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    "localId": "214916394",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Group Report, ORE [Office of Reports and Estimates] 1, Soviet Foreign and Military Policy",
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    "id": "214916394",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/214916394",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Group Report, ORE [Office of Reports and Estimates] 1, Soviet Foreign and Military Policy",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/214916394",
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        "Clark M. Clifford Papers",
        "Subject Files"
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{
    "seq": 9,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "UNCLASSIFIED\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nthat the U.S.S.R. exert with respect to each an influence at least equal to\n(and preferably greater than) that of any other power. Since in this region\nSoviet policy encounters that of the United States, it must be pursued with\ndue circumspection.\n22. Although the Soviet Union cannot hope to establish a predominant in-\nfluence over the whole of China, at least for a long time to come, it could\naccomplish its basic objective through either the formation of a coalition\ngovernment, with the Chinese Communist Party* as a major participant, or a\ndivision of the country, with the Chinese Communist Party in exclusive control\nof those areas adjacent to the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. should logically\nprefer the former solution as at once involving less danger of a collision with\nthe United States and greater opportunity for the subsequent expansion of Soviet\ninfluence throughout China through political penetration by the Communist Party,\nand the course of its relations with the Chinese Government would seem to con-\nfirm that preference. The U.S.S.R., however, would not be willing to sacrifice\nthe actual political and military independence of the Chinese Communists unless\nassured of their effective participation in the proposed coalition. If, there-\nfore, efforts to establish such a coalition were to fail and unrestricted civil\nwar were to ensue, the Soviet Union would probably support the Chinese Commun-\nists in their efforts to consolidate their effective control over Manchuria and\nNorth China.\n23. In Korea the Soviets have shown that they will consent to the unifica-\ntion of the country only if assured of a \"friendly\" government. In default of\nunification on such terms, they are content to consolidate their control in the\nnorth and to bide their time, trusting that an eventual American withdrawal\nwill permit them to extend their predominant influence over the whole country.\n24. The Soviets have been extremely critical of American administration in\nJapan, which has afforded them no opportunity to establish the degree of influ-\nence they desire. Regardless of the prevailing influence, they probably desire\nto see Japan politically and militarily impotent. The greater Japan's political\ndisorganization, the greater would be their opportunity to establish an equal\nand eventually predominant influence there.\nSOVIET POLICY ELSEWHERE\n25. Soviet policy in other areas will follow the general lines set forth\nin paragraph 3, seeking to undermine the unity and strength of national states,\nto foment colonial unrest, to stir up diversionary antagonisms between states,\nDespite a widespread impression to the contrary, the Chinese Communists are\ngenuine Communists, differing from other foreign Communist Parties only in\na certain local self-sufficiency derived from territorial control and the\npossession of an army, in consequence of which they exhibit unusual initia-\ntive and independence. In all essentials. they are an unusually effective\ninstrument of Soviet foreign policy.\nUNGLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET"
}