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ARCHIVES S. "NATIONAL RECORDS AMD
SERVICE*
- 2 -
Governor Dewey stated that in the past he thought we had used in China
people who were not familiar with oriental psychology and that it would be
desirable to utilize Chinese like Jimmy Lee. He also suggested that we should
work with T. V. Soong and that Soong might be induced to persuade the General-
issimo to fade out of the picture. As an alternative, he proposed that we
might have Henry Luce travel "quietly" to China to use his influence with
the Generalissimo. The general objective would be to have Chiang Kai-Shek
retire into exile from China but not to the United States or to France. The
Governor stated that he was in agreement with the general outline of the
present situation which I had made and recognized that we would not be in a
position to take public action which would quiet the opposition. He said,
for his part, he did not intend to agitate the subject and that his speech
this spring was the last he would say about it.
Governor Dewey also asked about the situation in Formosa and I explained
to him the very unsatisfactory state of affairs there which was again largely
due to the personal controls exercised by the Generalissimo. The Governor
expressed the hope that Formosa would not also be lost.
Governor Dewey then commented on the general situation throughout the
rest of Asia and the need for strengthening anti-communist elements there.
He said that some time ago we had lost our position in the world of moral
leadership which had accompanied our championing of freedom and the underdog.
He felt that our very recent policy had started a ma jor reversal of the
trend of the past few years and expressed entire agreement with the policy
of championing nationalism as the approach to capturing the imagination of
the Asiatic peoples in the face of communist propaganda. He inquired whether
I had discussed the situation in Indochina with Mr. Schuman and I told him
that I had. He said that he expected to see Schuman and would be glad to
try to persuade him along any lines I felt necessary. I told him that
Schuman himself did not need persuading but did need reinforcement of the
arguments which he would have to make to his own people in Paris. The chief
points were that the French Parliament must ratify the March 8th agreements
with Bao Dai, transfer the handling of Indochinese affairs from the Colonial
Office to the Foreign Office, and allow the Bao Dai Government more freedom
and authority in the conduct of foreign affairs. All of this, I pointed out,
was necessary as a prelude to recognition by the siatic governments which
ought to precede any recognition by the United States or the other Western
Powers. Governor Dewey expressed full agreement with this line of thought.
While somewhat critical of our "harsh" attitude toward the Dutch in Indo-
nesia, the Governor said that he had been able to exercise a calming
influence upon them when he had discussed the matter with then on his visit
to Europe last summer.
Governor Dewey inquired whether the Republican members of the Senate
and House understood the basic problems involved in our Far Eastern policy.
I told him that some did and some did not. I said that I had had a number
of talks with Senator Vandenberg and believed he understood it fully, but
that I was
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"ocrText": "num\nARCHIVES S. \"NATIONAL RECORDS AMD\nSERVICE*\n- 2 -\nGovernor Dewey stated that in the past he thought we had used in China\npeople who were not familiar with oriental psychology and that it would be\ndesirable to utilize Chinese like Jimmy Lee. He also suggested that we should\nwork with T. V. Soong and that Soong might be induced to persuade the General-\nissimo to fade out of the picture. As an alternative, he proposed that we\nmight have Henry Luce travel \"quietly\" to China to use his influence with\nthe Generalissimo. The general objective would be to have Chiang Kai-Shek\nretire into exile from China but not to the United States or to France. The\nGovernor stated that he was in agreement with the general outline of the\npresent situation which I had made and recognized that we would not be in a\nposition to take public action which would quiet the opposition. He said,\nfor his part, he did not intend to agitate the subject and that his speech\nthis spring was the last he would say about it.\nGovernor Dewey also asked about the situation in Formosa and I explained\nto him the very unsatisfactory state of affairs there which was again largely\ndue to the personal controls exercised by the Generalissimo. The Governor\nexpressed the hope that Formosa would not also be lost.\nGovernor Dewey then commented on the general situation throughout the\nrest of Asia and the need for strengthening anti-communist elements there.\nHe said that some time ago we had lost our position in the world of moral\nleadership which had accompanied our championing of freedom and the underdog.\nHe felt that our very recent policy had started a ma jor reversal of the\ntrend of the past few years and expressed entire agreement with the policy\nof championing nationalism as the approach to capturing the imagination of\nthe Asiatic peoples in the face of communist propaganda. He inquired whether\nI had discussed the situation in Indochina with Mr. Schuman and I told him\nthat I had. He said that he expected to see Schuman and would be glad to\ntry to persuade him along any lines I felt necessary. I told him that\nSchuman himself did not need persuading but did need reinforcement of the\narguments which he would have to make to his own people in Paris. The chief\npoints were that the French Parliament must ratify the March 8th agreements\nwith Bao Dai, transfer the handling of Indochinese affairs from the Colonial\nOffice to the Foreign Office, and allow the Bao Dai Government more freedom\nand authority in the conduct of foreign affairs. All of this, I pointed out,\nwas necessary as a prelude to recognition by the siatic governments which\nought to precede any recognition by the United States or the other Western\nPowers. Governor Dewey expressed full agreement with this line of thought.\nWhile somewhat critical of our \"harsh\" attitude toward the Dutch in Indo-\nnesia, the Governor said that he had been able to exercise a calming\ninfluence upon them when he had discussed the matter with then on his visit\nto Europe last summer.\nGovernor Dewey inquired whether the Republican members of the Senate\nand House understood the basic problems involved in our Far Eastern policy.\nI told him that some did and some did not. I said that I had had a number\nof talks with Senator Vandenberg and believed he understood it fully, but\nthat I was"
}