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8-
which General Chenault had talked about the possibility of assisting
dissension on the mainiend. General Chenault had spoken particularly
of the Communist General commanding the forces on the mainland
opposite Formose who General Chensult thought was of doubtful
loyalty to the Communist and who had been under surveilance by the
Fourth Army which had now moved up into Manchuria.
The Senator thought that efforts along this line were the most
productive open to us. He went on to mention his fears that the defense
of Western Europe was impossible and said that General Collins in
answer to a question from the Senator along these lines at the last
meeting of the Committee had left the Benator with the impression
that the defense of Western Europe was possible only if everything
turned out exactly as we hoped, including efforts by our allies and
sufficient time being made available by the Russians. He thought
that it was unlikelythat this combination of events would occur and
was therefore worried that we were wasting our strength.
The Senator thought that in the Middle West isolationism was
growing. He stated that he did not agree with the isolationist point
of view and that he thought the people of the Middle West quickly lost
these views when trouble started. He said that the Middle West had
the highest record of (voluntary enlistments of any section of the
country during World Wars I and II.
I sald to the Senator that in thinking sbout the matters which he
had propounded it seemed to me we must always keep in mind who
our principal antagonista was. This was the Soviet Union and not
China. Thersfore it was important not only to incresse our own
military strength but do everything possible so that we would have
an ares from which our strength and that of others could be deployed
in case of necessity. This led to the importence of the British Isles,
Western Europe and certain areas in the Eastern Mediterrsnean. If
we did not make every effort to strengthen and hold these parte of the
world, then it seemed likely not only that we would have no platformirom which
to operate if we had to against the Soviet Union, but that we would turn
great potential strength to the other side. I said, in response to his
reference to the atomic bomb, that the usefulness of this wespon would
be minimized if the Russians were not required to concentrate and put
on a big effort in order to attack Western Europe. (The Senator, in
reply, tended to be pessimistic about the utility of the atomic bomb.)
TOP
So far
Page data
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Document data
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Context sent to Scholar
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"ocrText": "TOP-SECNET\n8-\nwhich General Chenault had talked about the possibility of assisting\ndissension on the mainiend. General Chenault had spoken particularly\nof the Communist General commanding the forces on the mainland\nopposite Formose who General Chensult thought was of doubtful\nloyalty to the Communist and who had been under surveilance by the\nFourth Army which had now moved up into Manchuria.\nThe Senator thought that efforts along this line were the most\nproductive open to us. He went on to mention his fears that the defense\nof Western Europe was impossible and said that General Collins in\nanswer to a question from the Senator along these lines at the last\nmeeting of the Committee had left the Benator with the impression\nthat the defense of Western Europe was possible only if everything\nturned out exactly as we hoped, including efforts by our allies and\nsufficient time being made available by the Russians. He thought\nthat it was unlikelythat this combination of events would occur and\nwas therefore worried that we were wasting our strength.\nThe Senator thought that in the Middle West isolationism was\ngrowing. He stated that he did not agree with the isolationist point\nof view and that he thought the people of the Middle West quickly lost\nthese views when trouble started. He said that the Middle West had\nthe highest record of (voluntary enlistments of any section of the\ncountry during World Wars I and II.\nI sald to the Senator that in thinking sbout the matters which he\nhad propounded it seemed to me we must always keep in mind who\nour principal antagonista was. This was the Soviet Union and not\nChina. Thersfore it was important not only to incresse our own\nmilitary strength but do everything possible so that we would have\nan ares from which our strength and that of others could be deployed\nin case of necessity. This led to the importence of the British Isles,\nWestern Europe and certain areas in the Eastern Mediterrsnean. If\nwe did not make every effort to strengthen and hold these parte of the\nworld, then it seemed likely not only that we would have no platformirom which\nto operate if we had to against the Soviet Union, but that we would turn\ngreat potential strength to the other side. I said, in response to his\nreference to the atomic bomb, that the usefulness of this wespon would\nbe minimized if the Russians were not required to concentrate and put\non a big effort in order to attack Western Europe. (The Senator, in\nreply, tended to be pessimistic about the utility of the atomic bomb.)\nTOP\nSo far"
}