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1555866
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United Kingdom - Prime Minister Harold Wilson (2)
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1555866
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United Kingdom - Prime Minister Harold Wilson (2)
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https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1555866
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Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders (Ford Administration)
Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders
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Spain
Great Britain
International Monetary Fund. 7/1944-
Economics
Finance
Gold
Summit meetings
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1976-01-31
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1976
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1975-01-01
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1975
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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "United Kingdom - Prime Minister Harold Wilson (2)" of the National Security Adviser's Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Copyright Notice The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. of STATE Department of State UNITED STATES OF TELEGRAM SECREY N00237 PAGE 01 STATE 069371 00 ORIGIN NODS-00 INFO OCT-01 1001 R DRAFTED BY TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE APPROVED BY S/S-O:GTWOHIE Copy I of 13 copies 031445 0 150515Z JAN 75 ZFF4 Control: 2690Q FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AREMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE Recd: Jan 15, 1975 12:25 AM SECRE T STATE 009371 NODIS CHEROKEE E.O. 116521GDS TAGS: OVIP (GERALD R. FORD) SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER FOR THE AMBASSADOR PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO PRIME MINISTER. WILSON AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY ON JANUARY 15 AND IN ANY EVENT PRIOR TO NOON WASHINGTON TIME. BEGIN TEXT DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: THIS WEDNESDAY, IN MY STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS, I WILL PURMALLY PRESENT POLICIES TO MEET THE ECONOMIC AND ENERGY CHALLENGES WHICH ARE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. I SHALL, AT THAT TIME, MAKE A NUMBER OF DETAILED PROPOSALS, MANY OF WHICH I OUTLINED IN MY SPEECH TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON MONDAY NIGHT. I WRITE YOU IN THE SPIRIT OF COLLABORATION THAT ANIMATES DUR RELATIONS TO SHARE MY THOUGHTS ON THESE FORD NEW MEASURES. A SECRET GERALD LEBAR Wa 3/9/04 NOT TO BF REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR Digitized from Box 5 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library DEPARTMENT or STATE CELINO Department of State AMERICA TELEGRAM STATES to SECRET RAGE 02 STATE 009371 OUR COUNTRIES AND OUR KEY TRADING PARTNERS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN STRUGGLING WITH UNEMPLOYMENT, INFLATION, AND ENERGY SHORTAGES. THERE ARE, AS WE KNOW, NO EASY ANSWERS TO ANY OF THESE PROBLEMS, SINGLY OR IN COMBINATION, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT WE CANNOT AFFORD TO ADDRESS ONE ASPECT OF OUR DIFFICULTIES WHILE IGNORING THE OTHERS. MOREOVER, EACH COUNTRY MUST ACT TO ACHIEVE A BALANCE CONSISTENT WITH ITS PRIORITIES AND ITS PARTICULAR ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES WHILE RECUGNIZING IT MUST ACT IN A MANNER WHICH FURTHERS RATHER THAN HARMS THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF OTHER COUNTRIES. MY POLICIES AIM TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE ECONOMIC SLOW- DOWN WE NOW FACE WITHOUT TRIGGERING THE MAJOR INFLATIONARY PRESSURES WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM AN OVERLY EXPANSIONARY POLICY. A TAX CUT, ALONG WITH MEASURES TO STIMULATE INVESTMENT, SHOULD REINVIGORATE THE U.S. ECONOMY AND IMPROVE CONFIDENCE. UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS, WE BELIEVE IT WILL NOT RESTIMULATE THE INFLATIONARY SPIRAL. WE ARE ALSO TAKING MAJOR STEPS TO REDUCE OUR DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED OIL. WE ARE DETERMINED TO REDUCE OIL IMPORTS PROMPTLY AND SIGNIFICANTLY AND TO END VULNERABILITY TO ECONOMIC DISRUPTION BY FOREIGN SUPPLIERS BY 1985. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TO CUT ENERGY IMPURTS AND TO INCREASE BOTH OUR DOMESTIC SUPPLIES AND OUR ABILITY TO USE OUR COAL, GAS, OIL AND NUCLEAR POWER ARE CLEARLY NECESSARY AS ARE STRONG MEASURES TO ENSURE ADEQUATE CONSERVATION AND A NEW EMERGENCY STORAGE PROGRAM. THESE STEPS MAKE NEW DEMANDS ON THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AT THE SAME TIME, THEY PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A STRONGER U.S. ECONOMY IN THE FUTURE. THIS, IN TURN, SHOULD HAVE A BENEFICIAL IMPACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY. IN CLOSING, LET ME EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE I HAVE ATTACHED TO HAVING HAD THE BENEFIT OF YOUR VIEWS ON THESE ISSUES IN YOUR MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 30. WE ARE STRONGLY COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS IN CONFRONTING OUR COMMON PROBLEMS. WHILE MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE, WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY TE POSITIVE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN SECRET NOT TO BF REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR DEPARTMENT OF STATE Department of State TELEGRAM STATES of SEGRET PAGE 03 STATE 009371 RECENTLY. FOR OUR MUTUAL WELL-BEING, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE CONTINUE DEVELOPING A COMMON APPROACH IN DEALING WITH ENERGY PROBLEMS AND THAT WE CONTINUE TO COORDINATE CLOSELY IN CONFRONTING - OUR ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. I LOOK FORWARD TO STAYING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU ON THESE IMPORTANT ISSUES. SINCERELY, GERALD R. FORD THE RIGHT HONORABLE HAROLD WILSON PRIME MINISTER LONDON END TEXT. KISSINGER S 0 3 S SECRET NOT TO RF REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR 2F THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE 4086 WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATIVELY INFORMATION CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: Henry A. Kissinger B- June 18, GRT SUBJECT: Message From Prime Minister Wilson Prime Minister Wilson's note (at Tab A) thanks you for your congrat- ulatory message (text at Tab B) on the outcome of Britain's EC referendum. The Prime Minister states his pleasure that the verdict of the British people was so decisive and his conviction that the result is good for Britain, Europe and for the world. He says that a relation- ship of mutual trust between Europe and the United States is the cornerstone of Britain's foreign policy and states that as a member of the Community Britain looks forward to close, continuing cooperation. He concludes that he shares your conviction that such cooperation will contribute to world peace and prosperity. The Prime Minister's reply message is forwarded for your information. ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL 2B 4086 FROM: BRITISH EMBASSY THE HON. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008 SIR PETER RAMSBOTHAM KCMG TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340 The President 12 June 1975 The White House Dear M: President I have the honour to forward a message from the British Prime Minister, Mr Harold Wilson, in reply to your message to him on the result of the British referendum on the European Economic Community. yours sincerely Peta Rambokan H M Ambassador some / a GERALD ac 4086 Thank you very much for your message on the outcome of the referendum and for your congratulations. It is a great satisfaction that the British people should have given so decisive a verdict. I am convinced that this result is good for Britain, for Europe and for the world as a whole. As Prime Minister I have, as you know, always seen a relationship of mutual trust between Europe and the United States as the corner-stone of our foreign policy. We look forward as members of the Community to a close and continuing co-operation. In the face of many difficult problems ahead, I share your conviction that such co-operation will contribute to world peace and prosperity. DIEU MON 10 DOWNING STREET THE PRIME MINISTER 12 June 1975 my dea Mrs President Thank you very much for your message on the outcome of the Referendum and for your congratulations. It is a great satisfaction that the British people should have given so decisive a verdict. I am convinced that this result is good for Britain, for Europe and for the world as a whole. As Prime Minister I have, as you know, always seen a relationship of mutual trust between Europe and the United States as the corner-stone of our foreign policy. We look forward as members of the Community to a close and continuing co-operation. In the face of the many difficult problems ahead, I share your conviction that such co-operation will contribute to world peace and prosperity. lows very sincerely Harild Libor The President of the United States of America Staff w/ copy to THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON 2E 6/23/75 TO: DR. KISSINGER FORD OTHER LISBARY 1811 ARY RDL Robert D. Linder at To PM Wilson from President Ford At this historic moment, I want to congratulate you and the people of Great Britain on the outcome of the EC referendum. It reflects recognition of increasing interdependence. It reinforces the prospect of growing European cooperation and harmony. And it demonstrates the same perception of common destiny which has created a wider community of Atlantic and industrialized nations. The United States looks forward to continued and growing ; cooperation with Great Britain as part of a vital, unified Europe. By building on the accomplishments of the past and by working together to resolve the difficult problems ahead, the industrialized democracies can further their own well-being and contribute significantly to greater global harmony and prosperity. MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 4086 ADMINISTRATIVELY ACTION CONFIDENTIAL June 16, 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM: A. Denis Clift Br Robert Hormats SUBJECT: Message to the President From Prime Minister Wilson Sir Peter Ramsbotham has forwarded a message (at Tab A) from Prime Minister Wilson thanking the President for his congratulatory message (at Tab B) on the outcome of Britain's EC referendum. The memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab I would forward the Prime Minister's message together with a brief summary. It would also indicate that no reply from the President is necessary. RECOMMENDATION That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I. ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL DOC RECD LOG NBR INITIAL ACTION o NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE MO DA MO DA HR 6 12 6 13 15 7504086 CIRCLE Clift AS APPROPRIATE Linder REFERENCE: TO: PRES FROM: KISSINGER, H S/S UNCLAS OG IN/OUT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION KISSINGER * COLBY, W OTHER LOU NO FORN NODIS SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER, J C EYES ONLY EXDIS DAVIS ST EX SEC 5 CODEWORD TS SENSITIVE SUBJECT Ack ltr to Pres fm Ramsbatham, Amb of great Pres Britain INTERNAL for ROUTING finding his AND DISTRIBUTION recent a msg mog fm re Butish PM Wilson referendum thanking REC ACTION REQUIRED ACTION INFO. CY ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT The FOR MEMO FOR HAK ( ) STAFF SECRETARY MEMO FOR PRES ( ) REPLY FOR FAR EAST ( ) SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA APPROPRIATE ACTION , * ) DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT MID EAST / NO.,AFRICA / SO. ASIA MEMO TO - ) - EUROPE / CANADA RECOMMENDATIONS ) LATIN AMERICA JOINT MEMO - ) REFER TO FOR: ( ) UNITED NATIONS ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ( ECONOMIC ) SCIENTIFIC CONCURRENCE ( ) PROGRAM ANALYSIS DUE DATE: 6-20 NSC PLANNING COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) CONGRESSIONAL OCEANS POLICY INTELLIGENCE DATE FROM TO S SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN): CY TO Hille - HAK X Free for lnfo 6/18 Pres CIP info SUBSEQUENT ROUSING/ACTIONS 6/20 NSC/S C 6/24 Rect Org fun Linder noted by Pres DISPATCH CY ROMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: NSC/S DISP INSTR NOTIFY & DATE BY JUN 1975 BY Aec SPECIAL DSPOSITION: CRT OPE GAB LB: SA SF CROSS REF W/ HP NS SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: FOLDER: CLOSE Aoc WH EP DY (NBC-74-21) 3 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON August 31, 1975 Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Our representatives are meeting this weekend in Washington, along with those of other countries, to discuss some crucial issues in the international monetary area. Resolution of these questions will help assure the continued viability of the liberal trade and payments system which is so essential to world prosperity in the coming years. Sound agreements on gold and exchange rates are clearly important to every country. In addition, less developed nations will particularly benefit from the planned IMF quota increase and measures to mobilize IMF gold. For these reasons, I place great importance on progress at the upcoming meetings of the Bank and the Fund. I am, therefore, authorizing Secretary Simon to exercise further flexibility on the gold issue. I hope this flexibility by the United States on gold will pave the way for agreement on a full package of amendments to the IMF Articles as well as the quota increase. Obviously, the French approach to the exchange regime issue will be critical to working out a package. I have, therefore, written to President Giscard d'Estaing to urge reconsideration of the French position. - 2 - In the past, you have played a decisive role in the formulation of European views on monetary questions. I know we can count now on your continued efforts to reach a common ground on which we can all agree. Sincerely, Geord R. Ful Right Honorable Harold Wilson Prime Minister of Great Britain London MON 10 DOWNING STREET THE PRIME MINISTER 11 September 1975 Dear mw President. I appreciated very much your writing to me as you did before the discussions held in the Interim Committee a few days ago. We can, I believe, be well satisfied with the outcome of that meeting, and in particular the successful resolution of the gold issues See Gold File for origmed that have proved so intractable in the past. As you said in your address to the Annual IMF Meeting, these results represented a major breakthrough. The additional negotiating authority you felt able to give to Secretary Simon was clearly an important element in the overall result. Like you, I hope and believe that it will now be possible to build on this progress and complete in the coming months a comprehensive agreement covering in particular outstanding issues on the exchange rate regime. As you know, our own position on this question - and indeed that of a majority of EEC countries - is very close to that of the United States. You can be assured of our continued efforts to reach a solution. Meanwhile I am sure that it was right for you to have written to the French President asking him to reconsider the French position. Your very sincerely, Harrd Wibor The President of the United States of America MEMORANDUM THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 5977-6402 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON INFORMATION SECRET October 13, 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT B grey FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT SUBJECT: Responses from Wilson, Schmidt, and Moro to your Letters on Gold Prime Minister Wilson, Chancellor Schmidt, and Prime Minister Moro have responded to your messages of September 1 conveying a more flexible US position on gold. In the Interim Committee, agreement was reached on new IMF quotas, on reducing the vote required for a veto from 20% to 15%, abolition of an official price for gold, elimination of the obligation to use gold in transactions with the IMF, sale of one-sixth of the Fund's gold (25 million ounces) for benefit of the developing countries, and restitution of the same amount to its original owners. Wilson (Tab A) believes that your additional flexibility was an important element in the overall results of the meeting of the Interim Committee. He hopes and believes that it will now be possible to complete in coming months a comprehensive agreement covering, in particular, outstanding issues relating to exchange rates. Schmidt (Tab B) also believes that US flexibility was a significant factor in paving the way for progress in the Interim Committee. He states that future progress toward broader agreement should not be impaired by differences of opinion over the future exchange rate system (viz. France vs. the US). He expects that the gap between the different views will be narrowed, and warns that an unnecessarily tough discussion could damage present efforts to stimulate economic activity, reduce inflation and fight inflation and payments imbalances. He indicates that he will do all in his power "in an undogmatic spirit" to play a mediating role. Moro (Tab C) states that the positive results obtained in gold and IMF quotas were testimony of the goodwill of the US and the European Community in dealing with world monetary problems. He affirms that Italy intends to SECRET/GDS hb 3/9/04 SECRET 2 pursue discussion concerning exchange rates in the same constructive spirit, with the goal of reaching a formula that will reconcile existing differences. He underlines the point, made to you in Helsinki, that Italy's ability to play a constructive role on these matters will be made more difficult if major financial issues are discussed in meetings limited to five countries, i.e., excluding Italy. Constructive action by Italy "presupposes Italy's participation in all of the forums in which international policies in the economic and monetary areas are elaborated and agreed upon." I do not believe that replies to the three heads of government are required. SECRET/GDS MEMORANDUM 5977-6402 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TAB7 fudto 10.13 ACTION SECRET October 7, 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL A SCOWCROFT FROM: ROBERT HORMATS ORM SUBJECT: Responses from Wilson, Schmidt and Moro to President's Letters on Gold The above noted leaders responded to the President's messages of September 1 conveying a more flexible US position on gold. All believe that this flexibility was an important element in the successful meeting of the IMF Interim Committee. Should you wish to send these to the President, a memorandum is attached at Tab 1. RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab 1. SECRET/GDS the 3/9/04 5 604 COPY OP IMMED DE WTE #5949 2932152 0 202201Z OCT 75 PM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WH51991 TO: PRIME MINISTER WILSON FROM: PRESIDENT FORD OCTOBER 20, 1975 DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I WANTED TO CONVEY TO YOU MY SATISFACTION WITH THE PROSPECT OF THE SUMMIT MEETING NEXT MONTH. I GREATLY LOOK FORWARD TO A FULL AND CANDID REVIEW OF THE GREAT PROBLEMS WE ALL FACE TOGETHER. THE SPIRIT OF THE PREPARATORY WORK SINCE HELSINKI SUGGESTS THAT WE WILL HAVE A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE IMPULSE TO COOPERATIVE APPROACHES AMONG THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES AND THUS TO DEMONSTRATE OUR POLITICAL RESOLVE TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUES BEFORE US, I AM CONCERNED, HOWEVER, WITH ONE ASPECT OF THE SUMMIT: THE CONTINUED RESISTANCE OF OUR FRENCH COLLEAGUE TO THE INCLUSION OF CANADA, I AM SURE ALL OF US WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE MORE LIMITED MEETING OF FIVE LEADERS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZED THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVES THAT REQUIRED THE INCLUSION OF ITALY. BUT IT WAS ALWAYS CLEAR THAT ONCE THIS OCCURRED THE CANADIANS HAD A MOST LEGITIMATE CLAIM TO COME AS WELL, INDEED, FOR us IN THE DECLASSIFIED UNITED STATES THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION THAT A COUNTRY E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 WHICH IS OUR LARGEST TRADING PARTNER, WHOSE ECONOMY IS so INTIMATELY INTERTWINED WITH OURS AND WHICH CLEARLY RANKS NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES NARA, DATE 3/9/04 AS A LEADING ECONOMIC POWER IN THE WORLD WOULD HAVE TO BE PRESENT AT THE SUMMIT ONCE IT WAS ENLARGED BEYOND THE ORIGINAL BY loh FIVE. AS A MATTER OF PROCEDURE, I FIND IT QUITE DISMAYING WHSR COMMENT SCOWCROFT, RODMAN RECALLED FORD PSN#846920 PAGE 01 TOR:293/21:52Z DTG:202201Z OCT 75 & *******$ COPY GERALD ANOURIA e R E T *******S COPY THAT ONE MEMBER OF A GROUP SHOULD CLAIM A VETO IN A MATTER OF SUCH OBVIOUS CONCERN TO THE OTHERS. I CONSIDERED HOLDING UP THE SUMMIT ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL THE CANADIAN ISSUE WAS SETTLED BUT DECIDED AGAINST SUCH TACTICS BECAUSE I FELT THEY WERE UNWORTHY AMONG FRIENDS AND ALLIES AND I COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT OUR FRENCH COLLEAGUE WOULD PERSIST IN A POSITION THAT COULD ONLY DETRACT FROM THE PROMISE OF THE ENTERPRISE ON WHICH WE ARE EMBARKED AND WHICH HE HIMSELF HAD so STRONGLY ADVOCATED. I AM NOT CERTAIN WHAT STEPS YOU MIGHT BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE TO HELP BRING THIS ISSUE TO A CONCLUSION. I HAVE HAD A so FAR PRUITLESS EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES WITH GISCARD AND I HAVE ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WHO HAS EXCHANGED MESSAGES WITH GISCARD AND ALSO SPOKE TO MIM ON THE PHONE BUT so FAR WITHOUT RESULT. THE JAPANESE HAVE STRONGLY INDICATED THEIR SUPPORT OF CANADIAN PARTICIPATION TO SECRETARY KISSINGER WHEN HE PASSED THROUGH TOKYO. I PROPOSE TO BE IN TOUCH WITH GISCARD AGAIN SHORTLY. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, I DID WANT YOU TO KNOW MY OWN VIEWS ON THIS MATTER AND TO BE AWARE OF MY CONCERN THAT THIS UNFORTUNATE AND, IN MY VIEW, UNNECESSARY EPISODE COULD CLOUD THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT. SINCERELY, GERALD R. FORD 0503 YORD & GERALD LIBRARY RECALLED P8N1046920 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:293/21:52Z 07G:202201Z OCT 75 *******S COPY 0 ba SECRET BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 1 November 1975 The Honorable Henry A Kissinger SECRETARY OF STATE Dear Henry I enclose a copy of a reply from the Prime Minister to the President's message of 20 October about the Economic Summit Conference. from sincerely leter Ram bothing (Peter Ramsbotham) DECLASSIFIED GERALD a FORD LIDIARY to E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5 SECRET State Dept. Guidelines By We , NARA, Date 3/10/04 SECRET TEXT OF MESSAGE "1. I was encouraged to receive your message of 20 October about the Summit Meeting. I agree that the time is ripe for a gesture showing the willingness of the industrial democracies to tackle current world economic problems and to display a common political resolve in working for the resumption of growth. 2. On the question of Canadian participation, I fully share your feeling that Canada has good grounds for seeking to attend this meeting. I have let the Canadians know that this is my view, and have taken steps to have it brought to the attention of President Giscard. I have not received a direct reply. I understand, however, that Giscard maintains his objections, and that his reply will say so. 3. In the light of this I am considering whether I should send a direct message to President Giscard, asking him not to oppose the Canadian request for an invitation to attend the meeting, which I believe would profit from their presence. But before doing so I would be glad to know whether your exchange of messages with him has yet yielded anything; you mentioned that you were proposing to be in touch with him again. The answer to this would of course shape the terms in which I couch any approach to Giscard. 4. I share your reluctance to accept that the French President should be allowed to decide who should or should not participate in the proposed conference. I think we should spare no effort in trying to dislodge him. I am bound to say that in the light of the great attention and expectations which the announcement of the Summit Conference has raised, its abandonment for any reason at this stage could have a bad effect on international confidence. But we should do all we can to ensure Canada's attendance.' DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 UNITED GERALD FIRD MR# 09-120, #24 SECRET state dept. ltr 4/29/10 By dal NARA, Date 6/22/10 OP STATE Department of State of STATES € AMERICA TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL 0784 PAGE 01 STATE 267049 64 ORIGIN SS-25 INFO OCT-01 ISC-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 1026 R DRAFTED BY EB: TOENDERS APPROVED BY S: HAKISSINGER C: HSONNENFELDT TREAS: GPARSKY S/S MR. ORTIZ S: PEBARBIAN WH:BSCROWCROFT DESIRED DISTRIBUTION S,D,E,C, S/S, EB, EUR, EA, WH(SCOWCROFT), AND TREAS (SIMON) ONLY 095459 5 Z 1121477 NOV 75 ZFF4 AFR/UN FM SECSTATE WASHDC EUR/CAN TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO FLASH Fe L+B AMEMBASSY ROME FLASH LA AMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH NEA/SA AMEMBASSY BONN FLASH PRC DIH SEA e ONF 1 H4 STATE 267049 NCO/PLIG PGM/ANL EXDIS V.P. SCI/ENV ECON S E.O. 11652: GDS OPNL/INT SS/PR TAGS: EFIN CONGR SUBJECT: ECONOMIC SUMMIT FOR THE AMBASSADOR 1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT FORM & WITH APPROPRIATE SALUTATION TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, AND PRIME MINISTERS MIKI, MORO AND WILSON. 2. I AM WRITING TO SHARE MY THOUGHTS WITH YOU AS WE PREPARE FOR THE MEETING AT RAMBOUILLET. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO LEAD PUBLIC OPINION TO EXPECT DRAMATIC RESULTS, I AM CONVINCED THAT WE MUST USE THIS UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A PROLONGED NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Wa 3/9/04 FORM DEPARTMENT or STATE UNITED 3) Department of State TELEGRAM STATES of CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 STATE 267049 PERIOD OF SHARED PROSPERITY. ON REFLECTION, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT OUR PUBLICS AND OUR PARLIAMENTS WILL EXPECT NOTHING LESS AND THAT WE CAN, IN FACT, ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS. 3. OUR FIRST TASK AT RAMBOUILLET WILL BE TO BUILD CONFI- DENCE IN THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY UNDERWAY IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN AND WHICH IS BEGINNING IN EUROPE. HERE, I BELIEVE, A CAREFUL PRESENTATION OF THE MOST RECENT TRENDS WILL BE CONVINCING. 4. NEXT, WE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE TO OUR PUBLICS OUR INTEN- TION TO DIRECT THE COURSE OF THE RECOVERY SO AS TO MAINTAIN STABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH TN THE FUTURE. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE MIGHT CONSIDER WHETHER CLOSER COOPERATION AMONG OUR OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY, COUPLED WITH THE ARTICULATION OF JOINT GOALS FOR THE MAJOR INDUSTRIALIZED ECONOMIES, WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE. THESE GOALS MIGHT BE: --TO GENERALIZE THE RECOVERY DURING 1976 AMONG THE MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES. --TO SEEK TO RESTORE SUSTAINED VIGOROUS ECONOMIC EXPAN- SION AND HIGH LEVELS OF EMPLOYMENT BY 1977. --TO REDUCE INFLATION AND DISPARITIES AMONG NATIONAL INFLATION RATES. --TO RESTORE VIGOROUS GROWTH IN TRADE. 5. THIRD, OUR MEETING MUST COME TO GRIPS WITH THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF TRADE, MONEY AND ENERGY. 6. TRADE IS CLEARLY CRITICAL. WE SHOULD, I BELIEVE, PROVIDE NEEDED IMPETUS TO THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA- TIONS UNDERWAY IN GENEVA. SETTING 1977 AS THE DEADLINE FOR THEIR COMPLETION AND IDENTIFYING AS OUR GOALS: --A MAJOR CUT IN TARIFFS (NO LESS THAN THAT ACHIEVED IN THE KENNEDY ROUND) ; OT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZ OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY or STATE OFFINA 0 Department of State TELEGRAM STATES or OHO CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 STATE 267349 --PEDUCTION OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES BY NEGOTIATION OF CODES; --SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE; AND --ELIMINATION OF TARIFFS IN GIVEN COMMODITY AREAS. 7. WE SHOULD ALSO REAFFIRM OUR OECD PLEDGE NOT TO TAKE RESTRICTIVE ACTION. 8. ON MONETARY ISSUES, THE DIVERGENT POSITIONS OF A YEAR AGO HAVE NARROWED CONSIDERABLY. THESE PAST WEEKS OUR REPRESENTATIVE, TREASURY UNDER SECRETARY YEO, HAS BEEN MAKING AN INTENSIVE EFFORT TO RESOLVE REMAINING DIFFER- ENCES. IF THESE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD SUCCEED, CHANCES WILL BE GOOD OF GETTING THE WHOLE NEW MONETARY STRUCTURE IN PLACE BY THE JANUARY MEETING OF THE IMF. IN THIS AREA AS CA-OXM IN OTHERS, I 00 NOT THINK THAT WE SHOULD OURSELVES ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE OUTSTANDING ISSUES AT THE SUMMIT. THE TIME IS TOO SHORT THE ISSUES ARE OFTEN TECHNICAL: AND IT WOULD BE WRONG TO DIVERT OUR EFFORTS FROM WHAT ONLY WE CAN DO -- SET FUNDAMENTAL POLICY DIRECTIONS -- TO WHAT MINISTERS CAN DO. 9. ON ENERGY, A FRANK DISCUSSION OF THE POSITION OF OUR COUNTRIES AS WE EMERGE FROM THE RECESSION AND ENTER THE ECONOMIC DIALOGUE WITH THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND KEY OPEC MEMBERS IS CLEARLY IN ORDER. OUR VIEW WILL BE THAT THE IEA COUNTRIES MUST HOLD TO THEIR DECEMBER 1 DEADLINE IN THE LONG-TERM PROGRAM, INCLUDING THE MINIMUM SAFE- GUARD PRICE. WE ALSO OUGHT TO ALLOW FOR SOME WAY FOR S-OXM FRANCE TO ASSOCIATE INTO THAT PROGRAM ONCE IT IS COMPLETED. WE WILL WANT -TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF ACCESS TO ENERGY SUPPLY AND INVESTMENT WITHIN THE IEA. AND WE SHOULD TALK ABOUT WHAT WE CAN AND CANNOT DO IN ENERGY IN THE DIALOGUE. 10. FINALLY, WITH THE DIALUGUE IMMINENT AND IN THE WAKE OF THE SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IT WOULD BE BOTH APPROPRIATE AND POLITIC PUBLICLY TO NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY or STATE 3) Department of State TELEGRAM STATES or PAGE 04 STATE 267049 ACKNOWLEDGE THE RELATIONSHIP OF OUR DELIBERATIONS TO THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND TO RESTATE OUR COMMITMENT TO A TRANSFORMATION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING WORLD. : EXCER 11. AS I NOW SEE IT, IN ORDER FOR OUR MEETING TO HAVE THE DESIRED RESULTS, WE SHOULD PREPARE AND ISSUE A JOINT STATEMENT EMBODYING OUR CONCLUSIONS. WE ARE ALL FIRMLY IN AGREEMENT THAT OUR MEETING SHOULD NOT CONCERN ITSELF UNDULY WITH THE PREPARATION OF A TEXT, THAT TASK CAN BE LARGELY CONFIDED TO THE OFFICIALS THAT WILL ACCOMPANY US. 12. TO PROVIDE YOU AND YOUR ASSOCIATES WITH A FURTHER INDICATION -- AND SOME SPECIFICS -- OF WHAT WE BELIEVE WE MIGHT SAY IN SUCH A JOINT STATEMENT, GEORGE SHULTZ, OUR REPRESENTATIVE AT THE NOVEMBER 11 MEETING IN LONDON IS PROPOSING A TEXT WHICH EMBODIES OUR THINKING ON THE ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED AND OUR SUGGESTIONS ON WHAT SHOULD BE SAID 0-0xm PUBLICLY ABOUT THEM. 13. I AM SENDING SIMILAR LETTERS TO EACH OF THE LEADERS WHO WILL JOIN US AT RAMBOUILLET. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU THERE. GERALD R. FORD INGERSOLL BREA NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTCHE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FORM 8426 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON CONFIDENTIAL January 21, 1976 Dear Mr. Prime Minister: It was very good of you to provide me with a fuller expression of your thinking on Spain, in your message of December 22, 1975. Your analysis and ours are very similar, although we differ somewhat as to the policy conclusions to be drawn. I agree that the situation in Spain will remain fluid for some time. The King has outlined a generally progressive platform, however, and the Cabinet will require both time and determination to implement it. Given the relative strengths of the contending forces, the King and his ministers will need to combine progress with continuity. The pace they set will not satisfy all observers or all Spaniards, but I believe that they should not be pressed to move more rapidly than the political pressures permit. Whenever possible, we should all support and encourage the evolutionary process now in motion, as you propose to do. The King has already demonstrated that he wants to move but is opposed by hard-line elements. To be effective, the influence of friendly governments should be used to strengthen the King and his Cabinet. Further, we should avoid having the debate about Spain's ties with Europe focus on liberalization as a price Spain must pay. Even moderate Spaniards are resentful of foreign pressures. In my opinion, it will be more effective to emphasize the benefits of full participation in European affairs -- through inducements such as visits, high-level statements and trade negotiations -- rather than to threaten continued exclusion from NATO and the European Community. DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 BY NSC MEMO, Dues 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state deview 9/17/03 , NARA, DATE 3/9/04 CONFIDENTIAL - 2 - It is in this spirit that the United States intends to continue to encourage our European partners to take whatever steps they find possible to demonstrate that Spain's European identity is recognized and valued. We want to work closely with you on this and to tailor our efforts to political realities in Europe. I realize that not all of our partners share our view that their positive gestures now will be more fruitful than holding back until greater changes are made. To me, it is not a question of preserving the old regime but rather of encouraging progress with minimal risk of provoking resistance that might stop all change. On a purely bilateral matter, I trust our new agreement with Spain can be concluded in the near future. Quite apart from the obvious military advantages for Western security, we see this cooperative arrangement as very useful for the broad contacts it gives us with leaders in various fields throughout Spain. I would like to stay in close touch as the Spanish situation develops, both via the Secretaries of State and our own exchanges. Our differences seem to be matters of emphasis rather than of approach. Your intention to give the King the benefit of the doubt seems to me the best general approach. We shall do the same in our expressions of interest and sympathy, visits, and strengthening of contacts. Sincerely, Herold R. Ford The Right Honorable Harold Wilson Prime Minister London CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified Confidential 8b NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRAL Date: 1/21/76 NSC log # 7508426 MEMORANDUM FOR: George S. Springsteen Executive Secretary Department of State DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: To: Prime Minister Wilson From: President Ford Date: 1/21/76 Subject: Spain ACTION REQUESTED: Draft reply for: President's Signature White House Staff Other Direct reply Furnish info copy XXX Dispatch Translation Recommendations / Comments Appropriate Handling Other Information DUE DATE: COMMENTS: therey Kirchas for Jeanne W. Davis Staff Secretary CLASSIFICATION: confidential 8c MEMORANDUM THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON 8426 CONFIDENTIAL ACTION January 20, 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: Brent Scowcroft B SUBJECT: Reply to Prime Minister Wilson on Spain Further to the discussions he had with you at Rambouillet, Prime Minister Wilson has sent you a message (Tab B) outlining his thoughts on the future of Spain and on British policy toward Spain. The Prime Minister makes the following points: -- The aftermath of General Franco's death is likely to be confused and difficult. -- Encouragement, as far as possible, of those Spaniards who wish to move Spain in a liberal direction towards the rest of Western Europe is of supreme importance. -- Spain must be given the "benefit of the doubt" if and when the country moves "generally in the right direction. 11 This is likely to take the form of London's welcoming specific encouraging signs rather than declaring broad approval for the new regime. -- King Juan Carlos has a "very hard row to hoe. " Under these circumstances, London plans to encourage the King privately to move as fast as possible, while avoiding public condemnation if the pace is slower than public expectation in the UK may demand. -- Maintenance of continuity in Spain's political and governmental structure during the transition period can possibly be accomplished by the restructuring of the Spanish Cortes (parliament) with the creation of two houses -- an elected chamber and a second "corporate" house of appointed members. GONF IDENTIAL/GDS DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 9/17/03 BY lob , NARA, DATE 3/9/04 CONFIDENTIAL - 2 - -- Interference in Spanish domestic affairs must be avoided. As far as possible, the British Labor government will avoid taking sides among the various political factions in Spain, but will, because of close fraternal ties, lean toward support of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). -- The British government plans to make a "positive contribution to satisfactory developments" by public ençouragement to the Spanish people and new regime; support of efforts to establish closer ties between Spain and Western organizations such as the EC and NATO, while avoiding special "concessions" or "bending of the rules" for early entry; visits in both directions; and, encouragement of British political parties to establish contacts with like groups in Spain. -- Gibraltar will continue to hamper the positive development of Anglo-Spanish relations in the immediate future. While the British analysis in most respects is similar to our own, the UK policy conclusions differ in the approach to be taken with Spain. The reply for your signature to the Prime Minister at Tab A would note that it is of importance to help Spain into the mainstream of European activity, and that this should be done through positive gestures by ourselves and our European partners rather than through political pressures aimed at forcing the pace of liberalization in Spain. Your proposed reply states your concurrence in the Prime Minister's basic approach of giving King Juan Carlos the benefit of the doubt and states that you look forward to staying in touch with him on the Spanish situation developments. The letter has been coordinated with Secretary Kissinger and Bob Orben has cleared the text. RECOMMENDATION That you sign the letter at Tab A. CONFIDENTIAL/GDS 82 GONF IDENTIAL BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 22 December 1975 The President The White House My dear The President, The Prime Minister has asked me to transmit to you the enclosed personal message embodying his thoughts on the future of Spain and British policy towards Spain. He has asked me to say that the signed original letter, dated 18 December, will be delivered in due course. Your sincerely, John Roul J 0 Moreton Chargé d'Affaires LIBRARY GERALD R.FORD DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 MR # 09-120; #25 CONF IDENTIAL state dept. etr 4/29/10 By dal NARA, Date 6/22/10 CONFIDENTIAL TEXT OF MESSAGE 1. When we met at Rambouillet I promised to send you an account in greater detail of our thoughts on the future of Spain and British policy towards Spain. 2. The aftermath of General Franco's death is likely to be confused and difficult. It is of supreme importance to encourage as far as possible those Spaniards who wish Spain to move in a liberal direction and towards the rest of Europe. If the new Spanish Government is seen to be moving generally in the right direction it may prove to be appropriate to give them the benefit of the doubt if they make a slow start in some respects. But giving them the benefit of the doubt is likely to take the form of our welcoming specific encouraging signs rather than declaring broad approval for the new regime. It cannot expect a blank cheque. Nevertheless I recognise, even if it cannot be put bluntly in public, that King Juan Carlos has a very hard row to hoe. So we shall encourage him privately to move as fast as possible, but try to avoid public condemnation when we can, if the pace is slower than public expectation here may demand. 3. When we met at Rambouillet we touched on the need for some degree of continuity in Spain's political and governmental structures. One possibility, which I understand Senor Fraga mentioned to Elliot Richardson DECLASSIFIED / as E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 MR # 09-120;1925 - 1 - state dept etr 4/29/10 By dal NARA, Date 4/22/10 CONFIDENTIAL GERATO, FORD CONF IDENTIAL as something that he was urging on Juan Carlos, is the revision of the structure of the Cortes, to create two Houses - an elected chamber and a second "corporate" House containing the designated members: this to be done quickly by decree law and subsequently put to the test of a referendum. It will be for the Spaniards to work out themselves what is most likely to work in practice and have the right effect, but this suggestion is clearly designed to meet the twin needs of continuity and progress which I am sure the King and his advisers have very much in mind. 4. Our tactics will clearly have to be chosen with care, in order not to offend Spanish pride by appearing to patronise or interfere in their domestic affairs. As far as possible the British Government will avoid any appearance of taking sides among the all too many political groups, but you will understand that the Labour Party, through the Socialist International, has had special ties with the PSOE for many years, which we shall continue to foster. 5. I hope that it will be possible for the British Government to make a positive contribution to satisfactory developments by:- (a) speeches, displaying sympathetic interest, and encouragement to the Spanish nation and the new regime, in any moves to liberalise or reform, and particularly in moves to legalise political parties and to move towards a parliamentary system: / (b) - 2 - CONF IDENTIAL GERALD CONFIDENTIAL (b) efforts to establish closer ties between Spain and Western organisations. In my view the NATO "and EEC partners should be ready to meet the Spaniards at whatever speed they are able to move towards a rapprochement. It would be wrong, however, to give the Spaniards the impression that there could be any question for us of bending the rules, eg of NATO, the Council of Europe, or the EEC, to allow them entry, or of our wanting them in before they have achieved a satisfactory degree of democracy. It is more a case of indicating to them that, as they move towards a more democratic system, so it will be possible to build up closer links, and so to arrive at realistic planning for eventual membership: (c) visits, in both directions; the level will of course depend on the degree of political progress in Spain: (d) encouragement to British political parties to establish contacts with as broad as possible a spread of Spanish political groups, and to urge on those groups the need to work together for the common interest and eschew sectional policies (but this presupposes the legitimisation of political parties and political activity in Spain): / (e) - 3 - CONFIDENTIAL GERALD CONFIDENTIAL (e) encouraging other contacts, eg trade union and inter-parliamentary contacts. 6. I recognise that Gibraltar will continue to hamper the development of Anglo-Spanish relations. But I hope that the Spaniards may finally wake up to the truth that the way out of this age-old impasse is for them to build links with the Gibraltarians instead of physically isolating and antagonising them. The British Government genuinely wishes to pursue a solution that will be acceptable to all, and hopes that Spain will follow a course which will make this possible. - 4 - CONFIDENTIAL TERRAT GERALD FORD CONFIDENTIAL 8426 MON 10 DOWNING STREET THE PRIME MINISTER 18 December 1975 Dear mr President When we met at Rambouillet I promised to send you an account in greater detail of our thoughts on the future of Spain and British policy towards Spain. The aftermath of General Franco's death is likely to be confused and difficult. It is of supreme importance to encourage as far as possible those Spaniards who wish Spain to move in a liberal direction and towards the rest of Europe. If the new Spanish Government is seen to be moving generally in the right direction it may prove to be appropriate to give them the benefit of the doubt if they make a slow start in some respects. But giving them the benefit of the doubt is likely to take the form of our welcoming specific encouraging signs rather than declaring broad approval for the new regime. It cannot expect a blank cheque. Nevertheless I recognise, even if it cannot be put bluntly in public, that King Juan Carlos has a very hard row to hoe. So we shall encourage him privately to move as fast as possible, but try to avoid public condemnation when we can, if the pace is slower than public expectation here may demand. When we met at Rambouillet we touched on the need for some degree of continuity in Spain's political and governmental structures. One possibility, which I understand Sr. Fraga mentioned to Elliot Richardson as something that he was urging on Juan Carlos, is the revision of the structure of the Cortes, FORD same as MR 09-120 #25 /to create two à HR 10/12/12 CONTIDENTIAL CONTIDENTIAL - 2 - to create two Houses - an elected Chamber and a second "corporate" House containing the designated members; this to be done quickly by decree law and subsequently put to the test of a referendum. It will be for the Spaniards to work out themselves what is most likely to work in practice and have the right effect, but this suggestion is clearly designed to meet the twin needs of con- tinuity and progress which I am sure the King and his advisers have very much in mind. Our tactics will clearly have to be chosen with care, in order not to offend Spanish pride by appearing to patronise or interfere in their domestic affairs. As far as possible the British Government will avoid any appearance of taking sides among the all too many political groups, but you will understand that the Labour Party, through the Socialist International, has had special ties with the PSOE, for many years, which we shall continue to foster. I hope that it will be possible for the British Government to make a positive contribution to satisfactory developments by:- (a) speeches displaying sympathetic interest, and encourage- ment to the Spanish nation and the new regime, in any moves to liberalise or reform, and particularly in moves to legalise political parties and to move towards a parliamentary system; (b) efforts to establish closer ties between Spain and Western organisations. In my view the NATO and EEC partners should be ready to meet the Spaniards at whatever speed they are able to move towards a rapprochement. It would be wrong, however, to give the Spaniards the impression that there could be any question for us of bending the rules, e.g., of NATO, the Council of Europe, or the EEC, to allow them entry, FORD or of our wanting them in before they have achieved a satisfactory degree of democracy. It is more a case of indicating to them that, as they move towards a CONTININTIAL /more democratic CONTIDENTIAL - 3 - more democratic system, so it will be possible to build up closer links, and SO to arrive at realistic planning for eventual membership; (c) visits, in both directions. The level will of course depend on the degree of political progress in Spain; (d) encouragement to British political parties to establish contacts with as broad as possible a spread of Spanish political groups, and to urge on those groups the need to work together for the common interest and eschew sectional policies (but this presupposes the legitimisation of political parties and political activity in Spain); (e) encouraging other contacts, e.g. trade union and inter-Parliamentary contacts. I recognise that Gibraltar will continue to hamper the development of Anglo-Spanish relations. But I hope that the Spaniards may finally wake up to the truth that the way out of this age-old impasse is for them to build links with the Gibraltarians instead of physically isolating and antagonising them. The British Government genuinely wishes to pursue a solution that will be acceptable to all, and hopes that Spain will follow a course which will make this possible. Yours, Harrd Wibor The President of the United States of America FORD LERRARY CONVIDENTIAL 8426 7600028 8Pm DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 January 16, 1976 CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Proposed Reply from President Ford to Wilson Letter on Spain (NSC #8426) As requested in Mrs. Davis' memorandum of December 30, attached is a draft letter, reviewed by the Secretary, for the President's use in replying to Prime Minister Wilson's letter of December 18 on Spain. The Wilson letter contains no suprises and proposes no actions; it confirms our impression that the British intend to hold back for the time being, not being unduly critical of Juan Carlos but not doing much to help him either. The proposed response by the President would acknowledge the similarity of their and our perceptions of the situation while pointing out that we believe Western governments should act now to strengthen the King and to promote closer ties with Spain. We do not expect to move the British toward our view but we think it is important that they under- stand our approach. in George Executive Secretary Attachment: Draft Reply. CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS GDS We 3/9/04 Tab I Fudto it 1/20 940 8g MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 8426 CONFIDENTIAL ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT 7 SCOWCROFT January 17, 1976 Royal 1ˢᵗ FROM: Mr. Clift R.K SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Wilson on Spain In response to our request of December 30, the Department of State has forwarded a proposed Presidential reply (Tab II), reviewed by Secretary Kissinger, to Prime Minister Wilson's message of December 22 on UK policy toward Spain. We have made minor revisions here and have coordinated with Bob Orben, who is taking over from Paul Theis as the President's writer. * The memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab I would review the contents of the Prime Minister's message and recommend that he sign the reply at Tab A. RECOMMENDATION That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I. * In clearing the President's message with Orben, we took time to have a brief discussion on the speechwriting to be expected in 1976. He said he is looking for additional writers. I believe it would be helpful if someone with the right sort of background in foreign affairs were to join his staff, considering the number of speeches with at least some foreign policy content to be expected this year. CONFIDENTIAI / GDS lab 3/9/04 8i CONFIDENTIAL Reply by President Ford to Prime Minister Wilson's Letter of December 18 CONFIDENTAL Dear Mr. Prime Minister: It was very good of you to provide me with a 1.14 your message of December 22, 1975. fuller description of your thinking on Spain, Your analysis and ours are quite close, although we differ somewhat as to the policy conclusions to draw. I agree $ pain We too, believe that the situation will remain fluid for some time. The King has laid out a generally progressive platform, and the Cabinet, probably the best that could be expected, will need both time and luck in order to implement it. Given the relative strengths of the contending forces, we agree that the King and his ministers will need to combine progress with continuity. The pace they set will not satisfy all observers or all Spaniards, but H we believe that they should not be pressed to move more rapidly than the political pressures can stand. Whenever possible, we should all support and encourage the evolutionary process now in motion, as you intend to do. DECLASSIFIED CONF DENTIAL or E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 BY NSC MEMO, Was 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Deview 9/17/03 , NARA, DATE 3/9/04 -2- The King has already demonstrated that he wants to move but is opposed by the hard-line elements. To be effective, the influence of friendly governments should be used to strengthen the King and his Cabinet, not to squeeze them. Further, we must avoid having the debate about Spain's ties with Europe focus on liberalization as a price Spain must pay. Even many moderate Spaniards are resentful about foreign pressures. We, therefore, In my opinions believe that it is more effective to emphasize the benefits of full participation in European affairs -- for example, through visits, high-level statements X trade negotiations etc. -- as inducements than to wave European the club of continued exclusion from NATO and the EC Community. as punishment the United States It is in this spirit that we intends to continue to encourage our European partners to take whatever steps they find possible to demonstrate that Spain's European vocation is recognized and valued. We shall want to work closely with you on this and to tailor our efforts to political realities in Europe. & INFIDENTIAL BERALD CONFIDENTIAL -3- I we realize that not all of our partners share our view that their positive gestures now will be more fruitful than holding back until greater changes are To me, made. This is not a question of preserving the old regime but rather of encouraging progress with minimal risk of provoking resistance that might stop all change. I trust On Ypurely bilateral matters, we hope our new agreement with Spain can be concluded in the near future. Quite apart from the obvious military advantages for Western security, we see this cooperative arrangement as very useful for the broad contacts it gives us with leaders in various fields throughout Spain. I would like to stay in close touch as the Spanish situation develops, both via the Secretaries of State and our own exchanges. Our differences seem to be matters of emphasis rather than of approach. Your intention to give the King the benefit of the doubt seems to me the best general approach. We shall do the same in our expressions of interest and sympathy, visits, and strengthening of contacts. With best personal regards, Sincerely, GLAND Gerald R. Ford CONFIDENTIAL we MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 8426 SECRET ACTION December 30, 1975 K MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM: Mr. Clift in SUBJECT: Message to President from British Prime Minister Wilson Concerning Spain British Embassy Charge d'Affaires John Moreton has forwarded the text of a personal message to the President from Prime Minister Wilson outlining the latter's thoughts on the future of Spain and British policy toward that country (text at Tab B). The Prime Minister's message is further to discussions that he and the President had on Spain at Rambouillet. In brief, the Prime Minister makes the following points: --- The aftermath of General Franco's death is likely to be confused and difficult. -- Encouragement, as far as possible, of those Spaniards who wish to move Spain in a liberal direction towards the rest of Western Europe is of supreme importance. -- Spain must be given the "benefit of the doubt" if and when the country moves "generally in the right direction". This is likely to take the form of London's welcoming specific encouraging signs rather than declaring broad approval for the new regime. -- King Juan Carlos has a "very hard row to hoe". Under these circumstances, London plans to encourage the King privately to move as fast as possible, while avoiding public condemnation if the pace is slower than public expectation in the UK may demand. -- Maintenance of continuity in Spain's political and governmental structure during the transition period can possibly be accomplished by the restructuring of the Spanish Cortes (parliament) with the creation of two houses an elected chamber and a second "corporate" house of appointed members. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 SECRET/XGDS BY na NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state deview 9/17/03 , NARA, DATE 3/9/04 SECRET - 2 - -- Interference in Spanish domestic affairs must be avoided. As far as possible, the British Labor government will avoid taking sides among the various political factions in Spain, but will, because of close fraternal ties, lean toward support of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). -- The British government plans to make a "positive contribution to satisfactory developments" by public encouragement to the Spanish people and new regime; support of efforts to establish closer ties between Spain and Western organizations such as the EC and NATO, while avoiding special "concessions" or "bending of the rules" for early entry; visits in both directions; and, encouragement of British political parties to establish contacts with like groups in Spain. Gibraltar will continue to hamper the positive development of Anglo-Spanish relations in theimmediate future. In my opinion, Prime Minister Wilson and the British Labor government not surprisingly would appear to be expecting too much from Spain over the near and mid-term period. I think the President should strike this note of caution in his response to Wilson, while at the same time welcoming this dialogue with the UK. Considering the importance of this issue to US-European relations, I believe it would be very useful to keep the Department of State fully involved, rather than handle the response directly from the White House. To ensure White House/State coordination on the President's reply to Prime Minister Wilson, the memorandum at Tab A for Jeanne Davis' signature to George Springsteen would forward a copy of the Prime Minister's message and request a proposed draft reply by Wednesday, January 7, 1976. RECOMMENDATION That you approve the memorandum at Tab A for Jeanne Davis' signature to State. APPROVE B DISAPPROVE SECRET/XGDS sk MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE 8426 WASHINGTON CONFIDENTIAL ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: Brent Scowcroft SUBJECT: Reply to Prime Minister Wilson on Spain Further to the discussions he had with you at Rambouillet, Prime Minister Wilson has sent you a message (Tab B) outlining his thoughts on the future of Spain and on British policy toward Spain. The Prime Minister makes the following points: -- The aftermath of General Franco's death is likely to be confused and difficult. -- Encouragement, as far as possible, of those Spaniards who wish to move Spain in a liberal direction towards the rest of Western Europe is of supreme importance. -- Spain must be given the "benefit of the doubt" if and when the country moves "generally in the right direction. 11 This is likely to take the form of London's welcoming specific encouraging signs rather than declaring broad approval for the new regime. -- King Juan Carlos has a "very hard row to hoe. 11 Under these circumstances, London plans to encourage the King privately to move as fast as possible, while avoiding public condemnation if the pace is slower than public expection in the UK may demand. -- Maintenance of continuity in Spain's political and governmental structure during the transition period can possibly be accomplished by the restructuring of the Spanish Cortes (parliament) with the creation of two houses -- an elected chamber and a second "corporate" house of appointed members. DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL/GDS E.O. 12953, SEC. 3.5 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES Statele view 9/17/03 BY Wa 1 NARA, DATE 3/9/04 CONFIDENTIAL -2- -- Interference in Spanish domestic affairs must be avoided. As far as possible, the British Labor government will avoid taking sides among the various political factions in Spain, but will, because of close fraternal ties, lean toward support of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). The British government plans to make a "positive contribution to satisfactory developments" by public encouragement to the Spanish people and new regime; support of efforts to establish closer ties between Spain and Western organizations such as the EC and NATO, while avoiding special "concessions" or "bending of the rules" for early entry; visits in both directions; and, encouragement of British political parties to establish contacts with like groups in Spain. -- Gibraltar will continue to hamper the positive development of Anglo-Spanish relations in the immediate future. While the British analysis in most respects is similar to our own, the UK policy conclusions differ in the approach to be taken with Spain. The reply for your signature to the Prime Minister at Tab A would note that it is of importance to help Spain into the mainstream of European activity, and that this should be done through positive gestures by ourselves and our European partners rather than through political pressures aimed at forcing the pace of liberalization in Spain. Your letter states your concurrence in the Prime Minister's basic approach proposed uply of giving King Juan Carlos the benefit of the doubt and states that you look forward to staying in touch with him on the Spanish situation developments. Your The letter has been coordinated with Secretary Kissinger and Bob Orben has RECOMMENDATION Bob charled the text the litten clian the text, That you sign the letter at Tab A. CONFIDENTIAL/GDS 84 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON CONF IDENTIAL Dear Mr. Prime Minister: It was very good of you to provide me with a fuller expression description of your thinking on Spain, in your message quite close, although we differ somewhat as to the of December 22, 1975. Your analysis and ours are why similar, policy conclusions to drawn. homever, outlined I agree that the situation in Spain will remain fluid for some time. The King has laid out a generally progressive platform, and the Cabinet probably the best that could be eted, will need both time and luck in order to implement it. Given the relative strengths of the contending forces, the King and his ministers will need to combine progress with continuity. The pace they set will not satisfy all observers or all Spaniards, but I believe that they should not be pressed to move more rapidly than the political pressures sermit. stand. Whenever possible, we should all support and encourage the evolutionary process now in motion, as you infend to do. The King has already demonstrated that he wants to move but is opposed by the hard-line elements. To be effective, the influence of friendly governments should be used to strengthen the King and his Cabinet, not to squeeze them. should Further, we must avoid having the debate about Spain's ties with Europe focus on liberalization as a price Spain must pay. Even moderate Spaniards are resentful about foreign pressures. In my opinion, it 10 more effective to emphasize the benefits of full participation in European affairs -- through inducements such as visits, high-level statements and trade negotiations rather than to brandish the club of continued exclusion from NATO and the European Community. threaten CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 BY 14 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Deview 9/17/03 NARA, DATE 3/9/04 CONFIDENTIAL -2- It is in this spirit that the United States intends to continue to encourage our European partners to take whatever steps they find possible to demonstrate that Spain's European identity vocation is recognized and valued. We shall want to work closely with you on this and to tailor our efforts to political realities in Europe. I realize that not all of our partners share our view that their positive gestures now will be more fruitful than, holding back until greater changes are made. To me, this is not a question of preserving the old regime but rather of encouraging progress with minimal risk of provoking resistance that might stop all change. On a purely bilateral matter, I trust our new agreement with Spain can be concluded in the near future. Quite apart from the obvious military advantages for Western security, we see this cooperative arrangement as very useful for the broad contacts it gives us with leaders in various fields throughout Spain. I would like to stay in close touch as the Spanish situation develops, both via the Secretaries of State and our own exchanges. Our differences seem to be matters of emphasis rather than of approach. Your intention to give the King the benefit of the doubt seems to me the best general approach. We shall do the same in our expressions of interest and sympathy, visits, and strengthening of contacts. Sincerely, The Right Honorable Harold Wilson Prime Minister London CONFIDENTIAL 8 Retype 8426 CONFIDENTIAL ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: Brent Scowcroft SUBJECT: Reply to Prime Minister Wilson on Spain' Further to the discussions he had with you at Rambouillet, Prime Minister Wilson has sent you a message (Tab B) outlining his thoughts on the future of Spain and on British policy toward Spain. The Prime Minister makes the following points: -- The aftermath of General Franco's death is likely to be confused and difficult. -- Encouragement, as far as possible, of those Spaniards who wish to move Spain in a liberal direction towards the rest of Western Europe is of supreme importance. -- Spain must be given the "benefit of the doubt" if and when the country moves "generally in the right direction. 11 This is likely to take the form of London's welcoming specific encouraging signs rather than declaring broad approval for the new regime. -- King Juan Carlos has a "very hard row to hoe. # Under these circumstances, London plans to encourage the King privately to move as fast as possible, while avoiding public condemnation if the pace is slower than public expectation In the UK may demand. -- Maintenance of continuity in Spain's political and governmental structure during the transition period can possibly be accomplished by the restructuring of the Spanish Cortes (parliament) with the creation of FORD two houses -- an elected chamber and a second "corporate" house of a appointed members. DECLASSIFIED GENALO CONFIDENTIAL/GDS E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state leview 9/17/03 BS:igd:1/19/86 BY luby , NARA. DATE 3/9/04 Tab I CONFIDENTIAL . 2 - -- Interference in Spanish domestic affairs must be avoided. As far as possible, the British Labor government will avoid taking stilles among the various political factions in Spain, but will, because of close fraternal ties, lean toward support of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). -- The British government plans to make a "positive contribution to satisfactory developments" by public encouragement to the Spanish people and new regime; support of efforts to establish closer ties between Spain and Western organizations such as the EC and NATO, while avoiding special "concessions" or "bending of the rules" for early entry; visits in both directions; and, encouragement of British political parties to establish contacts with like groups in Spain. -- Gibraltar will continue to hamper the positive development of Angio-Spanish relations in the immediate future. While the British analysis in most respects is similar to our own, the UK policy conclusions differ in the approach to be taken with Spain. The reply for your signature to the Prime Minister at Tab A would note that it is of importance to help Spain into the mainstream of European activity, and that this should be done through positive gestures by ourselves and our European partners rather than through political pressures aimed at foreing the pace of liberalization in Spain. Your proposed reply states your concurrence in the Prime Minister's basic approach of giving King Juan Carles the benefit of the doubt and states that you look forward to staying in touch with him on the Spanish situation developments. The letter has bean coordinated with Secretary Kissinger and Bob Orben has cleared the text. RECOMMENDATION That you sign the letter at Tab A. CONFIDENTIAL/GDS policy LIBRARY d OTHER Em Rewrite 8426 CONFIDENTIAL Dear Mr. Prime Minister: It was very good of you to provide me with a fuller expression of your thinking on Spain, in your message of December 22, 1975. Your analysis and ours are very similar, although we differ somewhat as to the policy conclusions to be drawn. I agree that the situation in Spain will remain fluid for some time. The King has outlined a generally progressive platform, however, and the Cabinet will require both time and determination to implement it. Given the relative strengths of the contending forces, the King and his ministers will need to combine progress with continuity. The pace they set will not satisfy all observers or all Spaniards, but I believe that they should not be pressed to move more rapidly than the political pressures permit. Whenever possible, we should all support and encourage the evolutionary process now in motion, as you propose to do. The King has already demonstrated that he wants to move but is opposed by hard-line elements. To be effective, the influence of friendly governments should be used to strengthen the King and his Cabinet. Further, we should avoid having the debate about Spain's ties with Europe focus on liberalization as a price Spain must pay. Even moderate Spanlards are resentful of foreign pressures. In my opinion, it will be more effective to emphasize the benefits of full participation in European affaire -- through inducements such as visits, high-level FORD statements and trade negotiations -- rather than to threaten R continued exclusion from NATO and the European Community. GERALD LIGRARY CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 BS:igd:l/19/76 BY. Wa NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 9/17/03 NARA, DATE 3/9/04 CONFIDENTIAL - 2 - It is in this spirit that the United States Intends to continue to encourage our European partners to take whatever steps they find possible to demonstrate that Spain's European Identity is recognized and valued. We want to work closely with you on this and to tailor our efforts to political realities in Europe. I realize that not all of our partners share our view that their positive gestures now will be more fruitful than holding back until greater changes are made. To me, it is not a question of preserving the old regime but rather of encouraging progress with minimal risk of provoking resistance that might stop all change. On & purely bilateral matter, I trust our new agreement with Spain can be concluded in the near future. Quite apart from the obvious military advantages for Western security, we see this cooperative arrangement as very useful for the broad contacts it gives us with leaders in various fields throughout Spain. I would like to stay in close touch as the Spanish situation develops, both via the Secretaries of State and our own exchanges. Our differences seem to be matters of emphasis rather than of approach. Your intention to give the King the benefit of the doubt seems to me the best general approach. We shall do the same in our expressions of interest and sympathy, visits, and strengthening of contacts. Sincerely, The Right Honorable Harold Wilson Prime Minister FORD London a GERALD CONFIDENTIAL 80 DOC RECD LOG NBR NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE MO DA MO DA HR 22 24 10 7508426 Clift ACTION o TO: PRES Moreton, FROM: KISSINGER, H J. REFERENCE: CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE + S/S JNCLAS LOG IN/OUT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION KISSINGER COLBY, W OTHER LOU NO FORN NODIS SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER, J C EYES ONLY EXDIS SUBJECT DAVIS Cech lte ST EX to SEC Re for fm bilson TS $ SENSITIVE CODEWORD of re Spanish Bitish INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION REC ACTION REQUIRED ACTION INFO CY ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT FOR MEMO FOR HAK STAFF SECRETARY MEMO FOR PRES ( * ) REPLY FOR FAR EAST ( ) SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA APPROPRIATE ACTION ( ) DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA MEMO TO ( ) EUROPE / CANADA X RECOMMENDATIONS - ) LATIN AMERICA JOINT MEMO ( ) UNITED NATIONS REFER TO FOR: ( ) ECONOMIC ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ( ) SCIENTIFIC CONCURRENCE ) PROGRAM ANALYSIS DUE DATE: 01-1 - NSC PLANNING COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) CONGRESSIONAL OCEANS POLICY Index: Harald wilson INTELLIGENCE LEUNARD X moreton, J.O. DATE FROM to S CY TO 12/30 Sirth X Oecesion SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED ( 1-6) (OR TAKEN): 12/3/ Necls I Davis Scowcroft Sg approved recom SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS 1/2 S Agn memo to Springsteen (1-2) 1/2 D Davis Azd memo to Jpringster 1/16 1/16 CLIFT S memo for scoft (1/24) Reed state diaft, 7600028 1/17 Suit X hes for decision (1-24) 1/20 Plus Sender to Wilson 1/2/ NSCIS to Wilson HORNB 6 o.k. MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: NSC/S DISP INSTR DISPATCH CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: THRU STATE and NOTIFY & DATE W copy BY M F'D BY SPECIAL DISPOSITION: DATE=1/21 CRT ID: 1976 SA SF CROSS REF W/ HP OPEN CLOSE MSP NS SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: FOLDER: WH EP PA DY ( NSC 575-600 75-22 )