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    "label": "Memorandum of Conversation Regarding the National Security Council Meeting",
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    "title": "Memorandum of Conversation Regarding the National Security Council Meeting",
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        "Dean Acheson Papers",
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{
    "seq": 5,
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECHL\n- 5 -\nSECRETARY ACHESON said we were much closer to the danger of general\nware He pointedout the need for understanding that there had always been\na Chinese Communist involvement in Korea. There had been a progressive\nuncloaking of the extent of this involvement until now there was a full-\nscale attack. Behind thi there was always the Soviet Union whi ch was a\nmore somber consideration. We must consider Korea not in isolation but\nin the world-wide problem of confronting the Soviet Union as an antagoniste\nThere were certain objectives to reach and dangers to avoid. He thought\nthe memorandum of the three secretaries and the comments by General Marshall\nwere very wise. Our political purpose must including going forward in the\nUN to uncloak the Chinese Communist aggression. He agreed entirely that\nwe would not, at this time, say the USSR is responsible because ,we could\nnot do anything about following such a charge against the Soviet Union\ndue to the attitude of our allies. It is clear, however, that we should\ncharge the Chinese Communists with aggressione We should see what\npressures we can put on the Chinese Communists to make life harder for\ntheme He agreed with the three secretaries that it was not advantageous\nto involve the use of the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa. He had been\nasked about this on the Hill todaye This question raised the problem of who\nwould take them to China and who would bring them back if they ran into\ntrouble.\nGenenal MacArthur has a new situation. We should be sure he understands\nhis directive. He seems to have thought he had to occupy the northeast part\nof Korea. Perhaps we should tell him that from the UN and US point of view\n)\nhe need not occupy that territorye We want to achieve a termination of this\ninvolvemento We can't defeat the Chinese in Korea; they can put in more\nthan we cano We should give very, very careful thought regarding hir action\nin Manchuria. If this is essential to save our troops, it must be donea\nIf we enter Manchuria it would be very hard to stop and very easy to extend\nthe conflict. If we were successful in Manchuria, the Russians would\nprobably enter to aid their Chinese ally without considering it war with\nuse We would get more deeply involvedo One imperative step is to find a\nline that we can hold and hold it. This would help meet the views of our\nallies and show them we are not aggressive and we await the next\nChinese Communist move. We should know what line MacArthur thinks he\ncan hold and we should press forward in the UN. We might consider the\nquestion of a zone in North Korea. We should not say that we must push,\nforward. We should hold the line and turn it over to the ROK as soon as we\nother\ncan. Outside of Korea we must press faster to build our strength. We\nthe\nmust liquidate the French objection to the development of the European\n/\nArmyo\nSECRETARY SNYDER referred to the ticker item that the French Cabinet\nhad just resigned.\nMRLo MATTHEWS\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652. Sec. 3(È) and >(D) or\nDept. of State letter, 3/18/27\nBr NLT- HC NARS Date 3-26-77\nTOP SEGRET"
}