOF\nSECRET 1827\nPAGE 01 ISLAMA 08047 0211367\nEN\nA6\nACTION SS-25\nINFO OCT-01 ISO-90 1026 W\n$/05/20\n054797\nAFR/UN\nR 0245277 SEP 75\nEUR/CAN\nFN AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD\nFE\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 1831\nLA\nINFO AMEMBASSY KABUL\nb\nNEA/SA\nAMEMBASSY MOSCOW\nPRC\nAMEMBASSY TEHRAN\nSEA\nNSC/PLNG\nSECRET ISLAMABAD 8047\nPGM/ANL\nSCI/ENV\nEXPIS\nECON\nOPNL/INT\nF.O. 116521 GDS\nSS/PR\nTAGS: PFOR, PK, AF, UR\nCONGR\nSUBJECT: PAK-SOVIET RELATIONS: PM BHUTTO'S COMMENTS\nREF: ISLAMABAD 7507 AND 7433\n1. IN A DISCUSSION ON OTHER MATTERS WITH BHUTTO IN\nKARACHI, AUGUST 31. HE DIGRESSED TO GIVE ME WHAT HE\nSATD HE ACCEPTED AS THE FINAL SOVIET POSITION ON THE\nALTEGED PULICY REMARKS OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN\nKARUL RE THE DURAND LINE AND OTHER MATTERS, AND THEIR\nSUBSEQUENT DOWNGRADING BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR HERE CAND\nT SUSPECT TN MOSCOW). HE SAID THF SOVIET POSITION WAS\nTHAT THEIR POLICY RE PAKISTAN REMAINED AS SET FORTH IN\nTHEIR JOINT COMMUNIQUE AT THE TIME OF HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW\nYN OCTOBER 1970\nTELCATTO\nACCORDING TO THE\nSOVIETS, WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY ASREGARDS ANY ALLEGED\nREMARKS OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR.\n0. BHUTTO SAID HE HAD PERSONALLY TALKEN TO HIS AMBASSADOR\nKARUL AND THAT HE BELIEVES THE ALLEGED REMARKS WERE\nTRUTHFULLY AND ACCURATELY REPORTED. HE SAID IT APPARENT\nDECLASSIFIED\nTHAT OUR JOINT SPECULATION ON THIS MATTER (REFTELS) WAS\nB.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nDept. Guidelines state Review 9/17/03\nNARA, Date 3/9/04\nPROBABLY CORRECT. RUT HE SAID HE HAD GIVEN UP ON ANY\nState\nFFFORT TO GET ANY PUBLIC REASSURANCE FROM THE SOVIETS TO\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTSHE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nOF\nDepartment of State\nSTATES or AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nSECRET\nPARE 02 ISLAMA 08047 0211362\nCOMPENSATE FOR THE DISQUIETING MANOUVER ON THEIR PART\nAS TOO MANY THINGS HAD HAPPENED IN THE INTERVAL (AN\nOBVIOUS REFERENCE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO BANGLADESH)\nAN HE WAS CERTAIN THEY WOULDN'T DO IT.\nBYRDADE\n or\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUISE BEAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nIT OF\nOF\nSTATE\nPakistan\nDepartment of State\nGRUIN\nAMERICA\nCOPY OF 13 COPIES\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nN00987\nPAGE 01 ISLAMA 08041 0108272\n20\nACTION NODS-00\nINFO OCT-01 IS0-00 /001 iN\n045140\n0 72 6447 SEP. 75\nFM AMERICASSY ISLAMABAD\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1829\n$ E CRE T ISLAMABAD 8041\nNODIS/CHEROKEE\nFOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR\nE.O. 11652: XGDS-3\nTAGS: PFCR, PK, US, XF\nSUBJ: BHUTTO'S COMMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST\nREF: SECTO 10198\n1, I SAW BHUTTO IN KARACHI ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPART-\nURE FOR SAUDI ARABIA ON THE SUBJECT OF REFTEL CONTAIN-\nING YOUR LETTER TO HIM AND INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING MY\nORAL REMANKS IN CONNECTION RITH PAST LETTERS FROM\nHIM TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT. THIS MESSAGE WILL COVER\nONLY HIS REMARKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST PORTION OF YOUR\nLETTER.\n2. BHUTTO SAID Ht WOULD BE MOST HAPPY TO PUT ACROSS TO\nTHE SAUDIS THE POSITIVE VIEWS YOU EXPRESSED IN YOUR\nLETTER. ME WAS HIMSELF IMMENSELY PLEASED TO NOTE YOUR\nEMPHASIS THAT OTHER MOVES SUCH AS ON THE SYRIAN PROBLEM\nAND THE PALESTINIANS NEEDED TO BE TACKLED, AND THE DETER-\nMINATION OF BOTH YOURSELF AND THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAD\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nState Dept. Guidelines ew 9/17/03\nNARA, Date 3/9/04\nTO BE SO. Mt HAD NO DOUBLT WHATSOEVER THAT YOU BOTH\nMEANT THIS AND WOULD LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED, AND AT WHAT-\nEVER ENERGY AND EFFORT REQUIRED, TO MAKE IT SO,\n3. HAVING SAID THIS, HE THOUGHT THAT OUT OF OUR FRIEND-\nSHIP HE WOULD TELL US THAT HE DIDN'T THINK THINGS WOULD\nBy\nSECKET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nOF STATE\nDepartment of State\nAMERICA\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE p2 ISLAMA 08641 0108272\nWORK OUT AS WE WISHED AND THAT THE NEXT STEP, ASSUMING\nYOUR PRESENT EFFORT SUCCEEDS AS REGARDS THE EGYPTIAN FRONT,\nWOULD LEAD TO AN IMPASSE. HE SAID HE AAS SPEAKING AS UNE\n4:10 CONSIDERED RELATIONS WITH THE US AS VITAL AND WHO\nBELIEVED THAT ANY SETBACK IN THEM WOULD ot DISASTROUS\nFOR PAKISTAN. IN THIS CONTEXT HE THOUGHT YOU AND THE\nPRESIDENT WOULD MANT TO CONSIDER ALL FACETS OF EVERY\nPRO-LEN IN ThE MIDDLE EAST AND PERMAPS HIS OWN PESSI-\nMISTIC FEELINGS ACCUT THE FUTURE,\n4, BHUTTO SAID THAT, WHILE HE WOULD NOT MENTION IT IN\nCONNECTION WITH ANY OF THE SPECIFICS HE WAS ABOUT TO TELL\nME, AN UNDERLYING FACTOR IN HIS THINKING WAS THE UNFOR-\nTUNATE TIMING or OUR COMING ELECTIONS AS FAR AS THE MIDDLE\nEAST WAS CONCERNED. HE SAID HL WAS FIRST AND FOREMOST\nA POLITICIAN, AND KNEW FIRST HAND THAT THE EMOTIONS OF\nPEOPLE HAD A POWER OF THEIR OWN THAT COULD NOT BE IG-\nNORED, PARTICULARLY IN A DEMOCRACY SUCH AS OURS.\n5. BHUTTO SAID HE HAD HIGH REGARD FOR SADAR AND THOUGHT\nTHAT HE HAD BEEN VERY ACCOMMODATING. BUT ME SAID HE\nWOULD NOT NECESSARILY DESCRIBE THE CONCESSIONS HE HAD\nMADE AS STATESMANSHIP BUT MORE AS AN ACCOMMODATION. HE\nSAID (1) ME THOUGHT THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY HAD LOST THIER\nWILL TO FIGHT AND SAUAT HAS HAD TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNTT,\nANU (2) THAT SADAT HAS STAKING EVERYTHING, ON BOTH HIS\nFIRST AND SECOND AGREEMENTS THROUGHT YOUR GOOD EFFORTS, TO\nMAKE POSSIBLE AN ECONOMIC BOOM TO TURN ATTENTIONS AWAY\nFROM THE ISHAELI PROBLEM. HE SAID (1) ABOVE HAD INHERENT\nIN IT THE DANGER THAT SADAT COULD BE OVERTHROWN. AS\nREGARDS (2) ABOVE, BHUTTO REMINDED ME THAT ME WAS FROM AN\nUNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY AND HE KNEW THAT THE ECONOMIC\nMIRACLES SADAT WAS HOPING FOR JUST DIDN'T HAPPEN OVER-\nNIGHT, WHETHER IN A VERY RICH UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY LIKE\nIRAN OR A VERY POOR COUNTRY. 50 THERE WOULD BE NO GREAT QUICK\nCHANGE FROM POVERTY FOR THE EGYPTIANS. AFTER A PERIOD\nOF GREAT EXPECTATIONS AND BUDYANCY, IN WHICH THE PUBLIC\nPOSTURE OF EGYPT MIGHT APPEAR TO TURN BELLICOSE OR EVEN\nCHAUVANISTIC, THE LETDOWN WHICH WOULD COME WOULD ALSO\nENDANGER SADAT. IF HE TRIED TO RECOUP BY BOLDNESS AGAIN\nON THE ISRAELI FRONT HIS MILITARY MIGHT GET RID OF HIM AS\nSECRET\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nIMENT\nOF\nSTATE\nDepartment. of State\nOMINA\nAMERICA\nSTATES\nOF\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 ISLAMA 08041 0108272\nA PRETEXT FOR NOT FIGHTING AGAIN,\n6. AS A COROLLARY TO ThIS SCE ARIO HE SEES THE ISRAELIS\nSAYING \"BAS\" (ARABIC AND URDU FOR ENOUGH OR STOP) AS\nREGARDS FORTMER MOVES RE SYKIA, THE PALESTINIANS, ETC,\n(ME HAS PULITE ENOUGH NOT TO SAY 50 BUT I THINK BE HAD\nOUR ELECTIONS IN MIND). THEN HE SAID THERE WOULD BE\nA DIVISIVE EFFECT AMONG THE ARABS. ht THOUGHT SAUDI\nARABIA AND The GULF STATES WOULD TOLERATE A STATUS QUO\nFOR AWHILE AND POSSIBLY TUNISIA. MOROCCO MAYBE AND\nSUDAN PERMAPS. LIBYA WOULD DENOUNCE AND ALGERIA (UNLESS\nNE ARE MAKING MORE INROADS THAN Ht KNOWS THERE). IRAQ OF\nCOURSE KOLLD BE IN THIS CAMP. SYRIA, AND ASSAD IN\nPARTICULAR, WOULD BE INTENSELY TROUBLED, CHINAFOULDNIT\nLIKE IT--AND IT ThE SOVIETS WOULD DE AROUND SMILING LIKE\nCHESHIRE CATS!\n7. BHUTTO RETURNED TO HIS EARLIER REMARK THAT HIS OWN\nPREDICTIONS WOULD IN NO WAY AFFECT SUPPORTING YOUR VIEWS\nIN YOUR LETTER AND YOUR OBVIOUS DETERMINATIONM ME SAID\nHE EARNESTLY HOPED IS PREDICTIONS WERE WORNG, AS PEACE\nIN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS SO VITAL TO US, AND INDEED TO\nPAKISTAN AS WELL. BUT HE SAID HE COULD NOT GO BEYOND\nTHE ROLE OF TRYING TO BE HELPFUL AS PAKISTAN WAS MUSLIMN\nBUT NOT AKABIC, AND THE ARABS HAD TO MAKE THEIR OWN\nPOLICY, BE IT WAR OR NEGOTIATIONS, STEP BY STEP OR\nGENEVA, PEACE OK CAPITULATION.\n8. I SAID I WAS ENCOURAGED BY YOUR LETTER AND ITS\nOBVIOUS STRESS UN NECESSARY NEXT STEPS, HE AGREED BUT\nREMINDED ME AS A LAST THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE\nVERY SMART PEOPLE. 1 SAID I SUSPECTED YOU KNEW THEM\nPRETTY KELL YOURSELF BY NOW.\n9. MY CONVERSATIONS WITH BHUTTO ON THE LETTERS TO YOU\nAND THE PRESIDENT FOLLOWING YOUR TALK WITH AZIZ AHMED\nWENT wtil. IN VIEW OF PAST TALKS WITH BHUTTO BY BOTH\nYAQUB AND MYSELF, TMIS IS NO LONGEK A LIVING SUBJECT\nHERE. MY NEXT MESSAGE WILL THEREFORE BE PRIMARILY TO\nCOMPLETED AND CLOSE THE RECORD ON THIS SUBJECT.\nBYROADE\nSECRET\nLICRARY\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nS STATE\nPakestan Lar 12\nU\nDepartment of State THE\nD\nE\nAMERICA\nSTATES OF\n#5 TELEGINA TABIV\nS\nCONE\nN00444\n2420.\nPAGE 01 STATE 193876\n51\nORIGIN NODS-00\nINFO DCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R\nDRAFTED BY NEA/PABIRAPECK:LAB\n0\nAPPROVED BY THE SECRETARY\nPIJJSISCO\nNSC:ROAKLEY (DRAFT)\nNEAISSUBER\nS/S at MR. ORTIZ\n081429\nP 15 51eZ AUG 75 ZFF4\nFM SECSTATE WASHOR\nSD\nTO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY\nG 0 N F I E HTIAL STATE 193875\nNODIS\nE,O, 116521 GDS\nWORD\nTAGS: PFOR, PK, US\n0\nSUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO\nD\nREF $ ISLAMABAD 7272\nFOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY\n1, PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER\nBRUITO:\nQUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:\nI\nAMBASSADOR BYROADE MAS TOLD ME OF YOUR DEEP PERSONAL\nDESIRE THAT PRESIDENT FORD VISIT PAKISTAN THIS YEAR. I\nHAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE PRESIDENT YOUR CONCERNS AND THE\nHIGH INFORTANCE BUTH OUR GOVERNMENTS ATTACH TO THIS VISIT\nT.U PAKISTAN AS A SYMBOL DF OUR CLOSE BILATERAL RELATION-\nNOT 10 BE REPRODUCED WITH BULING AUTHORIZATION Of THE EXECUTIVE SECRE\nGh 3/9/04\nor\nSCATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATES of AMERICA\nTELEGRA\nCONF IDENTIAL\nPAGE 02 STATE 193676\nSHIP.\nWE ARE STILL IN THE MIDST OF WORKING OUT A SCREDULE FOR\nPOSSIBLE FOREIGN TRAVEL BY THE PRESIDENT DURING THE\nREMAINDER OF THE YEAR. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE STILL HOPEFUL\nTHAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE ABLE TO VISIT CHINA BEFORE THE\nEND OF THE YEAR, BUT THE SCHEDULE IS STILL UNCERTAIN AND NO\nDECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF VISITING\nOTHER COUNTRIES ON THE SAME TRIP. THUS THE TIMING OF A\nVISIT TO PAKISTAN REMAINS UNSETTLED, BUT THE PRESIDENT\nHAS ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT HE REMAINS MOST ANXIOUS\nTO VISIT YOUR COUNTRY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, IF\nNOT THIS YEAR AT LEAST NEXT YEAR, IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR\nINVITATION.\nWE HILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU AGAIN AS SOON AS NE HAVE A\nS\nMORE DEFINITE VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE IN THE\nMONTHS AHEAD,\nWITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END\nQUOTE.\n2. FYI: ABOVE MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO ASSURE BHUTTO THAT\nTHIS MATTER IS INDEED RECEIVING THE MOST CAREFUL\nATTENTION, BUT ALSO TO CONVEY THOUGHT THAT THERE IS\nLIKELY 10 BE SLIPPAGE IN PRESIDENT'S TRAVEL TO PAKISTAN.\nKISSINGER\nCONF IDENTIAL\nNOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRE\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDECLASSIFIED\nSECRET/NODIS (GDS)\nE.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BY\nNSC MEMO, labs 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 9/17/03\n, NARA, DATE 3/9/04\nPARTICIPANTS:\nPakistan\nAziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs\nYaqub Khan, Ambassador to the US\nIqbal Riza, Minister, Pakistan Embassy\nIqbal Akhund, Permanent Representative to the UN\nUnited States\nHenry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State\nand Assistant to the President for\nNational Security Affairs\nAlfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary\nof State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs\nRobert B. Oakley, NSC Staff\nDATE AND TIME:\nTuesday, September 30, 1975\n11:30 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.\nPLACE:\nSuite 34-A, Waldorf Towers\nNew York, New York\nAhmed:\nCongratulations on your success in the Middle East.\nIt must have been tough.\nKissinger:\nIt was rough but not nearly as rough as since I came\nback. We are in a nihilistic phase of Congressional\nbehaviour. Of course, they are hurting themselves by\nthis since the really damaging thing politically would be\nto attack the Administration on domestic policy rather\nthan foreign policy. What do they think they are doing?\nIn any event, I am relaxed since this cannot last.\nAhmed:\nLook at the investigation of the CIA and everything elsc.\nSubject to GDS of E. O. 11652\nSECRET/NODIS (GDS)\nAutomatically Downgraded at Two\nYear Intervals and Declassified on\nDecember 31, 1983.\nSECRET/ NODIS (GDS)\nPage 2\nKissinger:\nIt is typical of this stage of nihilism. I have refused\nto allow them to call up Foreign Service Officers to\ntestify on what their policy recommendations were.\nThis would be like the McCarthy period. My decision\nwill cause a tremendous brawl.\nAhmed:\nWe have submitted to you two lists of arms we need.\nKissinger:\nI hope the nuclear weapons are on the second list.\nAhmed:\nThey are on the third list; we have the Pershing on\nthe second list.\nKissinger:\nThe Pershing issue is a big fraud. We never had any\nintention of giving it to Israel in any foreseeable time\nframe. The people who are pushing all this are the\npro-Israelis who want to lock us into commitments to\nIsrael. But you didn't want it anyway.\nAhmed:\nNo, only the nuclear weapons.\nKissinger:\nThe 1960 models are in surplus now so we should\nbe able to give you some--but I had better watch what\nI say since there is no telling what you might report\nback to Bhutto.\nAhmed:\nWe are being modest and restrained in handling the\narms question.\nKissinger:\nDo you have the money yet?\nAhmed:\nWe will find it from Saudi Arabia. But we think it will\nbe easicr to get answers first from you on just what\nis available and how much it costs. Then we can go to\nthe Saudis.\nKissinger:\nI can inform you that we have approval to supply you\nwith 24 TOW launchers and 450 missiles. You can\nget started on a training program while awaiting\ndelivery of the rest. It is our intention to start slowly\non our new military relationship with you, concentrating\non defensive weapons, and get it going well before it can\nSECRET / NODIS (GDS)\nSECRET/NODIS (GDS)\nPage 3\nKissinger:\nbe disrupted. So let us not give any publicity to\n(Continuing)\nthe TOW's or the invitation we are extending to\nyour Air Marshal. Let us build up slowly but\nsteadily--with maybe some artillery next--weapons\nthat can reasonably be described as defensive.\nAhmed:\nWe have been very careful in compiling our lists.\nKissinger:\nIf you narrow the gap with India to 1 to 10 you will\nbe in good shape. Seriously, we want you strong\nenough so that India will be afraid to attack.\nAhmed:\nWe want A-7 and other weapons in a hurry. India\nmight well attack us the 2nd or 3rd week of November\nin Kashmir.\nKissinger:\nCan they really attack there? I thought the terrain\nwas too rugged, and it would seem as aggression anyway.\nAhmed:\nAccording to the Indian Constitution, all of Kashmir\nis part of India. We can take them on in Kashmir\nbut they will fight us all along the border. We cannot\nbe certain but we think this will happen and we must\nlook out for it. If it happens, it will be a two-front war\nwith Afghanistan joining in any time there is war with\nIndia. But we can handle this with the A-7.\nKissinger:\nIt has very long range and is an attack plane, isn't it?\nAhmed:\nYes. Are you saying it is not considered defensive?\nIt is a fighter as well.\nKissinger:\nI am simply stating facts about the plane.\nAhmed:\nWe have been very interested in this plane for a long\ntime. We want about 110 of them. We also need\nweapons in a short time frame since ordinary delivery\nwill never get them in our hands before the war in\nNovember. We will do our best by ourselves but we\nneed arms. It all depends on the USSR. The Indians\ncannot move without Soviet approval because of their\ntreaty which obliges the USSR to help India.\nSEGRET/NODIS (GDS)\nSECRET/NODIS (GDS)\nPage 4\nKissinger:\nThe treaty is not so binding.\nAhmed:\nYes it is since if India is attacked, the USSR is\nobliged to come in until the threat is removed.\nReally, this would bring the Soviets in even if\nIndia went first and we hit back. So whenever\nIndia wants to start something, she must have\nSoviet support. We think India will probably start\na war. Mid-November to mid-December is the\nprobable time. This year is unlikely, but we must be\nwatchful, and next year is more certain. If we seem\nto be in trouble, the Afghans will join in. We have told\nour chaps to be ready to do their best on two fronts\nand not to expect anyone to come to their help. Outside\nhelp is a bonus and they should not count upon it. Iran\ncould stop the Afghans by moving some of its units up\nto the borders but it would not do so for fear of the\nUSSR. So what they will really do to help us is\nquestionable. Nor have we been able to get China\nto assure us of support. That is why we need weapons\noff the shelf.\nKissinger:\nWe have serious problems with our own army on\nrapid delivery. Don't you have a team coming soon?\nWe can discuss all this when they come in October.\nAhmed:\nThank you. That is the best approach. Also, con-\ncerning the Soviet threat, you know about the Soviet\nAmbassador in Kabul. When Bhutto had the Soviet\nAmbassador in Islamabad in to ask about this, he had\nus all present. The Soviet Ambassador said he would\nreport immediately to Moscow and was sure it would\nbe cleared up soon. He would let us know. But he\nhas never returned. When our Ambassador to Moscow\ntook it up there, the Foreign Ministry expressed\nsurprise that we would credit any such statement.\nBut when our Ambassador asked the Soviets about the\nDurand line, they said they were \"not empowered\"\nto discuss borders. It is not conclusive but it is\nvery worrisome and worthy of note. We have informed\nyou and the Iranians and the Chinese.\nSECRET/NODIS (GDS)\nSECRET/ NODIS (GDS)\nPage 5\nKissinger:\nAs I told you in Ankara, we would take a grave view\nof Soviet machinations and you can be certain that\nthe Soviets understand that. The Indian Foreign\nMinister will be in Washington next week and I will\ntell him that any Indian pressure on Pakistan will\nruin Indian efforts at friendlier relations with the\nUnited States. They are trying hard to improve their\nrelations with us at the present time, due to their\ninternal developments. It is nothing spectacular,\nbut it is interesting.\nAhmed:\nWill there be a Communique in connection with\nChavan's visit?\nKissinger:\nAn agreed minute of the Joint Commission meeting,\nwords but no real substance. The biggest question\nconcerning the visit is whether I will be able to survive\na dinner given by Ambassador Yaqub's colleague,\nAmbassador Kaul. He insists upon making some sort\nof comment about each of his guests after dinner, and\nsince he takes at least half a minute for at least forty\nguests, that is already twenty minutes and then he gives\na long toast in which he attacks United States policy.\nIt is very boring. The last time I was at one of his\naffairs he gave a toast saying that some nations like\neconomic power and some like military power but\nIndia likes spiritual power. I replied that I was surprised\nthat he came out with spiritual power since I had\nexpected him to say India has chosen nuclear power.\nIn Bhutto's recent letter to President Ford he said that\nPakistan may have to adjust its policy to meet the\npolitical realities in the area. What does that mean?\nAhmed:\nThere will be no change in our relationship with you\nor with the Chinese, you can be sure of that.\nKissinger:\nWhat is the Chinese mood?\nAhmed:\nWe hope we can get more support from them. They have\nbeen hard to pin down. They defer to you so I hope that\nyou will talk to them about Pakistan when you go to China.\nSECRET (GDS)\nSECRET NODIS (GDS)\nPage 6\nKissinger:\nWhat is their attitude toward the United States?\nAhmed:\nLast night, Chou gave me the impression that it\nis about time something happened as a follow-up by\nyou to the Shanghai Communique. As you know,\nthey have been very cautious and patient on this issue\nbut for the first time I detected a bit of impatience.\nIn the past he has always said he appreciates the\nproblems of the United States. This time he did not\nsay that and he hinted that China is impatient. But\nthey clearly want to continue to have good relations\nwith you.\nKissinger:\nI will get eager on October 17 or 18.\nAhmed:\nWill you also visit Pakistan?\nKissinger:\nI simply do not have the time although I would love\nit. On this subject, I notice that your Prime Minister\nis excited over the visit by President Ford. You know\nwe never set a date for the visit and whether or not\nPresident Ford visits Pakistan is not dependent upon\nwhat he does with India. We have a special relationship.\nAhmed:\nCan he come in connection with his visit to China?\nKissinger:\nThis was never planned and I cannot imagine how\nanyone got this idea. You know how the Chinese are.\nCertainly we would never consider going to India or\neven to Pakistan in connection with a visit to China.\nIt has always been seen as a separate trip. The\nPresident may visit Southeast Asia after China, perhaps\nthe Philippines. They need to be shored up after\nwhat happened in Indo- China. Is it true that you are.\nbuying arms from North Vietnam?\nAhmed:\nWe have made some inquiries but there is nothing\ndefinite. The article in Newsweck saying we are\ninterested in buying arms from North Vietnam upset\nthem very much although the leak did not come from us.\nWe have no details of what they can supply and we have\nmade no decision but we are checking. It appears that\nalmost everything belongs to South Vietnam. We shall\nhave to see what happens.\nSECRET/ (GDS)\nSECRET/NODIS (GDS)\nPage 7\nKissinger:\nI do not know what they have to sell. Some things\nin some categories but I do not believe they have\nlarge overall totals. Also, I do not know what kind\nof shape it is in.\nAhmed:\nWe are having more trouble with the Tarbela Dam.\nLast year we had to empty the reservoir in order\nto repair damage to the tunnels. This has been\nfixed but it now turns out that the river bed has been\nscarred by closing the tunnels and this must be\nrepaired. This means a delay in refilling the reservoir\nwith a subsequent loss of water for irrigation. We\nhad been counting on a good crop this year, especially\nfor wheat, in 1976 but it now looks as if we shall have\nto wait for another year. Can you help us with more\nPL 480 wheat?\nKissinger:\nWhat do we have already planned?\nAtherton:\n500,, 000 tons in the planning figure. The same as\nfor India.\nAhmed:\nWe needed at least one million before learning of the\nTarbela problem. Now we need more.\nKissinger:\nWe shall review the problem and see what can be done.\nWho built the dam with which you are having so much\ntrouble? Repairing a big dam is a very tricky problem.\nAhmed:\nIt was a French, Italian construction with some parti-\ncipation by the United States. It is the biggest dam\nin the world and they may have taken on more than they\ncould handle.\nKissinger:\nWe shall see what we can do with PL 480.\nFORD\nGERALO\n/NODIS (GDS)\n2\nSent 3/19/76\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nPA\nMarch 18, 1976\nBrent:\nThe Paks and French are within a few\ndays of making a public announcement\nof the conclusion of the arrangements for\nthe reprocessing deal. It will be even more\ndifficult to get Bhutto to consider backing\naway after that occurs. State therefore requests\nurgent action on this package. They would\nlike to cable the President's letter Friday\nor Saturday if possible.\nDE E\nDavid Elliott\nMEMORANDUM\nACTION - 1625\nJoseped a It\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSEGRET\nMarch 18, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nDAVID ELLIOTT D.E.\nROBERT OAKLEY\nSUBJECT:\nPresidential Letter to Bhutto on\nPakistani Nuclear Issues\nHAK has requested the President to send a letter to Bhutto asking him\nto forego acquisition of a chemical reprocessing plant from France and\na heavy water production facility from the FRG (Tab B). Neither of these\nfacilities has any economic justification since Pakistan has only one\nuranium\nnatural reactor and that does not use plutonium fuel. The purpose of\nthese facilities almost certainly is to put Pakistan in an independent\nposition eventually leading to the capability to produce nuclear weapons.\nWe have much less leverage with Pakistan than we had with Korea, and\nunless we are prepared to withhold conventional arms and economic\nassistance, we probably will be unsuccessful in halting Pakistan's\nacquisition of a nuclear weapon capability. State might consider such\npressure or Congress might mandate it, but before we get to that point\nwe should exhaust the diplomatic possibilities.\nHAK previously asked Sauvagnargues and Genscher not to supply Pakistan\nwith these nuclear facilities. The Germans have held up to watch devel-\nopments but the French gave us a cold no. HAK's talk with Bhutto in\nNew York last month also elicited a flat rejection and Pak Ambassador\nYaqub has reported to Bhutto that, in his judgment, the U.S. will not\napply economic or military leverage on this matter.\nThe proposed letter from the President to Bhutto is our best diplomatic\ntry and should be taken before we consider other possibilities.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you initial the memorandum to the President at Tab I, recommending\nthat he sign the letter to Bhutto at Tab A.\nSECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nNSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review 9/17/03\nE.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5\nFORD LIDRABY is OTVHED\nBY\nWa\n, NARA, DATE 3/9/04\nyou\nGen S:wgh: 18 Mar 76 (retyped)\n# 1625 - Tab A - - Page 1\nDear Mr. Prime Minister:\nI am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual\nunderstanding which has traditionally characterized\nexchanges between our two Governments. During your\nvisit to Washington last year, we held very productive\ndiscussions and reached broad areas of understanding on\nmatters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the\nopenness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly\non Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear\nfacilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my\nGovernment.\nI know from my discussions with you that you share our\nfear over the threat to the general peace posed by the un-\nrestrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My\nGovernment has welcomed your forthright assurances that\nPakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts\ninto an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear\nactivities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.\nYou should be aware, however, that there is considerable\napprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread\non a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with\nthe development of nuclear explosives -- specifically,\nuranium enrichment, heavy water production and chemical\nreprocessing. Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN\nGeneral Assembly last September the view of this Government\nthat the further spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities\nunder national control would seriously aggravate the problem\nof nuclear proliferation.\nFor this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego\nacquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same\na FORD the LIBRARY\nreason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious\nconsideration to the broader implications of this matter for\nstability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,\n#/625\n- 3 -\nI believe that I understand the difficulties that my request\nto you will present to your Government. I would not raise\nthis matter with you, however, if I did not consider it to be\nof the utmost importance. I would be grateful if you would\nlet me have your views on the points I have raised.\nSincerely,\nHis Excellency\nZulfikar Ali Bhutto\nPrime Minister of the\nIslamic Republic of Pakistan\nIslamabad\nRetyped page 3:GRF:BS:feg:3/19/76\nFORD LIBRARY &\n2d\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDear Mr. Prime Minister:\nI am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual\nunderstanding which has traditionally characterized the\nexchanges between our two Governments. During your\nvisit to Washington last year, we held very productive\ndiscussions and reached broad areas of understanding on\nmatters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the\nopenness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly\non Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear\nfacilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my\nGovernment.\nI know from my discussions with you that you share our\nfear over the threat to the general peace posed by un-\nrestrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My\nGovernment has welcomed your forthright assurances that\nPakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts\ninto an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear\nactivities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.\nYou should be aware, however, that there is considerable\napprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread\non a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with\nthe development of nuclear explosives specifically, uranium\nenrichment heavy water production and chemical reprocessing.\nIn fact, Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN General Assembly\nlast September the view of this Government that the further\nspread of nuclear reprocessing facilities under national control\nwould\nwill seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear proliferation.\nFor this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego\nacquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same\nreason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious\nconsideration to the broader implications of this matter for\nstability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,\n- 3 -\nI believe that I understand the difficulties that my request\nto you will present to your Government. I would not raise this\nmatter with you, however, if I did not consider it to be of the\nutmost importance. I would be grateful if you would let me\nhave your views on the points I have raised.\nPersonal regards,\nHis Excellency\nZulfikar Ali Bhutto,\nPrime Minister of the\nIslamic Republic of Pakistan\n3A\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMarch 19, 1976\nDear Mr. Prime Minister:\nI am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual\nunderstanding which has traditionally characterized\nexchanges between our two Governments. During your\nvisit to Washington last year, we held very productive\ndiscussions and reached broad areas of standing on\nmatters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the\nopenness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly\non Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear\nfacilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my\nGovernment.\nI know from my discussions with you that you share our\nfear over the threat to the general peace posed by the un-\nrestrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My\nGovernment has welcomed your forthright assurances that\nPakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts\ninto an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear\nactivities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.\nYou should be aware, however, that there is considerable\napprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread\non a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with\nthe development of nuclear explosives -- specifically,\nuranium enrichment, heavy water production and chemical\nreprocessing. Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN\nGeneral Assembly last September the view of this Government\nthat the further spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities\nunder national control would seriously aggravate the problem\nof nuclear proliferation.\nDECLASSIFIED\nFor this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego\nE.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5\nNSC BY Wa MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES stateleview 9/17/03\nNARA, DATE 3/9/04\nacquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same\nreason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious\nconsideration to the broader implications of this matter for\nstability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,\n- 2 -\nI believe your Government has an opportunity to make a\nhighly important contribution to worldwide efforts effectively\nto forestall further nuclear proliferation.\nMy concern is not the reliability of the assurances of your\nGovernment. It is that the establishment of sensitive nuclear\nfacilities under national control inevitably gives rise to\nperceptions in many quarters that, under circumstances\nwhich perhaps cannot even be foreseen today, non-peaceful\nuses may be contemplated. Whether justified or not, such\nperceptions could be by themselves destabilizing and under-\nmine the mutual confidence and sense of security which must\nbe created if we are to build a system of international peaceful\nnuclear cooperation.\nThese perceptions are heightened in Pakistan's case by the\nlack of a persuasive economic justification for obtaining\nsensitive nuclear facilities. For example, the experience\nof the United States, as well as of all countries with major\nnuclear power programs, is that reprocessing of spent reactor\nfuel is only economic within a very much larger reactor program\nthan Pakistan could contemplate for the foreseeable future.\nI know that Secretary Kissinger has already expressed\nsimilar views to you on this matter, but I want to underline\nto you my deep personal concern over the possible effect\nof your actions in this area on our ability to sustain support\nin public opinion here for our close cooperation on a broad\nrange of issues of interest to both our governments. I fear\nthat many in this country will be critical of Pakistan's\nactions and skeptical regarding its intentions. Friendship\nwith Pakistan has enjoyed broad popular support in this\ncountry among the public and in the Congress over the years.\nHowever, Pakistan's acquisition of these sensitive facilities\nwould, I believe, arouse considerable criticism and could erode\nthis support.\nWith these considerations in mind, I hope that you will give\nserious consideration to foregoing present plans to acquire\nreprocessing and heavy water facilities until your future\nnuclear program is sufficiently developed to establish a clear need\nand until other alternatives, such as a multinational venture, are\nthoroughly explored.\n- 3 -\nI believe that I understand the difficulties that my request\nto you will present to your Government. I would not raise\nthis matter with you, however, if I did not consider it to be\nof the utmost importance. I would be grateful if you would\nlet me have your views on the points I have raised.\nSincerely,\nHeald R. Good\nHis Excellency\nZulfikar Ali Bhutto\nPrime Minister of the\nIslamic Republic of Pakistan\nIslamabad\nFORM\n4\nBENALD\n3B\nMEMORANDUM\nPRESIDENT HAS SEE\nACTION - 1625\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET\nMarch 19, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nB\nSUBJECT:\nLetter to Bhutto on Pakistani\nNuclear Issues\nSecretary Kissinger has requested that you send a letter to Prime\nMinister Bhutto concerning Pakistan's acquisition of sensitive nuclear\nfacilities (Tab B).\nConsistent with our long-standing efforts to prevent increased national\naccess to sensitive nuclear technology, we have asked France, the FRG,\nand Pakistan to reconsider transactions involving national reprocessing\nand heavy water facilities for Pakistan. If these projects were to go\nforward, they would provide Pakistan with important basic elements\nneeded for a nuclear explosive program.\nSecretary Kissinger direct and forceful intervention on this subject\nwith Prime Minister B hutto last month was politely but frankly rejected.\nWe also have other reliable indications of continuing high-level Pakistani\ndetermination to pursue this independent nuclear option. Our concern is\nheightened by the obvious lack of economic justification for these projects\nand the equally obvious Pakistani concern not to be at the mercy of India.\nAlthough these facilities and their products would be safeguarded, it would\nbe possible for the GOP to contravene or abrogate any safeguards agree-\nments, a possibility we must take seriously in view of Pakistan's perception\nof its critical security situation.\nEven if Pakistan kept its agreements, its possession of a potential nuclear\nexplosives capability could by itself adversely affect South Asian stability.\nFuture decisions on nuclear issues by other regional states such as Iran\ncould be affected, and our own ability to cooperate with Pakistan might\nbe jeopardized as Congressional and public opinion focus increasingly on\nthe implications of Pakistan's nuclear activities. This has already been\nraised with Secretary Kissinger in Congressional hearings.\nFORD\nSECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\n&\nE.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5\nNSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES televiow 9/17/03\nBY.\nlah\nGERALD\nLIDRARY\n, NARA, DATE 3/9/04\nSECRET\n2\nIn order to underscore the extent of our concern, Secretary Kissinger\nrecently sent letters to the Foreign Ministers of France and the FRG\nreinforcing the demarches already made with their governments (Tab C).\nIt would be most helpful for you to sign the attached letter (Tab A) to\nPrime Minister Bhutto, reinforcing our request for reconsideration\nof its present plans.\nBob Hartmann's office has cleared the text of the letter.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you sign the attached letter to Prime Minister Bhutto.\nSECRET\n30\nMEMORANDUM\nACTION - 1625\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSECRET\nMarch 18, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nDAVID ELLIOTT\nROBERT OAKLEY\nSUBJECT:\nPresidential Letter to Bhutto on\nPakistani Nuclear Issues\nHAK has requested the President to send a letter to Bhutto asking him\nto forego acquisition of a chemical reprocessing plant from France and\na heavy water production facility from the FRG (Tab B). Neither of these\nfacilities has any economic justification since Pakistan has only one\nuranium\nnatural reactor and that does not use plutonium fuel. The purpose of\nthese facilities almost certainly is to put Pakistan in an independent\nposition eventually leading to the capability to produce nuclear weapons.\nWe have much less leverage with Pakistan than we had with Korea, and\nunless we are prepared to withhold conventional arms and economic\nassistance, we probably will be unsuccessful in halting Pakistan's\nacquisition of a nuclear weapon capability. State might consider such\npressure or Congress might mandate it, but before we get to that point\nwe should exhaust the diplomatic possibilities.\nHAK previously asked Sauvagnargues and Genscher not to supply Pakistan\nwith these nuclear facilities. The Germans have held up to watch devel-\nopments but the French gave us a cold no. HAK's talk with Bhutto in\nNew York last month also elicited a flat rejection and Pak Ambassador\nYaqub has reported to Bhutto that, in his judgment, the U.S. will not\napply economic or military leverage on this matter.\nThe proposed letter from the President to Bhutto is our best diplomatic\ntry and should be taken before we consider other possibilities.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you initial the memorandum to the President at Tab I, recommending\nthat he sign the letter to Bhutto at Tab A.\nSECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5\nBY. NSC MEMO, Leb 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Aeriew 9/17/03\n, NARA, DATE 3/9/04\n1625 3D\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\n7605327\nWASHINGTON\nMarch 16, 1976\nSECRET/EXDIS\nMEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT\nFrom:\nHenry A. Kissinger HK\nSubject:\nFurther Demarches on Pakistani\nNuclear Issues\nConsistent with our long-standing efforts to\nprevent increased national access to sensitive\nnuclear technology, we have asked France, the FRG,\nand Pakistan to reconsider transactions involving\nnational reprocessing and heavy water facilities\nfor Pakistan. If these projects were to go for-\nward, they would provide Pakistan with important\nbasic elements needed for a nuclear explosive pro-\ngram. We have reliable indications of continuing\nhigh-level Pakistani interest in pursuing this op-\ntion, and our concern is heightened by the lack of\neconomic need for these projects. Although these\nfacilities and their products would be safeguarded,\nit would be possible for the GOP to contravene or\nabrogate any safeguards agreements, a possibility\nwe must take seriously in view of Pakistan's percep-\ntion of its critical security situation. Even if\nPakistan kept its agreements, its possession of a\npotential nuclear explosives capability could by it-\nself adversely affect South Asian stability, future\nnuclear decisions by other regional states such as\nIran, and our own ability to cooperate with Pakistan\nin the future as Congressional and public opinion\nfocuses increasingly on the implications of Pakistan's\nnuclear activities.\nSECRET/EXDIS\nXGDS 3\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nState Dept. Guidelines\nstatekriew 9/17/03\n, NARA, Date 3/9/04\nSECRET/EXDIS\n-2-\nFrance and Pakistan appear intent on moving\nahead quickly on the reprocessing plant despite our\nprevious demarches and my expression of concern to\nPrime Minister Bhutto in New York. The FRG is tempor-\narily delaying a decision on the heavy water plant\nuntil France and Pakistan have responded to our\ndemarches.\nIn order to underscore the extent of our concern,\nI have recently sent letters to the Foreign Ministers\nof France and the FRG reinforcing the demarches\nalready made with their governments (copies attached).\nI believe it would be helpful with Pakistan for you\nto sign the attached letter to Prime Minister Bhutto\nunderlining our request for reconsideration of its\npresent plans.\nFollowing my recent communications to the French\nand German Foreign Ministers, and my decision to\nrecommend that you write to Prime Minister Bhutto,\nI appeared before the Senate Government Operations\nCommittee on non-proliferation and nuclear export\nquestions on March 9th. In response to Committee\nquestions, I indicated that we were pursuing the is-\nsue of the reprocessing facility with the governments\ninvolved.\nI anticipate that these additional approaches\nwill prompt serious review before France, the FRG,\nand Pakistan make their final decisions. If these\ncommunications should not lead to cancellation of the\nreprocessing transaction, they may at least contrib-\nute to the evolution of French and German nuclear ex-\nport policy in more reassuring directions. I would\nalso hope that these efforts would enhance our ability\nto act affirmatively in the future in preserving our\nimportant continuing relationship with Pakistan.\nRecommendation:\nThat you send the attached letter concerning\nPakistan's acquisition of sensitive nuclear technol-\nogy to Prime Minister Bhutto.\nSECRET/EXDIS\nSECRET/EXDIS\n-\n-3-\nAttachments:\n1. Suggested letter to Prime Minister Bhutto\n2. Letters to Foreign Ministers of France\nand FRG\nSECRET/EXDIS\n3E\nSECRET/EXDIS\nSUGGESTED LETTER\nDear Mr. Prime Minister:\nI am writing to you in the spirit of friendship\nand mutual understanding which has traditionally\ncharacterized the exchanges between our two Govern-\nments. During your visit to Washington last year, we\nheld very productive discussions and reached broad\nareas of understanding on matters of mutual interest.\nI am encouraged by the openness of our relationship\nto approach you quite candidly on Pakistan's plans to\nacquire certain sensitive nuclear facilities, a\nmatter which is of deep concern to my Government.\nI know from my discussions with you that you\nshare our fear over the threat to the general peace\nposed by unrestrained spread of nuclear explosives\nDECLASSIFIED\nState Dept. Guidelines state Review 9/17/03\ntechnology. My Government has welcomed your forth-\nDate 3/9/04\nright assurances that Pakistan will not divert its\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nHis Excellency\nZulfikar Ali Bhutto,\nPrime Minister of the\nIslamic Republic of Pakistan.\nDepartment of State\nSECRET/EXDIS\nSECRET/EXDIS\n-2-\ncivil nuclear development efforts into an explosives\nprogram, and that Pakistan's nuclear activities will\nbe devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.\nYou should be aware, however, that there is con-\nsiderable apprehension in this country and elsewhere\nover the spread on a national basis of the nuclear\ntechnology associated with the development of nuclear\nexplosives--specifically, uranium enrichment, heavy\nwater production and chemical reprocessing. Indeed,\nSecretary Kissinger stated at the UN General Assembly\nlast September the view of this Government that the\nfurther spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities under\nnational control will seriously aggravate the problem\nof nuclear proliferation. This is why we welcomed Korea's\ndecision to forego acquisition of a national reprocess-\ning plant, and also why I am writing to you to ask\nthat you give serious consideration to the broader\nimplications of this matter for stability both in your\nregion and in the world. At this juncture, I believe\nyour Government has an opportunity to make a highly\nimportant contribution to worldwide efforts effectively\nto forestall further nuclear proliferation.\nFORD\n?\nSECRET/EXDIS\nGERALD\nSECRET/EXDIS\n-3-\nMy concern is not the reliability of the assur-\nances of your Government. It is that the establish-\nment of sensitive nuclear facilities under national\ncontrol inevitably gives rise to perceptions in many\nquarters that, under circumstances which perhaps can\nnot even be foreseen today, non-peaceful uses may be\ncontemplated. Whether justified or not, such percep-\ntions could be by themselves destabilizing and under-\nmine the mutual confidence and sense of security which\nmust be created if we are to build a system of inter-\nnational peaceful nuclear cooperation.\nThese perceptions are heightened in Pakistan's\ncase by the lack of a persuasive economic justifica-\ntion for obtaining sensitive nuclear facilities. For\nexample, the experience of the United States, as well\nas of all countries with major nuclear power programs,\nis that reprocessing of spent reactor fuel is only\neconomic within a very much larger reactor program\nthan Pakistan could contemplate for the foreseeable\nfuture.\nI know that Secretary Kissinger has already ex-\npressed similar views to you on this matter, but I\nwant to underline to you my deep personal concern\nSECRET/EXDIS\nSECRET/EXDIS\n-4-\nover the possible effect of your actions in this area\non our ability to sustain support in public opinion\nhere for our close cooperation on a broad range of\nissues of interest to both our governments. I fear\nthat many in this country will be critical of Pakistan's\nactions and skeptical regarding its intentions. Friend-\nship with Pakistan has enjoyed broad popular support\nin this country among the public and in the Congress\nover the years. However, Pakistan's acquisition of\nthese sensitive facilities would, I believe, arouse\nconsiderable criticism and could erode this support.\nWith these considerations in mind, I hope that\nyou will give serious consideration to not proceeding\nwith present plans to acquire reprocessing and heavy\nwater facilities until your future nuclear program\nis sufficiently developed to establish a clear need\nand until other alternatives, such as a multinational\nventure, are thoroughly explored.\nI believe that I understand the difficulties\nthat my request to you will present to your Government.\nI would not raise this matter with you, however, if\nFORD\nR\nSECRET/EXDIS\nBERALD\nSECRET/EXDIS\n-5-\nI did not consider it to be of the utmost importance.\nI would be grateful if you would let me have your\nviews on the points I have raised.\nSincerely,\nGerald R. Ford\nFORD\nSECRET/EXDIS\n&\nGERALD\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDear Jean:\nI am writing you on a matter of profound\nimportance to our efforts to promote stability and\ndeter the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities:\nthe threat posed to those efforts by increased\nnational access to sensitive nuclear technology --\nparticularly chemical reprocessing facilities --\nespecially in areas of conflict and instability.\nI have been heartened by the progress we have\nmade since our Presidents met in Martinique in 1974.\nThe meetings of nuclear suppliers in London have\nsucceeded in strengthening and expanding guidelines\nfor nuclear safeguards and controls. We take very\nseriously their provisions for consultation,\nrestraint in sensitive nuclear exports, and encourage-\nment of multinational alternatives to such exports.\nWe have applauded the active cooperation of France\nwhich has made possible the success of this effort.\nI continue to believe, as I noted last September\nto the UN General Assembly, that the further spread\nunder national control of reprocessing facilities\nwill seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear\nproliferation. My concern is all the greater in the\ncase of countries whose incentives to acquire nuclear\nHis Excellency\nJean Sauvagnargues,\nMinister of Foreign Affairs of\nthe French Republic,\nParis.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDECLASSIPIED\nGERALD\nB.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nState Dept. Guidelines state loview 9/17/03\nBy\ntabs\n, NARA, Date 3/9/04\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 2 -\nweapons are substantial. This is why we welcomed\nKorea's decision to forego acquiring a national\nreprocessing plant, and why we deeply appreciated\nFrance's constructive stance which contributed so\nmuch to our efforts. We have made emphatically\nclear to the Korean Government that future US\ncooperation should not hamper or replace its peace-\nful nuclear cooperation with France.\nWe are therefore at a juncture where we can\nmove to consolidate a pattern of restraint in\nsensitive nuclear transfers while fostering effectively\nsafeguarded cooperation in non-sensitive parts of the\nnuclear fuel cycle. It is in this context that we are\nasking France to join us in an act of leadership to\ndeter or delay Pakistani acquisition of a national\nreprocessing capability and to pursue, when the need is\nclear, safer and more economic alternatives, such as a\nmultinational venture in the region.\nIn this connection, we have asked Pakistan to\nconsider cancellation of present plans to acquire a\nreprocessing plant until its future nuclear program\nis sufficiently developed to establish clear need and\nuntil other alternatives have been more thoroughly\nexplored. I expressed my personal concern about these\nplans to Prime Minister Bhutto. I must be frank in\npointing out that-compared to Korea, Pakistan is\npursuing a much larger plutonium-production capability,\nfor which it has no economic need but it does have\nconsiderable potential for being used either to counter\nIndia's nuclear capability or to try to obtain concessions\nfor not doing so. We must also face the danger of\ncontravention or abrogation of even the most effective\nsafeguards agreement if a nation finds this to be in its\nnational interest.\nI believe that I understand the difficulties that\nmy request may present to your Government. While I would\nprefer that France participate with us in persuading\nPakistan to cancel its facility, it would help our efforts\nwith Prime Minister Bhutto if France could delay further\nactions on this transaction for a reasonable period of\nFORD\nCONFIDENTIAL\n?\nGENALD\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 3 -\ntime. I believe that we can make no more enduring\ncontribution to international stability than a\ndecisive act to forestall further transfers of\nnational reprocessing capabilities, particularly in\ncircumstances where there is a substantiál risk that\nthey might be used for non-peaceful purposes.\nWarm regards,\nHenry A. Kissinger\n3\nFORD\ntie\nCONFIDENTIAL\na\nGERALD\n34\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDear Mr. Minister:\nI know that you are aware of our concern over the\nGovernment of Pakistan's plans to acquire a pilot\nreprocessing plant from France and a heavy water plant\nfrom the Federal Republic. I have personally discussed\nthe matter with Prime Minister Bhutto but have not yet\nreceived a definitive response. In the meantime, I\nwanted to ensure that you understand the importance we\nattach to this matter, and to ask that in reaching a\ndecision on this transaction, you take into account not\nonly the immediate risks which we perceive but some of\nthe longer-term implications which in my view must be\nconsidered.\nIn reviewing the totality of Pakistan's planned\nnuclear program, we find it difficult to avoid the\nconclusion that there is a substantial risk of nuclear\nproliferation. Neither a chemical reprocessing nor a\nheavy water production capability are needed to meet\nPakistan's civil nuclear needs. Both facilities would,\nhowever, provide important elements in an indigenous\ncapability to produce nuclear explosives. Whether or\nnot Pakistan in fact chooses to produce explosives, I\nbelieve the capability to do so would in itself\ncontribute to a highly unstable situation in South Asia,\nwith sharply increased danger that other nations will\nHis Excellency\nHans-Dietrich Genscher,\nMinister of Foreign Affairs of the\nFederal Republic of Germany,\nBonn.\n&\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nGERALO\nState Dept. Guidelines state Deview 9/17/03\nlabor\n, NARA, Date 3/9/DN\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 2 -\nfeel impelled to take countermeasures. In such\ncircumstances, there would inevitably be a greater\nrisk of conflict, which because of its nuclear aspect\ncould threaten the security of countries both within\nand without the area.\nI am also concerned that our long-term mutual\nobjective of developing nuclear power as an alter-\nnative world energy source may be prejudiced if we\nfail to contain the proliferation problem. This has\nbeen an important consideration in pursuing greater\ncooperation among major nuclear suppliers. The\nrecent London Guidelines, in which the FRG played an\nimportant role, are an impressive start toward such\ncooperation. However, I cannot stress too strongly\nthe growing apprehension in this country about the\ndangers of nuclear proliferation, and my own view\nthat unless supplier governments deal adequately and\nconvincingly with those dangers in pursuing peaceful\nnuclear transfers, our long-term economic interests\nas well as our security may be affected.\nI am grateful for your Government's recent\ndecision to defer further action on the proposed heavy\nwater sale until we have received the reactions of\nFrance and Pakistan to our recent approaches. As you\nmay be aware, we had hoped to seek deferral of the\nFrench/Pakistani safeguards agreement at the recent\nIAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, in order to\nallow us more time to convince Pakistan that it is in\nits own interest not to acquire sensitive nuclear\nfacilities at this time. This did not prove feasible.\nFor Pakistan, an independent ability to produce\nheavy water would be a critical link in an indigenous\nfuel cycle which would give Pakistan the ability to\ndevelop nuclear explosives. Therefore, I would\nCONFIDENTIAL\n3.\nGERALO\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 3 -\nappreciate your personally reviewing this problem\nirrespective of what positions other governments\nmay adopt.\nWarm regards,\nHenry A. Kissinger\nCONFIDENTIAL\nBERALD\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDear Jean:\nI am writing you on a matter of profound\nimportance to our efforts to promote stability and\ndeter the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities:\nthe threat posed to those efforts by increased\nnational access to sensitive nuclear technology --\nparticularly chemical reprocessing facilities --\nespecially in areas of conflict and instability.\nI have been heartened by the progress we have\nmade since our Presidents met in Martinique in 1974.\nThe meetings of nuclear suppliers in London have\nsucceeded in strengthening and expanding guidelines\nfor nuclear safeguards and controls. We take very\nseriously their provisions for consultation,\nrestraint in sensitive nuclear exports, and encourage-\nment of multinational alternatives to such exports.\nWe have applauded the active cooperation of France\nwhich has made possible the success of this effort.\nI continue to believe, as I noted last September\nto the UN General Assembly, that the further spread\nunder national control of reprocessing facilities\nwill seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear\nproliferation. My concern is all the greater in the\ncase of countries whose incentives to acquire nuclear\nHis Excellency\nJean Sauvagnargues,\nMinister of Foreign Affairs of\nthe French Republic,\nParis.\n&\nDECLASSIFIED\nCONFIDENTIAL\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nState Dept. Guidelines state Deview 9/17/03\nGERALD\nBy\n, NARA, Date 3/9/04\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 2 -\nweapons are substantial. This is why we welcomed\nKorea's decision to forego acquiring a national\nreprocessing plant, and why we deeply appreciated\nFrance's constructive stance which contributed so\nmuch to our efforts. We have made emphatically\nclear to the Korean Government that future US\ncooperation should not hamper or replace its peace-\nful nuclear cooperation with France.\nWe are therefore at a juncture where we can\nmove to consolidate a pattern of restraint in\nsensitive nuclear transfers while fostering effectively\nsafeguarded cooperation in non-sensitive parts of the\nnuclear fuel cycle. It is in this context that we are\nasking France to join us in an act of leadership to\ndeter or delay Pakistani acquisition of a national\nreprocessing capability and to pursue, when the need is\nclear, safer and more economic alternatives, such as a\nmultinational venture in the region.\nIn this connection, we have asked Pakistan to\nconsider cancellation of present plans to acquire a\nreprocessing plant until its future nuclear program\nis sufficiently developed to establish clear need and\nuntil other alternatives have been more thoroughly\nexplored. I expressed my personal concern about these\nplans to Prime Minister Bhutto. I must be frank in\npointing out that compared to Korea, Pakistan is\npursuing a much larger plutonium-production capability,\nfor which it has no economic need but it does have\nconsiderable potential for being used either to counter\nIndia's nuclear capability or to try to obtain concessions\nfor not doing SO. We must also face the danger of\ncontravention or abrogation of even the most effective\nsafeguards agreement if a nation finds this to be in its\nnational interest.\nI believe that I understand the difficulties that\nmy request may present to your Government. While I would\nprefer that France participate with us in persuading\nPakistan to cancel its facility, it would help our efforts\nwith Prime Minister Bhutto if France could delay further\nactions on this transaction for a reasonable period of\nCONFIDENTIAL\n&\nGERALD\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 3 -\ntime. I believe that we can make no more enduring\ncontribution to international stability than a\ndecisive act to forestall further transfers of\nnational reprocessing capabilities, particularly in\ncircumstances where there is a substantiál risk that\nthey might be used for non-peaceful purposes.\nWarm regards,\nHenry A. Kissinger\nI\nCONFIDENTIAL\nBERELO\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nWASHINGTON\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDear Mr. Minister:\nI know that you are aware of our concern over the\nGovernment of Pakistan's plans to acquire a pilot\nreprocessing plant from France and a heavy water plant\nfrom the Federal Republic. I have personally discussed\nthe matter with Prime Minister Bhutto but have not yet\nreceived a definitive response. In the meantime, I\nwanted to ensure that you understand the importance we\nattach to this matter, and to ask that in reaching a\ndecision on this transaction, you take into account not\nonly the immediate risks which we perceive but some of\nthe longer-term implications which in my view must be\nconsidered.\nIn reviewing the totality of Pakistan's planned\nnuclear program, we find it difficult to avoid the\nconclusion that there is a substantial risk of nuclear\nproliferation. Neither a chemical reprocessing nor a\nheavy water production capability are needed to meet\nPakistan's civil nuclear needs. Both facilities would,\nhowever, provide important elements in an indigenous\ncapability to produce nuclear explosives. Whether or\nnot Pakistan in fact chooses to produce explosives, I\nbelieve the capability to do SO would in itself\ncontribute to a highly unstable situation in South Asia,\nwith sharply increased danger that other nations will\nHis Excellency\nHans-Dietrich Genscher,\nMinister of Foreign Affairs of the\nFederal Republic of Germany,\nBonn.\nFORD\n&\nDECLASSIFIED\nCONFIDENTIAL\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nlake\nState Dept. Guidelines state leview 9/17/03\nDERALD\nBy\n, NARA, Date 3/9/04\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 2 -\nfeel impelled to take countermeasures. In such\ncircumstances, there would inevitably be a greater\nrisk of conflict, which because of its nuclear aspect\ncould threaten the security of countries both within\nand without the area.\nI am also concerned that our long-term mutual\nobjective of developing nuclear power as an alter-\nnative world energy source may be prejudiced if we\nfail to contain the proliferation problem. This has\nbeen an important consideration in pursuing greater\ncooperation among major nuclear suppliers. The\nrecent London Guidelines, in which the FRG played an\nimportant role, are an impressive start toward such\ncooperation. However, I cannot stress too strongly\nthe growing apprehension in this country about the\ndangers of nuclear proliferation, and my own view\nthat unless supplier governments deal adequately and\nconvincingly with those dangers in pursuing peaceful\nnuclear transfers, our long-term economic interests\nas well as our security may be affected.\nI am grateful for your Government's recent\ndecision to defer further action on the proposed heavy\nwater sale until we have received the reactions of\nFrance and Pakistan to our recent approaches. As you\nmay be aware, we had hoped to seek deferral of the\nFrench/Pakistani safeguards agreement at the recent\nIAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, in order to\nallow us more time to convince Pakistan that it is in\nits own interest not to acquire sensitive nuclear\nfacilities at this time. This did not prove feasible.\nFor Pakistan, an independent ability to produce\nheavy water would be a critical link in an indigenous\nfuel cycle which would give Pakistan the ability to\ndevelop nuclear explosives. Therefore, I would\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 3 -\nappreciate your personally reviewing this problem\nirrespective of what positions other governments\nmay adopt.\nWarm regards,\nHenry A. Kissinger\nCONFIDENTIAL\n3\nLD\n33\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDear Mr. Prime Minister:\nI am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual\nunderstanding which has traditionally characterized the\nexchanges between our two Governments. During your\nvisit to Washington last year, we held very productive\ndiscussions and reached broad areas of understanding on\nmatters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the\nopenness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly\non Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear\nfacilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my\nGovernment.\nI know from my discussions with you that you share our\nfear over the threat to the general peace posed by un-\nrestrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My\nGovernment has welcomed your forthright assurances that\nPakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts\ninto an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear\nactivities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.\nYou should be aware, however, that there is considerable\napprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread\non a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with\nthe development of nuclear explosives--specifically, uranium\nenrichment, heavy water production and chemical reprocessing.\nIn fact, Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN General Assembly\nlast September the view of this Government that the further\nspread of nuclear reprocessing facilities under national control\nwill seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear proliferation.\nFor this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego\nacquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same\nreason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious\nconsideration to the broader implications of this matter for\nstability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,\nDECLASSIPIED\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nState Dept. Guidelines state Review 9/17/03\nBy\n, NARA, Date 3/9/04\n- 2 -\nI believe your Government has an opportunity to make a\nhighly important contribution to worldwide efforts effectively\nto forestall further nuclear proliferation.\nMy concern is not the reliability of the assurances of your\nGovernment. It is that the establishment of sensitive nuclear\nfacilities under national control inevitably gives rise to\nperceptions in many quarters that, under circumstances\nwhich perhaps cannot even be foreseen today, non-peaceful\nuses may be contemplated. Whether justified or not, such\nperceptions could be by themselves destabilizing and under-\nmine the mutual confidence and sense of security which must\nbe created if we are to build a system of international peaceful\nnuclear cooperation.\nThese perceptions are heightened in Pakistan's case by the\nlack of a persuasive economic justification for obtaining\nsensitive nuclear facilities. For example, the experience\nof the United States, as well as of all countries with major\nnuclear power programs, is that reprocessing of spent reactor\nfuel is only economic within a very much larger reactor program\nthan Pakistan could contemplate for the foreseeable future.\nI know that Secretary Kissinger has already expressed\nsimilar views to you on this matter, but I want to underline\nto you my deep personal concern over the possible effect\nof your actions in this area on our ability to sustain support\nin public opinion here for our close cooperation on a broad\nrange of issues of interest to both our governments. I fear\nthat many in this country will be critical of Pakistan's\nactions and skeptical regarding its intentions. Friendship\nwith Pakistan ha/s enjoyed broad popular support in this\ncountry among the public and in the Congress over the years.\nHowever, Pakistan's acquisition of these sensitive facilities\nwould, I believe, arouse considerable criticism and could erode\nthis support.\nWith these considerations in mind, I hope that you will give\nserious consideration to foregoing present plans to acquire\nreprocessing and heavy water facilities until your future\nnuclear program is sufficiently developed to establish a clear need\nand until other alternatives, such as a multinational venture, are\nthoroughly explored.\n- 3 -\nI, believe that I understand the difficulties that my request\nto you will present to your Government. I would not raise this\nmatter with you, however, if I did not consider it to be of the\nutmost importance. I would be grateful if you would let me\nhave your views on the points I have raised.\nPersonal regards,\nHis Excellency\nZulfikar Ali Bhutto,\nPrime Minister of the\nIslamic Republic of Pakistan\n3k\nDOC\nRECD\nLOG NUMBER\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\nNSC CORLESPONDENCE PROFILE\n3\n16\n3\n17\n17\n7601625\nEliot INITIALACTION o\nX\nTO: PRES\nFROM: SECSTATE\nx\nS/S 7605327\nUNCLAS LOG OUT\nSCOWCROFT\nSECDEF\nLOU\nNO FORN\nNODIS\nHYLAND\nDCI\nX REF\nC\nEYES ONLY\nEXDIS\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nDAVIS\nSTATE EXSEC\n$\nCODEWORD\nSUBJECT State sosition caper ie Outter\nOTHER\nTS\nSENSITIVE\nDemarkles on Pakistene Ruchar\nIssues\nINTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION\nREC\nACTION REQUIRED\nACTION\nCONCUR-\nCOOR-\nINFO\nCY\nRENCE\nDINATE\nADV CYS $ CROFT , WGH\nFOR\nMEMO FOR SCOWCROFT\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO FOR PRES\nM\nCONGRESSIONAL\nX\nREPLY FOR\nECONOMIC\nDISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\nEUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS\n+\nMEMO\nTO\nFAR EAST/PRC\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nINTELLIGENCE\nJOINT MEMO\nLATIN AMERICA\nREFER TO\nFOR:\nMID EAST/ NO. AFRICA\nX\nANY ACTION NECESSARY?\nNSC PLANNING\nCONCURRENCE\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDUE DATE:\nSCIENTIFIC\nX\n3-24\nCOMMENTS: INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS\nSUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN\nLeonold M\ntubel : 17:00\nDATE\nFROM\nSirth\nto\nSTATUS\nSUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:\nDUE\nCY TO\n3/18\nX\nhas to Bhutto to\n3/29\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\n3-19\nPres\nP\nSgn ltr to Bhutto\n3-19\nC\nPres sgd ltr to Bhutts\nto state\nDISPATCH\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nhand-carried by DR. Elliott 3-20-76 NOTIFY\nMICROFILM & FILE ROMTS\nM/ FD\nBY\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION:\nCRT ID:\nNS\nDY\nSPECIAL INDEXING\nOPEN\nWH SA FP\nNO\nCLOSE TA\nPA\nSUSPENSE CY ATTACHED\nNSC 76-21-\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976\n599-022\n7607747\n2211\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWashington, D.C. 20520\nApril 14, 1976\nSECRET/EXDIS\nMEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nSubject: Transmittal of Bhutto Letter\nto the President\nThe attached letter from Pakistani Prime Minister\nBhutto is in response to the President's letter to him\nof March 19. The letter was given to the Secretary by\nPakistani Ambassador Yaqub-Khan during a meeting in the\nSecretary's office on April 12.\nThe Department, in conjunction with Dr. Eliot of\nyour staff and representatives of ACDA, is consider-\ning options as to possible further steps which might\nbe taken in pursuit of the objectives outlined in the\nPresident's letter of March 19.\nC. arthmBood\nGeorge S. Springsteen\nExecutive Secretary\nAttachment:\nLetter to the President\nFORD\nis\nSECRET/EXDIS\nGDS\nGERALO\nlab 3/9/04\n*)\n*\nPRIME MINISTER\nPrime Minister's House,\nRawalpindi.\n30 March 1976\nDear Mr. President,\nI have given the most careful consideration to\nyour letter on the subject of Pakistan's decision to acquire\na reprocessing plant and heavy water facilities which was\nhanded over to the Foreign Office by your Ambassador on\nMarch 21. Let me assure you at the outset that, far from\nbeing insensitive to it, we ourselves fully share the\nserious concern about the spread of nuclear weapons which\npermeates your communication.\nIn this spirit and mindful of the traditional\nbonds between our two countries, I appreciate your candour\nand welcome the opportunity to explain both the factual\nposition and our viewpoint on this matter of far-reaching\nimportance to the economic viability of Pakistan. As I\nrecollect our meeting in Washington and my deep impression\nof your perceptions of the forces at work in this region,\nI feel hopeful that our mutual understanding will not\nfail on an issue which is of profound significance to us.\nAs you know, we have repeatedly and voluntarily\ngiven categorical assurances about the peaceful intent of\nour nuclear programme. More significantly, we have accepted\niron-clad safeguards for every one of our nuclear facilities.\nLest these be overlooked, as I fear they apparently are, I\nmust recount some of the most pertinent facts which need\nto be borne in mind in this context.\nFirst, neither our nuclear programme nor the\nplan to build a reprocessing plant constitutes a new decision\nFORD\nDECLASSIFIED\n&\nB.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nDept. Guidelines state Review 9/17/03\n, NARA, Date 3/9/04\nGERALD\nPRIME MINISTER\n-2-\nor a reaction to what others may have done. The programme\nis almost two decades old. We negotiated for a research\nreactor from the United States under the Atoms for Peace\nPlan in the early 1960's. The project was completed in\n1965. Since then we have built a large nuclear research\ncentre around it. In 1966, we started construction of a\nCanadian-supplied nuclear power plant (KANUPP) which was\ncompleted in 1972 and which supplies power to Karachi.\nAbout that time, we also started discussions with France\nfor the supply of a reprocessing plant. Agreement in\nprinciple was reached in 1972 and the actual design work\nwas started in 1973. What has happened now is merely the\nsigning of a formal bilateral agreement with France on\nthe supply, support and safeguard aspects of this facility.\nThis has been accompanied by the conclusion of a trilateral\nsafeguards agreement with the IAEA which was approved by\nits Board of Governors last month. It was a matter of\ngreat satisfaction to my Government that these agreements\nwere approved by consensus and without opposition not only\nin the Agency but in the European Economic Commission in\nBrussels.\nSecond, we have gone beyond the normal IAEA\nrules about safeguards and accepted the most stringent\nconditions from France, fully conforming to the guidelines\nrecently adopted by the seven nuclear exporting countries.\nThis is as convincing an earnest as any of our commitment\nto use this facility exclusively for peaceful purposes.\nI have responded favourably to Prime Minister Trudeau's\nproposal to revise existing safeguards on KANUPP and, after\n&\nDERALD\nPRIME MINISTER\n-3-\nexhaustive discussions between the two sides, I am happy to\ninform you that an agreement satisfactory to both is in\nsight. We are also in touch with the Federal Republic of\nGermany with regard to the safeguards to be applied to the\nsmall heavy water plant which will be barely adequate for\nmeeting KANUPP's requirements and which will not be used\nfor any other purpose. Thus we have not only placed all\nour nuclear facilities under safeguards but also agreed\nto make existing safeguards agreements even more fail-safe\nto satisfy the additional conditions laid down by the\nnuclear suppliers.\nThird, we have made a prolonged and unprejudiced\nexamination of the economic necessity of our nuclear\nprogramme of which a reprocessing plant forms an integral\npart. Pakistan is especially poor in terms of indigenous\nfuel. It has, therefore, been hit hardest by the recent\nenergy crisis and the phenomenal rise in oil prices. Vast\ntracts of our valuable land have been rendered uncultivable\nby water-logging and salinity. This destructive process\npersists. We must have the necessary power to sink and\noperate at least one hundred thousand tubewells to deal\nwith this menace. This is a demand superimposed upon the\naccelerating energy needs of our increasing population\nand the requirements of our growing industry. If we do\nnot plan now with some foresight, we will find no answer\nto a gnawing problem and we will face an appalling situation\nin the 1980's. For these plans to be more than visionary,\nit is essential for us to embark now on a large-scale\nnuclear power programme and, to this end, to build the\n4\nnecessary infra-structure and facilities and to train\nGERALD\nPRIME MINISTER\n-4-\nthe required manpower.\nOur sincerity of purpose, Mr. President, is\nthus not merely a matter of verbal pledge but something\nthat is fully insured by agreements that are inviolable.\nUnhappily, the same cannot be said of the nuclear\nprogramme of our neighbouring country. India, having\nalready exploded a nuclear device on our doorstep, makes\nno secret of its intention to carry out a series of\nnuclear explosions. Pakistan was threatened with cessation\nof all supplies for KANUPP if we did not accept the\nadditional safeguards proposed by Canada. On the other\nhand, I am not aware that the supply of enriched uranium\nto India for the operation of Tarapur reactors has been\ndiscontinued by the United States or that India will be\ncompelled to accept safeguards for the unsafeguarded\nCanada-India CIRRUS reactor which enabled her to carry\nout its nuclear explosion in 1974.\nI am not suggesting that Pakistan or other\ncountries should similarly be given a free hand to develop\nunrestrained nuclear programmes. On the contrary, we\nbelieve that, for world peace and stability in our region,\nthe nuclear powers need to concentrate on India to prevent\nit from going forward with its plans to develop nuclear\nweapons. What is happening at this time is that while\nIndia is getting away with the fruits of its 'fait accompli',\nit is Pakistan which is being treated with discrimination\nand suspicion. Our people see Pakistan, bound by alliance\nwith the United States, being subjected to pressures while\nthey observe India, allied to Soviet Union in a 20-year\nRALD\nmilitary pact, being treated with consideration and deference.\nPRIME MINISTER\n-5-\nI am sure that if the full significance of the\nkind of safeguards that Pakistan has accepted with respect\nto its nuclear facilities were fully known to your\nCongress and the public, there could be no ground to fear\nthat they might, in certain circumstances, be used for\nnon-peaceful purposes. With these apprehensions dispelled,\none cannot imagine that the United States would wish\nPakistan to reverse its considered decision, shelve its\nnuclear energy programme and thus not only frustrate the\nexpectations of its people about their development but\nalso inflict lasting damage on their expectation of\nsupport from the United States in their legitimate\ninterests.\nI have, of course, given serious thought to your\nview that the establishment of purely national reprocessing\nfacilities should be discouraged and the establishment of\nregional facilities promoted. Even before I received\nyour letter, I had taken advantage of the recent visit\nto Pakistan of the Shahanshah of Iran to discuss this\nmatter with him. He was agreeable to joining us in\nconverting the reprocessing plant in Pakistan into a\nregional project. We both will explore the possibility\nof inviting one or two other countries in this region to\nparticipate in this venture. As I said at the outset, we\nare thus making a constructive response to your concerns.\nhi\nZulfikar Ali Bhutto\nHis Excellency\nMr. Gerald R. Ford,\nPresident of the United States of America,\nWASHINGTON, DC.\n\"\nRALD\n4d\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMarch 19, 1976\nDear Mr. Prime Minister:\nI am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual\nunderstanding which has traditionally characterized\nexchanges between our two Gover ments. During your\nvisit to Washington last year, we held very productive\ndiscussions and reached broad areas of understanding on\nmatters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the\nopenness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly\non Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear\nfacilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my\nGovernment.\nI know from my discussions with you that you share our\nfear over the threat to the general peace posed by the un-\nrestrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My\nGovernment has welcomed your forthright assurances that\nPakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts\ninto an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear\nactivities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.\nYou should be aware, however, that there is considerable\napprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread\non a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with\nthe development of nuclear explosives -- specifically,\nuranium enrichment, heavy water production and chemical\nreprocessing. Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN\nGeneral Assembly last September the view of this Government\nthat the further spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities\nunder national control would seriously aggravate the problem\nof nuclear proliferation.\nFor this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego\nacquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same\nreason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious\nconsideration to the broader implications of this matter for\nstability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5\nNSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review 9/17/03\nBY tabs\n$ NARA, DATE 3/9/04\n- 2 -\nI believe your Government has an opportunity to make a\nhighly important contribution to worldwide efforts effectively\nto forestall further nuclear proliferation.\nMy concern is not the reliability of the assurances of your\nGovernment. It is that the establishment of sensitive nuclear\nfacilities under national control inevitably gives rise to\nperceptions in many quarters that, under circumstances\nwhich perhaps cannot even be foreseen today, non-peaceful\nuses may be contemplated. Whether justified or not, such\nperceptions could be by themselves destabilizing and under-\nmine the nutual confidence and sense of security which must\nbe created if we are to build a system of international peaceful\nnuclear cooperation.\nThese perceptions are heightened in Pakistan's case by the\nlack of a persuasive economic justification for obtaining\nsensitive nuclear facilities. For example, the experience\nof the United States, as well as of all countries with major\nnuclear power programs, is that reprocessing of spent reactor\nfuel is only economic within a very much larger reactor program\nthan Pakistan could contemplate for the foreseeable future.\nI know that Secretary Kissinger has already expressed\nsimilar views to you on this matter, but I want to underline\nto you my deep personal concern over the possible effect\nof your actions in this area on our ability to sustain support\nin public opinion here for our close cooperation on a broad\nrange of issues of interest to both our governments. I fear\nthat many in this country will be critical of Pakistan's\nactions and skeptical regarding its intentions. Friendship\nwith Pakistan has enjoyed broad popular support in this\ncountry among the public and in the Congress over the years.\nHowever, Pakistan's acquisition of these sensitive facilities\nwould, I believe, arouse considerable criticism and could erode\nthis support.\nWith these considerations in mind, I hope that you will give\nserious consideration to foregoing present plans to acquire\nreprocessing and heavy water facilities until your future\nnuclear program is sufficiently developed to establish a clear need\nand until other alternatives, such as a multinational venture, are\nthoroughly explored.\nA\nDERALD\n- 8 -\n- 3 -\n1 believe that I under stard the difficulties that my\nI believe that I understand the difficulties that my request\nto you will present to your Government. 1 would not naise NA\nthis tratter withryou, however, if I did not consider it to be:\noftheratmost importance.com would be grateful if you would\nlet me have your views on the points I have raised.\nSincerely,\nSincerely,\nHealth R. Sal\nHis Excellency\nHis Excellency notto\nZulfikar Ali Bhutto tox\nPrime Minister of the\nIslamic Republic of Pakistan\nIslamabad\nLIBRARY FORD & OF\nDOC\nPRICE\nLOG NUMBER\n-\nDA\nNO\nDA\nHR\nONDENCE PROFILE\n3\n16\n3\n7601625\nEliot INITIALIDACTION o\n17\n17\n+\n:\n10. once\nSECETATE\nx\nS/S 7605327\nUNCLAS\nLOO IN OUT\nSCONICROFT\nSECHEF\nLOU\nNO FORM\nNODIS\nHYLAND AND\nBOX\nc\nYES ONLY\nE XDIS\nR REF\nDAVIS\nSTATE EXSEC\n$\nCODEWORD\nYS\nSENSITIVE\nState sosition OTHER caper we Outher\nVemarkles on Pakisteni Ruchar\nIssues\nREC\nACTION REQUIRED\nCONCYR.\ncook-\nINFO\nCV\nDISATE\nFOR\nMEMO FOR SCOWCROFT\nSTAFF\nMEMO FOR PAID\nM\nX\nREPL FO\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\n*\nEUR/ DEEAMS\n+\nMEMO\nTO\nI\nI 1\nRECONMENDATIONS\nINTELLIGENCE\nJOINT MEMO\nt\nLATHE AMERICA\nREFER TO\nFOR\nwith EAST/RD. AFRICA\nX\n56\nANY ACTION NECESSARY\nI\nPLANNING\nCONCURRENCE\nPROGRAM AWALYSIS\n+\nDUE DATE\nSCIENTIFIC\nX\n3-24\nCOMMENTS: INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:\nSUB-SAN/ AFRICA/UM\n2.01\nwhel 17:00\nDATE\nFROM\nSTATUS\nJUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED OR TAKENI\nDUE\nCY:TO\n3/18\nThere\nX\nOF\nhes to Son dts Bhutto to\n3/29\n3-19\nPree\n8\nSgn lts to Bhutto\n3-19\nC\nPres sgd lts to Bhatto\n|\nVto blate\nhead-carried by DR. Elliott 3-20-76 NOTIFY\nMICROFILI A FILE ROMTS\nDISPATCH\nM/ D\nBY\nIF\n....\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION\nCHT ID\nNS\nOPEN\nWH\nSPECIAL INDEXING\nNO\nCLOSE TH\nPA\n4f\nPRIME MINISTER\nPrime Minister's House,\nRawalpindi.\n30 March 1976\nDear Mr. President,\nI have given the most careful consideration to\nyour letter on the subject of Pakistan's decision to acquire\na reprocessing plant and heavy water facilities which was\nhanded over to the Foreign Office by your Ambassador on\nMarch 21. Let me assure you at the outset that, far from\nbeing insensitive to it, we ourselves fully share the\nserious concern about the spread of nuclear weapons which\npermeates your communication.\nIn this spirit and mindful of the traditional\nbonds between our two countries, I appreciate your candour\nand welcome the opportunity to explain both the factual\nposition and our viewpoint on this matter of far-reaching\nimportance to the economic viability of Pakistan. As I\nrecollect our meeting in Washington and my deep impression\nof your perceptions of the forces at work in this region,\nI feel hopeful that our mutual understanding will not\nfail on an issue which is of profound significance to us.\nAs you know, we have repeatedly and voluntarily\ngiven categorical assurances about the peaceful intent of\nour nuclear programme. More significantly, we have accepted\niron-clad safeguards for every one of our nuclear facilities.\nLest these be overlooked, as I fear they apparently are, I\nmust recount some of the most pertinent facts which need\nto be borne in mind in this context.\nFirst, neither our nuclear programe nor the\nplan to build a reprocessing plant constitutes a new decision\nDECLASSIPIED\nBO. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nState Dept. Guidelines\nstate feview 9/17/03\n, NARA, Date 3/9/04\nPRIME MINISTER\n-2-\nor a reaction to what others may have done. The pro mme\nis almost two decades old. We negotiated for a research\nreactor from the United States under the Atoms for Peace\nPlan in the early 1960's. The project was completed in\n1965. Since then we have built a large nuclear research\ncentre around it. In 1966, we started construction of a\nCanadian-supplied nuclear power plant (KANUPP) which was\ncompleted in 1972 and which supplies power to Karachi.\nAbout that time, we also started discussions with France\nfor the supply of a reprocessing plant. Agreement in\nprinciple was reached in 1972 and the actual design work\nwas started in 1973. What has happened now is merely the\nsigning of a formal bilateral agreement with France on\nthe supply, support and safeguard aspects of this facility.\nThis has been accompanied by the conclusion of a trilateral\nsafeguards agreement with the IAEA which was approved by\nits Board of Governors last month. It was a matter of\ngreat satisfaction to my Government that these agreements\nwere approved by consensus and without opposition not only\nin the Agency but in the European Economic Commission in\nBrussels.\nSecond, we have gone beyond the normal IAEA\nrules about safeguards and accepted the most stringent\nconditions from France, fully conforming to the guidelines\nrecently adopted by the seven nuclear exporting countries.\nThis is as convincing an earnest as any of our commitment\nFORD\nto use this facility exclusively for peaceful purposes.\nI have responded favourably to Prime Minister Trudeau's\nproposal to revise existing safeguards on KANUPP and, after\nPRIME MINISTER\n-3-\nexhaustive discussions between the two sides, I am happy to\ninform you that an agreement satisfactory to both is in\nsight. We are also in touch with the Federal Republic of\nGermany with regard to the safeguards to be applied to the\nsmall heavy water plant which will be barely adequate for\nmeeting KANUPP's requirements and which will not be used\nfor any other purpose. Thus we have not only placed all\nour nuclear facilities under safeguards but also agreed\nto make existing safeguards agreements even more fail-safe\nto saticfy the additional conditions laid down by the\nnuclear suppliers.\nThird, we have made a prolonged and unprejudiced\nexamination of the economic necessity of our nuclear\nprogramme of which a reprocessing plant forms an integral\npart. Pakisten is especially poor in terms of indigenous\nfuel. It has, therefore, been hit hardest by the recent\nenergy crisis and the phenomenal rise in oil prices. Vast\ntracts of our valuable land have been rendered uncultivable\nby water-logging and salinity. This destructive process\npersists. We must have the necessary power to sink and\noperate at least one hundred thousand tubewells to deal\nwith this menace. This is a demand superimposed upon the\naccelerating energy needs of our increasing population\nand the requirements of our growing industry. If we do\nnot plan now with some foresight, we will find no answer\nto a gnawing problem and we will face an appalling situation\nFORD\nin the 1980's. For these plans to be more than visionary,\n&\nit 1S essential for us to embark now on a large-scale\nnuclear power programme and, to this end, to build the\nnecessary infra-structure and facilities and to train\nPRIME MINISTER\n-4-\nthe required manpower.\nOur sincerity of purpose, Mr. President, is\nthus not merely a matter of verbal pledge but something\nthat is fully insured by agreements that are inviolable.\nUnhappily, the same cannot be said of the nuclear\nprogramme of our neighbouring country. India, having\nalready exploded a nuclear device on our doorstep, makes\nno secret of its intention to carry out a series of\nnuclear explosions. Pakistan was threatened with cessation\nof all supplies for KANUPP if we did not accept the\nadditional safeguards proposed by Canada. On the other\nhand, I am not aware that the supply of enriched uranium\nto India for the operation of Tarapur reactors has been\ndiscontinued by the United States or that India will be\ncompelled to accept safeguards for the unsafeguarded\nCanada-India CIRRUS reactor which enabled her to carry\nout its nuclear explosion in 1974.\nI am not suggesting that Pakistan or other\ncountries should similarly be given a free hand to develop\nunrestrained nuclear programmes. On the contrary, we\nbelieve that, for world peace and stability in our region,\nthe nuclear powers need to concentrate on India to prevent\nit from going forward with its plans to develop nuclear\nweapons. What is happening at this time is that while\nIndia is getting away with the fruits of its 'fait accompli',\nit is Pakistan which is being treated with discrimination\nand suspicion. Our people see Pakistan, bound by alliance\nFond\nwith the United States, being subjected to pressures while\n&\nGERALD\nthey observe India, allied to Soviet Union in a 20-year\nmilitary pact, being treated with consideration and deference.\nPRIME MINISTER\n-5-\nI am sure that if the full significance of the\nkind of safeguards that Pakistan has accepted with respect\nto its nuclear facilities were fully known to your\nCongress and the public, there could be no ground to fear\nthat they might, in certain circumstances, be used for\nnon-peaceful purposes. With these apprehensions dispelled,\none cannot imagine that the United States would wish\nPakistan to reverse its considered decision shelve its\nnuclear energy programme and thus not only frustrate the\nexpectations of its people about their development but\nalso inflict lasting damage on their expectation of\nsupport from the United States in their legitimate\ninterests.\nI have, of course, given serious thought to your\nview that the establishment of purely national reprocessing\nfacilities should be discouraged and the establishment of\nregional facilities promoted. Even before I received\nyour letter, I had taken advantage of the recent visit\nto Pakistan of the Shahanshah of Iran to discuss this\nmatter with him. He was agreeable to joining us in\nconverting the reprocessing plant in Pakisten into a\nregional project. We both will explore the possibility\nof inviting one or two other countries in this region to\nparticipate in this venture. As I said at the outset, we\nare thus making a constructive response to your concerns.\nShoulds\nZulfikar Ali Bhutto\nHis Excellency\nMr. Gerald R. Ford,\nPresident of the United States of America,\nFORD\nWASHINGTON, DC.\n&\nGERALD\nDac\nRECD\nLOG.NUMBER\n4g\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\nNSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE\n4\n14\n4\n1510\n7602211\nOahle INITIAL ACTION o\nTO: PRES\nFROM: SECSTATE\nt\nS/S 7607747 UNCLAS LOG IN/ OUT J\nSCOWCROFT\nSECDEF\nLOU\nNO FORN\nNODIS\nHYLAND\nDCI\nX REF\nC\nEYES ONLY\nEXDIS\n+\nDAVIS\nSTATE EXSEC\nS\nCODEWORD\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nSUBJECT Ceel lte to koo OTHER for fm Bkutto of TS Rakistas SENSITIVE\nre he Inl lte to him of Rae 19 1976\nhe Los- Pakistani Rulear Issues\nINTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION\nREC\nACTION REQUIRED\nACTION\nCONCUR-\nCOOR-\nINFO\nCY\nRENCE\nDINATE\nFOR\nADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH\nMEMO FOR SCOWCROFT\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO FOR PRES\nCONGRESSIONAL\nREPLY FOR\nECONOMIC\nDISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\nEUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS\nMEMO\nTO\nFAR EAST/ PRC\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nINTELLIGENCE\nJOINT MEMO\nLATIN AMERICA\nREFER TO\nFOR:\nMID EAST/ NO. AFRICA\nANY ACTION NECESSARY? AT this time\n*\nNSC PLANNING\nCONCURRENCE\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDUE DATE:\nSCIENTIFIC\nX\n4-21\nCOMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)\nSUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN\nLogged per Oakley' instructions\nDATE\nFROM\nTO\nSTATUS\nSUBSEQUENT\nBockup ACTION REQUIRED (OR atched TAKEN): DUE\nCY TO\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\n0401\n&\nGERALD\nDISPATCH\nNOTIFY\nMICROFILM & FILE RQMTS\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nM/F'D\nBY\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION:\nIF\nSPECIAL INDEXING: 7601625\nCRT ID: D\nNS\nDY\nOPEN\nWH SA FP\nCLOSE\nPA\nSUSPENSE CY ATTACHED\nNSC 76-21\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 1976\n599-022\n7607747\n2211\n4h\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWashington, D.C. 20520\nwillia\nApril 14, 1976\nSECRET/EXDIS\nMEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nSubject: Transmittal of Bhutto Letter\nto the President\nThe attached letter from Pakistani Prime Minister\nBhutto is in response to the President's letter to him\nof March 19. The letter was given to the Secretary by\nPakistani Ambassador Yaqub-Khan during a meeting in the\nSecretary's office on April 12.\nThe Department, in conjunction with Dr. Eliot of\nyour staff and representatives of ACDA, is consider-\ning options as to possible further steps which might\nbe taken in pursuit of the objectives outlined in the\nPresident's letter of March 19.\nC. arthmBood\n1\nGeorge S. Springsteen\nExecutive Secretary\nAttachment:\nLetter to the President\nbe\nSECRET/EXDIS\nGERALD\nGDS\nh 3/9/04\nPRIME MINISTER\nPrime Minister's House,\nRawalpindi.\n30 March 1976\nDear Mr. President,\nI have given the most careful consideration to\nyour letter on the subject of Pakistan's decision to acquire\na reprocessing plant and heavy water facilities which was\nhanded over to the Foreign Office by your Ambassador on\nMarch 21. Let me assure you at the outset that, far from\nbeing insensitive to it, we ourselves fully share the\nserious concern about the spread of nuclear weapons which\npermeates your communication.\nIn this spirit and mindful of the traditional\nbonds between our two countries, I appreciate your candour\nand welcome the opportunity to explain both the factual\nposition and our viewpoint on this matter of far-reaching\nimportance to the economic viability of Pakistan. As I\nrecollect our meeting in Washington and my deep impression\nof your perceptions of the forces at work in this region,\nI feel hopeful that our mutual understanding will not\nfail on an issue which is of profound significance to us.\nAs you know, we have repeatedly and voluntarily\ngiven categorical assurances about the peaceful intent of\nour nuclear programme. More significantly, we have accepted\niron-clad safeguards for every one of our nuclear facilities.\nLest these be overlooked, as I fear they apparently are, I\nmust recount some of the most pertinent facts which need\nto be borne in mind in this context.\nFirst, neither our nuclear programme nor the\nplan to build a reprocessing plant constitutes a new decision\nDECLASSIFIED\nFORD\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nState Dept. Guidelines Stateleview 9/17/03\n, NARA, Date 3/9/04\nPRIME MINISTER\n-2-\nor a reaction to what others may have done. The programme\nis almost two decades old. We negotiated for a research\nreactor from the United States under the Atoms for Peace\nPlan in the early 1960's. The project was completed in\n1965. Since then we have built a large nuclear research\ncentre around it. In 1966, we started construction of a\nCanadian-supplied nuclear power plant (KANUPP) which was\ncompleted in 1972 and which supplies power to Karachi.\nAbout that time, we also started discussions with France\nfor the supply of a reprocessing plant. Agreement in\nprinciple was reached in 1972 and the actual design work\nwas started in 1973. What has happened now is merely the\nsigning of a formal bilateral agreement with France on\nthe supply, support and safeguard aspects of this facility.\nThis has been accompanied by the conclusion of a trilateral\nsafeguards agreement with the IAEA which was approved by\nits Board of Governors last month. It was a matter of\ngreat satisfaction to my Government that these agreements\nwere approved by consensus and without opposition not only\nin the Agency but in the European Economic Commission in\nBrussels.\nSecond, we have gone beyond the normal IAEA\nrules about safeguards and accepted the most stringent\nconditions from France, fully conforming to the guidelines\nrecently adopted by the seven nuclear exporting countries.\nThis is as convincing an earnest as any of our commitment\nto use this facility exclusively for peaceful purposes.\nI have responded favourably to Prime Minister Trudeau's\nproposal to revise existing safeguards on KANUPP and, after\nFORD\n&\nBERALD\nPRIME MINISTER\n-3-\nexhaustive discussions between the two sides, I am happy to\ninform you that an agreement satisfactory to both is in\nsight. We are also in touch with the Federal Republic of\nGermany with regard to the safeguards to be applied to the\nsmall heavy water plant which will be barely adequate for\nmeeting KANUPP's requirements and which will not be used\nfor any other purpose. Thus we have not only placed all\nour nuclear facilities under safeguards but also agreed\nto make existing safeguards agreements even more fail-safe\nto satisfy the additional conditions laid down by the\nnuclear suppliers.\nThird, we have made a prolonged and unprejudiced\nexamination of the economic necessity of our nuclear\nprogramme of which a reprocessing plant forms an integral\npart. Pakistan is especially poor in terms of indigenous\nfuel. It has, therefore, been hit hardest by the recent\nenergy crisis and the phenomenal rise in oil prices. Vast\ntracts of our valuable land have been rendered uncultivable\nby water-logging and salinity. This destructive process\npersists. We must have the necessary power to sink and\noperate at least one hundred thousand tubewells to deal\nwith this menace. This is a demand superimposed upon the\naccelerating energy needs of our increasing population\nand the requirements of our growing industry. If we do\nnot plan now with some foresight, we will find no answer\nto a gnawing problem and we will face an appalling situation\nin the 1980's. For these plans to be more than visionary,\nit is essential for us to embark now on a large-scale\nnuclear power programme and, to this end, to build the\nFORD\n&\nnecessary infra-structure and facilities and to train\nGERALD\nPRIME MINISTER\n-4-\nthe required manpower.\nOur sincerity of purpose, Mr. President, is\nthus not merely a matter of verbal pledge but something\nthat is fully insured by agreements that are inviolable.\nUnhappily, the same cannot be said of the nuclear\nprogramme of our neighbouring country. India, having\nalready exploded a nuclear device on our doorstep, makes\nno secret of its intention to carry out a series of\nnuclear explosions. Pakistan was threatened with cessation\nof all supplies for KANUPP if we did not accept the\nadditional safeguards proposed by Canada. On the other\nhand, I am not aware that the supply of enriched uranium\nto India for the operation of Tarapur reactors has been\ndiscontinued by the United States or that India will be\ncompelled to accept safeguards for the unsafeguarded\nCanada-India CIRRUS reactor which enabled her to carry\nout its nuclear explosion in 1974.\nI am not suggesting that Pakistan or other\ncountries should similarly be given a free hand to develop\nunrestrained nuclear programmes. On the contrary, we\nbelieve that, for world peace and stability in our region,\nthe nuclear powers need to concentrate on India to prevent\nit from going forward with its plans to develop nuclear\nweapons. What is happening at this time is that while\nIndia is getting away with the fruits of its 'fait accompli',\nit is Pakistan which is being treated with discrimination\nand suspicion. Our people see Pakistan, bound by alliance\nFORD\nwith the United States, being subjected to pressures while\n&\nthey observe India, allied to Soviet Union in a 20-year\nmilitary pact, being treated with consideration and deference.\nPRIME MINISTER\n-5-\nI am sure that if the full significance of the\nkind of safeguards that Pakistan has accepted with respect\nto its nuclear facilities were fully known to your\nCongress and the public, there could be no ground to fear\nthat they might, in certain circumstances, be used for\nnon-peaceful purposes. With these apprehensions dispelled,\none cannot imagine that the United States would wish\nPakistan to reverse its considered decision, shelve its\nnuclear energy programme and thus not only frustrate the\nexpectations of its people about their development but\nalso inflict lasting damage on their expectation of\nsupport from the United States in their legitimate\ninterests.\nI have, of course, given serious thought to your\nview that the establishment of purely national reprocessing\nfacilities should be discouraged and the establishment of\nregional facilities promoted. Even before I received\nyour letter, I had taken advantage of the recent visit\nto Pakistan of the Shahanshah of Iran to discuss this\nmatter with him. He was agreeable to joining us in\nconverting the reprocessing plant in Pakistan into a\nregional project. We both will explore the possibility\nof inviting one or two other countries in this region to\nparticipate in this venture. As I said at the outset, we\nare thus making a constructive response to your concerns.\nShoulds\nJusilin Ali Bhutto\nhi\nHis Excellency\nMr. Gerald R. Ford,\nPresident of the United States of America,\nis\nWASHINGTON, DC.\nBRALD\nDOC\nRECD\nLOG NUMBER\n4:3\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\nNSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE\n4\n14\n4\n1510\n7602211\nTO: PRES\nFROM: SECSTATE\nS/S 7607747\nOakley\n+\nSCOWCROFT\nSECDEF\nLOU\nNO FORN\nNODIS\nHYLAND\nDCI\nX REF\nC\nEYES ONLY\nEXDIS\nDAVIS\nSTATE EXSEC\nS\nCODEWORD\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nSUBJECT: Ceel lte to Rx OTHER for Sm Bkutto of TS Fakister SENSITIVE\nthe 205- Pakistani Rulear Issues\nre he Inl lte to him of Mar L9 1976\nINTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION\nREC\nACTION REQUIRED\nACTION\nCONCUR-\nCOOR-\nINFO\nCY\nRENCE\nDINATE\nADV CYS S'CROFT / WGH\nFOR\nMEMO FOR SCOWCROFT\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO FOR PRES\nCONGRESSIONAL\nREPLY FOR\nECONOMIC\nDISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\nEUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS\nMEMO\nTO\nFAR EAST/ PRC\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nINTELLIGENCE\nJOINT MEMO\nLATIN AMERICA\nREFER TO\nFOR:\nMID EAST NO. AFRICA\nX\nANY ACTION NECESSARY? AT this time\n#\nNSC PLANNING\nCONCURRENCE\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDUE DATE:\nSCIENTIFIC\nX\n4-21\nCOMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS\nSUB-SAH/ AFRICA / UN\nLogged per Oakley's instructions\nDATE\nFROM\nTO\nSTATUS\nSUBSEQUENT Backup ACTION REQUIRED (OR atched TAKENI: DUE\nCY TO\n1-11-77\nElliott\nOabley\nFor appropriate folling\n1/12\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\nC Class per Dakley\nGERALD\nDISPATCH\nNOTIFY\nMICROFILM & FILE ROMTS\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nM/F'D\nBY\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION:\nIF\nSPECIAL INDEXING: 760 1625\nCRT ID:\nNS\nDY\nOPEN CLOSE MST\nSA FP\nSUSPENSE CY ATTACHED\nNO\nNSC 76-21\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976\n599-022"
}