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    "localId": "183391317",
    "label": "Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Ambassador of India Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Sir Girja Bajpai, and Others",
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    "title": "Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Ambassador of India Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Sir Girja Bajpai, and Others",
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{
    "seq": 2,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "CONT\n-2-\nor Pakistan might quickly create an explosive situation. I then referred to the\nfact that Prime Minister Nehru had recently expressed disappointment to our\nAmbassador in New Delhi because his talks in Washington had not resulted in a\nbetter American understanding of the Indian position with respect to the Kashmir\ndispute. I said that we believed we did understand the Indian position. Under-\nstanding, however, did not necessarily entail agreement; for example, I was sure\nthat the GOI understood our position with respect to the recognition of the Chinese\nCommunist regime but evidently did not agree with it. I went on to say that we had\nbeen following developments in New York with great concern as it seemed to us that\nthe trend was away from rather than toward a settlement. I asked Sir Girja for\nhis views.\nSir Girja agreed that no progress was being made in New York. He believed\nthat General McNaughton had done all he could, and that it was now necessary for\nthe Security Council to hear the parties and to decide upon the next step. India\nand Pakistan had reached irreconcilable positions on the two fundamental questions\nof the disarming and disbanding of the Azad forces and the disposition of the\nnorthern areas of the state. These could not be resolved within the framework of\nthe August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, resolutions of the UNCIP; a new approach\nwas required. A new approach was beyond the scope of General McNaughton's terms of\nreference from the Security Council. A single mediator, or a team of three, one\nchosen by each party and the third by the parties' appointees, with broad terms of\nreference for the overall solution of the problem should, therefore, be sent to\nthe subcontinent.\nSir Girja, speaking \"personally\" and \"without commitment\", then developed once\nagain the Indian suggestion of partition with a plebiscite limited to the Vale of\nKashmir, observing that the problem of demilitarization would be much simpler in\nthis\ncontext. He indicated that if the Azad forces were withdrawn \"into Pakistan\",\nit might be possible for Indian forces to leave the Vale before a plebiscite was\nheld. He did not think that there would be any serious problem of returning\nrefugees to the Vale in preparation for a plebiscite as relatively few of the\ninhabitants had fled. When asked whether it would not be possible for General\nMcNaughton\nto explore this avenue, Sir Girja reiterated that McNaughton had done\nall he could. He went on to say that it would not be possible, in any event, to\nmove quickly into this new avenue as the proposal could not be put forward by the\nSecurity Council, the U.S. or India, and Pakistan could not accept it, without\nadvance preparation of public opinion in the subcontinent.\nAs Sir Girja had mentioned the difficulties of incorporating the Azad areas\nin India, or Jammu in Pakistan, as the result of an over-all plebiscite, I asked\nhim why India and Pakistan had not taken these problems into consideration at t he\nearliers stage when both had agreed upon a plebiscite for the state as a whole. Sir\nGirja replied that it was his opinion that neither side had recognized the inherent\ndifficulties until both were committed to the over-all plebiscite.\nAt this point I was forced to close the interview in order to keep another\nappointment. I told Sir Girja that his exposition had been very helpful and that\nwe would give consideration to his views.\ns\nNEA: SOA: EGMathews:ajh\n1/10/50\nthe\nSERVICE\"\nand\nVicana"
}