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{
    "localId": "193223521",
    "label": "Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Prime Minister of Belgium Joseph Pholien, Ambassador of Belgium Robert Silvercruys, United States Ambassador to Belgium Robert Murphy, George W. Perkins, and Robert Winfree",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Prime Minister of Belgium Joseph Pholien, Ambassador of Belgium Robert Silvercruys, United States Ambassador to Belgium Robert Murphy, George W. Perkins, and Robert Winfree",
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    "ocrText": "-2-\nARCHIVES 'NATIONAL RECORDS AND\nThe Belgian Prime Minister then said that his country would be\nfaithful to all of its NATO and Brussels Pact engagements. He asked,\nhowever, if it would be possible for us to consult with the other NATO\nnations before taking really decisive steps such as crossing the 38th\nparallel or dropping the atom bomb. I replied that he had raised very\ndelicate questions which most certainly should not be discussed at any\ntime with the press. While we desired to consult with our NATO part-\nners on any moves which we might make, if the security of the United\nStates was threatened, the President might have to act promptly with-\nout consultation. The Prime Minister replied that the decisions of\nthe United States Government would have a direct influence on the\nworld situation. If the decisions we were called upon to make would\ndecide whether or not there would be war or peace, would we consult\nwith the NATO nations? I said that it was very hard to reply to this\nquestion. We might have to make immediate decisions. I pointed out\nthat in the last two wars when Germany had attacked we came into the\nconflict sometime later, after we had had time to build up our defense\nproduction. If war came again, it was likely (possible) that an\naggressor would not take the same course and would try to destroy our\nproductive power first. If such were the case, we must act immediately.\nI asked the Prime Minister to recall what we had been doing in\nKorea; that we had made no unilateral decisions but had kept all\ninterested powers fully informed and had discussed every proposed\nstep before we took it. We had actually had restrictions placed upon\nus by the United Nations. As the Prime Minister knew, we had thought\nit would be wise to have the President make a public statement regard-\ning our intentions in China, emphasizing that we sought only peace and\nhad no desires of conquest. This statement had been cleared with the\ninterested powers, but, unfortunately, General NacArthur had issued\na statement which served only to confuse the situation.\nI then spoke about Germany emphasizing that although we thought\nWestern Germany should be brought into the European community, we\nhad consulted with our NATO partners on every German issue and had\nactually turned over the leadership on German questions to other\nEuropean nations. We had no desire to take any step involving\nGermany without the full understanding and agreement of other\nEuropean nations.\nI added that the same was true of Japan. At the moment there\nwas no predominant power in the Pacific, but there could be no doubt\nbut\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nDept. of State letter, 5-62-25\nBy NLT- He NARS Date 6-24-76"
}