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    "label": "Central Intelligence Group Report, ORE [Office of Reports and Estimates] 1, Soviet Foreign and Military Policy",
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    "id": "214916394",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Group Report, ORE [Office of Reports and Estimates] 1, Soviet Foreign and Military Policy",
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        "Clark M. Clifford Papers",
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            "day": 23,
            "logicalDate": "1946-07-23",
            "month": 7,
            "year": 1946
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    "seq": 7,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "UNCLABSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\n12. The Soviet Union hitherto has been content to proceed with the con-\nsolidation of its position in eastern Germany free of quadripartite inter-\nference. Now, rejecting both federalization and the separation of the Ruhr\nand Rhineland, it appears as the champion of German unification in opposition\nto the \"imperalistic\" schemes of the Western powers. A German administration\nstrongly centralized in Berlin would be more susceptible than any other to\nSoviet pressure, and the most convenient means of extending Soviet influence\nto the western frontiers of Germany. The initial Soviet objective is pre-\nsumably such a centralized anti-Fascist' republic with a coalition government\nof the eastern European type, but actually under strong Communist influence\nand bound to the Soviet Union by ties of political and economic dependency.\nSOVIET POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE\n13. For a time it appeared that the Communist Party in France might prove\nable to gain control of that country by democratic political processes and\nSoviet policy was shaped to support that endeavor. The Communists recent\ne-\nlectoral reverses, however, appear to have led the Soviet Union to sacrifice\na fading hope of winning France to a livelier prospect of gaining Germany.\nThe French Communists remain a strong political factor nevertheless, and exer-\ncise disproportionate influence through their control of organized labor. That\ninfluence will be used to shape French policy as may be most suitable for Soviet\npurposes, and to prepare for an eventual renewal of the attempt to gain control\nof France by political means. A resort to force is unlikely in view of the\ndanger of provoking a major international conflict.\n14. In Italy also the Communist Party is seeking major influence, if not\ncontrol, by political means, with a resort to force unlikely in present cir-\ncumstances. The Party and the Soviet Union have played their cards well to\ndivert Italian resentment at the proposed peace terms from themselves toward\nthe Western Powers.\n15. The Soviet Union misses no opportunity to raise the Spanish issue as\na means of embarrassing and dividing the Western Powers. Any change in Spain\nmight afford it an opportunity for penetration. Even its goading of the West-\nern Powers into expressions of distaste for Franco appear to have afforded it\nan opportunity to approach him.\n16. For the rest, the Soviet Union is concerned to prevent the formation\nof a Western Bloc, including France and the Low Countries, or a Scandinavian\nBloc, in accordance with its general policy. As opportunity offers, it will\nseek to facilitate the growth of Communist influence in Scandinavia and the\nLow Countries, but not at the sacrifice of more important interests or at the\nrisk of provoking a strong reaction.\nSOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST\n17. The Middle East offers a tempting field for Soviet expansion because\nof its proximity to the Soviet Union and remoteness from other major powers,\nthe weakness and instability of indigenous governments (except Turkey), and the\nUNCLASSIFIES\nTOP SECRET"
}