Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the Ambassador of Israel

177 17 TOP OECRET Address February 5, 1949 to is AND The Iszaeli Ambassador called at my request. After an exchange of courtesies, I said to him that we had received yesterday messages from Mr. Ross and Mr. Jessup in New York and from the United Nations Mediator, Mr. Bunch, which caused us con- siderable concern. It was reported from New York that the armistice proposals put forward by the Mediator had been accepted practically in full, although with reluctance, by the Egyptians. On the other hand, however, Mr. Eban, the Israeli representative in New York, had told our representatives that the Israeli Government could not accept these proposals. We received the same information from Mr. Bunchewho expressed grave fears that the negotiations would break down and that the matter would have to be reported to the Security Council by him. It appeared that in such a situation the responsibility for the collapse of the negotiations would rest on the Israeli Government. I said that this situation caused the President a deep concern and that I was speaking to the Ambassador with the knowledge and approval of the President. The Ambassador knew that the Israeli Government had no more sympathetic friend than President Truman and that no one had done more to support them in trying days. The President believed that this was the psychological moment where an armistice could be brought about without injury to the vital interests of any of the parties, if the Israeli Government would approach these discussions in a spirit of broad statesmanship and make concessions which were wholly in accord with the moral position of Israel. I hoped therefore that his Government would not reject the proposals but would accept them as a basis for further discussion and work out an armistice along the lines proposed. I did not believe that the attitude of the Egyptian Government was brittle but did believe that there was sufficient flexibility so that with a conciliatory attitude on both sides, a solution could be reached. I said that if this were not done, if the negotiations failed, and if the matter was so reported to the Security Council, the position of Israel, both morally and otherwise, would be prejudiced. I spoke of the importance DECLASSIFIED E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) Or (B) 9723.75 Dept. of State letter, Aig.9.1973 Bx NLT- HC NARS Date 4-2076 TOP SECRE