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Tanzania - President Julius Nyerere
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Tanzania - President Julius Nyerere
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Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders (Ford Administration)
Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders
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The original documents are located in Box 4, folder "Tanzania - President Julius
Nyerere" of the National Security Adviser's Presidential Correspondence with Foreign
Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 4 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
COPY 10 OF 15 COPIES
NODIS
DEPARTMENT STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
NO0952
PAGE 01 STATE
62
ORIGIN NODS-00
22 JAN 76 2047
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R
108057
0 2218062 JAN 76
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 538
ZODIU
SECRE T SECTION 1 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 0242
NODIS
both
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, TZ, AO, US
SUBJECT: NYERERE'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT'S LETTER
Q. I WAS CALLED TO FONOFF 6:00 PM LOCAL 22 JANUARY AND
HANDED ORIGINAL SIGNED TEXT (BEING POUCHED) OF PRESIDENT
NYEHERE'S RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD ON ANGOLA.
AT TIME FONOFF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAS AFFAIRS DIRECTOR
MUGANDA SAID PRESIDENT NYERERE EAGER THAT LETTER BE -
TRANSMITTED IMMEDIATELY TO PRESIDENT FORD.
N
2. BEGIN TEXT.
HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD,
THE WHITE HOUSE,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
D
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,
DECLASSIPIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
Dept. Guidelines 9/17/03
new
0
WASHINGTON D. C.,
NARA, Date 3/9/04
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 5TH JANUARY 1976, IN
WHICH YOU MADE THE AMERICAN POSITION ON ANGOLA QUITE
CLEAR. I HOPE THAT THIS REPLY WILL CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER
S
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND THUS ASSIST
State
IN THE MAINTENANCE OF OUR FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
DESPITE ANY POLITICAL DISAGREEMENTS ON THIS OR OTHER
runu
ISSUES.
s
SECRET
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ZODIS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE
I HAVE EXPLAINED TANZANIA'S POSITION TO YOUR AMBASSADOR
IN DAR ES SALAAM - BOTH BEFORE THE D.A.U. MEETING IN
ADDIS ABABA, AND YESTERDAY IMMEDIATELY UPON MY RETURN FROM
INDIA. HIS EXCELLENCY MR. SPAIN WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE
REPORTED TO YOU ON OUR DISCUSSIONS.
WAR IN ANGOLA IS, UNFORTUNATELY, NOTHING NEW, IT HAS
BEEN - AND STILL IS - PART OF THE WHOLE STRUGGLE FOR
NATIONAL FREEDOM AND FOR HUMAN EQUALITY AND DIGNITY IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT HAS NOT BEEN AN
ZODIS
IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND NON-COMMUNISTS
SINCE 1961 IT HAS BEEN A STRUGGLE BETWEEN COLONIALISTS
AND RACIALISTS ON THE ONE SIDE, AND ANTI-COLONIALISTS
AND ANTI-RACIALISTS ON THE OTHER.
THE M.P.L.A. OF ANGOLA WAS BY FAR THE MOST ACTIVE
OF THE THREE NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA: IT NEEDED,
AND USED MORE MILITARY AND OTHER MATERIAL SUPPORT IN
CONDUCTING THE WAR AGAINST THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT. THE
M.P.L.A. THEREFORE OBTAINED MORE ARMS FROM THE COMMUNIST
GOVERNMENTS THAN EITHER OF THE OTHER TWO MOVEMENTS - ALTHOUGH
ALL THREE HAVE HAD, AT VARIOUS TIMES, ARMS SUPPLIES FROM ONE
OR MORE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. BUT NONE OF THE LIBERATION
MOVEMENTS GOT ARMS FROM THESE COUNTRIES BECAUSE OF AN
IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT TO COMMUNISM. THEY GOT ARMS
EXCLUSIVELY FROM EASTERN BLOCK COUNTRIES BECAUSE THEY COULD
NOT GET ANY ARMS FROM WESTERN BLOCK COUNTRIES. THE LATTER
WERE IN FACT ALLIED WITH PORTUGAL IN NATO THROUGHOUT
200-0
THE PERIOD OF THE COLONIAL WAR.
WHETHER OPPOSITION TO NATO WAS THE REASON
WHY SOME COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WERE WILLING TO GIVE ARMS
TO THE ANGOLAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS, OR WHETHER THERE WAS
SOME OTHER MOTIVE, ONLY THE DONORS CAN SAY. WHAT WE
CAN SAY - AND ON THIS AT LEAST AFRICA IS UNITED PO IS THAT
ARMS WERE OBTAINED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO OTHER WAY IN
WHICH THE PEOPLES OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES COULD
OBTAIN FREEDOM. THE SALAZAR AND CAETANO GOVERNMENTS
REJECTED THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL FREEDOM FOR ANGOLA,
MOZAMBIQUE, AND GUINEA BISSAU. FINALLY, IN 1974, A NEW
GOVERNMENT CAME TO POWER IN PORTUGAL AS A DIRECT RESULT
BECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
200-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
STATE SP PAGE
OF THE COLONIAL WARS; THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL FREEDOM
HAS THEN CONCEDED - AND NEGOTIATIONS REPLACED ARMED CONFLICT.
AMERICA'S INTEREST IN ANGOLA, AS I UNDERSTAND IT,
IS THAT ANGOLA SHOULD NOT BECOME A SATELLITE OR PUPPET
OF THE D.S.S.R.N AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MILITARY
BASES ON ANGOLAN SOIL WHICH MIGHT BE USED BY AMERICA'S
ENEMIES. TANZANIAIS INTEREST IN ANGOLA STEMS FROM
OUR INVOLVEMENT IN OUR OWN CONTINENT, AND OUR DESIRE THAT
ANGOLA SHOULD NOT BECOME THE SATELLITE OR PUPPET OF ANY
OTHER COUNTRY - WITH A PARTICULAR WORRY IN OUR MIND ABOUT
ZODIS
RACIALIST AND COLONIALIST SOUTH. AFRICA. AMERICA IS CONCERNED
ABOUT CUBAN TROOPS AND RUSSIAN WEAPONS IN SUPPORT OF THE
M.P.L.A. TANZANIA IS MUCH MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE
INTERVENTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AND WEAPONS IN SUPPORT
OF F.N.L.A. AND UNITA. FOR ALL THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
OF AFRICA HAVE PERFORCE USED COMMUNIST SUPPLIED WEAPONS
THROUGHOUT ANY NECESSARY ARMED STRUGGLE; WE DO NOT YET HAVE
AN EXAMPLE OF AN INDEPENDENT AFRICAN COUNTRY WHICH HAS BECOME
A SATELLITE OR PURPET OF THE U.S.S.R. BUT SOUTH FARICA'S
DESIRE FOR A PUPPET REGIME IN ANGOLA IS VERY CLEAR! HAVING
LOST ITS PORTUGUESE BUFFER STATE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN
GOVERNMENT WISHES TO SUBSTITUTE ANOTHER KIND OF BUFFER TO
PROTECT ITS DOMINATION OVER NAMIBIA AND ITS OWN INHUMAN
APARTHEID PRACTICES IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF.
200-0
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
200-0
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
NOD961
PAGE И1 DAR ES 00242 02 OF 02 222113Z
61
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
108350
0 221800Z JAN 76
F : 1 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHOC NIACT IMMEDIATE 539
$
ECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 0242
200-0
NODIS
I AM CONCERNED, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT BY INTERVENING
IN ANGOLA ON THE SAME SIDE AS THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT,
AMERICA WILL ACHIEVE TWO THINGS WHICH ARE QUITE THE OPPOSITE
OF WHAT I UNDERSTAND YOU TO INTEND. FIRST, YOU WILL BECOME
INCREASINGLY IDENTIFIED WITH SOUTH AFRICAIS RACIALIST
DOCTRINE, BECAUSE YOU WILL BE FORCED, BY THE LOGIC OF EVENTS,
INTO ASSISTING ITS INTERVENTION AND ITS POLICIES.
SECOND, ACTIVE INTERVENTION BY AMERICA AGAINST M.P.L.A.
WOULD FORCE THE M.P.L.A. GOVERNMENT INTO A DEGREE
OF DEPENDENCE UPON THE U.S.S.R. AND ITS ALLIES WHICH
WOULD ENDANGER ITS PRESENT DECLARED POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT.
FOR ALTHOUGH THE MP.L.A, GOVERNMENT NOW NEEDS TO OBTAIN WEAPONS
TO FIGHT SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS ANGOLAN ALLIES, THE EXTENT OF
ITS POLITICAL INDEBTEUNESS FOR THIS PURPOSE WOULD BE
VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT INVOLVED IN OBTAINING RUSSIAN
HELP AGAINST THE MIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
200-0
MR. PRESIDENT, THE HISTORY OF THE LAST FOURTEEN YEARS
MEANS THAT THE MPLA GOVERNMENT WILL NATURALLY BE
FRIENDLY WITH A U.S.S.R. WHICH RESPECTS ITS SOVEREIGNTY,
BUT FRIENDSHIP DOES NOT IMPLY SUBSERVIENCE. THE FRELIMO
GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE HAS THE SAME KIND OF HISTORICALLY
PROMOTED FRIENDSHIP WITH CHINA, BUT IT IS NOT A SATELLITE
OF CHINA - ON THE ANGOLAN ISSUE THEY ARE TAKING DIFFERENT
SIDES. AND FRIENDSHIP WITH THE U.S.S.R. DOES NOT AUTO-
MATICALLY LEAD TO ENMITY TOWARDS THE U.S.A. AS YOUR COUNTRY HAS
NOW RECOGNISED, NON-ALIGNED NATIONS CAN BE FRIENDLY
WITH YOURSELVES AND WITH COUNTRIES OF THE EASTERN BLOCK
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
200-0
OF STATE
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET
PAGE 62 DAR ES 00242 02 OF 02 2221132
AT THE SAME TIME. IT IS MY HOPE THAT AMERICA'S POLICIES
AT THIS VERY DIFFICULT TIME WILL NOT PRECLUDE THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CORPERATION BETWEEN
ANGOLA AND THE U.S.A. IN THE FUTURE,
LET ME ADD THAT MY DISCUSSION WITH YOUR AMBASSADOR
YESTERDAY HAS GIVEN ME SOME ENCOURAGEMENT TO HOPE THAT ON
ANGOLA THE POSITIONS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL BECOME
CLOSER IN THE FUTURE. FOR I DO UNDERSTAND AMERICA'S
FEARS ABOUT POSSIBLE SOVIET BASES IN ANGOLA, AND ABOUT
ZODIS
FUTURE ANGOLAN HOSTILITY TO THE UNITED STATES. HE ON OUR
SIDE ARE ANXIOUS THAT ANGOLA SHOULD BE RUN BY ANGOLANS
IN THE INTERESTS OF ANGOLA, AND NOT ANYONE ELSE. BUT I
STRESSED TO YOUR AMBASSADOR THAT WE 00 NOT REGARD SOUTH
AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA AS A MATTER OVER WHICH
THERE CAN BE NEGOTIATION; OUR ABHORRENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN
RACIALIST POLICIES, AND ITS COLONIAL DOMINATION OF NAMIBIA,
IS SUCH THAT SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AND SUPPORT CANNOT BE
EQUATED IN ANY WAY WITH OTHER FORCES WHICH ARE HELPING
THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT TO DEFEAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN
AGRESSION. THE TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT CONTROL
THE MPLA GOVERNMENT BUT I BELIEVE THAT ON THAT
QUESTION OUR ATTITUDE IS THE SAME. FURTHER, IT APPEARS
TO ME LIKELY THAT AFTER A COMPLETE SOUTH AFRICAN
WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLAN TERRITORY, THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT
WILL WATCH THE POSITION VERY CAREFULLY, AND WITH SOME
SUSPICION, FOR A TIME,, BUT WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE
THAT THEY, LIKE OTHER AFRICAN TERRITORIES, WOULD NOT LIKE
ZODIU
TO HAVE FOREIGN TROUPS ON THEIR SOIL, EVEN IN ALLIANCE WITH
THEM, LONGER THAN IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE
INTEGRITY OF THE STATE. THE MPLA POLICY, AND ITS
ADOPTED CONSTITUTION, DEMANDS NON-ALIGNMENT AND A FOREIGN
POLICY. ANGOLAN LEADERS WILL REALISE THAT THIS REQUIRES
THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS AS SOON AS THEIR PRESENCE
IS NOT MADE NECESSARY BY AN ACTIVE THREAT FROM SOUTH
AFRICAN AND ITS SUPPORTERS.
MR, PRESIDENT, ALLOW ME TO CONCLUDE THIS LETTER
BY SAYING HOW MUCH I VALUE DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN US ON
THIS AND OTHER ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN. I WOULD ALSO LIKE
TO EXPRESS MY GOOD WISHES FOR YOU, AND FOR THE AMERICAN
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ZODIS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SEGRET
PAGE 03 DAR ES 00242 02 OF 02 222113Z
PEOPLE, FOR THE WHOLE OF 1976.
YOURS SINCERELY,
JULIUS K. NYERERE
END TEXT,
SPAIN
200-0
200-0
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET/NODIS for staffing
STATE - -A.I.D. - USIA
DATE of up
ROUTING SLIP
Feb. 9, 1976
TO:
Organ.
Initials
Date
Name or Title
Symbol
Room No. Bldg.
1.
S
7234A NS
o
2.
3.
4.
5.
Approval
For Your Information
Note and Return
As Requested
Initial for Clearance
Per Conversation
Comment
Investigate
Prepare Reply
File
Justify
See Me
For Correction
Necessary Action
Signature
REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING
Received from Amembassy Dar es Salaam.
Text contained in Dar es Salaam 0242,
repeated to the Secretary Jan. 22.
Make copy for
two ф original To + WH.
Tarzania and
FROM: (Name and Org. Symbol)
ROOM NO. & BLDG.
PHONE NO.
Ellen Shippy, AF/E
as
5240 NS
20857
FORM
3 68
JF-29 (Formerly Forms DS-10, AID-5-50 & IA-68)
SECRET/NODIS
CLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRE T /NODIS
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
January 23, 1976
TO
For the Attention of
Department of State
Ellen Shippy (AF/E)
FROM
Amembassy Dar es Salaam
TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE
TO THE DEPARTMENT
For Transmittal to Addressee
Dept. Information Only
at the Discretion of Post
CERP Publications
Post Information Only
Enclosure to Previous
Transmit to Foreign Office
Airgram
Submit Report
Reply to Department
Reply to the Individual
Request
Transmit to:
(U. S. Agency)
Inform:
REFERENCE
Dar es Salaam 0242
ITEMS/REMARKS
IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NUMBER AND DRAFTING OFFICE
FILE NO.
CLASSIFICATION
SIGNATURE OFFICE Herbert Levin M
SECRET NODIS
Deputy Chief of Mission
FORM DS - 4
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1973-725-341/417 3-1
12-64
2c
THE STATE HOUSE,
DAR ES SALAAM,
TANZANIA.
22nd January, 1976
His Excellency President Gerald R. Ford,
The White House,
Washington D.C.,
United States of America
Dear Mr. President,
Thank you for your letter of 5th January 1976, in
which you made the American position on Angola quite
clear. I hope that this reply will contribute to greater
understanding between our two countries, and thus assist
in the maintenance of our friendship and cooperation
despite any political disagreements on this or other
issues.
I have explained Tanzania's position to your Ambassador
in Dar es Salaam - both before the O.A.U. Meeting in
Addis Ababa, and yesterday immediately upon my return from
India. His Excellency Mr. Spain will undoubtedly have
reported to you on our discussions.
War in Angola is, unfortunately, nothing new; it has
been - and still is - part of the whole struggle for
national freedom and for human equality and dignity in
Southern Africa. The Angolan conflict has not been an
ideological struggle between Communists and Non-Communists;
since 1961 it has been a struggle between colonialists
and racialists on the one side, and anti-colonialists
and anti-racialists on the other.
The M.P.L.A. of Angola was by far the most active
of the three Nationalist Movements in Angola; it needed,
and used, more military and other material support in
conducting the war against the colonial government. The
M.P.L.A. therefore obtained more arms from the Communist
Governments than either of the other two Movements - although
all three have had, at various times, ar supplies from one
or more Communist countries. But none of the Liberation
Movements got arms from these countries because of an
ideological commitment to Communism. They got arms
exclusively from Eastern Block countries because they could
not get any arms from Western Block countries. The latter
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines, Stateleview 9/17/03
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
GERACO
LIBRARY
./2
By
- 2 -
were in fact allied with Portugal in NATO throughout
the period of the colonial war.
Whether opposition to NATO was the reason why some
Communist countries were willing to give arms to the
Angolan Freedom Fighters, or whether there was
some other motive, only the donors can say. What we can say -
and on this at least Africa is united - is that arms
were obtained because there was no other way in
which the peoples of the Portuguese colonies could
obtain freedom. The Salazar and Caetano Governments
rejected the principle of national freedom for Angola,
Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau. Finally, in 1974, a new
Government came to power in Portugal as a direct result
of the colonial wars; the principle of national freedom
was then conceded - and negotiations replaced armed conflict.
America's interest in Angola, as I understand it,
is that Angola should not become a satellite or puppet
of the U.S.S.R., and that there should be no military
bases on Angolan soil which might be used by America's
enemies. Tanzania's interest in Angola stems from
our involvement in our own continent, and our desire that
Angola should not become the satellite or puppet of any
other country - with a particular worry in our mind about
racialist and colonialist South Africa. America is concerned
about Cuban troops and Russian weapons in support of the
M.P.L.A. Tanzania is much more concerned about the
intervention of South African troops and weapons in support
of F.N.L.A. and UNITA. For all the Liberation Movements
of Africa have perforce used communist supplied weapons
throughout any necessary armed struggle; we do not yet have
an example of an independent African country which has become
a satellite or puppet of the U.S.S.R. But South Africa's
desire for a puppet regime in Angola is very clear; having
lost its Portuguese buffer state, the South African
government wishes to substitute another kind of buffer to
protect its domination over Namibia and its own inhuman
apartheid practices in South Africa itself.
I am concerned, Mr. President, that by intervening
in Angola on the same side as the South African government,
America will achieve two things which are quite the opposite
of what I understand you to intend. First, you will become
increasingly identified with South Africa's racialist
doctrine, because you will be forced, by the logic of events,
- 3 -
into assisting its intervention and its policies.
Second, active intervention by America against M.P.L.A.
would force the M.P.L.A. Government into a degree
of dependence upon the U.S.S.R. and its allies which
would endanger its present declared policy of non-alignment.
For although the M.P.L.A. government now needs to obtain weapons
to fight South Africa and its Angolan allies, the extent of
its political indebtedness for this purpose would be
very different from that involved in obtaining Russian
help against the might of the United States of America.
Mr. President, the history of the last fourteen years
means that the M.P.L.A. government will naturally be
friendly with a U.S.S.R. which respects its sovereignty.
But friendship does not imply subservience. The Frelimo
Government of Mozambique has the same kind of historically
promoted friendship with China, but it is not a satellite
of China - on the Angolan issue they are taking different
sides. And friendship with the U.S.S.R. does not automatically
lead to enmity towards the U.S.A. As your country has
now recognised, non-aligned nations can be friendly
with yourselves and with countries of the Eastern Block
at the same time. It is my hope that America's policies
at this very difficult time will not preclude the
development of economic and political cooperation between
Angola and the U.S.A. in the future.
Let me add that my discussion with your Ambassador
yesterday has given me some encouragement to hope that on
Angola the positions of our two countries will become
closer in the future. For I do understand America's
fears about possible Soviet bases in Angola, and about
future Angolan hostility to the United States. We on our
side are anxious that Angola should be run by Angolans
in the interests of Angola, and not anyone else. But I
stressed to your Ambassador that we do not regard South
African intervention in Angola as a matter over which
there can be negotiation; our abhorrence of South African
racialist policies, and its colonial domination of Namibia,
is such that South African troops and support cannot be
equated in any way with other forces which are helping
the Angolan Government to defeat the South African
aggression. The Tanzanian Government does not control
the M.P.L.A. Government; but I believe that on that
.../4
- 4 -
question our attitude is the same. Further, it appears
to me likely that after a complete South African
withdrawal from Angolan territory, the Angolan Government
will watch the position very carefully, and with some
suspicion, for a time. But we have reason to believe
that they, like other African territories, would not like
to have foreign troops on their soil, even in alliance with
them, longer than is absolutely necessary for the
integrity of the state. The M.P.L.A. policy, and its
adopted constitution, demands non-alignment as a foreign
policy. Angolan leaders will realise that this requires
the withdrawal of foreign troops as soon as their presence
is not made necessary by an active threat from South
Africa and its supporters.
Mr. President, allow me to conclude this letter
by saying how much I value direct contact between us on
this and other issues of mutual concern. I would also like
to express my good wishes for you, and for the American
people, for the whole of 1976.
Yours sincerely,
GERALD 4 i
His Excellency President Gerald R. Ford,
The White House,
Washington D.C.,
United States of America
Dia
JUHURU
NA
UMOJA